Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in Moral Frameworks
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- Non-Human Animals Should Be Accorded Equal Consideration in Moral Frameworks
- Infliction of Pain Suffering on Animals Immoral
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in Moral FrameworksMULTIPLE ARGUMENTS FAVOR EXTENDING MORAL CONSIDERATION TO ANIMALS Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 52 Regan argues that it is morally wrong to regard animals as nothing more than receptacles for intrinsic value that lack any value of their own. Animals have inherent value apart and it is inappropriate to treat them solely as the means to the end of value maximization. Regan claims that evolutionary theory, common sense, and ordinary language all point to the possession of consciousness—indeed, of a complex mental life—by nonhuman animals. Normal mammals aged one year or more (human and nonhuman) share mind states such as perception, memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness, a sense of the future intention, emotion sentience. Human and nonhuman animals possess equal inherent value precisely because they share a crucial similarity; almost every mammal—human or nonhuman—is the subject of a life that is meaningful to that being, irrespective of the value of that being to anyone else. The basic moral right possessed by all moral agents and patients is the right to respectful treatment. This right is based on the respect principle, which precludes treating the rightholder merely as a means to an end. Rather, the rightholder must be treated in a manner consistent with the recognition that she possesses an inherent value that is the same as any other holder of such right. Inherent value and respect support the harm principle, which holds that we have a prima facie duty not to harm individuals and we owe this duty directly to the beneficiaries of the duty. Although the harm principle imposes a prima facie and not absolute obligation, we need valid moral reasons to override the obligation and cannot do so simply by appeal to consequences, as is the case with animal welfare. Non-Human Animals Should Be Accorded Equal Consideration in Moral FrameworksNON-HUMAN ANIMALS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PERSONS Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 270 “Person” has both a descriptive and an evaluative meaning. In the evaluative sense of the term, “person” refers to beings whose interests are morally or legally protected against routine exploitation by those whose actions can be directly influenced by moral or legal concepts. Persons are those whom morality or the law indicates we, as moral or legal agents, must treat fairly: must not, as Kant would say, treat as a mere means to the satisfaction of our interests. I think –and have argued at length for this conclusion elsewhere – that we should regard beings with interests (i.e. all beings with feelings) as persons in this evaluative sense of the term. That is, I think we should treat all beings with interests fairly, regarding none of them as mere means to the satisfaction of our interests. That is what animal liberation is all about. Very briefly, the argument for this conclusion runs as follows. Morality is goal-directed activity which aims at making the world a better place in terms of reduced suffering and frustration, increased happiness and fulfillment, a wider reign of fairness and respect for others, and enhanced presence and effectiveness of such virtues as kindness and impartiality. Through our exploitation of nonhuman animals we detract from all of these moral goals. Factory farming, fur trapping and other exploitations of nonhuman animals increase the suffering and frustration in the world and reduce happiness and fulfillment—the exact opposite of our moral goals. In using our vast power over nonhuman animals to make them bear burdens and suffer losses so that we may be comfortable and prosperous, we extend and enforce a reign of tyranny and disregard, verging on contempt, for others – again, the exact opposite of our moral goals. Finally, by giving revulsion at and compassion for the suffering of nonhuman animals the demeaning labels of “squeamishness” and “sentimentality” and by conditioning children to disregard such feelings as they learn to hunt, butcher or vivisect nonhuman animals, we limit and inhibit the virtues of which we are capable—again, just the opposite of our moral goals. Consequently, in all these ways our goal of making the world a morally better place will be more effectively pursued by liberating from human exploitation all those capable of suffering and happiness and of being treated fairly and virtuously. Infliction of Pain & Suffering on Animals ImmoralINTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF SUFFERING ON SENTIENT BEINGS IS IMMORAL Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 112 Consider the following example. Simon proposes to torture a dog by burning the dog with a blowtorch. Simon’ only reason for torturing the dog is that he derives pleasure from this sort of activity. Does Simon’s proposal raises any moral concern? Is Simon violating some moral obligation not to use the animal in this way for his amusement? Or is Simon’s action morally no different from crushing and eating a walnut? I think most of us would not hesitate to maintain that blowtorching the dog simply for the pleasure of it is not a morally justifiable way to act under any circumstances. What is the basis of our moral judgment? Is it merely that we are concerned about the effect of Simon’s action on other humans? Do we object to the torture of the dog merely because by torturing the dog Simon may become a more callous or unkind person in his dealings with other humans? We may very well rest our moral objection to Simon’s action in part on our concern for the effect of his action on other humans, but that is not our primary reason for objecting. After all, we would condemn the act even if Simon tortures the animal in secret, or even if, apart from his appetite for torturing dogs, Simon is a charming fellow who shows only kindness to other humans. Suppose that the dog is the companion animal of Simon’s neighbor Jane. Do we object to the torture because the dog is Jane’s property? We may very well object to Simon’s action because the dog belongs to Jane, but again, that is not our first concern. We would find Simon’s action objectionable even if the dog were a stray.
James Rachels, Professor of Philosophy-University of Alabama, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 170 We could spin these observations into a theory of moral standing that would compete with the other theories. Our theory would start like this: There is no such thing as moral standing simpliciter. Rather, moral standing is always oral standing with respect to some particular mode of treatment. A sentient being has moral standing with respect to not being tortured. A self-conscious being has moral standing with respect to not being humiliated. An autonomous being has moral standing with respect to not being coerced. And so on. If asked, toward whom is it appropriate to direct fundamental moral considerations? we could reply: It is appropriate to direct moral consideration to any individual who has any of the indefinitely long list of characteristics that constitute morally good reasons why he or she should not be treated in any of the various ways in which individuals may be treated. You may think this isn’t a very appealing theory. It is tedious; it lacks the crispness of the other theories; it doesn’t yield quick and easy answers to practical questions; and worse, it isn’t exciting. But it is the truth about moral standing. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
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