Platform economics and electricity markets



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Platform economics and electricity markets



Claire Weiller, University of Cambridge Engineering Department, Phone: +447980206166, Email: cw451@cam.ac.uk

Michael Pollitt, University of Cambridge Judge Business School, Email: m.pollitt@jbs.cam.ac.uk


Overview


Current structural transitions in the electric power industry introduce new actors and new roles for existing actors that may give way to the development of one or multiple “platform” markets, i.e. multi-sided markets where an intermediary captures the value of the interaction between user groups. The emergence of platform markets is often accompanied by a shift from transaction-based marginal cost pricing to fee-based services. Examples of platform markets include telecommunications, data storage, cinema, music and media, and the automobile industry. Why not electricity?
In this paper, we explore the relevance of the platform, two-sided market concept for the electricity supply industry and the consequences for pricing. Two cases are analysed: a balancing services provider for smart home energy management systems and an electric vehicle charge manager. A platform entrant could position itself in the retail electricity markets between supply companies and end-users. The drivers of a transition to energy service platforms include increased volatility due to renewable generation, the new complexity of roles for end-users, and the introduction of information and communication technologies that collect highly granular behaviour and demand data from residential consumers. Electricity platform markets where new entrants provide an energy optimisation and management service could stimulate competitive ecosystems and innovation. It is suggested that fee-based pricing would enable the objectives of time-varying pricing to be achieved without adversely affecting the most vulnerable customers.

Methods


Economic model and qualitative case analysis

Results


Two cases are presented, domestic balancing services and electric vehicle charging management. An electricity platform essentially provides an an optimisation service based on information intermediation that benefits both sides of the market – consumers and distribution system operators – and can therefore capture revenue from both sides of the market.
The entry of platform mediators in electricity retail markets has implications for market structure and competitive dynamics. We discuss the implications of the transition to platform markets for pricing strategies, including the decision by the platform provider to subsidise one user groupside of the market to gain market share. In addition, the transition to selling electricity through a platform is expected to change pricing structures from transaction-based to subscription fee-based, with the platform absorbing the volatility of time-of-use pricing. Other implications of platforms in electricity markets are increased innovation and differentiation of consumers in terms of their value as resources and preferences. Households that are more sensitive to price changes and are willing to give up more control to the platform company to shift, interrupt, or reduce their energy consumption, have higher value in the system.

Conclusions


First, the entry of platform service providers has the effect of shielding consumers from the unintended consequences of smart metering and real-time pricing on consumers who do not have the capabilities to manage their energy demand.

Second, while the platform service could be provided by incumbent utilities and electricity suppliers, the value of the service justifies the entry of third party entrants distinct from existing players. These new entrants will have the additional benefits of stimulating innovation and new capital investment in the sector.




Selected references


(Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Eisenmann, Parker, & Alstyne, 2006; Faruqui, 2010; Hagiu, 2009; Moser & Nicholas, 2004; Silva, Stanojevic, Aunedi, Pudjianto, & Strbac, 2011)

Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003). Chicken & egg: Competition among intermediation service providers. RAND journal of Economics, 34(2), 309–328.

Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., & Alstyne, M. Van. (2006). Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard business review, 92–101.

Faruqui, A. (2010). The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing. The Electricity Journal, 23(6), 13–27. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2010.05.013

Hagiu, A. (2009). Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 18(4), 1011–1043.

Moser, P., & Nicholas, T. (2004). Was electricity a general purpose technology? Evidence from historical patent citations. The American Economic Review, 94(2), 388–394.



Silva, V., Stanojevic, V., Aunedi, M., Pudjianto, D., & Strbac, G. (2011). Smart domestic appliances as enabling technology for demand-side integration: Modelling, value and drivers. In T. Jamasb & M. G. Pollitt (Eds.), The Future of Electricity Demand: Customers, Citizens and Loads. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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