Pressure Counterplan 1NC Text The United States federal government should increase its economic/diplomatic pressure on the People’s Republic of China to [insert affirmative mandate]. Solvency Pressure solves the aff – a tough stance on China on every issue is necessary
AFP 2016
Associated Foreign Press, “G7 needs ‘clear and tough stance’ on territorial disputes: Tusk,” May 26, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3610121/G7-needs-clear-tough-stance-territorial-disputes-Tusk.html
The Group of Seven needs to take a "clear and tough stance" on China's controversial maritime claims and the Russian annexation of Crimea, European Council President Donald Tusk said Thursday. Speaking on the sidelines of a G7 summit in Japan, Tusk warned that the credibility of the club of rich nations was on the line. "The test of our credibility at the G7 is our ability to defend the common values that we share," he told reporters. "This test will only pass if we take a clear and tough stance on every topic of our discussions here... I refer in particular to the issue of maritime security and the South and East China Seas and (the) Russia-Ukraine issue." Tusk added: "If we are to defend our common values it is not enough these days to only believe in them. We also have to be ready to protect them." Beijing has angered some of its Southeast Asian neighbours, including the Philippines and Vietnam, by claiming almost all of the South China Sea. Beijing is also locked in a dispute with Japan over rocky outcroppings in the East China Sea, stoking broader concerns about China's growing regional might and threats to back up its claims with force, if necessary. "The policy of the G7 is clear: any maritime or territorial claim should be based on international law and any territorial dispute should be resolved by peaceful means," Tusk said. "Unilateral action and the use of force or coercion will not be accepted." Russia and Ukraine have been locked in a bitter feud since Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014 and was then accused of fuelling a bloody separatist uprising in the east of the country. The crisis has pushed ties between Russia and the West to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, and drawn sanctions against Moscow. "The European Union and the entire G7 continue to believe that this crisis can only be resolved in full compliance with... international law, especially the legal obligation to respect Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence," Tusk said. Progress on the Minsk peace accords, designed to resolve the crisis, is slow, Tusk added. "I want to state clearly that our stance vis-a-vis Russia, including economic sanctions, will remain unchanged as long as the Minsk agreements are not fully implemented," he said. "Unfortunately there is much less progress on the implementation of Minsk than we had hoped for one year ago."
Net Benefit Japan Re-Arm Japan’s confident in our assurances now, but is closely monitoring our foreign policy to determine security reliance---China’s key
Einhorn 2015 [Robert, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and is the former special advisor to Secretary of State Clinton for nonproliferation and arms control, M.A. in public affairs and international relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, 5/1/15, “Ukraine, Security Assurances, and Nonproliferation”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 1, pp. 47-72]//SC
Japan and South Korea Among the states often considered potential candidates to join the nuclear club are Japan and the Republic of Korea. Both clearly have the technical skills, infrastructure, and economic resources to produce nuclear weapons. Both face growing military threats from neighboring countries that possess nuclear weapons. And both have entertained the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons in the past.38 But the Ukraine case will not materially affect prospects for either country to reconsider its nonnuclear status in the future. Instead, they will be affected primarily by factors much more directly relevant to the two countries’ own security situations—the evolution of regional military threats, the state of their bilateral relations with potential regional adversaries, the development of their own conventional military capabilities, and the perceived reliability of the U.S. alliance commitment to their security. Japan is concerned by China’s military modernization efforts and its greater regional assertiveness, especially Beijing’s claim to what Tokyo regards as the Japanese Senkaku Islands. It is also concerned by North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities as well as by the continuing bilateral tensions with both North Korea and China over historical grievances. But at the present time, there is little reason to believe that these concerns will lead to a Japanese interest in pursuing nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Abe’s determination to strengthen Japan’s self-defense capabilities as well as his government’s reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution to permit collective defense efforts have increased confidence within Japan regarding its ability to address regional security threats. Moreover, the perception in some parts of the world that the United States may be pulling back from its global responsibilities does not seem to have shaken Japanese confidence in the U.S. security guarantee. In addition to continuing to station sizable military forces in Japan, the United States has taken a variety of steps to reinforce the credibility of the mutual defense relationship including support for Abe’s defense policies, close cooperation on missile defenses, a challenge to China’s unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone, and President Obama’s April 2014 public assertion that U.S. obligations under the U.S.– Japan mutual defense treaty cover all territories under the administration of Japan, including the disputed Senkaku Islands.39 Moreover, while members of Japan’s national security establishment have from time to time privately debated whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, the Japanese public remains firmly opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapon state.40 The South Korean public is much more comfortable with the idea of Seoul possessing nuclear weapons,41 and some ROK politicians have openly advocated the return of U.S. tactical weapons to South Korean territory and even consideration of the possibility of the ROK producing its own nuclear weapons.42 But ROK officials continue to reject the nuclear option. While some South Korean observers have voiced concerns about U.S. willingness to continue meeting its overseas commitments, senior officials and military officers seem well satisfied with current bilateral defense cooperation, including stepped-up preparations for countering possible North Korean provocations, continued robust joint military exercises despite protests from Pyongyang, and the U.S. decision—in light of the continuing North Korean threat—to honor the ROK request to once again defer the transfer of operational control over South Korean forces in wartime from U.S. to South Korean commanders. Japan and South Korea will both follow the crisis in Ukraine closely and will be attentive to any U.S. actions that might provide clues about Washington’s readiness to meet its security commitments to them. But both governments understand the difference between U.S. responsibilities toward Ukraine and U.S. security guarantees to its allies. They will find U.S. responsiveness to the concerns of its NATO allies more relevant to their security than U.S. actions vis-a`-vis Ukraine. However, far and away the most relevant indications of U.S. reliability will not be U.S. actions on the other side of the world, but U.S. actions directly in support of bilateral security commitments to them. And at least at the present time, Japanese and South Korean perceptions of the reliability of U.S. security guarantees do not seem to have given them grounds for altering their non-nuclear status.
Maintaining Japanese confidence is critical to prevent an allied arms racing
Lind 2016 [“Keep, Toss, or Fix? Assessing US Alliances in East Asia” by Jennifer Lind – Associate Prof of Government at Dartmouth, Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, Pub: 2016, Acc: 4/20/2016, The Tobin Project, Oxford University Press, http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Lind%20-%20Keep,%20Toss,%20or%20Fix.pdf]//SC
Critics of the current US grand strategy identify “buck-passing” as one of its costs. Indeed, current US national security policy has encouraged buck-passing among friendly and potentially militarily powerful countries. As Barry Posen writes, America’s Cold War alliances “have provided US partners in Europe and Asia with such a high level of insurance that they have been able to steadily shrink their militaries and outsource their defense to Washington.” Since the end of the Cold War, European countries that previously contributed to balancing against the Soviet Union now collectively spend only 1.6 percent of the GDP on defense—lower than either the United States or the global average in defense spending.120 Similarly, Tokyo (during and since the Cold War) has pursued a low level of defense spending for a great power—less than one percent of its GDP. Japan’s high GDP means that this is a nontrivial sum, so even with this low level of effort, Japan developed a capable maritime military force.121 However Japan’s level of defense effort, and its regional and global leadership, could be far greater. Critics of US grand strategy argue that an important negative effect of the US commitment to Japan is that it has led one of the most potentially powerful countries in the world, a wealthy liberal democracy friendly to the United States, to act as a secondary diplomatic and military power. Importantly, Japanese buck-passing is not an unfortunate cost of the current grand strategy: it is a goal of the current grand strategy. Allied buck-passing means that countries are not balancing against the preponderance of American power. Furthermore, allied buck-passing means that countries in key regions are not building up independent capabilities that could trigger security dilemma dynamics. As discussed earlier, the prevention of arms racing is an explicit US national security goal. Therefore, far from being a cost of the current grand strategy, allied buck-passing is the manifestation of its goals being achieved.
That triggers global nuclear war
Cimbala 2014 [Stephen J. Cimbala, professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, “Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects”, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March 2014]//SC
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling” without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch, by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.
Share with your friends: |
