Confidence-building measures fail -- increases the risk of preemption and conflict.
Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)
Blair and his colleagues argue that such a vicious cycle need not arise. "A lower level of launch readiness" flanked by "much deeper cuts," they write, would make for "uncertainty and incomplete knowledge" and so render policymakers risk averse in a crisis. Uncertainty mightwell instill caution. But it could just as well breed the opposite. Which nation has ever started a war on the basis of certainty about its own and its enemy's capabilities, actual and potential? Would Germany and Japan have taken on the Soviet Union and the United States if they had known in1941 what these unready giants would throw back at them from 1942 to 1945? What stops the would-be aggressor is the certainty of unacceptable damage, even if it follows a sudden first strike. Preemption, the worst enemy of stability, might actually be easier in a world filled with confidence-building measures, as Schelling has pointed out. Today's retaliatory forces are hardened or hidden under the sea. Now think of a world replete with circuit breakers-with missiles in one place, warheads in another. Instead of having to take out hardened silos or elusive submarines, a state could resort to simpler means of preemption, attacking or sabotaging the logistical chain between its enemy's launchers and its warheads or the storage sites where its weapons are kept. One of the oldest paradoxes of the nuclear age is that loaded and ready weapons induce caution while also carrying risks. Forty years of arms control have managed to preserve the caution while reducing the risks through innumerable fail-safe devices. Trading the residual risks for a return to vicious cycles of suspicion, fear, and possible preemption does not seem like a good bargain.
Opacity Bad – Stability
Proliferation won’t be stable under opacity.
Roberts ’96 (Brad, Ed. Washington Quarterly and Research Fellow – CSIS, “Weapons Proliferation and World Order: After the Cold War”, p. 208-209)
In interstate relations in which nuclear weapons are an open and accepted fact, perceptions of the opponent are likely to be relatively clear, which will contribute to stability in times of crisis. But in relations dominated by opaque patterns of nuclearization, perceptions will be less clear, which may well aggravate instability in times of crisis. The very opacity of the proliferation process complicates the task of clearly understanding stakes, risks, and consequences. The salience of the risks associated with uncertainties in opaque circumstances will depend significantly on the propensity of leaders to run those risks; as discussed in chapter 3, risk-taking is a marked propensity among regimes that find the status quo untenable. In the case of Israel, for example, opacity operates not so much to create doubts about the existence of an Israeli nuclear option but about the stage in a military crisis when it might be threatened or used, with a result that leaders of opposing states might miscalculate that threshold. In the case of South Asia, opacity leaves doubts about the degree to which either Pakistan or India might have secure retaliatory capabilities, and thus it may contribute to a decision to strike first in time of near war in order to avoid a devastating first strike.
Opacity Good – Stability
Opaque prolif solves stability
[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]
Factors relating to behavior in the international community help to both keep arsenals small and to keep them opaque. As discussed, Third World states are limited by their resources when it comes to weapons development and buildup.They cannot buildup numbers of weapons quickly, which increases the chances that they will not buildup large numbers of weapons at all. Thus, policies that force developing states to rely on their own resources while developing nuclear weapons capability--or otherwise serve to lengthen the timeline of nuclear development-are valuable policies.Current restrictions oninternational trafficking in weapons-useable material should be maintained or strengthened. International inspection regimes that aim to prevent the diversion of weapons fuel from commercial reactors can be a good way to restrict and slow growth in weapons Fuel stockpiles even frame diversion does actually occur. Opacity creates stable nuclear prolif -- no hardliners
[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 97]
Second, by obscuring the existence of nuclear weapons,opacity also robs hardliners within adversarial states of a potential causes belli. If one's enemy starts building nuclear bombs, it could generate a sense of threat within one's state. Hardliners within an enemy state could seize on the development of nuclear weapons within a proliferating state, seeking to parlay the sense of threat into political power and reactionary, aggressive policies. Opacity robs hardliners of obvious evidence of nuclear weapons construction, thereby weakening their hand. Further, a policy of opacitymay indicate that the proliferating state is exercising restraint. helping to limit the threat generated by nuclear development _ That is, while it may be known that the opaque state could construct nuclear weapons and target the enemy state, opacity suggests that it might not necessarily be so, or that the opaque state is at least willing to curb its nuclear weapons development in some fashion. Leaders in the enemy state may be reassured by such behavior. Also, they may not want to tempt the proliferator to lose that restraint. and if those in control are moderate. they may welcome the proliferator`s opacity as a means of taming hardliners