Public Health Engagement Aff Notes



Download 1.1 Mb.
Page3/22
Date23.04.2018
Size1.1 Mb.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   22

1AC Soft Power Advantage

U.S. soft power needs help now but not yet collapsing


Gasana '15 (Parfait Gasana, assistant director of the Center for Peace, Democracy, and Development at the University of Massachusetts Boston's McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies, co-founder and board president of the Kigali Reading Center, "The Decline of America’s Soft Power", CPDD, December 24, blogs.umb.edu/paxblog/2015/12/24/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power/, CL)

Joseph Nye, distinguished professor of service and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, famously said the following: “Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcome you want” (Nye). In a world that is experiencing a spike in terrorist activities with spectacular displays of cruelty, soft power is politically harder to sustain but even more essential for effective governance. For the U.S., recent rhetoric on the campaign trail (Donald Trump suggested that all Muslims be banned from entering the U.S., or Ted Cruz who suggested that they carpet bomb areas that pose a threat to the U.S.) threaten more than just America’s loss of leadership in rallying the world in the fight against terrorism. Politics like this will alienate Arab countries; without whom the war on terror is already lost. There is no doubt that America maintains an edge over all other countries in the world in terms of military might. The U.S. Defense budget is estimated at $585.2 Billion for fiscal year 2016, while that of Russia is estimated to be at $50 Billion in 2016. However, American leadership is only effective when the U.S. successfully deploys both military and diplomatic tools at its disposal. Failure to strategically deploy these tools undermines U.S leadership and prevents it from building bridges of trust. This is even more important after America’s military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and other Muslim countries. The toxic and inflammatory rhetoric seen recently on the campaign trail threatens America’s ability to gain a diplomatic upper hand. The U.S. should be doing more to boost its public diplomacy efforts, not undermine them. This is important because as Nye states, “soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics” (Nye). With more than 9000 air strikes in Syria and Iraq since the campaign against ISIL begun, coupled with ISIL’s ability to still recruit, gain sympathizers in Western capitals, loosing the public diplomacy battle is a strategic blunder that should not be allowed to happen. Yet, this is exactly what the crop of republican candidates have offered in their language on the fight against terrorism. One of the central components of soft power, according to Nye, is its foreign policy (Nye). America’s foreign policy as it currently stands has indisputably challenged its diplomatic leverage. In many countries, the U.S. has lost its “legitimate… moral authority” (Nye). Perceptions matter and how one is perceived can be the deciding factor in politics. Those who witnessed the debate between Kennedy and Nixon would remember his perspiring face next to the calm and well-controlled Kennedy. Kennedy was perceived by many to be ready and charismatic, while Nixon looked uncomfortable and unprepared. With the rising threat of lone wolves, the ability of non-state actors including terrorists groups to use social media to recruit in the West, how can the U.S. build its soft power to counter the message of hate and terror? The divisive rhetoric and at times outright racist comments made by some republican candidates for the White House can only contribute to a decline in America’s soft power, and, by extension, a less safe world. It would be wise for the likes of Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Carly Fiorina, and others to think beyond the primaries, and even the general election to what kind of a world they would face on day one after taking office should they be elected. Would it be a world ready to welcome and partner with the new U.S leadership, or one that sees the U.S as seeking to antagonize them? The complexity of current global governance issues require consensus building, and the broadening of coalitions as the Paris Climate talks demonstrated. As we push deep into the 21st century, successful leaders are going to be those who can appreciate international trends such as the increasing power of social media and non-state actors, and the challenges these pose to traditional governing bodies. In such a world, a wise leader would pay just as much attention to the power and effectiveness of public diplomacy, as they would that of military capabilities.

U.S. soft power key to solve multiple scenarios for extinction


Hamre ‘07 (John Hamre, specialist in international studies, a former Washington government official and President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Restoring America’s Inspirational Leadership.” Forward, CSIS Commission on Smart Power, Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf, CL)

There is a moment of opportunity today for our political leaders to strike off on a big idea that balances a wiser internationalism with the desire for protection at home. Washington may be increasingly divided, but Americans are unified in wanting to improve their country’s image in the world and their own potential for good. We see the same hunger in other countries for a more balanced American approach and revitalized American interest in a broader range of issues than just terrorism. And we hear everywhere that any serious problem in the world demands U.S. involvement. Of course, we all know the challenges before us. The center of gravity in world affairs is shifting to Asia. The threat America faces from nuclear proliferation, terrorist organizations with global reach, and weak and reckless states cannot be easily contained and is unlikely to diminish in our lifetime. As the only global superpower, we must manage multiple crises simultaneously while regional competitors can focus their attention and efforts. A globalized world means that vectors of prosperity can quickly become vectors of insecurity. These challenges put a premium on strengthening capable states, alliances, partnerships, and institutions. In this complex and dynamic world of changing demands, we greatly benefit from having help in managing problems. But we can no longer afford to see the world through only a state’s narrow perspective. Statehood can be a fiction that hides dangers lurking beneath. We need new strategies that allow us to contend with non-state actors and new capabilities to address faceless threats—like energy insecurity, global financial instability, climate change, pandemic disease—that know no borders. We need methods and institutions that can adapt to new sources of power and grievance almost certain to arise. Military power is typically the bedrock of a nation’s power. It is understandable that during a time of war we place primary emphasis on military might. But we have learned during the past five years that this is an inadequate basis for sustaining American power over time. America’s power draws just as much from the size of its population and the strength of its economy as from the vitality of our civic culture and the excellence of our ideas. These other attributes of power become the more important dimensions. A year ago, we approached two of our trustees—Joe Nye and Rich Armitage—to chair a CSIS Commission on Smart Power, with the goal of issuing a report one year before the 2008 elections. We imposed the deadline for two reasons. First, we still have a year with the Bush presidency wherein these important initiatives can be furthered. Second, looking ahead to the next presidency, we sought to place before candidates of both parties a set of ideas that would strengthen America’s international standing. This excellent commission has combined that essential American attribute—outlining a truly big idea and identifying practical, tangible actions that would help implement the idea. How does America become the welcomed world leader for a constructive international agenda for the twenty-first century? How do we restore the full spectrum of our national power? How do we become a smart power? This report identifies a series of specific actions we recommend to set us on that path. CSIS’s strength has always been its deep roots in Washington’s defense and security establishment. The nature of security today is that we need to conceive of it more broadly than at any time before. As the commission’s report rightly states, “Today’s central question is not simply whether we are capturing or killing more terrorists than are being recruited and trained, but whether we are providing more opportunities than our enemies can destroy and whether we are addressing more grievances than they can record.” There is nothing weak about this approach. It is pragmatic, optimistic, and quite frankly, American. We were twice victims on 9/11. Initially we were victimized by the terrorists who flew airplanes into buildings and killed American citizens and foreigners resident in this country. But we victimized ourselves the second time by losing our national confidence and optimism. The values inherent in our Constitution, educational institutions, economic system, and role as respected leader on the world stage are too widely admired for emerging leaders abroad to turn away for good. By becoming a smarter power, we could bring them back sooner. What is required, though, is not only leadership that will keep Americans safe from another attack, but leadership that can communicate to Americans and the world that the safety and prosperity of others matters to the United States. The Commission on Smart Power members have spoken to such a confident, inspiring, and practical vision. I am sure they will not be the last.

Public health diplomacy has become an important driver for soft power


Brown et al. 13 (Matthew Brown, Bryan A. Liang, Braden Hale, and Thomas Novotny, Senior Advisor at Office of Global Affairs, US Department of Health and Human Services - ‎US Department of Health and Human Services, “China's Role in Global Health Diplomacy: Designing Expanded U.S. Partnership for Health System Strengthening in Africa”, Global Health Governance, Volume 6, No. 2, CL)

First, it is important to understand how geopolitical relations among nations now involve critical multi-sectoral actions in health and foreign policy. This may be thought of as ‘global health diplomacy’. Global health diplomacy, as characterized by Adams and Novotny in 2007, refers to “tools of diplomats and statecraft [that] can be employed for the dual purposes of improving health and relations among nations.”28 Jones later described this concept as a useful perspective for diplomats in the U.S. Department of State,29 and by Fidler who suggested that mapping relations among state and international actors can help identify areas of shared interest and assist in forming plans for collective action in global public health.30 The July 2012 U.S. Department of State (DOS) announcement of the formation of an S/GHD, at the same time announcing the closure of the coordinating office for President Obama’s Global Health Initiative (GHI), launched in May 2009, illustrates the importance the U.S. government places on this perspective.31 According to the announcement, the new S/GHD will champion the original GHI principles, programs, and interagency coordination activities, but will focus this health activity within the diplomatic sector.32 While the office has yet to publish a plan of action, it has identified priorities and actions, and its establishment in the DOS under Ambassador Eric Goosby (Global AIDS Coordinator) is unique and notable. Diplomats represent the policy interests of their government to other foreign governments and multi-national organizations and have not traditionally been given a mandate to address public health issues. According to requirements set forth in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the cornerstone of modern international relations guiding diplomatic interaction among the 193 member states of the United Nations (UN),33 the United States regularly publishes a list of accredited foreign diplomats (the ‘Diplomatic List’).34 A review of the Diplomatic List for Winter 2012 shows that only seven of the more than 180 countries accredited to the United States have diplomats with the word “health” in their title.35 No other country has established an entity similar to the S/GHD which will, according to its founding principles, champion global health in the diplomatic arena.36 The establishment of S/GHD itself presents new opportunities in strategic health cooperation among donor nations.


Pandemic control is the cornerstone for diplomacy and is the most effective starting point


Long ’11 (William Long, Professor and Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs Georgia Institute of Technology, “Pandemics and Peace: Public Health Cooperation in Zones of Conflict", published June 2011, CL)

As noted, the fight against infectious disease spread occurs on many levels: global, pan-regional, subregional, and national and these initiatives are interdependent. Chapter 2 introduces the global and pan-regional frameworks for fighting infectious disease and analyzes in-depth the working of three intriguing subregional infectious disease control networks. National policies are also critical in infectious disease control and, as discussed at length in chapter 5, no nation is more important than the United States in this respect. The United States, as a leader in both medical and information technology, is well situated to strengthen public health systems abroad and indirectly support regional health cooperation as a peaceful and positive dimension of its global health diplomacy and a frontline defense of its own population from the threat of infectious diseases, outbreaks of which typically begin in the developing world. Beyond terrorism, disease surveillance and response provides the United States an opportunity to address a critical national and transnational problem. Indeed, because it is largely apolitical and nonreligious, combating pandemics, more than counterterrorism, may offer a basis on which to build better bilateral relations and lay a foundation for regional cooperation. The U.S. government could, by helping prevent the political and social discord and the personal suffering wrought by pandemic disease, win the good will of both foreign governments and peoples. To date, some domestic actors—notably the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—have participated indirectly in support of some of these subregional networks by their assistance to infectious disease surveillance and response capacity abroad. Chapter 5 analyses in detail the programs of the U.S. government explicitly designed to bolster foreign capacity in infectious disease control within the larger context of America's global health diplomacy. It asks whether the policies and the institutional arrangements of the U.S. government are enough to fully meet the challenge that infectious disease spread poses to national and international security and whether the United States is doing all it should to maximize the potential diplomatic benefits to be had from its policies.

Public health cooperation can spillover to sociopolitical cooperation in a multiplicity of other global issues—solves terrorism, environmental challenges, resource scarcity, human rights, and economic stability


Pierannunzi and Sturma '11 (Meg Pierannunzi and Allison Sturma, writers and primary contacts at the USIP, "Global Health Diplomacy Can Foster International Cooperation", United States Institute of Peace, June 1, www.usip.org/publications/global-health-diplomacy-can-foster-international-cooperation, CL)

(Washington) – The United States Institute of Peace releases Pandemics and Peace: Public Health Cooperation in Zones of Conflict, a new study revealing lessons in infectious disease control and international health cooperation. Identifying infectious disease as a first-order problem affecting the security and welfare of the international system, author William J. Long explores the extent to which public health cooperation can lead to new and improved forms of transnational political cooperation in a host of important areas, such as counterterrorism, environmental challenges, resource management, human rights protection, and economic assistance. Long focuses on three unexpected cases of cooperation to prevent such diseases as bird flu and swine flu among countries with historic or present antipathies and in resource-constrained environments: the Mekong Basin, Middle East, and East Africa. He demonstrates how interests, institutions, and ideas can align to allow interstate cooperation even in unfavorable environments. He provides analytical frameworks for practitioners grappling with transnational problems and generates working propositions on what makes new forms of public-private governance effective and legitimate. U.S. policies in the area of infectious disease control are little known, and this book outlines the key players, policy initiatives, and their impacts. Long contends that the United States, a leader in both medical and information technology, is well situated to strengthen public health systems abroad and indirectly support regional health cooperation as a peaceful and positive dimension of its global health diplomacy and as a frontline defense of its own population from the threat of infectious diseases. As such, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to address a critical national and transnational problem, deepen bilateral ties, foster regional and global cooperation and stability, and burnish America’s image globally. Long calls for an expansion—both in actual resources and in interagency coordination—of U.S. global health policy in infectious disease control. “At their current levels, U.S. support for foreign capacity in infectious disease control is shortchanging American interests. Given the seriousness of the threat posed by the spread of infectious disease and the vast potential for goodwill to be had from U.S. support for overseas surveillance and response capacity, this policy area requires greater U.S. commitment of funds and expertise.” said Long. “This study recommends a significant increase in the size of U.S. programs devoted to this challenge. This is a particularly daunting goal in light of an extremely difficult budget climate, but it is a critical step for U.S. security. In the context of overall U.S. global health expenditures, even an increased expenditure on foreign capacity for infectious disease control would be only a small fraction of America’s international public health budget but deliver significant security and diplomatic returns on the investment.”

1AC Plan


The United States Federal Government should offer to provide economic aid for pandemic control with the People’s Republic of China.

1AC Solvency

The United States and China need to develop the infrastructure together to combat pandemic outbreaks—there are no costs and only a risk lack of action escalates


Erickson et. al ’10 (Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, Nan Li, “China, the United States, and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership”, p. 342-343, CL)

These significant challenges should not distract us from the larger issues at stake: that a significant threat to humanity can be, and must be, averted. This collective responsibility requires cooperation across national boundaries regardless of political differences. A sense of humility and respect is vital for effective cooperation to be realized in practice, however. AS Dr. Liu observes, Both China and [the] U.S. have the capacity to play leadership roles in the response to pandemic outbreak. The U.S. and China need to build infrastructure for cooperation and coordination if joint leadership and response is needed. At present, there are lots of exchanges; avian influenza experts in the West already collaborate with their Chinese counterparts, and vice versa. But it needs to be broadened and deepened. Again, if joint leadership and response is expected, ongoing scientific collaboration needs to be applied to policy and command structures. A superiority complex on the part of any country could jeopardize effectiveness when it comes to working together. Under time pressure, the negative effects of such an attitude would be intensified. In this spirit, though translation and analysis of Chinese sources, I have endeavored to increase awareness among Western scholars, analysts, and policymakers of important Chinese developments and their potential relevance to Sino-American cooperation against avian influenza. The bottom line is that differences in other national interests should not prevent the United States and China—or, for that matter, all other nationsfrom recognizing their growing collective interests in combating emerging threats such as that of pandemic influenza. As Admiral Michael Mullen stated in 2005 as U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, “in today’s interconnected world, acting in the global interest is likely to mean acting in one’s national interest as well. In other words, exercising sovereignty and contributing to global security are no longer mutually exclusive events.” And as a Chinese proverb cautions, “disasters know no boundaries


Public health policies are key to fighting pandemics –the U.S. is in a prime position internationally to exercise “smart power” to improves relations and foster regional stability, but it must be in the form of material assistance or training


Long ’11 (William Long, Professor and Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs Georgia Institute of Technology, “Pandemics and Peace: Public Health Cooperation in Zones of Conflict", published June 2011, CL)

In addition to the emerging subregional networks of cooperation focused on in earlier chapters and the pan-regional and global organizations noted in chapter 2, the public health policies of states also play a critical role in the fight against pandemics. This chapter examines in detail the policy of a key national actor, the United States, in the fight against infectious disease spread. From the perspective of the United States, old and new infectious diseases present a major danger to the health and welfare of its citizens and to its interests worldwide. By the same token, the control of infectious disease also presents an unparalleled opportunity for U.S. leadership in global public health that could deepen bilateral ties, foster regional cooperation and stability, and burnish the U.S. image globally through the effective exercise of "smart power."' As a frontrunner in health and information technology and the largest single contributor to global public health, the United States can both enhance its national and international security and economic interests and demonstrate its commitment to improving human welfare through the promotion of infectious disease control systems abroad. Its record of successful participation in campaigns against infectious disease, such as eradicating smallpox, reinforces its legitimacy in this domain.2 Rhetorically, protecting domestic and foreign populations from infectious diseases has become a national priority, and the need to develop foreign capabilities in infectious disease detection and response has received explicit presidential endorsement. In 1996, President Clinton's Decision Directive NSTC-7 "established a national policy to address the threat of emerging infectious diseases through improved domestic and international surveillance, prevention, and response measures."3 In introducing the new national policy to the public, then vice president Al Gore underscored that the directive instructs the U.S. government, particularly CDC, USAID, and DOD, to work with other nations and international organizations to establish a global infectious disease surveillance and response system, based on regional hubs and linked by modern communications technologies .4 Shortly after taking office, President Obama announced a new global health initiative that would adopt an integrated approach to fight the spread of infectious diseases while addressing other global health challenges.' The president emphasized America's military leaders have echoed these sentiments. In November 2009, the National Security Council document "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats" reinforced the importance of strengthening foreign capacity in detecting and responding to infectious disease outbreaks, because this capacity is of equal importance in combating naturally occurring or man-made biological threats. President Obama noted that addressing the challenge "requires a comprehensive approach that recognizes the importance of reducing threats from outbreaks of infectious disease whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in nature."' Recognizing multilateral partnerships to improve international preparedness by helping countries establish "effective and sustainable systems for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and reporting." Despite consensus on the importance of the issue and clear recognition that combating the threat of infectious diseases requires support for public health systems abroad, U.S. policies designed to bolster foreign capacity in infectious disease control have not kept pace with America's burgeoning global public health expenditures.

With regard to the finely wrought cooperative regional networks de-scribed in chapter 2 and analyzed in chapters 3 and 4 of this book, the U.S. government role has been, and should remain, indirect. For example, U.S. governmental material assistance and training has contributed to the development of substantial epidemiological capacity in Thailand, which in turn is a locus of expertise for the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Network. Even though the role of U.S. policy is most appropriately an indirect one of technical assistance and capacity building, this chapter questions whether U.S. policies that indirectly foster regional cooperation and global capacity are enough to meet the challenge to its interests and the opportunity for enhanced cooperation posed by the emergence and potential global spread of old and new infectious diseases. If not, what changes in terms of policies, purse, or bureaucratic organization and coordination might better secure these interests and opportunities? To explore these questions, this chapter identifies and describes four federal programs designed exclusively to strengthen foreign capacity in infectious disease surveillance and response, considers their interagency and international partnerships, and recommends ways to expand U.S. support for infectious disease control abroad.


The U.S. and China need to work together to build public health infrastructure in order to avoid extinction level impacts


Erickson '07 (Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Assistant Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and a founding member of the department’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). His research, which focuses on East Asian defense, foreign policy, and technology issues, has been published in Comparative Strategy, Chinese Military Update, Space Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies and Naval War College Review, "Combating a Truly Collective Threat: Sino-American Military Cooperation against Avian Influenza", Global Health Governance, published January 2007, ghgj.org/Erickson%20article.pdf, CL)

These significant challenges should not distract us from the larger issues at stake: that a significant threat to humanity can be and must be averted. This collective responsibility requires cooperation across national boundaries regardless of political differences. A sense of humility and respect is vital for effective cooperation to be realized in practice, however. As Dr. Liu observes. Both China and [the] U.S. have the capacity to play leadership roles in the response to pandemic outbreak. The U.S. and China need to build infrastructure for cooperation and coordination if joint leadership and response is needed. At present, there are lots of exchanges: avian influenza experts in the West already collaborate with their Chinese counterparts, and vice versa. But it needs to be broadened and deepened. Again, if joint leadership and response is expected, ongoing scientific collaboration needs to be applied to policy and command structures. A superiority complex on the part of any country could jeopardize effectiveness when it comes to working together. Under time pressure, the negative eiTects of such an attitude would be intensified.** In this spirit, through translation and analysis of Chinese sources. I have endeavored to increase awareness among Western scholars, analysts, and policymakers of important Chinese developments and their potential relevance to Sino-American cooperation against avian influenza. The bottom line is that differences in other national interests should not prevent the United States and China—or. for that matter, all other nations—from recognizing their growing collective interests in combating emerging threats such as that of pandemic influenza. As Admiral Michael Mullen stated in 2005 as U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, "in today's interconnected world, acting in the global interest is likely to mean acting in one's national interest as well. In other words, exercising sovereignty and contributing to global security are no longer mutually exclusive events.”8 And as a Chinese proverb cautions, “disasters know no boundaries".


The plan improves a global pandemic response and symbolizes a commitment to collaboration


Erickson '07 (Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Assistant Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and a founding member of the department’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). His research, which focuses on East Asian defense, foreign policy, and technology issues, has been published in Comparative Strategy, Chinese Military Update, Space Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies and Naval War College Review, "Combating a Truly Collective Threat: Sino-American Military Cooperation against Avian Influenza", Global Health Governance, published January 2007, ghgj.org/Erickson%20article.pdf, CL)

In domestic, bilateral and international forums, the U.S. and China have already made considerable, if preliminary, progress in combating avian influenza. In October 2005, for instance, Chinese Minister of Health Gao Qiang signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to enhance cooperation on avian influenza and other infectious diseases. On November 19, 2005, the United States and China announced a “Joint Initiative on Avian Influenza,” through which the countries’ respective ministries of Health and Agriculture will “strengthen cooperation” concerning vaccines, detection, and planning. Such bilateral measures could offer a model for U.S. cooperation with other nations. At the January 2006 “Ministerial Pledging Conference for Avian Influenza,” attended by 700 representatives of over 100 nations, including the U.S., Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that “China will continue to actively participate in international cooperation in avian influenza prevention and control, share our experience with related countries and help them fight avian influenza.” Paul Wolfowitz, president of the World Bank, emphasized, “By hosting this event in Beijing, the Chinese Government is sending a powerful message … that we urgently need a global commitment to share information quickly and openly, and to find ways to work together effectively.” Such information exchange has already been facilitated by a draft agreement signed on December 20, 2005, affirming China’s intention to share “virus samples isolated from human H5N1 cases” with the WHO. At the end of the conference, representatives matched their words with substantive actions. The World Bank agreed to contribute $500 million, the Asian Development Bank, $470 million, the U.S. $334 million and China $10 million. As of October 2006, virtually all the $1.9 billion granted at the Pledging Conference had been committed. Other examples of Sino-American cooperation regarding pandemic preparedness include the Joint Science Academies’ Statement on avian influenza and infectious diseases, whose signatories include Lu Yongxiang of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Ralph Cicerone of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. Noting that SARS caused as much as $30 billion in economic damage, and affirming the accomplishments of the Beijing ministerial pledging conference, the statement calls for “coordinated actions on a global scale by a whole spectrum of stakeholders including governments, scientists, public health experts, veterinary health experts, economists, representatives of the business community, and the general public.” In order to ensure that these recommendations are carried out, however, it is necessary to explore in depth the potential roles of the U.S. and Chinese militaries in combating avian influenza. No pandemic disease prevention efforts will be complete without the robust involvement of these two powerful and influential organizations. Given the U.S. military’s strong presence throughout the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the abundance of relevant information thanks to its relative transparency, its potential role in such efforts will now be examined in detail.

SQ can’t solve—the U.S. needs to reorient its approach towards health infrastructure—we need to shift from symptom based approaches to tackling the root cause of the problem


Long ’11 (William Long, Professor and Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs Georgia Institute of Technology, “Pandemics and Peace: Public Health Cooperation in Zones of Conflict", published June 2011, CL)

U.S. disease-specific support in the case of pandemic influenza, illustrates a second problem with the focus of U.S. funding: the tendency to spend funds overwhelmingly on domestic preparedness, rather than creating a front line of defense by detecting and controlling infectious disease outbreaks at the source, that is to say primarily in Africa and Asia is as reflected in figure 7. When the United States responded to the swine flu outbreak with a supplemental appropriation of more than $6.5 billion in 2009, for example, only $190 million of that amount went to global measures, the balance spent largely on domestic defensive countermeasures. Of course, domestic programs such as a vaccine stockpiling are essential to protect Americans, but the issue is whether an ounce of protection achieved by putting a higher priority on global overseas surveillance and response capacity is worth a pound of domestically medical cure. In considering that question, a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that efforts to support overseas capacity in infectious disease surveillance and response “will likely benefit U.S. national security more than U.S.-based countermeasure efforts have to date while also working to improve health during times of peace.” Long-term investments in support of surveillance programs overseas is an efficient way to support resource-poor countries as they develop their national surveillance and overall public health infrastructure and to enhance transnational capacity for disease control.

Download 1.1 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   22




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2020
send message

    Main page