Rail Safety News Edition 8, December 2012

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Rail Safety News

Edition 8, December 2012

Cover image: Puffing Billy steam engine approaching

From the Director

As you would be aware, the biggest thing on the rail horizon at the moment is the implementation of a single national regulator for Australia.

Most accredited rail operators and exempt rail operators in Victoria will be required to comply with the new Rail Safety National Law (the National Law). The National Rail Safety Regulator Project Office has been formed to establish the National Rail Safety Regulator (NRSR) and will operators through the transition process. Its website (www.nrsrproject.sa.gov.au) includes useful information on the reform including a set of principles to support the transition from the existing regime to the new legislation.

Tram (light rail) and some tourist and heritage operators will not transition to the National Law. These operators will still be required to comply with new local rail safety legislation.

TSV will continue to provide the regulatory functions and services for the rail industry in Victoria under both the National Law and the new local rail safety legislation.

If operators have any questions about the transition to the NRSR, they should refer to the NRSR website or call the project office on 08 8343 2893.

Locally, nationally and internationally distraction continues to be a major concern for everyone involved in delivering safe public transport. All kinds of electronic devices, not just mobile phones, are common in our private lives and becoming more so in our working lives. These devices distract people at all levels from their task in a safety critical situation.

Passengers and pedestrians are also increasingly distracted by electronic devices whether it is listening to music, talking, texting or online activities. This puts an additional burden on people employed within the rail system to take due care not only of their own safety but also to alert obviously distracted members of the public to imminent danger.

Safety in a high risk environment is everyone’s responsibility. For this reason we are continuing our focus on distraction in this edition with an in-depth look at it from the train driver’s perspective.

Finally, as we approach the end of the year, we remind rail operators to consider what preparations are required to ensure the safe operation of their rail networks throughout the summer period.

I hope you enjoy this Rail Safety News. We are increasingly moving towards electronic delivery of the newsletter either via our website, where you can read or download it, or via email.

If you would prefer to receive your copy by email please provide your details to info@transportsafety.vic.gov.au.

In closing, I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of TSV, to wish you a safe and happy festive break with your loved ones. I look forward to working with you in the New Year.

Best regards, Andrew Doery

Image: portrait of Andrew Doery

Management of risk at level crossings

An important consideration in a risk management process is the consequences of failures of the technical system. Level crossings are designed to fail to a safe state. In other words, in the event of failure, the default position is to make the crossing safe for all by ‘closing’ it and warning people not to cross the tracks or enter the rail corridor and to behave as though a train were coming. This state is referred to as ‘safe’ as it results in a continuous warning to the motorist who is legally required to not enter the crossing.

For a level crossing fitted with boom barriers, this ‘safe’ state is both boom barriers horizontal across the road and the flashing lights and bells operating. In a small number of situations, in the order of one to three per cent of level crossing failures, the level crossing fails to provide the normal warning to the motorist and results in an unsafe state. An unsafe state can be a level crossing failing to operate, providing only a very short warning time, one of the boom barriers failing to descend or significant damage to the barrier.

For all failures, safe or unsafe, the effect on the motorists should be considered when analysing the risks associated with level crossings. Human Factors research has found that people use models inside their heads to guide their behaviour. The models can influence what information is perceived from the environment, how it is interpreted and what actions are taken. Motorists can develop models about how, when and where level crossings operate. If the level crossing fails to operate in the manner expected by the motorist, there is a risk that the appropriate model will not be triggered leading to undesirable behaviours occurring.

For example, a motorist would reasonably expect at a level crossing fitted with boom barriers, that the boom barrier will be horizontal when a train goes through. According to the motorist’s mental model, the lowered boom barrier means the presence of a train. Therefore, if the boom barrier is not lowered, the motorist is unlikely to seek further information about the presence of a train and may believe that the lights flashing are an indication that the booms are soon to descend, but there is still time available to cross.

Another consequence of failures to safe states occurs when a motorist has experienced a level crossing repeatedly failing to a safe state and has ceased to trust the warning systems. For example, when warnings continue to operate when no train is approaching and no train is present. This could trigger mistrust of the warnings and encourage work around behaviours such as driving around boom barriers.

The management of risks to safety at level crossings is complex and cannot be accomplished by the rail infrastructure managers alone. They need to work with the relevant road managers who, in turn, are required to understand their safety duties under the Rail Safety Act 2006 (Vic). The necessary collaboration is achieved through a safety interface agreement (SIA) which rail infrastructure managers are required to seek to enter into for public and relevant road interfaces. The SIA provisions of the legislation require the rail infrastructure manager, preferably in collaboration with the road authority, to conduct a risk assessment to identify, assess and manage the risks to safety SFAIRP. The risk assessment then provides a basis for managing the risks to safety and informing the content of the SIA.

Further details on SIA requirements can be located within the rail safety section of TSV’s website. (http://www.transportsafety.vic.gov.au/rail-safety/accreditation/how-to-become-accredited/safety-interface-agreements).