Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- 2AC Affirmative Answers to Pressure CP- Hegemony Net-Benefit
2AC- Pressure CP- BIT Affirmative
Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, “China-U.S. Trade Issues”, December 15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf] The United States and China have held negotiations on reaching a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the goal of expanding bilateral investment opportunities. U.S. negotiators hope such a treaty would improve the investment climate for U.S. firms in China by enhancing legal protections and dispute resolution procedures, and by obtaining a commitment from the Chinese government that it would treat U.S. investors no less favorably than Chinese investors. In April 2012, the Obama Administration released a “Model Bilateral Investment Treaty” that was developed to enhance U.S. objectives in the negotiation of new BITs.102 The new BIT model establishes mechanisms to promote greater transparency, labor and environment requirements, disciplines to prevent parties from imposing domestic technology requirements, and measures to boost the ability of investors to participate in the development of standards and technical regulations on a nondiscriminatory basis.103 During the July 10-11, 2013, session of the S&ED, China indicated its intention to negotiate a high-standard BIT with the United States that would include all stages of investment and all sectors, a commitment U.S. official described as “a significant breakthrough, and the first time China has agreed to do so with another country.”104 A press release by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that China was willing to negotiate a BIT on the basis of nondiscrimination and a negative list, meaning the agreement would identify only those sectors not open to foreign investment on a nondiscriminatory basis (as opposed to a BIT with a positive list which would only list sectors open to foreign investment). During the July 9-10, 2014, S&ED session, the two sides agreed to a broad timetable for reaching agreement on core issues and major articles of the treaty text and committed to initiate the “negative list” negotiation early in 2015.105 During BIT negotiations held in June 2015, each side submitted their first negative list proposals, and later agreed to submit a revised list in September 2015. While some progress was reportedly made in September 2015, a breakthrough was not achieved in time for President’s Xi’s summit visit to the United States. Many analysts contend the negotiation of a U.S.-China BIT could have significant implications for bilateral commercial relations and the Chinese economy. According to USTR, Michael Froman, such an agreement “offer a major opportunity to engage on China’s domestic economic reforms and to pursue greater market access, a more level playing field, and a substantially improved investment environment for U.S. firms in China.”106 For China, a high-standard BIT could help facilitate greater competition in China and result in more efficient use of resources, factors which economists contend could boost economic growth. Some observers contend that China’s pursuit of a BIT with the United States represents a strategy that is being used by reformers in China to jumpstart widespread economic reforms (which appear to have been stalled in recent years). This strategy, it is argued, is similar to that used by Chinese reformers in their efforts to get China into the WTO in 2001. Such international agreements may give political cover to economic reformers because they can argue that the agreements build on China’s efforts to become a leader in global affairs. This may make it harder for vested interests in China who benefit from the status quo to resist change. 2AC Affirmative Answers to Pressure CP- Hegemony Net-Benefit
Posen, 2014 Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, “Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy,” Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June 24 Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would argue that the good the strategy has achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted in the introduction, partisans assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies, free trade, nuclear nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take responsibility for their own security, and U.S. political and military hegemony are all mutually causative, and all lead ineluctably to a vast improvement in the security and welfare of others, and hence to the U.S. security position. 124 They also posit that the world is fragile; damage to one of these good things will lead to damage to other good things, so the United States must defend all. The “fragile and interconnected” argument is politically effective. By accident or design, the argument derives an inherent plausibility due to the inevitable limits of our substantive knowledge, fear, uncertainty, liberal ideology, and U.S. national pride. Most targets of the argument do not know enough about the world to argue with experts who claim these connections; the chain of posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and fear is a powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-probability chains of causation can be made to seem frightening enough to do something about, especially if you believe your country has overwhelming power. It is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S. values such as liberty and democracy depend on U.S. power and leadership. The argument does not stand close scrutiny. First, it obscures the inherently strong security position of the United States, which I have already reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic, and technological facts supporting this point are seldom discussed, precisely because they are facts. It takes very large events abroad to significantly threaten the United States, and more moderate strategies can address these possibilities at lower costs. Typical Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form of domino theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to produce another and another until the small problems become big ones, or the collection of problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these connections are valid in any particular case will always be open to debate. Even if the connections are plausible, however, it is unlikely given the inherent U.S. security position that the United States need prop up the first domino. It has the luxury of waiting for information and choosing the dominos it wishes to shore up, if any. Second, proponents of Liberal Hegemony often elide the difference between those benefits of the strategy that flow to others, and those that flow to the United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheap-riders and reckless-drivers like the current situation because of the welfare, security, or power gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the international politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise be the case. The United States, however, pays a significant price and assumes significant risks to provide these benefits to others, while the gains to the United States are exaggerated because the United States is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal Hegemonists argue that U.S. commitments reduce the intensity of regional security competitions, limit the spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds of conflict, and that this helps keep the United States out of wars that would emerge in these unstable regions. This chain of interconnected benefits is not self-evident. United States activism does change the nature of regional competitions; it does not necessarily suppress them. For example, where U.S. commitments encourage “free-riding,” this attracts coercion, which the United States must then do more to deter. Where the United States encourages “reckless driving,” it produces regional instability. United States activism probably helps cause some nuclear proliferation, because some states will want nuclear weapons to deter an activist United States. When the United States makes extended deterrence commitments to discourage proliferation, the U.S. military is encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies that are themselves destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence of the last twenty years, the United States ends up in regional wars in any case. Fourth, one key set of interconnections posited by Liberal Hegemonists is that between U.S. security provision, free trade, and U.S. prosperity. This is a prescriptive extension of hegemonic stability theory, developed by economist Charles Kindleberger from a close study of the collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing great depression. 125 Professor Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system of free trade and finance would more easily survive crises if there was a “leader,” a hegemon with sufficient economic power such that its policies could “save” a system in crisis, which would also have the interest and the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126 Subsequent theorists, such as Robert Gilpin, extended this to the idea that a global economic and security hegemon would be even better. 127 Robert Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a “liberal” hegemon would be still better, because it would graft transparent and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system, which would make it more acceptable to the “subjects” and hence less costly to run. 128 A comprehensive rebuttal of hegemonic stability theory is beyond the scope of this book. But this theory has fallen into desuetude in the study of international politics in the last twenty years. Proponents did not produce a clear, consolidated version of the theory that integrated economics, security, and institutional variables in a systematic way that gives us a sense of their relative importance and interdependence, and how they work in practice. The theory is difficult to test because there are only two cases: nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, and post–World War II United States, and they operated in very different ways under very different conditions. Finally, testing of narrow versions of the theory did not show compelling results. 129 These problems should make us somewhat skeptical about making the theory the basis for U.S. grand strategy.
Chen, 2015 Dingding Chen ,Assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute, 1-14-15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-china-wont-challenge-us-hegemony/ Needless to say, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet complicated bilateral relationships in the world today. This explains why Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang’s recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online (here and here). Wang Yang stated that China “[has] neither the ability nor the intent to challenge the United States.” Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such soft remarks with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because Wang’s remarks are seemingly inconsistent with China’s recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true meaning of Wang’s remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward Wang’s conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that China’s ultimate aim is to establish a China-centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia. In other words, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon. The reactions from the U.S. side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with regard to China’s long term goals. But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asia’s peace and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere when he said that China does not have the capabilities and desires to challenge the United States. The evidence of his sincerity is apparent. First let us look at China’s capabilities, which need to be especially formidable if China wants to challenge the United States. Although China’s comprehensive capabilities have been growing rapidly for the past three decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is still a huge gap between China and the U.S. in terms of comprehensive capabilities, particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and technological realms. China’s economy might have already passed the U.S. economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of China’s economy still remains a major weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day China’s comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it would still be a huge mistake for China to challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely interconnected, creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries. Besides limited capabilities, China also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts. It is true that China’s grand strategy is to realize the “China dream” — a dream that will bring wealth, glory, and power to China again — but this, by no means, suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia, or to create a Sino-centric tributary system around which all smaller states must obey China’s orders. Perhaps these perceptions exist in the United States because many U.S. analysts have unconsciously let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power and influence. But the structure of international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony ineffective or even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony outweigh the benefits of hegemony in this new era of international politics, thanks to rising nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers. The Chinese leaders understand this new and changed structure of international politics and based on their assessments, they have decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new era. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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