1. Framework: Our interpretation is that the negative gets to defend a competitive policy alternative Predictability – there are millions of representations that we can’t predict – the resolution says USFG so we should debate that – predictability is key to fairness
Education – policy discussions foster better informed debate that can be adapted to the real world
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor at Central European University, “The enduring dilemmas of realism in International Relations,” Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, December 2001, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gus02/gus02.pdf, accessed 8/13/02
Contrary to Waltz, Gunther Hellmann does not leave the debate at this unfinished stage. Starting from the same Friedmanian pragmatist grounding that a theory is good as long as it works or functions, he wants a return to the common language of academia and practice by pushing academia back to the language of the practitioner, yet by keeping the advantage of the outside observer. More openly than Waltz, he plays down the need for scientific respectability, but by offering a more philosophically grounded argument. The grounding is provided by the recourse to the philosophy of science, more particularly to modern versions of “pragmatism”, represented in particular, but not only, by Richard Rorty. For Hellmann, pragmatism has done the job in undermining the credentials of positivism and all what comes with it. This move takes the ground away for the need of any of the classical justifications in IR theory. Any version of the correspondence theory of truth, any version of scientific realism, any version of falsification is wrong-headed, if understood in a logical theoretical way. Such devices are just this: scholarly habits devised through the tradition of a scientific community. Butpragmatism is also not succumbing to the sirens of poststructuralism whose theorising, according to him, is purely de-constructing and has lost any major connection with real problems.
2. Perm Do Both
Threats are real and Weezey ain’t racist– not all politicians would make the same mistake and their evidence is based on out-dated Cold War theories
Knudsen, ‘1 [Olav F., Sodertorn University College, Security Dialogue, 32.3, “Desecuritizing Securitization”]
This argument is convincing as far as its description of the military establishment and decisionmakers goes, but its heyday is gone. It was a Cold War phenomenon, and things just aren’t so anymore. In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.
3. Perm Do Plan without Security Representations. You can only determine the value of policies by their outcomes and not intentions or premises
Waever 1998 [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]
From a more Nietzschean perspective, I should also mention that politics always involves an element of exclusion, in which one has to do violence to the inherent openness of situations, to impose a pattern--and one has not only to remember but also to forget selectively. 77 To act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for forcing things in one direction instead of another. Whether such an act is "good" or "bad" is not defined by any inner qualities of the act or its premises, but by its effects (which depend on the actions of others, interaction and, therefore, an element of coincidence). As Hannah Arendt pointed out, "Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian." 78 Acting politically can, consequently, never be risk-free, and "progressiveness" is never guaranteed by one's political or philosophical attitude. Theoretical practices, as well as any political ones, have to risk their own respectability and leave traces, letting posterity tell the story about the meaning of an act. Post-structuralists have usually been arguing that their project is about opening up, implicitly arguing that a situation was too closed, too self-reproducing. Politics is inherently about closing off options, about forcing the stream of history in particular directions. 79 In the present context, politics and responsibility can involve prevention and limitation and, at times, the tool of securitization may seem necessary. It is thus not impossible that a post-structuralist concerned about risks of power rivalry and wars will end up supporting a (re)securitization of "Europe" through rhetorics such as that of integration/fragmentation. The purpose of this would be to impose limits, but it would have as a side-effect some elements of state-building linked to the EU project. This could therefore imply that national communities might have to engage in a certain degree of securitization of identity questions in order to handle the stress from Europeanization. Under such circumstances, there might emerge a complementarity between nations engaging in societal security and the new quasi-state engaging in "European security." Neither of these two moves are reflections of some objective "security" that is threatened; they are, instead, possible speech acts , moving issues into a security frame so as to achieve effects different from those that would ensue if handled in a nonsecurity mode.
4. Even in the context of cooperation, the history of the space programs across the world is best explained and navigated by realism
Sheehan 2007 [Michael The International Politics of Space Series: Space Power and Politics Series editors: Everett C. Dolman and John Sheldon Both School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Air, Maxwell, USAhttp://bib.tiera.ru/dvd64/Sheehan%20M.%20-%20The%20International%20Politics%20of%20Space%282007%29%28248%29.pdf As with the skies in the early twentieth century, space evolved from being seen simply as an environment in which the use of force on the ground might be aided, to a dimension in which combat would take place, as each side sought to exploit the military use of space, and deny its use to the enemy. The logic of the inevitabilityof such developments is in line with the realist approach to international relations, and it is similarly a self-fulfi lling prophecy to the extent that states act as if it was true. Neorealism can also be felt to be validated by the convergence in goals that has occurred over the same period. By the mid-1980s the various space programmes had obvious similarities, but also important differences. A key feature of the neorealist explanation of international relations is the argument that the security dilemma compels states to behave in essentially similar ways if they are to survive and prosper. The constraints of the system drive states to become functionally alike in the security realm. There is evidence to support this claim in the evolution of several space programmes in the past three decades. The programmes of Japan and the European Space Agency, for example, originally had no military dimension, while those of China and India lacked a manned presence in space, nor did any of these national and international programmes seem to feel that these absences constituted a signifi cant weakness. In the past two decades, however, the various programmes have become increasingly similar in terms of their content and objectives. Europe and Japan have now added a military dimension, while China has acquired a manned programme and India has announced its intention to do so. These developments appear to validate the neorealist argument that states in the international system differ in capability, but exhibit a similarity in objectives and process, and indeed are obliged to do so by the nature of the system.25 Neorealists like Waltz argue that states are obliged to be functionally alike, that they tend to operate with a similar range of instruments and to use them in remarkably similar ways, constrained only by the comparative resources available to them. Against this, realist assumptions about the likelihood of competition in the international anarchy are not necessarily borne out by the history of space policy. For realists, states are not inclined to cooperate unless there are compelling reasons to do so, because of the mutual insecurity they experience under the security dilemma. Weber, for example, argues that international cooperation is likely to be limited, and where it does occur, will be ‘tenuous, unstable and limited to issues of peripheral importance’.26 In space policy, however, states have frequently sought out opportunities to cooperate and have often self-consciously seen this as a possible way to mitigate the dangers inherent in an adversarial relationship such as that between the superpowers during the Cold War,27 or between China and Russia. Some realist proponents allow for such cooperation. Glaser, for example ,argues that there will be circumstances where a state’s best security strategy will be cooperation rather than competition.28 For realists, statesmanship is about ‘mitigating and managing, not eliminating confl ict; seeking a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one’.29 There is clearly an appropriate place for international cooperation in such a world view, though it is not seen as overcoming the essentially confl ictual nature of international relations. Thus, space activity brought an alteration in the visible measurement of power, in its image, but not in the underlying fundamentals.Given the dominance of realist thinking in the early years of the space age therefore, it was always likely that competition, rather than cooperation, would be the dominant political theme.30
5. Realism is the only way to prevent war.
Mearsheimer 1 (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
It should be apparent from this discussion that offensIve realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have beHAved in the past and how ThEy are likely to behave in the future. But it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.One might ask, if the theory describes how great powers act, why is it necessary to stipulate how they should act? THe imposing constraints of the system should leave great powers with little choice but to act as the theory predicts. Although there is much truth in this description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage, the fact remains that they sometimes—although not often—act in contradiction to the theory. These are the anomalous cases discussed above. As we shall see, such foolish behavior invariably has negative consequences. In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists.
1. Perm Do Both
Only the Perm works-US involvement is key
Peter 8 (Nicolas, Research Fellow at European Space Policy Institute, “Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe” http://www.lpi.usra.edu/meetings/leagilewg2008/presentations/oct29pmSalonIII/Peter4088.pdf, 8/14/2008) SV
Up-to-now, the EU and the European Commission (EC) has been reluctant to get involved in space exploration but this is evolving. As indicated in April 2008 by Vice President of the European Commission Günter Verheugen, Commissioner for Industry and Enterprise in charge of space policy in the EC, while acknowledging that relatively little resources are allocated for space exploration from the EC budget, indicated that this needs to change. For him, in the context of the international situation, it is perceived that space exploration done in cooperation could be a way to ensure the competitiveness of the industrial and scientific sector in Europe. This echoes the space policy speech given by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on 11 February 2008 that encourages the EU’s involvement in space and underlines that France considers the EU as the right vector for large projects with ambitions that go beyond the reach of any member State, but also to strengthen Europe’s assets in space exploration. Space exploration could therefore become a new Community initiative. As underlined by Vice President Günter Verheugen, space exploration (to Mars) should be done in the context of international cooperation with Europe’s main partners. President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated also that a stand alone European exploration programme should not be considered insofar as it should only be elaborated in collaboration with the United States and other space-faring countries, since space exploration can be only a global endeavor
2. Internal divisions between EU members means no solvency
Selding 10 (Peter B. de Selding, Staff Writer at Space News, “Mistrust Dilutes Goodwill at Global Space Exploration Conference”, http://www.spacenews.com/civil/101021-mistrust-global-exploration-conference.html, 10/22/2010) SV
PARIS — An Oct. 21 conference of the world’s spacefaring nations to discuss space exploration featured a heavy dose of good feelings but also highlighted the mistrust that will slow the effort: Germany’s suspicions of France, France’s fear of being dominated by the United States, Russia’s distrust of long-term U.S. government policy, the U.S. distaste for new international bureaucracies and many governments’ refusal to start multibillion-dollar investments. Organized by the European Union, of which Belgium holds the six-month rotating presidency, the second International Conference on Space Exploration in Brussels, Belgium, confirmed the results of the first conference, held in Prague, Czech Republic, a year ago: It is difficult to discuss a space exploration strategy in the absence of one. The meeting ended with an agreement to meet in Italy in 2011 to pursue discussions, and to consider the creation of a group of experts to guide the effort. But alongside the statements that space exploration is of necessity a global enterprise calling for global cooperation, individual governments used the conference to raise less-noble issues that lurk beneath the surface. Peter Hintze, state secretary in the German Ministry of Economics, which leads German space policy, said Germany wanted Europe’s Ariane 5 rocket to be center stage in Europe’s exploration strategy. But he also threw a dart at France: “If the Ariane 5 is needed for an institutional mission and is not available, then this is a major problem in terms of cooperation. If it is required for an institutional mission, it should be available for that mission,” Hintze said, referring to the fact that the Ariane 5 launch of Europe’s Automated Transfer Vehicle-2 (ATV-2) to the international space station scheduled for December has been moved to February to permit the vehicle to conduct three commercial launches.
3. ESA space policy is spun as military policy, causes an arms race
Synon 8 (Mary Ellen Synon, Freelance Journalist, “EU military space policy could lead to expensive 'Star Wars' arms drive, say experts”, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1087939/EU-military-space-policy-lead-expensive-Star-Wars-arms-drive-say-experts.html#ixzz1QscopyGY, 11/20/2008) SV
The European Union is pursuing a secretive military space policy which could lead to a costly 'Star Wars' arms drive, a report warned yesterday. It accused Brussels of using the European Space Agency to develop technologies - including a multimillion- pound EU Satellite Centre in Spain - for use by military as well as civilian authorities. The Transnational Institute, a Dutch think-tank, said: 'EU-financed communication and spy satellites are slowly becoming reality and in the long term the inclusion of space-based missile defence and other more offensive uses of space are real options for an increasingly ambitious EU military space policy.' Next week, ministers from all ESA member states will meet in The Hague to implement a new European space policy which identifies military 'security' as a priority. A driving force behind the switch in policy is President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, which holds the European presidency until December 31. In July, he said the space agenda was one of his priorities. The think-tank report also said French ambitions for the militarisation of space have caused rows with Britain - particularly over Galileo, the much-delayed European global positioning system.
4. SOLVENCY DEFICIT - Cross Apply the Leadership Advantage, There is no way that the ESA doing the plan can Promote the US leadership that the Young in ’08 Evidence calls for. Which means the CP allows for the United States to be perceived as weak locking us out of the race for Hegemony. That leads to global nuclear war, that’s Kagan
1. We meet:
2. Counter definition: Exploration is the expansion of human influence in outer space
Faith 9 (G. Ryan Faith is an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Giving NASA a Clear Mission,” August 31, 2009. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1456/1)
If neither technology-oriented nor destination-oriented objectives seem able to provide a sense of direction to guide the nation’s efforts in space, then what can? To approach this question, it is useful to ask why President Kennedy’s challenge to go to the Moon was so effective in providing NASA with leadership. The critical element of this challenge that, although never explicit, was so important to NASA’s health and growth during this period was the transformation—at least in fact, if not in law—into an exploration agency. If we wish to see NASA act effectively as a space exploration agency, then the most direct way to do this is to amend the Space Act to explicitly task the agency with the job of space exploration. However, before we do so, we must define what space exploration actually is.
Space exploration is the expansion of human influence in space.
This definition of exploration is inherently one of capacity building. Human influence in space is a measure of our ability to do useful things beyond the Earth’s surface. In order to do something useful, there has to be some sort of human presence, either humans themselves or their robotic proxies. Once some measure of human influence has been established at some destination in space, there are two ways a space exploration agency can expand that influence. One, the agency can decrease the costs and increase the benefits of human influence at a given location until such influence becomes sufficiently useful that it is economically self-sustaining, at which point continued use of agency resources is unnecessary. Alternately, human influence can be extended to some new place that may in future become home to some form of self-supporting human influence. The key element is that such a mandate compels each step to build on past accomplishments and lay the groundwork for future missions.
And, exploration can be either manned or unmanned
Encyclopedia Britannica 11 (“Britannica Online Encyclopedia – Space Exploration,” July 12, 2011. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/557348/space-exploration)
Space exploration - Investigation of the universe beyond Earth’s atmosphere by means of manned and unmanned spacecraft. We meet counterdefinition: a space elevator constitutes significant human presence in outer space 3. Counter Standards
a. Intent do define – both our definitions come from sources writing with the intent to define what is and isn’t space exploration
b. Predictable limits – our definitions provides adequate ground for both the aff and the neg
c. literature base – their definition cuts out space elevators from the topic, this skews aff ground because our case is at the heart of the topic 4. T is not a voter
a. good is good enough – if we are reasonable topical don’t vote us down because we found a good case that they didn’t prep for
b. predictability – tons of camps put this aff out meaning that it is predictable and they should have known about it
c. clash checks – there is plenty of clash in the round so don’t vote us down