State Compacts Neg Section



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State Compacts



Neg Section




General Solvency

( ) Multi State compacts are an effective alternative to enacting federal legislation



Pincus ‘9

(Matthew, published in the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Articles Editor, COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS, “When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?”, 4/23/09, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf ck)

Essentially, an interstate compact is an agreement that two or more states enter into in order to deal with a problem or concern that crosses state boundaries. 17 While states employ a variety of mechanisms to assure legal uniformity — for instance, the adoption of uniform codes or the adaptation of model acts — interstate compacts are distinct in that they address issues that, by their nature, affect more than one state. 18 This Part situates recent proposals that have broad national impacts within the larger historical context of interstate compacts and of the Compact Clause. Whereas, interstate compacts were originally used to address issues that were of concern to pairs or small groups of states, the 20th century saw the interstate compact transformed into a tool for dealing with a wide range of social, environmental, and political issues. Part II.A addresses the history of interstate compacts generally, as well as the origins of the Compact Clause in the Constitution. Part II.B examines the briefer history of the NPV, as well as a similar recent compact proposal to curb the emission of greenhouse gasses. As the expanse of issues addressed by interstate compacts has increased, they have come to represent an alternative means of achieving results that might more naturally be achieved through federal legislation or through constitutional amendment.

Are Binding, Have Force of Law

( ) Compacts solve – have force of law and are effective



Council of State Governments ‘3

(nonpartisan organization that brings state leaders together to share ideas, advocates the interests of the states, https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:XodKT3ZyjLgJ:ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/Introoverview.doc+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiNcV1zWAJGONKIJRrz0EZd-4bv_JNCJ7NM1teMUO2WKPME-RUTlAulqZWzHTyKZGoIg3YqX-HlOJQ0-Vj4XT9r08BpXP5mjLY4LPjupwmMhIx7pKZFHL05vXXZj52XPp4V6ItK&sig=AHIEtbQVB7kbD5DGcl6ri0CQT1C4RBf8Vg) CS


The Nature of Interstate Compacts Compacts are agreements between two or more states that bind them to the compacts’ provisions, just as a contract binds two or more parties in a business deal. As such, compacts are subject to the substantive principles of contract law and are protected by the constitutional prohibition against laws that impair the obligations of contracts (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10). That means that compacting states are bound to observe the terms of their agreements, even if those terms are inconsistent with other state laws. In short, compacts between states are somewhat like treaties between nations. Compacts have the force and effect of statutory law (whether enacted by statute or not) and they take precedence over conflicting state laws, regardless of when those laws are enacted. However, unlike treaties, compacts are not dependent solely upon the good will of the parties. Once enacted, compacts may not be unilaterally renounced by a member state, except as provided by the compacts themselves. Moreover, Congress and the courts can compel compliance with the terms of interstate compacts. That’s why compacts are considered the most effective means of ensuring interstate cooperation.

( ) Compacts solve – they’re binding



Morrow 09 (William S., "The Case for an Interstate Compact APA," Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice," http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/interstate/ICAPAPaper_Morrow.authcheckdam.pdf) CS

Whether approved by Congress or not, interstate compacts are not merely legislative acts they are in very important respects contracts binding on the signatories. As the Supreme Court has noted: "It requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who alone have political authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified, or given final meaning by an organ of one of the contracting States D101 v Sims, 341 U.S. at 28. Upon entering into an interstate compact, a state effectively surrenders a portion of its sovereignty; the compact governs the relations of the parties with respect to the subject matter of the agreement and is superior to both prior and subsequent law. Further, when enacted, a compact constitutes not only law, but a contract which may not be amended, modified, or otherwise altered without the consent of all parties. It, therefore, appears settled that one party may not enact legislation which would impose burdens upon the compact absent the concurrence of the other signatories. C.T. Hellmuth & Assocs., Inc., v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, 414 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1976).



A-to “Conflicting Laws”

( ) Compacts are federal law-- overrules conflicting laws


Bell ‘5

Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Dean’s representative on the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States (Bernard W., "Scope of Judicial Review and Related Matters Interstate Compact APA Project Preliminary Outline," April 13, 2005) CS

Congressional approval (d) Under the “Law of the Union” doctrine, an agreement covering an appropriate subject is upon receipt of congressional approval transformed into federal law. “Where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.” Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); see N.Y. v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000) (interstate agreement on detainers); Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 951 F. Supp. 383, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (under “law of the Union” doctrine, Congressional approval of a bistate compact makes it appropriate to treat the document’s interpretation as a federal question (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 440); Entergy, Ark., Inc., v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000)("The Compact is federal law because it is a congressionally sanctioned agreement within the meaning of the Compact Clause.").

A-to “Courts Overturn”

( ) Court won't repeal-- empirics


Ernst 77

professor (Thomas J., "Legal Problems Affecting Interstate Transportation Agencies," Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 11 Number 3, Spring 1977, http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1674&context=vulr) CS



No case has arisen in which a compact has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Once a state has formally ratified a compact and the approval of Congress has been obtained, the agreement is binding on the state and all its officers- executive, legislative, and judicial. A state cannot unilaterally declare that a compact is in violation of its constitution and use this as a basis for withdrawal.

A-to “Congress Overturns”

( ) Congress won’t overturn – inertia with the Neg.



Pincus ‘9

(Matthew, published in the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Articles Editor, COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS, “When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?”, 4/23/09, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf ck)


Thus, the institutional bias against taking action is a deliberate and important facet of the federal constitutional structure. When interstate compacts of wide impact are allowed to come into force, this “legislative inertia” has an unintended effect: the same forces that typically prevent congressional action exert pressure to let the compact remain in place. It is true that, because interstate compacts inevitably involve interstate concerns, Congress is almost always able to override any compact it wishes, either explicitly (through legislation) or by preempting the field in which the compact operates. 121 Any such legislation, however, must pass through both houses and survive any possible veto by the president. Thus, legislative inertia makes it more difficult for Congress to pass a law voiding an interstate compact than to refuse to approve one. As a result, passing an interstate compact effectively enhances the power of the enacting states, while diminishing that of Congress. 122 Although the same could be said for the enactment of any state law in an area where Congress and the states share authority, what makes interstate compacts different is that they inherently involve relations between the states and coordinated action among them. Interstate compacts have the potential — as demonstrated by the NPV — to have much broader impact on the country as a whole than uncoordinated actions by individual states.


A-to “Links to Net Benefit – Compacts involves the Feds”

( ) Ignore how the text of Compact Clause reads – in practice, most compacts won’t be reviewed



Masters ‘11

(Rick Masters, CSG Special Counsel for Interstate Compacts – Knowledge Center” Council for State Governments – June 28, 2011 – http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/content/interstate-compacts-and-congressional-consent)


When is Congressional Consent required? The determination of whether congressional consent is required depends upon the applicability of the compact clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 3). Despite the wording of this provision, not all interstate compacts require the consent of congress, only those which interfere or conflict with some enumerated power granted to the federal government under the Constitution. The Supreme Court has specifically interpreted the meaning of the 'compact clause' in this manner in a number of decisions. See for example U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multi-tate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-460, 463-65, 468-69 (1978); also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981). How is Congressional Consent granted? Under Article I., Section 10., Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution (Compact Clause), no specific procedures are established for states to follow in obtaining congressional consent to interstate compacts, nor does the Constitution outline specific procedures which Congress must respect in granting consent. Although the Constitution is silent on the matter, tradition demonstrates that congressional consent is generally given in one of three ways. 1) Congress can explicitly give consent upon submission of a compact by the member states for approval. Such consent is most often seen in compacts that resolve boundary disputes, but can occur in other areas. For example, in 1999 Congress gave its consent to the establishment of the boundary between South Carolina and Georgia. See Public Law No. 106-90, 113 Stat. 1307 (1999). 2) Congress may give its consent broadly and in advance by adopting legislation that encourages states to enter into an interstate compact for a specific purpose or by granting consent in advance of the actual adoption of a compact by the states. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1959). Examples of such advance consent include the Crime Control Compact Consent Act of 1934, in which Congress authorized “any two or more States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such agreements and compacts.” See 4 U.S.C., Section 112 (2003). The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS), adopted in 2002, as well as the compact superceded by ICAOS, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, relied upon this 1934 statute. Likewise Congress gave its’ advance consent to states authorizing the development of interstate pilot banking programs for the financing of highway infrastructure, (Pub. Law No. 104-59, Title III, Section 350, 109 Stat. 618 (1996); the development of radioactive waste disposal facilities, (42 U.S.C., Section 2021d (2004); coordination of mass metropolitan transit systems, See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. Law No. 105-178 (1998); and for the construction of deep water ports, See 33 U.S.C., Section 1508(d) (2004). 3) Consent may be implied through congressional acquiescence to a compact. In Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) the Supreme Court held that congressional consent may be inferred when Congress engages in acts that demonstrate acquiescence to the compact. Such acts may include the adoption of subsequent legislation consistent with the terms of the compact or ratification of actions by state authorities and Congress that are harmonious with the purposes of the compact. Implied consent is most easily demonstrated in the context of border compacts, as subsequent actions would clearly point to Congress’s intention vis-à-vis the compact.

( ) Feds never involved – Court set-up a “new power” and “federal supremacy” standard.



Pincus ‘9

(Matthew, published in the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Articles Editor, COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS, “When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?”, 4/23/09, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf ck)



The Court described the test to determine whether an unapproved compact was unconstitutional as a determination of “whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government.” 73 The pertinent issue, in the Court’s view, was whether the compact had any “potential, rather than actual, impact upon federal supremacy.” 74 Nonetheless, the entire focus of the Court’s examination of the MTC was its actual impact — or, rather, lack thereof — on the national government. 75 In determining that the MTC was not the sort of interstate agreement for which congressional consent was required, the Court emphasized the following factors: first, the MTC did not authorize the member States to exercise any new powers other than those they could have exercised without the existence of the compact; second, the MTC did not delegate the states’ sovereign power to the commission it created; and lastly, each compacting state retained its ability adopt or reject the rules and regulations developed by the commission and to withdraw from the compact at any time. 76 Additionally, the Court dismissed the appellants’ claim that the MTC exerted unconstitutional pressure on non-member states to alter their own tax policies: “unless [such] pressure transgresses the bounds of the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, it is not clear how our federal structure is implicated.” 77 By the Court’s logic, a compact’s impact on non-participating states was irrelevant to the question of the necessity of congressional consent, so long as it did not threaten federal supremacy. 78

( ) Our compact meets these standards – two reasons:

  1. Compacts already used on transportation policy



Krent ‘11

Harold – Dean and Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. “Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications Of Free Enterprise Fund” – Fordham Law Review, Forthcoming --At the time of this posting – February 3, 2011 – available at: SSRN

To some degree the constitutional system of federalism contemplates such congressional sharing of power with state entities. Article I provides that Congress can consent to state decisions to levy “duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, [or] enter into an[] agreement with another state or with a foreign power.”112 The Compact Clause has been utilized frequently, and Congress long has delegated to groups of states the power to regulate over subjects such as transportation,113 energy,114 and tax matters.115 The resulting rules of the compacts are to be treated as federal law,116 even if the interstate commissions are not considered federal agencies.117 The fact that the Founders authorized Congress to consent to state compacts whose authority could reach issues of national or regional import strongly calls into question the view that congressional delegation of authority to state entities should be categorically prohibited.

  1. We’re not a core Federal issue – Horowitz proves that transportation is a quintessential State responsibility.




( ) Burden’s on the Aff – majority of compacts don’t require congressional approval



Pincus ‘9

(Matthew, published in the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Articles Editor, COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS, “When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?”, 4/23/09, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf ck)


That a limited number of states could agree to create such a fundamental shift in the federal political system without the approval of Congress might strike someone acquainted with the text of Article I of the Constitution as odd. 6 One section of this Article, labeled “the Compact Clause,” proclaims “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” 7 Read literally, this provision would require all agreements between states to be approved by both houses of Congress and to be signed by the President before coming into effect. 8 The Supreme Court, however, has held in a series of decisions beginning with Virginia v. Tennessee 9 in 1893, that only a small subset of interstate agreements require congressional assent. In its most recent major case to consider the issue, U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Commission, 10 the Supreme Court ruled that only those interstate agreements that “enhance[ ] state power quoad the National Governmentare ineffective without the approval of Congress. 11 This test — at least as elaborated in U.S. Steel — would exempt agreements such as the “Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by Nationwide Popular Vote” (“NPV”) from the congressional consent requirement. 12 This Note argues that the current test to determine when interstate compacts require the consent of Congress should be overhauled. 13 The U.S. Steel test potentially allows a coalition of states to set national policy, while making an end-run around the “finely wrought” procedures of bicameralism and presentment necessary for enacting federal legislation 14 and the strict super majoritarian requirements for amending the Constitution through Article V. 15 If coalitions of states are able to effect nationwide change through interstate compacts, the inertia that normally hinders the federal legislative process will make it difficult for Congress to override their legislation. In this way, the use of interstate compacts can exploit the constitutional mechanisms designed to hamper Congress’s ability to create federal law for the purpose of making change more permanent. Accordingly, compacts that attempt to effect change on a national level should be invalid in the absence of Congressional consent. Ultimately, this Note recommends that the U.S. Steel test should be replaced with a comparatively simple judicial standard that would strike down interstate compacts not approved by Congress unless the subject matter of the compact is widely recognized as a traditional locus of state action. 16

( ) Compact Clause theory is irrelevant – in practice, Courts allows Congress and President to not be involved.



Millhiser ‘10

(Ian, Senior Constitutional Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund and the Editor of ThinkProgress Justice. His writings have appeared in a diversity of legal and mainstream publications, including the New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, U.S. News and World Report, Slate, the Guardian, the American Prospect, the Yale Law and Policy Review and the Duke Law Journal; and he has been a guest on CNN, MSNBC, Al Jazeera English, Fox News and many radio shows, “Meet The New Nullification, Just as Unconstitutional as the Old Nullification”, 12/4/10, http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2010/12/04/176974/interstate-compact/ ck)


The only problem for these would-be John C. Calhouns is that the Constitution expressly rejects nullification, but that hasn’t stopped them from dreaming up increasingly creative theories for how states can ignore the Constitution’s express command. As Dave Weigel reports, the latest such theory comes from former Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz. The Constitution permits states with the consent of Congress to form contracts with each othera power that Cruz somehow interprets to allow the states to bypass Congress and the President altogether: Interstate compacts are an effective way to regulate areas of mutual concern among two or more States. In areas of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, or where state legislation is preempted by an enumerated federal power, the Constitution requires congressional consent (Art. I, sec. 10). The Supreme Court has held that such congressional consent trumps prior federal law and may even subordinate federal agencies to agencies created by the interstate compact. Although Congress has generally consented to interstate compacts through regular legislation signed by the President, congressional consent does not necessarily require presidential signature; the Supreme Court has suggested that congressional consent may even be inferred from acquiescence. . . .

( ) No link – consent is inferred


Bell ‘5 --Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Dean’s representative on the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States (Bernard W., "Scope of Judicial Review and Related Matters Interstate Compact APA Project Preliminary Outline," April 13, 2005) CS

Subsequent interpretation by the 1J.S.Supreme Court established the rule that only those agreements which affect the political balance within the federal system or which affect a power delegated to the national government must be approved by Congress.38 As a practical matter, Congressional consent is sought and obtained in almost every case. Sometimes Congress will even grant advance consent to interstate compacts to encourage state cooperation in fields where Congress would like to see more action.39 Failure to obtain Congressional consent is not necessarily destructive, as the Constitution does not specify either a time or method for Congressional approval. Furthermore, consent may be inferred. Failure of Congress to object actively to the continued operation of the Southern Regional Education Compact may well indicate an informal, implied grant of consent,40 especially since segregation in the operation of the Southern Region Educational Board facilities is no longer the issue it was when the debate over approval by Congress took place. In addition, extensive debate at the time over the question of consent to this compact characterized the agreement as being of such character as not to require Congressional approval in the first place.41


( ) No perception – consent is implicit


Ernst ‘77-- professor (Thomas J., "Legal Problems Affecting Interstate Transportation Agencies," Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 11 Number 3, Spring 1977, http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1674&context=vulr) CS

C. Herman Pritchett provided one of the best, most concise historical overviews of the interstate compact formation process. He stated: Although congressional consent to interstate compacts is required, there is no set formula as to when and how that approval should be registered. The assent may be given before or after the agreement; it may be explicit, implicit, or tacit. Nor is there any form in which Congress must cast its approval. It may be done by specific statute, by a joint resolution, by ratification of a state constitution which contains such a compact or by means of a compact between Congress and the states involved. Congress may even extend blanket approval to future agreements in certain specified areas.




( ) Doesn’t involve White House – Consent delegated to Secretary of Transportation



Bell ‘5

Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Dean’s representative on the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States (Bernard W., "Scope of Judicial Review and Related Matters Interstate Compact APA Project Preliminary Outline," April 13, 2005) CS

General Background. Compacts are generally approved by congressional legislation that appends the Compact. Charting No Man’s Land, supra, 111 HARV. L. REV. at 1993 & n.18. However, “consent may be express or implied, and may precede or follow state enactment of the compact.” The Kentucky-Virginia Compact was considered approved by admission of Kentucky into the Union. See, PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 17-18 (1982). Although the Compact Clause itself requires only the consent of Congress, "settled usage" has granted the President veto power over consent. Charting No Man’s Land, supra, 111 HARV. L. REV. at 1993-94 & n.19. Congress can lawfully delegate its power to consent to compact to Executive Branch officials. Thus, Congress did not violate the Constitution when it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to consent to a milk compact upon the Secretary’s finding that the compact served a “compelling public interest.” Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

A-to “Compacts not fair, not real world”




( ) Yes, Real World – Compacts already used on transportation policy



Krent ‘11

Harold – Dean and Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. “Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications Of Free Enterprise Fund” – Fordham Law Review, Forthcoming --At the time of this posting – February 3, 2011 – available at: SSRN

To some degree the constitutional system of federalism contemplates such congressional sharing of power with state entities. Article I provides that Congress can consent to state decisions to levy “duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, [or] enter into an[] agreement with another state or with a foreign power.”112 The Compact Clause has been utilized frequently, and Congress long has delegated to groups of states the power to regulate over subjects such as transportation,113 energy,114 and tax matters.115 The resulting rules of the compacts are to be treated as federal law,116 even if the interstate commissions are not considered federal agencies.117 The fact that the Founders authorized Congress to consent to state compacts whose authority could reach issues of national or regional import strongly calls into question the view that congressional delegation of authority to state entities should be categorically prohibited.

AT: Links to Federalism




CP avoids the link to federalism – multi state compacts avoid federal intervention or regulation


Council of State Governments No Date (National Centre for Interstate Compacts, “Understanding Interstate Compacts”, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/CompactEducation/Understanding_Interstate_Compacts--CSGNCIC.pdf ck)
Interstate compacts represent an opportunity for multistate cooperation, reinforcing state sovereignty and avoiding federal intervention. The emergence of broad public policy issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries present new governing challenges to state authorities. Compacts enable the states – in their sovereign capacity – to act jointly and collectively, generally outside the confines of the federal legislative or regulatory process while respecting the view of Congress on the appropriateness of joint action. Unlike federal actions that impose unilateral, rigid mandates, compacts afford states the opportunity to develop dynamic, self regulatory systems over which the party states can maintain control through a coordinated legislative and administrative process. Compacts enable the states to develop adaptive structures that can evolve to meet new and increased challenges that naturally arise over time.


Aff section




Compacts link to politics

( ) Compacts link to politics – most require Congressional consent



Wade ‘94

(et al, Jeffry S. Wade – Associate in Law; Director of Environmental Division, Center for Governmental Responsibility; Affiliate Faculty, Center for Latin American Studies – ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR BASINWIDE MANAGEMENT OF THE ACF BASIN: THE FLORIDA PERSPECTIVE – March 24th – https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:ycvCKQeqy9MJ:www.law.ufl.edu/cgr/publications/alternative_strategies.pdf+%22Generally,+interstate+compacts+require+the+consent%22&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi9kaVFAqbykqeoEj7YXeqkYyB4HcXkD3I4a4jLcUkrNOagq1-CSpk4G3Q0iA0WM7sCuc4fpxNjY0aWQpXwCjD4esd5-uJIbVWxz7AQuvzR1RQdp-EX-T-VPR74wsz8Fgip9chI&sig=AHIEtbSf8eif_o9OOzB_xwQQ8-wQCAaEFg)


The Constitution of the United States provides for establishing compacts between states 68. Compacts can be solely between states, with no federal signatories, or between states and the federal government. Generally, interstate compacts require the consent of Congress.69 While compacts were first used to resolve boundary and jurisdictional disputes, compacts have become the most common method of apportioning interstate waters.70 A variety of water related topics can be addressed through compacts, including but not limited to allocation of waters, conservation, pollution control, flood control, planning, permitting, standard setting, and enforcement.'1 Fn68 – U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The compacts clause of the Constitution states that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State Id.

( ) Compacts link to politics – require Federal Approval.



Buck ‘99

Susan J. Buck is associate professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, (1999) 'Contextual factors in the development of state wildlife management regimes in the United States of America', Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 1: 3, 247-259.

Throughout the 19th century, the inability of the states to provide sustainable game resources stemmed from many factors. (1) Game seemed so plentiful that many were unconvinced that a problem existed or, if convinced, refused to accept that diminishing numbers were the result of indiscriminate hunting. We see this denial at the end of the 20th century also, with many fishermen on both coasts refusing to accept that over-fishing is a major cause of declining fish stocks [remote factors and local factors: scientific data]. (2) Local custom dating to colonial times endorsed unrestricted hunting even on private land; vestiges of this attitude remain today in state laws that assume private land is open to hunting unless it is posted (Lund, 1980) [local factors: custom]. (3) As wealthy sportsmen often brought substantial business into rural areas, rural-dominated legislatures were understandably reluctant to cut off the income supply by restricting hunting (Tober, 1981) [local factors: interest groups, constituencies, employment opportunities]. (4) States that shared both migratory stocks and borders frequently suffered long-standing and often violent disputes, over resources and had little incentive to join multi-state compacts; such compacts would, in any case, require congressional approval, and states were reluctant to involve Congress in their internal affairs (Buck,1988) [remote factors: political decisions of remote states; local factors: political decisions of adjoining states, interest groups]. (5) No established professional class of administrators for wildlife existed; the Pendleton Act, passed in 1887, initiated a professional civil service corps at the federal level, but most states lagged far behind; state governments were so far from professional game management that, in many states, sportsmen’s clubs and conservation groups such as the fledgling Audubon Society paid private detectives to enforce the game laws (Orr, 1992; Tober, 1981, pp. 215–216) [local factors: state legislation, agency resource allocation].

( ) Compacts link to politics – they require White House and Congress to approve.



Millhiser ‘10

(Ian, Senior Constitutional Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund and the Editor of ThinkProgress Justice. His writings have appeared in a diversity of legal and mainstream publications, including the New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, U.S. News and World Report, Slate, the Guardian, the American Prospect, the Yale Law and Policy Review and the Duke Law Journal; and he has been a guest on CNN, MSNBC, Al Jazeera English, Fox News and many radio shows, “Meet The New Nullification, Just as Unconstitutional as the Old Nullification”, 12/4/10, http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2010/12/04/176974/interstate-compact/ ck)


Cruz is actually a pretty good lawyer, so it is deeply embarrassing that he would sign his name to proposal that is so riddled with errors. Contrary to Cruz’ implication, an interstate compact cannot be used to bypass the President’s veto power. As Article I of the Constitution provides: Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

( ) Compacts link to politics – someone in Congress will attempt to block


Koza ‘11

(et al, John R. Koza-- Ph.D. from University of Michigan, consulting professor at Stanford, Barry Fadem-- partner in law firm of Fadem & Associates, President of National Popular Vote, Mark Grueskin-- legal counsel, Michael S. Mandell-- general counsel to the Arizona State Senate, Robert Richie, and Joseph F. Zimmerman-- professor of political science at the State university of New York at Albany, "EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A State-Based Plan For Electing The President By National Popular Vote," January 2011, Ch. 5) CS



As a matter of practical politics, an objection by a member of Congress who represents an area affected by a compact will often be able to halt congressional consideration of consent. This fact is illustrated by the experience of the New Jersey Legislature and the New York Legislature, which each enacted an amendment to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Compact (signed by the two Governors) allowing the Port Authority to initiate industrial development projects. In 1967, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman of New York placed a hold on the consent bill on the grounds that the Port Authority had failed to solve the port’s transportation problems. Holtzman argued that the Port Authority should construct a railroad freight tunnel under the Hudson River to obviate the need of trains to travel 125 miles to the north to a rail bridge over the river.

Perm Section – Aff

( ) Federal-interstate compacts solve best – accountability, funds


Martin 75 (Harry S., "Coordination by Compact: A Legal Basis for Interstate Library Cooperation," http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/6846/librarytrendsv24i2f_opt.pdf?sequence=1) CS

Within the last few years, a new type of compact has emerged with even greater potential for handling large-scale regional operations in an effective way, yet in such a manner as to retain a large element of local control. The federal-interstate compact offers the most direct alternative to the federal agency model for handling multistate affairs.66 The model for this type of agency is the Delaware River Basin Compact.67 The Delaware River Basin Compact created a regional agency with territorial jurisdiction over the area of the Delaware River Basin, including areas of the signatory states (Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware). The agency is to develop water resources, control water quality, improve flood control, operate facilities for the generation and transmission of hydroelectric power, and set rates and charges for such power, The implementing powers granted by the signatories include: borrowing and bond issuing powers, with a pledge of the credit of the agency but not that of the signatories; the power of eminent domain; and the power to adopt necessary rules and regulations to effectuate the varied purposes of the agency. Provision is also made for capital fund contributions from the signatories in accordance with cost-sharing provisions previously agreed to, but subject to the legislative appropriation of the respective parties. No mandatory obligation is imposed on any signatory with respect to finance. No individual, corporate, or political body in the basin may undertake erection of water facilities in the basin unless the agency approves by including that facility in the comprehensive plan. Finances have been placed on a voluntary basis despite an anticipated deficit in the operation of various agency projects. In dealing with appropriations, the compact makes no distinction between the actual area of the basin and the whole area of the signatories; that is, the compact sets up no “appropriation districts” within the states. The federal government agrees to substantially the same terms except that its agreement is subject to the provision that: “Nothing in this compact shall be construed to relinquish the functions, powers or duties of the Congress of the United States with respect to the control of any navigable waters within the basin, nor shall any provision hereof be construed in derogation of any of the constitutional powers of the Congress to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations.”68 Further reservations of federal power are found in a provision for congressional approval of any water project, and in the power “to withdraw the federal government as a party to the compact or to revise or modify the terms, conditions and provisions under which it may remain a party by amendment, repeal or modification of any federal statute applicable thereto.”69 Under the allocation-of-cost formula, the federal government will provide about one-half of the financing of the comprehensive plan for the Delaware River Basin Compact. The agency which is to exercise the compact powers consists of five members, one from each of the signatory states and one representing the federal government. Each has one vote, and no action is to be taken except on a majority vote of the total membership. Although the validity of the several compacts which the federal government has entered has not been litigated in the courts, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly has expressed itself in favor of the compact device to solve regional problems.70relationship in afi operational field in terms so closely approaching parity. Of course, it is not the governments themselves that are so described. Rather it is the joint agency which is their common instrument and the compact which is their mutual obligation.” There also would seem to be little merit in the possible objection that federal entry into a federal-interstate compact with regulatory powers would amount to an unlawful delegation of regulatory powers over interstate commerce. Congress has been said to have a broad choice of regulatory agencies to carry out the law in areas in which the federal power to act is clear,71 and the doctrine is well established that Congress may confer upon the states the power to regulate commerce in ways they otherwise could Even without an expressed reservation such as that contained in the Delaware River Basin Compact, it would seem that under the supremacy clause alone, the federal would prevail in the event of conflict between a compact policy and a subsequently enacted federal policy.73 A federal-interstate compact seems to be an ideal form for channeling federal funds into multistate services while retaining a high degree of state participation. A federal authority on the TVA model would assume control of local and state facilities built up over years of effort and sensitivity to local priorities. Eschewing federal assumption of regional functions in favor of the compact device encourages a responsiveness to the people being served.74 The independent federal agencies (e.g., Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Federal Communications Commission) amount to a fourth branch of government, and are the least accountable, most independent branch of all.75 While interstate compacts have not been noted for their responsiveness-largely because of the reputation of the Port of New York Authority for independent action-and despite the fact that federal agencies can demonstrate a high degree of sensitivity to the people they regulate, on the whole, a compact device offers more opportunity to construct a mechanism for accountability and responsiveness than does an independent federal agency. A federal-interstate compact has a further advantage. Whereas the consent statute to a normal interstate compact does not impose a binding obligation on the federal government to support the compact,76 a federal-interstate compact is binding on the agencies of the federal government to uphold and support the agreement. In the words of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: “No other legal device available within the Federal system comes this close to placing Federal activities within the same regimen as those of States, and no other instrument has ever defined a Federal-State relationship in an operational field in terms so closely approaching parity. Of course, it is not the governments themselves that are so described. Rather it is the joint agency which is their common instrument and the compact which is their mutual obligation.””


( ) Perm solves: federal interstate compacts best for funding


NCFRP 11 (National Cooperative Freight Research Program, September 2011, "Multi-State Freight Transportation Organizations," http://www.camsys.com/pubs/ncfrp_w002.pdf) CS

Given the realities of limited state budgets, it would be difficult to assume that states could fully fund their multi-state freight organizations. This implies that freight organizations would have to be able to derive adequate revenue from their operations to be successful. Multistate freight organizations established by interstate compact could receive federal funds, but are not predicated on a federal grant program. • Jurisdictional gaps or overlaps. The required Congressional consent transforms an interstate compact into federal law. This may, in and of itself, address any gaps between state and federal jurisdiction. Less frequently, the federal government may also become a party to the compact (which is then designated a federal-interstate compact), and Congress enacts authority for the appropriate federal participation. In any event, the institution contemplated by the interstate compact would be charged with operating in accordance with federal requirements and the flexibility to negotiate specific terms and requirements for Congressional approval provide ample opportunity to address any gaps or overlaps between state and federal jurisdiction. The powers of the institution would be established by the participating states and made effective across state lines by Congressional enactment. One of the advantages of having a congressionally approved interstate compact is that, to the extent it is recognized as federal law, the interstate compact will supersede inconsistent state laws.


Solvency Deficits: Conflict of Laws

Conflict of laws delays implementation


Ernst ‘77

professor (Thomas J., "Legal Problems Affecting Interstate Transportation Agencies," Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 11 Number 3, Spring 1977, http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1674&context=vulr) CS

Regionalism is still a strong concept attractive to many policymakers in interstate areas. Areawide transportation authorities continue to be proposed' as the solution to metropolitan traffic jams and gasoline shortages. Prior to the establishment of additional interstate transportation agencies, urban leaders would do well to ponder the major legal problems involved in the formation and subsequent operation of a new interstate transportation agency, as conflict of laws issues will prove a problem to such an agency from its inception. Traditional conflict of laws questions arise quite often for an interstate transit agency involved in numerous traffic accidents. The number and severity of such accidents varies from one transit agency to another, depending upon several different factors, but even the finest interestate transportation agency operating buses and other transit vehicles cannot avoid involvement in some traffic accidents. Should the victim of one of these accidents wish to bring suit against the transit agency, an issue closely related with conflicts questions will demand resolution: which of the concerned states or the federal government has the proper jurisdiction to try such an action? For instance, when the transit agency exists through an interstate compact authority created pursuant to the compact clause of the United States Constitution,' a traffic accident involving that agency may result in a wrongful death action being brought against the agency in the federal district courts.


Solvency Deficits: Funding

Can't solve: fiscal equity and distribution


Ernst ‘77

professor (Thomas J., "Legal Problems Affecting Interstate Transportation Agencies," Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 11 Number 3, Spring 1977, http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1674&context=vulr) CS



The distribution of transit benefits and allocation of federal and non-federal fiscal resources are two potential causes for litigation. If one state consistently contributes less than its fair share of monies, citizens of the other state are unduly burdened for transit services never received. Transit operations in State Y could be as frequent, with comparable equipment, with equally skilled drivers, maintenance and supervisory personnel as those provided citizens of State X. But if the citizens of State X are paying for eighty percent or more of all operating cost, if state X is providing a disproportionate share of local monies to match federal capital resources, litigation may result if the evenly divided Board of Commissioners fails to act in rectifying this fiscal imbalance. Conversely, perhaps the state providing most of the money is receiving most of the benefits-all of the new buses, the bulk of new passenger shelters, and all the new demand-response vehicles. Under such circumstances, minority persons in the under-served state may bring a Title VI equal protection action. The important point for planners and appropriate officials to note is that the problems raised in this hypothetical will almost certainly arise during the existence of any interstate transit agency. Distribution of services and fiscal equity are two of the most troublesome problems facing modern transit operators. In litigating such situations, minority or under-served state plaintiffs would rely on many of the Title VI cases cited earlier in this article. Further, plaintiffs suing for lack of representative voting rights would allege that the existence of "state action" is established through the governmental processes needed to create the interstate transit agency. The concept of "state action" has even been applied to privately-owned transit operators. .


Solvency Deficits: Delay

( ) Compacts are slow – process and implementation take forever



Zimmerman ‘4

PhD, professor of political science at Rockefeller College (Joseph, "Regulation of Professions by Interstate Compact," CPA Journal, May 2004, Vol. 74 Issue 5 p 22-28, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=a4f79e73-7bad-4765-b981-7cd6043502b9%40sessionmgr14&vid=1&hid=8&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=13276866&anchor=AN0013276866-3) CS



The Negotiation and Ratification Process The process of enacting a compact involves three steps: negotiators reaching an agreement on a tentative compact; enactment of the compact by concerned state legislatures; and congressional grant of consent if the compact is political in nature (see below). Political obstacles typically arise during each step, even for relatively simple compacts established or proposed in the past, and may become an insurmountable obstacle. Compact negotiations. Gubernatorially appointed members representing their state on joint commissions negotiated and drafted all interstate compacts until 1930. The advantages of this method include the prestige of the commission, staff assistance, and the ability to continue negotiations over a substantial period of time. This method has been supplemented with other approaches, as illustrated by the proposed Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Compact, which was drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and the Nurse Licensure Compact, which was drafted by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing. Commissioners critically examine each draft compact provision and seek to include only provisions perceived to be acceptable to their respective state legislatures. Individual negotiators may raise major administrative, financial, substantive, and technical issues that must be resolved. Unanimity must be reached on each issue, often an extremely difficult task, before the compact can be submitted to each concerned state legislature. A negotiated compact proposing creation of only a study commission charged with developing recommendations to solve a specific problem or of a commission financed entirely by user fees generally involves a limited financial commitment by each compacting state and may not encounter serious legislative opposition. One or more legislative leaders in each state, however, may inform negotiators that the compact will not be enacted unless it is amended to authorize specified forms of gubernatorial or legislative oversight. Fears that political checks on the activities of the proposed compact commission could impair its functioning provide additional impetus for prolonged negotiations. In addition, governors may instruct negotiators to ensure that their states' political interests are safeguarded. Not surprisingly, state legislators may redebate many of the issues addressed by compact negotiators. If the latter fail to keep in close contact with legislative leaders or the governor, the legislature may reject the compact bill or the governor may veto it. Negotiators also may be instructed to renegotiate certain contentious compact provisions. The establishment of a compact also may be delayed or complicated by political concerns. The process of obtaining the approval of each state legislature can be lengthy because each statute must be identical to statutes enacted by the other states. There are many examples of prolonged delays prior to the enactment of an interstate compact by all concerned state legislatures. Five years were required to secure the necessary enactments for the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact, which became effective in 1942. The Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin state legislatures enacted the Great Lakes Basin Compact in 1955, but enactment was delayed in Pennsylvania (1956), New York (1960), and Ohio (1963). Compact implementation also may be delayed or prevented if one or more of the concerned states make participation contingent upon specified other states enacting the compact, as illustrated by the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact. The party state legislatures or the compact also can make its execution conditional upon Congress initiating specific actions. Furthermore, a compact may not be self-executing and a governor may decide not to execute it. The 1936 New York State Legislature enacted a non-self-executing compact--the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees--and it was not executed for eight years because of the refusal of Governor Herbert H. Lehman to execute it.

( ) Multi-State compact need to be approved by each State– that process will take forever.



Council of State Governments ‘3

(nonpartisan organization that brings state leaders together to share ideas, advocates the interests of the states, https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:XodKT3ZyjLgJ:ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/Introoverview.doc+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiNcV1zWAJGONKIJRrz0EZd-4bv_JNCJ7NM1teMUO2WKPME-RUTlAulqZWzHTyKZGoIg3YqX-HlOJQ0-Vj4XT9r08BpXP5mjLY4LPjupwmMhIx7pKZFHL05vXXZj52XPp4V6ItK&sig=AHIEtbQVB7kbD5DGcl6ri0CQT1C4RBf8Vg) CS

Compacts are not always complicated, but they take time, especially if their subject matter is controversial. A study of 65 interstate compacts conducted in the early 1960s indicated that the average amount of time required to launch a new compact was almost five years. But that study was admittedly skewed by the unusually long time required for the approval of several compacts that dealt with controversial natural resource issues. In fact, the average time required to enact 19 compacts covering river management and water rights was almost nine years. Without these extremes, the prospects appear more manageable. In recent years, there have been some remarkable success stories. For example, in December 1989, a committee of the Midwestern Legislative Conference approved draft language for the Midwestern Higher Education Compact and began circulating it to lawmakers in the twelve Midwestern states that were eligible to participate. Just 13 months later, the compact became effective.

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