Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
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- Western oversight has failed to ease the tensions
- 2. Empirically denied – wars in Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 90’s should have caused the impacts.
- 4. Balkan war won’t happen–regional powers have incentives to cooperate and relations are too solid BURNS 2006
AT: Balkan Instability1. Instability inevitable – Kosovo and Bosnia tensions without EU oversight Wall Street Journal 2009: Balkan Troubles. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/analysis/15869/ Bosnia and Kosovo have largely disappeared from public view. Washington and Brussels are hoping the promise of European Union accession will ultimately triumph over remaining ethnic tensions in the region. Would that this were so. Rather, a divided EU is allowing the Balkans to slide toward greater instability, while the U.S. remains mostly on the sidelines. America's massive investment in the region in the 1990s may go the way of the subprime market. Bosnia is a nonfunctioning state living under the constant threat its autonomous Serb region to hold a referendum on independence. The Bosnian Muslim prime minister wants to throw out the Dayton agreement that concluded the Bosnia war in 1995, end Serb autonomy and form a unitary state. Western oversight has failed to ease the tensions among ethnic groups. The wounds of war are still raw. Newly independent Kosovo, unrecognized by two-thirds of the world's states -- including five EU members -- barely functions after 10 years of U.N. rule. It has high unemployment and little foreign investment and needs enormous foreign assistance. Most politically damaging to the new state is the largely Serb-inhabited northern part of Kosovo, which continues to be run from Belgrade without vigorous objections from the EU or the U.S. This in effect partitions the fragile Kosovo state and cements continued ethnic tensions. The root cause for most of this instability still rests in Belgrade. Although its new government is eager to become part of the EU, it insists on governing Serbs in Kosovo and is doing everything possible to reverse its independence. In Bosnia, Belgrade is working with Moscow to strengthen Serb autonomy with political and particularly economic support. Despite its constant assurance to seek a European future, Serbia remains mired in the past, failing to turn indicted war criminal Ratko Mladic over to the Hague Tribunal. The EU, which believes that Serbia is the center of the Balkans, is doing little to pull it out of the muck. All member states seem to subscribe to the assumption that, under pro-EU President Boris Tadic, Serbia must be permitted to pursue the process of EU accession -- irrespective of its policies toward Kosovo and Bosnia and the fact that Serbia does not meet EU requirements for political and economic reform. 2. Empirically denied – wars in Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 90’s should have caused the impacts. 3. NATO solves the impact – can bargain within its political institutions and member states to force conflict resolution Erik Yesson (Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and specializes in international security and military affairs) 2003: Sending Credible Signals: NATO’s Role in Stabilizing Balkan Conflicts. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/yesson.pdf There is also no question that NATO members employed a lowest common denominator approach during the Kosovo campaign. This process bid down the intensity of the opening air strikes against Yugoslavia. It was difficult for the allies to signal their resolve because they rules out the use of ground forces and bombed from an altitude that insured ground fire could not down allied aircraft. Allied states creatively avoided domestic audience costs. Those contributing directly to the air attacks had a great deal of support from the public and opposition politicians. Meanwhile states whose publics and political opposition rejected the air campaign—Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Czech Republic, for example—did not participate directly in offensive military operations against Yugoslavia, sparing them from public rebuke. But these difficulties were surmountable within NATO’s existing political institutions. In the end air strikes far less punishing than those launched on Iraq in 1991 imposed sufficient political costs on Belgrade to force a settlement. NATO is a “consensus-making machine.” This means that the allies will make compromises. While the allies should be prepared for hard bargaining and internal debate—inevitable in any democratic alliance—they need not overhaul their alliance to pursue out-of-area peace and security operations. Current structures allow for building a consensus and sending credible signals. The reality is simply that some out-of-area operations are harder than others. In the future, intra-alliance debate on out-of-area interventions will likely focus on the degree of difficulty such operations pose. Answers to that question will inform first-order decision making on whether to intervene in the first place. 4. Balkan war won’t happen–regional powers have incentives to cooperate and relations are too solid BURNS 2006 (Nicholas, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Knocking on NATO’s Open Door,” Feb 19, http://zagreb.usembassy.gov/issues/060221.htm) A decade ago, the countries of Southeast Europe were reeling from the impact of Europe's bloodiest war in half a century. With the determined intervention of NATO, genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia were brought to an end; a few years later in Kosovo, NATO again intervened to end ethnic cleansing in the region. Southeast Europe seemed to some a tangle of intractable inter-ethnic conflicts in which only massive international peacekeeping deployments could keep the warring parties apart. But the United States and its friends in the region looked to tell a different story: one that would require friends to make hard choices for the sake of a peaceful and prosperous future for their people. Today's story is indeed different, in part thanks to the tremendous efforts of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. The region's nascent democracies have largely normalized their relations. Peacekeeping contingents have downsized, and a return to war is unlikely. The region is not only increasingly stable, but it contributes to international coalitions that work to end conflicts elsewhere. Southeast Europe is on the path to changing from being a consumer to a provider of security. On February 13 in Washington, the United States hosted the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to discuss recent accomplishments of these members of the Adriatic Charter, or "A3." Founded in May 2003, the A3 brings Albania, Croatia and Macedonia into a partnership with the United States to advance their individual and collective candidacies for NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were present as observers. At the meeting, we reviewed A3 progress on their individual NATO Membership Action Plans, and sought ways to bring NATO membership closer. We also shared lessons learned from deployments in international coalitions. Finally, we recommitted ourselves to our cooperation as friends and, if reforms continue to meet necessary standards, full Allies in the greatest Alliance in history: NATO. Not so long ago, such goals would have been impossible to imagine. The countries of the region have worked hard to gain this new status. With fresh memories of war and dictatorship, the A3 partners share a resolve to strengthen their democratic institutions, market economies and human rights, and to fight corruption and crime. The path to NATO and the European Union promotes a positive cycle of change: the more candidate countries do to pursue reforms required for membership, the more support they get for the accession process. Though difficult, the reforms are key to lasting peace and prosperity in the region. Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. 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