Banyan Whose splendid isolation? In the dock for its aggressive expansionism in the South China Sea, China seems undeterred

Banyan

Whose splendid isolation?

In the dock for its aggressive expansionism in the South China Sea, China seems undeterred

THE Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual powwow in Singapore for Asia-Pacific defence chiefs, has begun to follow a pattern: America and its friends in Asia line up to criticise China for its alleged transgressions in the seas around its coast; China issues fierce, mendacious and unconvincing rebuttals; everybody goes home. Last year, China’s crimes were its declaration of an Air-Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over an area including islands it disputes with Japan; and its dispatch of an oil-rig to drill in waters claimed by Vietnam. The row was vitriolic. This year, it has been building frantically in contested waters in the South China Sea. At Shangri-La, both the criticism and its response were more measured. But the disagreements seem even more profound and irreconcilable than a year ago, and China even more isolated.

Five of the six countries with claims to all or some of the reefs and islets in the South China Sea have built structures on them, often after reclaiming land. China, however, has taken this to unprecedented lengths. In his speech at the Dialogue, America’s defence secretary, Ash Carter, said China had filled in over 2,000 acres (810 hectares), “more than all other claimants combined…and more than in the entire history of the region”; and all in the past 18 months. He called this a “source of tension”.

China argues that the sea is peaceful and stable—far from the kind of security threat the Dialogue should have been discussing. It insists its sovereignty is “indisputable”, and that its building work is for the international common good: search and rescue; disaster; meteorology; conservation; and so on. But American officials believe otherwise. They say satellite pictures show that China brought two mobile-artillery vehicles to one of its man-made islands (though the weapons since seem to have been removed). It has also added harbours and, on one or two islands, airstrips. This has enhanced their military potential and, China presumably hopes, created evidence of its control and sovereignty. Mr Carter warned against “further militarisation” of the sea.

Around the world, American forces sail and fly through areas of tension to prove that they have the freedom to do so. But such behaviour in the South China Sea infuriates China, which claims that freedom of navigation is not under threat. It has always objected to America’s insistence that one such freedom is the right to send surveillance planes and ships up to the edge of China’s territorial waters. This disagreement has led to incidents such as one in 2001 when a Chinese jet collided with an American spy-plane; and another in 2009 when America complained about Chinese “harassment” of one of its surveillance ships.

Another potentially alarming confrontation looms. Mr Carter demanded an “immediate and lasting halt” to the land reclamation by China and other claimants. China shows no sign of stopping, and it seems inconceivable that America would resort to force. But it is under pressure to go further in asserting its right to use the contested waters and airspace. Also at the Dialogue was a delegation of senators led by John McCain, who is chairman of the Senate’s Armed Services Committee. Mr McCain said he hoped America would disregard any “territorial waters” China may claim around the man-made islands.

This is a complicated issue. China’s claims are unclear. Its maps show a “nine-dash line” encompassing most of the sea. But under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), sovereignty depends on the land. Countries can claim 12 nautical miles (22km) of territorial sea and 200 nautical miles of “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) off the coast of their mainlands and habitable islands. Uninhabitable “rocks” get the territorial waters but no EEZ; rocks that are submerged at high tide have no waters at all. The status of the places where China is building is uncertain. It is clear that, pre-construction, they were not “islands”; but some may be rocks with territorial waters; some “low-tide elevations” with none. Only “natural” features count, however, and America does not want to give the impression a low-tide elevation can become a rock, or a rock an island, thanks to construction. Despite never having ratified it, America does adhere to UNCLOS. And though it is not clear who does own these rocks and reefs (America, as one naval officer jokes, is “pretty sure they’re not ours”), the United States takes a keen interest in whether territorial lines have a basis in international law.

Don’t be troublesome, please

The impression the Dialogue gave was of a world united in outrage at China’s bullying in the South China Sea. But if America goads it with intensive surveillance around its maritime claims, China may succeed in portraying the United States as the troublemaker. Moreover, China knows America itself does not want to ruin what both countries regard as a crucial relationship just to make a point about island-building. The two countries have their annual high-level get-together, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, in Washington, DC, at the end of June; and China’s president, Xi Jinping, is due for a state visit in September. Preparations for both events are on track, despite the bickering.

As for the complaints it endures at the Shangri-La Dialogue, China may simply respond by stepping up efforts to develop its own, friendlier, alternative: an annual meeting in Beijing called the Xiangshan Forum, “Asia’s own platform for security dialogue”. Interfering American officials are not invited.

EIU

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