US Has Strong Democracy-Assistance Role in Mideast

U.S. Foreign Assistance High/Increasing

Lael Brainard, Brookings Institute-International Economics, 2007, Security By Other Means: foreign assistance, global poverty, and American leadership, ed. L. Brainard, p. 4

Indeed, it took the tragedy of September 11, 2001, to unite lawmakers across the political spectrum in support of a sizable increase in American foreign assistance. Two major military interventions, whose scope and duration have not been seen since America’s occupation of Japan and Germany, and a succession of humanitarian disasters, including the East Asian tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake, have led to massive increases in U.S. assistance. For the first time since the cold war ended, national security strategists and military experts are making the case that America has vital security interests in effective governance abroad. Indeed, one of the most persuasive advocates of deep U.S. engagement in the least developede reaches of the planet comes not from the development community but from the Naval War College. Thomas P. M. Barnett writes, “If a country is either losing out to globalization or rejecting much of the content flows associated with its advance, there is a far greater chance that the United States will end up sending military forces there at some point.”

Strong Support for Civil Society Now

Massimo Tommasoli, UN Observer for IDEA, 2010, Engaging Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance, eds. G. Cheema & V. Popovski, p. 131

The perceptions of civil society and its role in democratic change are influenced by two different traditions that Tom Carothers (2009) identified: one rooted in democracy promotion and the other related to development practice. While the former is based on a definition of democracy as a value in itself, the latter addresses democracy only inasmuch as it is a variable contributing to development. Thus the political approach focuses on direct and indirect support to democracy activists, and the developmental approach emphasizes strengthening the conditions for democratic development through building state capacity and good governance in the medium and long term in order to improve human conditions.

Goran Hyden, Political Science Professor-University of Florida, 2010, Engaging Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance, eds. G. Cheema & V. Popovski, p. 256

Broadly defined, democracy assistance is aid designed to advance social, economic and other conditions believed to be beneficial to democracy. What such assistance actually constitutes, however, is contested. Furthermore, given the plurality of actors in the international community, the means and methods used in promoting democracy are seldom uniform, and cover a variety of competing approaches. Regardless of approach, the rise in importance of such assistance in the past two decades is undeniable, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. It starts from the perspective that in order to strengthen democratic citizenship attitudes, norms, and behavior associated with democratic citizenship must be imparted and a vibrant civil society development (Burnell, 2000).
U.S. HEAVILY INVOLVED IN TARGETING CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS NOW

Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 104

Already, “civil society strengthening” is a visible component of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the State Department’s new several-hundred-million-dollar effort to promote reform in the Arab world beyond Iraq. In his December 2002 speech launching the initiative, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the United States would seek partnerships with “community leaders to close the freedom gap with projects to strengthen civil society” and would strengthen “the civic institutions that protect individual rights and provide opportunities for participation.” MEPI’s political reform “pillar,” one of four categories under which the initiative’s programs are organized, has “strengthening civil society” as one of its leading objectives. To date, MEPI has funded several civil society programs, and new programs are in the pipeline. Outside the MEPI framework, USAID’s large, multiyear NGO assistance programs in Egypt and in the West Bank and Gaza are still under way.
ALL DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE FOCUSED ON CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT NOW

Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2000, Funding Virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion, eds. M. Ottaway & T. Carothers, p. 3

Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2000, Funding Virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion, eds. M. Ottaway & T. Carothers, p. 6

Civil society assistance was not a major component of democracy aid at the outset. In the first phase, which unfolded primarily from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, donors concentrated on elections. The United States and other aid-giving countries underwrote countless election observer missions and election administration projects to support the many transitional elections occurring in the developing world and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the second phase, donors added to their portfolio of democracy assistance the reform of major state institutions, especially judiciaries and legislatures, to help render them more competent, accountable, and representative. In the third phase, which arose in the mid-1990s, they began to focus on strengthening civil society. In the past five to seven years, civil society programs have mushroomed. In most countries attempting transitions to democracy, numerous donors are sponsoring programs explicitly labeled as “civil society assistance” with pro-democracy objectives. More broadly, the general notion that civil society development is critical to democratization has become a new mantra in both aid and diplomatic circles.
EGYPT RECEIVES SIGNIFICANT CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE FROM US NOW

Imco Brouwer, Mediterranean Program Coordinator-European University Institute, 2000, Funding Virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion, eds. M. Ottaway & T. Carothers, p. 22-3

I chose Egypt for a number of reasons. First, it receives a significant amount of civil society assistance from Washington. Second, it provides a test of the effectiveness of civil society assistance in a climate of limited and diminishing political liberalization: after periods of relaxing its hold in the 1970s and 1980s, the Egyptian government in the 1990s became increasingly restrictive. Third, Egypt illustrates how the donors’ goal of democracy promotion is balanced against—or outweighed by—their desire for political stability in a country and a region. Moderate Islamist forces have been important social and political actors in Egypt for many decades, and radical Islamist forces that espouse the use of violence have put the regime under strong pressure in the 1980s and 1990s. The regime has adopted a hard line against moderate and radical Islamist activists alike, and most donors, including governments, intergovernmental organizations, and to a lesser degree NGOs, accept or even sympathize with Cairo’s policy. The reason for this acquiescence is that they consider stability in Egypt crucial for maintaining and furthering peace with Israel.
CURRENT CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE IS DIVERSIFIED

OECD, 2009, Better Aid: Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, Findings, Recommendations and Good Practice, p. 110

Most donors have adapted to the diversity of CSO actors and situations—and indeed the diversity of their own priorities as donors—by adopting a wide range of civil society support mechanisms. Existing analysis suggests that this is an appropriate response, as it provides more choice for CSOs and for donors seeking to support them, and provides opportunities for donors to experiment with different funding mechanisms.

Attention to diversity is particularly important today, because emerging evidence suggests increasing concentration of aid resources in a smaller number of CSOs and increased restrictions on sectors of interventions and types of activities. Several authors have called for an appropriate balance to be established between mechanisms that are responsive to CSOs’ priorities and approaches and those that steer CSOs into areas of donor interest.

Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 201