*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
Civil Society Assistance Fails: Rebuilding Failed States
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- Civil Society Assistance Fails: Problems with USAID Undermine Effectiveness
Civil Society Assistance Fails: Rebuilding Failed StatesCIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS EMPIRICALLY INEFFECTIVE AT REPLACING STATE INSTITUTIONS DURING TRANSITIONS Mathijs van Leeuwen, Professor Radboud University-Netherlands, 2009, Partners in Peace: discourses and practices of civil-society peacebuilding, p. 184 Secondly, the extent to which civil society can take over from failing state institutions is limited. The case of Burundi in particular puts in doubt the idea that civil society could serve as a fairer alternative or replace the institutions of the state in providing justice. At community level, civil society only to a limited extent could fulfill such functions. Various NGOs supported local conflict resolving institutions to deal with land disputes. In practice, such local institutions lacked knowledge of state legislation and differed strongly in their interpretations of what justice was about. And while local institutions might in principle be better adapted to take care of the local particularities of conflict and local sense of justice, and be less corrupt than then formal juridical system, the case of Burundi shows that this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, precisely such characteristics are lost when local institutions are seen as alternatives to the state judicial system. Supporting local institutions did not always result in strengthening those institutions but could also end in their formalization. Legal training to local institutions resulted in that in disputes on land were reviewed on the basis of state legislation at the expense of local perspectives of justice, thereby moving those institutions further away from the communities. More important than the proper balance between civil-society and state institutions is to assure the accessibility of institutions – both local and state.
Mathijs van Leeuwen, Professor Radboud University-Netherlands, 2009, Partners in Peace: discourses and practices of civil-society peacebuilding, p. 184-5 Thirdly, in many instances, civil society is heavily affected by conflict, reducing its capacities for peacebuilding. In southern Sudan and Burundi, many of the traditional institutions to deal with conflict at local level has eroded significantly as a consequence of violence, or were incapable to deal with the large scale violence affecting their communities. In Guatemala, civil-society organizations were restricted in their space of operation, leaving but a few strategies to realize societal change. Such conditions pose limitations for the democratizing roles of civil society envisaged. Often, civil society is not representing visions different from government. In the Great Lakes Region, the affinity of civil society with state politics impeded possibilities for regional civil society peacebuilding interventions. Before civil society could play a role in reconciling governments, reconciliation of civil society itself was necessary.
Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 101-2 Where civil society assistance fell short was in contributing to a process of democratization. The tens of millions of dollars in aid did not generate popular demand for democracy, alters Arab governments’ intolerance of independent citizen activism, or spur a broader dynamic of political change. Although it is certainly unrealistic to expect external assistance programs to decisively affect the political direction of any Arab society, U.S. civil society aid can nevertheless be seen as flawed in two fundamental respects. First was the manner in which civil society assistance was implemented. Programs involving service NGOs tended to be overly bureaucratic and micromanaged. U.S. contractors served as “pass-through agencies” for USAID funds, assembling large staffs to disperse grants to NGOs and to provide technical assistance. The rationale for this top-heavy arrangement was that outside contractors were needed because USAID was too understaffed to oversee what sometimes amounted to tends of millions of dollars in NGO grants. The result, however, was to create a bureaucratic superstructure that was reminiscent of some of the restrictions Arab governments place on NGOs. To be considered for funding, NGOs had to submit detailed proposals; once approved, they had to undergo various training programs and meet strict accountability of funds is understandable, such requirements were beyond the capacity of most groups. Aid for prodemocracy groups often suffered from the opposite problem: too much informality. This assistance was typically for short-term, one-off projects, with little follow-up. Across the board, the evaluation of civil society projects was superficial, rarely getting past the question of how many activities were completed to probe the deeper issue of whether the assistance contributed to political change. TIED NATURE OF USAID UNDERMINES EFFECTIVENESS OF US CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE Benoit Challand, Research Fellow-European Institute in Florence, 2009, Palestinian Civil Society: foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, p. 106 The problem of tied funding is twofold: on the one hand, it gives the wrong impression that large amounts of funding are made available for Palestinian development whereas, in fact, this funding remains in western Capitals; on the other hand, it limits the flexibility of funding to reach each single part of the Territories. In both cases, the result is a biased form of international aid, and in particular in the first instance, it means that strategic decision-making is not taken in accordance with local needs. According to Nakhleh, the problem not only lies in the amount of tied funding but with the type of projects put forward by certain donors, and – in particular—USAID. In his words:
So tied funding would also be about a form of conditionality linked to the certain preferred approaches to the peace negotiations. US DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE APPROACH FRAGMENTED WITH MULTIPLE GOALS NOW Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 194 To date, the soft line lacks definition. As U.S State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials have searched for ways to step up U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East, they have tended to put forward many ideas. All of these various ideas are appealing to one group or another in the U.S. policy community but do not necessarily add up to a coherent strategy—promoting women’s rights, bolstering civil society, revitalizing education, fostering good governance, strengthening the rule of law, supporting decentralization, and so forth. Looking at this growing domain of activities and initiatives, it is possible to see several competing strategies at work. This chapter identifies and assesses these diverse strategies, examines the question of whether they constitute a coherent whole, and identifies the key choice concerning strategy that lies directly ahead. Directory: assets assets -> Northern territory of australia assets -> Number: caveat in the [Will/Will and Codicil/Estate of] assets -> Invitation for Bid Calact/mbta for Standard Floor and Low Floor Rural Duty Vehicles ifb no. 12-03 November 14, 2012 assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> Sigaccess annual Report assets -> Central Government is expected to ask the seventh pay commission to consider merging 50% dearness allowance assets -> List of accessible executive records assets -> Emergency telephone numbers Call toll-free from anywhere in France Download 2.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
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