Trump’s Proposals


Trump Policies Take Out Solvency



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Con

Trump Policies Take Out Solvency



Expanding the military useless when Trump wants to decrease its forward deployment


Tryle Schlote, November 29, 2016, The Trumpet, Making the Military Great Again? https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/14357.2.0.0/world/military/making-the-military-great-again

While Mr. Trump talks about advancing America’s military power, he also wants to pull back America’s military power. No wonder nations in Europe and Asia are scrambling—they don’t know what to expect from him. Those regions are already undergoing changes because of Mr. Trump’s election. Consider further why Mr. Trump wants to disengage from the world. Mr. Trump told the New York Times that when America agreed to protect other nations, “we were a rich country. We’re not a rich country. We were a rich country with a very strong military and tremendous capability in so many ways. We’re not anymore.” He went on to say, “We protect countries, and take tremendous monetary hits on protecting countries.” This is his reasoning for pulling out of nations like Japan, South Korea and Germany if they don’t agree to take on a greater share of the costs. America doesn’t have the money to maintain foreign bases, he says, but apparently it does have the money to increase military spending in America. Already, the Trumpet has reported on the consequences of America’s withdrawal from the world. Europe is defenseless against Russia without the U.S., so Trump’s election led the European Union to speed up the process of creating a unified European army. Without American backing, Southeast Asia would be unable to defend itself against Chinese expansionism. These massive geopolitical shifts do not seem to concern Mr. Trump, even though the savings to America would be minimal at best. n 2016, the U.S. defense budget was $585 billion—a staggering amount of money. However, it only costs $5.5 billion to maintain its forces on Japan, $2.7 billion to maintain its forces in South Korea, and $4.4 billion to maintain its forces in Germany. Much of those costs are personnel costs, which would have to be paid regardless of where the soldiers were stationed, so the costs of maintaining a foreign presence decreases even more. Is it worth disengaging from these crucial regions to save only a couple billion dollars a year? Mr. Trump doesn’t seem to have a problem increasing defense spending by tens of billions of dollars, as long as it’s being spent on America. But spending that money to defend other nations is unacceptable to him. Mr. Trump’s “America first” policy reveals a muddled approach to foreign policy that will lead to disaster. A stronger military, gained through more deficit spending, is of no value if it just sits in America. Many are worried that his policies will lead to American isolationism. Mr. Trump may see strength in that. After all, the strategy worked in the early 1900s, for the most part. But in the 21st century—with intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, long-range bombers and cyberwarfare—isolation from the rest of the world no longer guarantees safety and protection. Mr. Trump reasons that a stronger military will deter people from attacking America. But what if American disengagement leads to a geopolitical shift that causes Europe or Asia to become more powerful than the U.S.? M

Russia A2/AD Answers




Policy changes solve


Jonathan Altman, 2016, Naval War College Review, Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Meditteranean, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/4ac8b59c-4634-44b3-af06-dee0203d6c67/Russian-A2-AD-in-the-Eastern-Mediterranean---A-Gro.aspx (Jonathan Altman is a program analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc., who holds a master’s degree in international security from the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.)

Fortunately, there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome. Starting at the geopolitical level, the most straightforward counter to the Russian establishment of an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone would be to break the nascent bond between Russia and Turkey. 25 For reasons already described, an openly hostile Turkey would prove a fatal bar to Russian aspirations. Practically speaking, there are a number of pressure points that could be leveraged by American policy makers seeking to fracture the Russian-Turkish relationship. Perhaps most immediately, the conflict in Syria provides an opening. While the Russians continue to support the Assad government against all rebel forces, including through active aerial bombardment, Turkey remains fundamentally opposed to

Assad’s continued presence and provides support to some of those same forcesseeking to overthrow him. 26 This discord could be highlighted to increase domestic pressure on President Erdogan to back off from supporting Russia. American officials could also consider more robustly supporting some Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups to gain a more favorable perception from Erdogan. There are additional avenues that could be pursued to undermine Russian-Turkish bilateral relations as well, such as publicizing past historical enmity or Russia’s harsh treatment of Muslims in its Caucasus region. Another nonmilitary option for countering Russian plans can be found in defense policy. Specifically, NATO nations could individually, in groups, or preferably as one voice issue a strong statement of maritime declaratory policy with respect to Russian expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean. Such a statement would aim to show the Russians that the alliance is united in opposition to the Russian threat and that Russian moves are not going unnoticed. Of course, to be effective—to avoid being seen as hollow—this statement would need to be supported by military demonstrations. One such example could be the announcement and visible media coverage of a NATO-wide war game in the Mediterranean in which the alliance would practice its abilities to cooperatively respond to regional A2/AD challenges. The effect of this war game would be amplified if NATO forces were seen to be often practicing, as part of their normal routines, the planning and joint naval exercises needed to operate in an A2/AD environment.



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