Background
Trump’s proposal includes increased funding for cyber security, reversals in sequestration, more fighters, and increase in troop strength, and 80 more ships for the Navy
Bill Bartel, November 14, 2016, Military.com, Trump’s military expansion plans could be boost to Hampton roads, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/11/14/trump-military-expansion-plans-could-be-boost-hampton-roads.html
The president-elect has proposed a military buildup that would include enlarging the Navy's fleet to 350 ships from today's 270-plus. He wants to grow the Marine Corps to 36 battalions from today's 24 and increase the Army's troop strength to 540,000, an increase of about 65,000. He would add at least 1,200 fighter aircraft to the Air Force, increase the number of missiles and upgrade cybersecurity. Trump also promised to end the automatic budget cuts known as sequestration that were set in motion three years ago after Congress failed to settle on a plan to reduce deficit spending. Roughly half of $1 trillion in cuts over 10 years are aimed at military spending. Congress and President Barack Obama have found ways to use adjustments to dodge or reduce cuts for a few years, but haven't agreed on how to stop them.
General Pro
US Credibility and Deterrence Low Now
Assurance low now --- un-fulfilled redlines
Bruce Klinger 14, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia @ The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, “Asia’s Big Fear: Is America Emboldening China and North Korea?” July 17, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/7/asias-big-fear-is-america-emboldening-china-and-north-korea
Despite these reassurances and the Obama administration’s loudly proclaimed “Asia Pivot,” Asian nations increasingly question U.S. military capabilities and resolve. The pivot strategy is sound only if Washington devotes sufficient resources to deploy the requisite military forces in the Pacific. Without this, it fails to reassure allies or deter potential opponents. But even well before sequestration, it was obvious that the Obama administration was underfunding U.S. defense requirements.
Secretary of Defense Hagel commented in February 2014 that, due to sequestration, the military readiness and modernization budget would be cut, leading to “a hollow force . . . that is not ready, that is not capable of fulfilling assigned missions. In the longer term . . . the resulting force would be . . . too small to fully execute the President's defense strategy.”
The Asia Pivot—which never provided for new permanent deployments of additional military forces to the Pacific—has been derailed by defense budget cuts. Beyond that, Seoul and Tokyo were flummoxed by Obama’s refusal to live up to the pledged military response when Syrian President Assad crossed the U.S. redline against using chemical weapons against civilians. The allies have privately expressed fears that Obama might similarly abandon U.S. defense commitments if North Korea or China attacked them. Similarly, U.S. inability or unwillingness to prevent Vladimir Putin’s actions in Crimea generated concerns that China would be encouraged take similar action against areas Beijing claims as its own.
Despite strong U.S. rhetoric, America’s opponents haven’t moderated their behavior. Our Asian allies now fear that the administration’s slashed defense budgets and unfilled ‘red lines’ will embolden Beijing and Pyongyang to employ more coercive diplomacy—or worse.
AT: Deterrence Theory False Deterrence works---the theory is robust and proven by centuries of empiricism
Quackenbush-prof political science Missouri-10
General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory International Interactions, 36, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050620903554069
This paper has two related purposes. The specific purpose is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting perfect deterrence theory—a recently developed theory of general deterrence—to a systematic test. I do so for several reasons. First, perfect deterrence theory (Zagare and Kilgour 2000) is supported by a formal logic with explicit theoretical expectations that facilitates empirical testing. Second, several preliminary tests of perfect deterrence theory have rendered promising, albeit provisional results (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush and Zagare 2006).1 And finally, as Huth (1999) points out, standard formulations of deterrence—to the extent that they have been explored empirically—are without compelling support. The more general purpose is to develop the conceptualization and procedures to make such a test possible. This is necessary to bridge the divide between formal theories and quantitative analyses of deterrence. Key conceptualizations include case selection for direct general deterrence—I argue that identifying opportunity for conflict is the key. In addition, this paper offers the first direct test of incomplete information equilibrium predictions made by formal deterrence theory. Conducting such a test requires measurement of the utilities the actors have for the different outcomes that may emerge, so a modification of the measurement procedures developed by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) is used. Also, since incomplete information equilibria depend on each state’s estimate of the opponent’s credibility, a nonlinear transformation technique is developed to estimate the credibility parameters. To test perfect deterrence theory, I examine general deterrence from 1816–2000. After detailing the equilibrium predictions of perfect deterrence theory’s unilateral deterrence game, I more fully discuss the research design used to test them, including case selection, measurement of variables, and statistical method. In the next section, I discuss the empirical results and the theory’s ability to explain general deterrence and international conflict. The results indicate that perfect deterrence theory is well supported by the empirical record. Finally, I compare these findings to previous results supporting Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992) international interaction game that is the basis of one of the most influential and important theories of interstate conflict.
Moore-prof law Virginia-4
Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace pg 30-38
As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation. In my War & Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century. This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly. In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six weeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary to prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France would not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed in his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.” In contrast, following Hermann Goering’s failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attack on South Korea and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded by what I refer to as a “double deterrence absence.” That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not inclined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the real historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the later robust NATO alliance and an absence of World War III. Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. In this book he conducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal’s War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence. Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod’s famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy. Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives. The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings.
Aircraft Carriers Decreasing
US down to 10 aircraft carriers, below the number required by law
Tryle Schlote, November 29, 2016, The Trumpet, Making the Military Great Again? https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/14357.2.0.0/world/military/making-the-military-great-again
A simple review of the recent history of the United States military reveals why so many soldiers feel that the military is broken. Hampered by a sequestration imposed in 2013, the military has faced serious cutbacks in funding. Since that time, there have been few developments to celebrate. In late 2012, the U.S. Navy downsized to only 10 aircraft carriers. Federal law requires the Navy to have no less than 11 operational aircraft carriers, but the current administration has simply ignored that law.
Air Force is short 4,000 airmen and 700 pilots
Tryle Schlote, November 29, 2016, The Trumpet, Making the Military Great Again? https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/14357.2.0.0/world/military/making-the-military-great-again
The U.S. Air Force is reportedly 4,000 airmen short to maintain its fleets and 700 pilots short to fly them. Then there are the numerous reports of worn-out military equipment, reduced flight hours, and extended deployments.
Should Expand the Army -- Hegemony
Expanding the army from 460,000 to 540,000 increases the power projection capabilities of the military
Tryle Schlote, November 29, 2016, The Trumpet, Making the Military Great Again? https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/14357.2.0.0/world/military/making-the-military-great-again
Mr. Trump also favors expanding the Army to 540,000 troops. Under the current sequester, the Army is slated to downsize to 450,000 troops by 2018, but Mr. Trump says he will reverse that.He plans to expand the Marine Corps from 24 infantry battalions to 36, end the sequester, and create a new state-of-the-art missile system.
There’s no doubt such a buildup would greatly increase America’s ability to project power around the world. Additional men and material would reinforce its status as the world’s lone superpower, and undo many years of retreat.
A stronger military boosts power and prestige
Tryle Schlote, November 29, 2016, The Trumpet, Making the Military Great Again? https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/14357.2.0.0/world/military/making-the-military-great-again
In his mind, and undoubtedly in the minds of many of those who voted for him, America has been losing for some time now. It’s been losing in trade; it’s been losing in prestige; it’s been losing in power. Now it’s time to make America great again. Part of his solution is to pump billions of dollars into the military. A greater military means greater power and prestige.
General Hegemony Impacts
Global security challenges
Robert Marnitage, 2014, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting Long Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability, , http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore [Robert Martinage recently returned to CSBA after ve years of public service in the Department of Defense (DoD). While performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Navy, he led development of the Department of the Navy’s FY 2014/2015 budgets and represented the Department during the Strategic Choices and Management Review, as well as within the Defense Management Action Group (DMAG). From 2010–2013, Mr. Martinage served as the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, providing senior-level advice on foreign and defense policy, naval capa- bility and readiness, security policy, intelligence oversight, and special programs. Appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Con ict, and Interdependent Capabilities in the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 2009, Mr. Martinage focused on special operations, irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, and security force assistance policy. He also led a two- year, DoD-wide effort to develop an investment path for a future long-range strike “family of systems.”]
After more than a decade of sustained, costly military operations in reductions in defense spending as the country attempts to climb out of debt. Facing an uncdertain period of fiscal austerity, the U.S. military nevertheless confronts a range of global security challenges. In Europe, Russia is resurgent and increasingly assertive in its near abroad. In the Middle East, the Syrian arsenal as it drives toward a nuclear weapons capability. In Central Asia, the security situation in Afghanistan remains tenuous and will likely deteriorate as U.S. forces withdraw over the coming year. In East Asia, an unstable, nuclear- armed North Korea remains as belligerent as ever, while China pursues hegemonic ambitions and has become increasingly confrontational in the South China Sea. The metastasizing radical Islamic threat has spread from the Middle East and Central Asia into Africa
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