Trump’s Proposals

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EMPs

China developing EMP weapons

A July 22, 2011, press report states that “China’s military is developing electromagnetic pulse weapons that Beijing plans to use against U.S. aircraft carriers in any future conflict over Taiwan, according to an intelligence report made public on Thursday [July 21].... The report, produced in 2005 and once labeled ‘secret,’ stated that Chinese military writings have discussed building low- yield EMP warheads, but ‘it is not known whether [the Chinese] have actually done so.’”

Cyberwar

China developing cyberwarfare capabilities

ONI states that

Strategic Chinese military writings do not specifically deal with how China would employ cyber operations in a maritime environment, although they do make clear the importance of cyber operations. The PLA highlights network warfare as one of the “basic modes of sea battle” alongside air, surface, and underwater long-range precision strikes.” As the PLA’s larger military investment in emerging domains such as cyber matures, the application of cyber operations in the maritime realm will consequently bolster the PLA(N)’s capability.¹³⁷

China A2/AD

China A/AD Capabilities Increase Regional Aggression

Through the construction of a “fortress fleet,” China is developing anti-access (A2) and AntiDenial (AD) capabilities that threaten the ability of the United States and its allies to project power in the Asia Pacific. We need to respond to deter the Chinese

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, June 20, 2016, The Diplomat, Defeating China’s Fortress Fleet A2/AD Strategy: Lessons for the United States and Her Allies, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/defeating-chinas-fortress-fleet-and-a2ad-strategy-lessons-for-the-united-states-and-her-allies/
To borrow from the strategist Obi-wan Kenobi: Japan and South Korea have the mixed fortune to inhabit a wretched hive of scum and villainy, populated by the likes of China and North Korea. The same goes for U.S. forces based in Northeast Asia. We are all in this together. But how does an alliance like ours uphold freedom of the sea and other important interests in such a neighborhood? How do you deter an ambitious, seafaring great power like China that wants to abridge freedom of the sea, when your navy and its supporting ground and air forces lie constantly within effective weapons range? Can you deter such a power? Henry Kissinger says Yes. You can make a believer out of your opponent by amassing impressive capabilities—capabilities meaning not just widgets but the obvious ability to use them effectively for operational and strategic gain. And you make him a believer by convincing him of your resolve to use those capabilities to defeat his aims should he do things you want to deter. Deterrence is thus a product of multiplying capability by resolve by belief. That’s Kissinger’s equation. As we remember from grade-school algebra, if any variable in a series of variables multiplied by one another is zero, so is the product. If any one of Kissinger’s three factors is zero, so is deterrence. Maximize all three and you have a fighting chance to deter. Let summarize the strategic predicament facing our three countries, then briefly go through those three elements of deterrence—capability, resolve, and belief—and close by sketching one of many prospective strategic courses of action the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance could embrace to deter a China that seems bent on remaking the Asian maritime order to our—and the region’s—detriment. Let’s first review the maritime strategic situation. China has constructed a “fortress fleet,” and this represents savvy strategy on its part. Fortress fleet is an obscure term but not a new one. A bit over a century ago, naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, the second president of the Naval War College and probably history’s most influential proponent of sea power, savaged the imperial Russian Navy for operating such a fleet—for deploying a fleet, that is, that sheltered timidly under the guns of Port Arthur for protection against the big, bad Imperial Japanese Navy commanded by Admiral Tōgō. The logic of a fortress fleet is straightforward. Forts and other land bases generally outgun fleets. If a hostile fleet comes with range, the fort’s gunnery can pound it. A battleship or a cruiser—the capital ships of yesteryear—is a big gun platform by naval standards, but it’s small by contrast with a fortress that can sprawl out on shore. Forts house bigger weapons boasting greater range and more ammunition. So if a fleet enjoys fire support from a fort, it can hope to withstand or even defeat a stronger foe. That’s what Russian commanders tried to do during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. When the Russian squadron stayed close to Port Arthur, Tōgō’s fleet typically kept its distance to avoid getting whacked. When the Russians ventured beyond range of Port Arthur’s gunners, they lost—catastrophically so. Two Russian fleets were reduced to artificial reefs by the end of the conflict. So there’s safety in fire support. But merely existing is not a navy’s purpose. A century ago artillery had extremely short effective firing ranges, measured in just a few miles. Staying within reach of shore fire support thus meant staying within a very cramped sea area—and surrendering the high seas to the enemy. A fortress fleet could stay safe, then, but if it did it accomplished next to nothing of value. That’s why Mahan blasted Russian commanders for pursuing a “radically erroneous” naval strategy against Japan. Does his critique hold up today? No. I think the day of the fortress fleet has come, courtesy of extended-range, precision, guided-missile technology. Ask yourself: what if the guns of Port Arthur could have rained accurate fire on ships throughout the Yellow Sea or beyond? How would the Russo-Japanese War have turned out if Tōgō had had to worry about getting pummeled as soon as he left port? That would have put a different complexion on things. Technology has granted China’s navy the luxury of operating within range of shore fire support throughout vast sea areas. No longer are ships confined within a short radius of a single point along the coast. Assuming they fulfill their hype, systems like the DF-31D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles will provide protective cover for PLA Navy warships operating well beyond the first island chain—beyond the second island chain if the DF-26 reaches the upper limit of its estimated firing range. In other words, PLA weaponry can, at least hypothetically, strike at enemy fleets throughout the waters Beijing cares about most—the Western Pacific and China seas. And that’s not all. PLA ASBM batteries are mobile. They’re mounted on trucks. Latter-day “fortresses” can be positioned up and down Chinese shorelines, and repositioned to concentrate fire near potential trouble spots. The imperial Russian Navy had Port Arthur, a single point on the Liaotung Peninsula that could sweep a small offshore area clear of hostile vessels. The PLA Navy has Fortress China, which adjoins all of the embattled expanses just offshore. One imagines this technological progress would give Mahan pause. I doubt the prophet of sea power would castigate China for radically erroneous strategy, the way he did Russia. China has the long arm of advanced weaponry. It can operate a free-range navy while still reaching out from land to smite China’s foes. Weapons technology has superseded Mahan’s critique. I need not remind anyone here what this means in geographic terms. Korea is a half-island appended to continental Asia. Japan is an archipelago five hundred or fewer miles offshore, depending on the latitude. Japanese and Koreans live within the anti-access/area-denial zone, as do the U.S. Seventh Fleet and affiliated joint forces. How do you deter a China that has such an arsenal at its disposal, when you’re permanently in close quarters with it? For one thing, let’s construe “capability” broadly rather than limit it to weapons, tactics, and operational methods. Anti-access/area denial is about more than guns and ammo. It is a strategy if not a grand strategy. China gets this. For instance, it harnesses not just strategic rocket forces and PLA Navy and Air Force assets to deter and coerce, but also psychological, media, and legal operations—its so-called three warfares. Beijing wages the three warfares 24/7/365 to shape opinion in its favor, with the goal of disheartening potential opponents or convincing them the costs of bucking China’s will would be unbearable. There’s wisdom in China’s methods, however much we might deplore China’s aims. We should reciprocate—taking stock of all the resources we can pool as an alliance, not just our military forces. In Kissinger’s lingo, these are all elements of capability. Let’s leave no implement—diplomatic, economic, or military—on the shelf in this high-stakes competition. Unity—what Kissinger calls will—is one of these implements. Carl von Clausewitz, the grand wizard of all things military, reminds us that the “community of interest” constitutes the “center of gravity” for multinational consortiums. Disrupt the community of interest through an effective military blow, the compelling threat of such a blow, or political means, and you splinter the alliance into manageable bits. China’s approach to diplomacy is reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s Hegemonic King, who overawes outmatched neighbors into not combining against him, then deals with them piecemeal. It doubtless pleases Beijing when diplomats from smaller neighbors utter sentiments like, “When the dragon roars, the little countries need to stay away from the fire coming out of its mouth.” That’s how one ASEAN diplomat explained ASEAN’s retraction of a strong statement against Chinese lawlessness in the South China Sea last week. Let’s firm up our allied unity—and deny China the easy victory promised by its Hegemonic King strategy. If our alliance maintains solidarity while deploying formidable diplomatic, economic, and military means, we will stand a good chance of making believers out of China. It’s doubtful Beijing will ever formally relinquish such goals as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, or its claims to sovereignty over sea and sky. Nor is it likely to dismantle its fortress-fleet strategy, or the navy that takes refuge underneath. But we gain time if we deter China. And if we gain enough time, good things may happen. China may mellow, postponing a reckoning on contentious matters into the indefinite future. Stringing out the strategic competition may be the best we can achieve. Up to now I’ve spoken in general terms about allied power and purpose. What about strategy? Others here are far better qualified than I to comment on how the allies can preserve and deepen their sense of common purpose—their community of interest. Such diplomatic endeavors are of fundamental importance to our cause. Since time is short, however, let me stick to the naval and military dimensions for now and we can widen the aperture during the Q&A if you so desire. How do you blunt a fortress-fleet strategy? Well, for one thing, we can take the fleet out of fortress fleet. The PLA may operate ASBMs, but the allies have anti-ship capability of their own. We have systems that can span the waters we care about, and our reach will only grow in the coming years as we distribute lethality throughout our fighting forces. We could, say, deploy mobile batteries of anti-air and anti-ship missiles along the island chain, turning geography to advantage. Ground-pounders thus could assail shipping that attempts east-west movement from the China seas into the Western Pacific and back. The Ryukyus and other island groups would become de facto missile emplacements—hard to root out short of amphibious assault. Offensive sea mines in the straits would complete the offshore cordon, while submarines lurking behind the island chain would provide mobile striking forces to plug gaps should PLA Navy surface or undersea forces stage a breakout anyway. Meanwhile, a few allied subs could slip into the Yellow and East China seas to raid shipping from below. In short: the ROK Navy, JMSDF, and U.S. Navy could bottle up China’s navy within the first island chain while making the waters within dangerous indeed. If China’s A2/AD strategy constitutes Beijing’s challenge, joint and combined island warfare—or, in peacetime, the imposing threat thereof—would constitute the allied reply. The result would be a kind of mutually assured sea and air denial—in other words, a form of conventional deterrence. Over time, considering China’s reliance on seaborne imports of natural resources and exports of finished goods, blockading China from afar would probably hurt them more, economically and militarily, than it would hurt us. That’s the hardware part. Lifting our gaze, the allies could negotiate a geographic division of labor to execute such a strategy. Japan could apply its efforts mainly along a southwestern axis, minding the islands and straits between the home islands and Taiwan. Korea could look eastward and northward, closing the Tsushima Strait to north-south Chinese movements while policing the Sea of Japan in case of a breakthrough. Such a partition of duties would let each partner harness its competitive advantages, operate on the ground it knows best, and, in the case of Japan, continue what it’s already doing as it fields a dynamic defense force to guard or recover the Ryukyus. Japan and Korea, then, can help the United States by helping themselves. To the extent that Tokyo and Seoul can manage events in Northeast Asia, they will free up U.S. joint forces for operations to the south—letting them tighten the cordon around the South China Sea, take down China’s manufactured islands, or whatever. Such a strategy would pay off in a wider strategic competition or war. And it would send a message. China is prone to hubris, or overweening pride. It believes History with a capital H is on China’s side, and will remain there. But if the allies work out a counterstrategy, field the implements necessary to execute it, and conspicuously practice executing it, they can sow doubt in Chinese minds. They can counteract hubris, reminding Beijing of what the ancient Greeks knew: that the gods punish outrageous human arrogance. Nemesis, or divine retribution, follows hubris inexorably. Pride goes before a fall. In so doing, the allies can deflate China’s confidence in its fortress-fleet strategy. And Kenobi, Kissinger, and Mahan—wherever they are—will smile.

Failure to contest China’s A2/AD capabilities undermines deterrence against China’s aggression in the South China Seas and Taiwan

Torsvoll, Fletcher School of law and Diplomacy MA law and diplomacy, 2015

(Eirik, “China's Anti-Access Challenge and America's Air-Sea Battle Response”, 2-26, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=188445)

The novelty of today’s A2/AD measures, however, is in the power of technology, which has made missile capabilities much more potent and accessible. China now has the ability to target U.S. bases and forces beyond ranges of a thousand nautical miles. Its missile capabilities include advanced cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, with greater precision and range than previously possible. When this capability is coupled with existing and expanding military power, such as modern submarines, fighter jets, and minelayers, it becomes a dangerous picture for any U.S. commander attempting to operate near or within China’s maritime periphery. The development has turned the offense-defense balance decidedly in the favor of the latter. The reach and effectiveness of China’s missiles is significant, because much of the U.S. force projection in the region is reliant on bases and access to the maritime commons. When this is put at risk, decision-makers in Washington must make a much tougher call on whether to deploy U.S. forces in a given situation. The calculus is worsened further by the fact that U.S. forces are operating far from home, being reliant on a long logistical chain, while China would be operating in its own backyard. Beijing is thus exploiting a “home field advantage” as well as the cost-effectiveness of missile attacks against capital-intensive U.S. military assets. What is at stake is America’s ability to deter China from using, or threatening to use, force against its neighbors in the region. A response to China’s A2/AD capabilities has therefore been deemed crucial in Washington. Additionally, by being able to cast doubt over the United States’ resolve and ability to intervene in a given situation, Beijing is strengthening its overall regional power. This allows China greater flexibility in pursuing favorable outcomes to its strategic interests, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well as changing the status of Taiwan. It could also lead decision-makers in Beijing into thinking that it had the upper hand in any conflict against the United States, and open up for adventurism in new areas of China’s neighborhood.

Perception of US Weakness Means China Escalates

Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies @ Victoria University, 14

(Robert, “Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia,” http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf)

China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But knowing the resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7 Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves, become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific: China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR systems including America’s satellite capabilities. In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to a much more serious and damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early resort to anti-satellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that nuclear escalation is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the great equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese) conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and

Taiwan War Goes Nuclear

War with Taiwan goes nuclear

Dr. Adam Lowther 8/11/15, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command, with Alex Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, August 11, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/

Possible Scenario¶ While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.¶ If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.¶ In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.¶ It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.¶ In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.¶ China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.¶ China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.¶ Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.¶ Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.¶ Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.¶ China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.¶

US-China War Goes Nuclear

Colby, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 2-15-15 (Elbridge, “The Foreign Policy Essay: A Nuclear Asia?,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/02/the-foreign-policy-essay-a-nuclear-asia/, accessed 2-16-15, CMM)

For all the focus on maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, there is an even greater peril in Asia that deserves attention: the rising salience of nuclear weapons. China’s military buildup—in particular its growing capabilities to blunt America’s ability to project effective force in the western Pacific—is threatening to change the military balance in the region. This will lead to a cascade of strategic shifts that will make nuclear weapons more central in both American and Chinese national-security plans, while increasing the danger that other regional states will seek nuclear arsenals of their own. Like it or not, nuclear weapons in Asia are back. This is true for four reasons. First, the conventional military balance in the region is becoming more competitive in ways that will make the possibility of nuclear escalation in the event of conflict more likely. After three quarters of a century of unquestioned supremacy in maritime Asia, the U.S. military is now facing an increasingly severe challenge from China’s military buildup. No longer can U.S. forces in maritime Asia operate decisively and with impunity; rather, key U.S. facilities and assets, such as aircraft carriers and vital bases on Okinawa and Guam, are now increasingly vulnerable to China’s strike forces even as the United States’ own strike assets face a more and more capable Chinese air defense network. Because of this, U.S. forces attempting to operate in maritime Asia will now have to struggle for dominance rather than simply assume it. A war in the region between the United States and China under such circumstances would be more susceptible to nuclear escalation. In any contingency in the region, the growing sophistication of China’s large military would mean that the United States would have a much more difficult time overcoming it, since Chinese systems that have longer range, are more accurate, are smarter, and are more effectively netted together require more work, creativity, and skill to defeat. Put more directly, the United States and its allies would have to fight harder, quicker, nastier, deeper, for longer, with less deliberation, and over a wider battlefield than was the case in the past in order to defeat Chinese forces in maritime Asia. Even without anyone really wanting to introduce nuclear weapons into the equation, these trends raise classic “inadvertent escalation” risks. This line of analysis points to the dangers of escalation that can arise due to the way even a conventional war can unfold. In particular, if one needs to fight harder against an opponent in order to prevail, it also becomes harder to limit the war—including in ways that might entangle nuclear weapons. Second, China’s nuclear arsenal is becoming somewhat larger and considerably more sophisticated. While China continues to exhibit restraint regarding the size of its nuclear arsenal and in how it appears to think about the role of nuclear weapons in its military strategy, China is nevertheless substantially modernizing its nuclear forces. It is fielding more modern road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) while also making progress on the development of a serious ballistic missile submarine capability. At the same time, its command and control systems and the professionalism of its nuclear warriors are also improving. Whether deliberately pursued or not, these advances will by necessity give Beijing more and better options for employing its nuclear weapons, especially in more limited and controlled ways. Instead of only, practically speaking, having the option of striking at a major American or Japanese city, China will increasingly gain the ability to employ its nuclear forces in more tailored fashion—for example, against military facilities or forces, including those in the region. This ability to use nuclear weapons in more limited and tailored ways will make China’s threats—explicit or implicit—to use nuclear forces more credible. The consequence of this is that China’s nuclear force will cast a darker shadow over Sino-American competition in the Pacific. Third, the conventional balance is not fixed and the United States might actually lose the conventional advantage in the western Pacific—or important portions of it. A loss of U.S. conventional advantages in maritime Asia could come about because of a U.S. lack of resolve or inattention, because of the scale and effectiveness of China’s substantial and ongoing military buildup, or because of some malign combination of both. In this case, Washington might seek to rely more on its nuclear weapons to compensate for this conventional weakness in extending deterrence to its allies in the region. In particular, Washington would likely seek to exploit its superior ability to conduct a limited nuclear war to deter China from taking advantage of its conventional lead. This course will seem unappealing to many, not least in the United States. But this disquiet points to the fourth and final reason: the prospect of further nuclear proliferation in the region. If, as China grows stronger and more assertive, its conventional military power begins to outweigh that of the United States in maritime Asia, and if that shift is not met by a greater U.S. reliance on its nuclear forces or some other effective countervailing steps, then those countries of Asia traditionally allied to Washington—countries that cannot hope to match China’s strength at the conventional level—may ultimately see getting their own nuclear weapons as essential to deterring China’s exploitation of its growing strength. None of these four trends pushing toward the greater salience of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific should—or will—be welcomed in Washington or in allied capitals. But hoping they will not materialize will not be sufficient to stave them off. Rather, the most effective step Washington—and, importantly, its Asian allies—can take is to strive relentlessly to maintain the U.S. and allied military edge in maritime Asia. As Clausewitz pithily put it, “The best strategy is always to be very strong.” But keeping this margin will require profound changes in how the United States invests its defense resources and in how it commits them. It means shifting away from the model of a “balanced force” designed to cover all bases and toward one concentrated first and foremost on prevailing in the most consequential forms of military conflict. And it means committing those forces less to elective interventions serving peripheral interests while husbanding them for use in deterring and, if necessary, defeating our most formidable potential adversaries, of which the most daunting is China.

Answers to: Offshore Balancing Solves

No, too long to deploy the ships

Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, June 17, 2016, CRS Report, China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy, Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting locations of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide responsibilities, and a substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the Atlantic. As a consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might be available for a crisis or conflict scenario in China’s near-seas region, or could reach that area within a certain amount of time. In contrast, China’s navy has limited responsibilities outside China’s near-seas region, and its ships are all homeported along China’s coast at locations that face directly onto China’s near-seas region. In a U.S.-China conflict inside the first island chain, U.S. naval and other forces would be operating at the end of generally long supply lines, while Chinese naval and other forces would be operating at the end of generally short supply lines.  

China A2/AD

China developing A2/AD capabilities

Most observers believe that, consistent with these goals, China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.²⁹(A2/AD is a term used by U.S. and other Western writers. During the Cold War, U.S. writers used the term sea-denial force to refer to a maritime A2/AD force.) ASBMs, ASCMs, attack submarines, and supporting C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of China’s emerging maritime A2/AD force, though other force elements are also of significance in that regard.  China’s maritime A2/AD force can be viewed as broadly analogous to the sea-denial force that the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War with the aim of denying U.S. use of the sea and countering U.S. naval forces participating in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. One difference between the Soviet sea-denial force and China’s emerging maritime A2/AD force is that China’s force includes ASBMs capable of hitting moving ships at sea.  

China Naval Modernization

Significant Chinese naval modernization

Although press reports on China’s naval modernization effort sometimes focus on a single element, such as China’s aircraft carrier program or its anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), China’s naval modernization effort is a broad-based effort with many elements. China’s naval modernization effort includes a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including programs for ASBMs, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, underway replenishment ships, hospital ships, and supporting C4ISR¹⁸systems. Some of these acquisition programs are discussed in further detail below. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.

China is developing antiship cruise missiles, antiship ballistic missiles

Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)

China is fielding an ASBM, referred to as the DF-21D, that is a theater-range ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) designed to hit moving ships at sea. DOD states that

China continues to field an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBM that it began deploying in 2010. This missile provides the PLA the capability to attack aircraft carriers in the western Pacific. The CSS-5 Mod 5 has a range exceeding 1,500 km [about 810 nm] and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.³³

Another observer states that “the DF-21D’s warhead apparently uses a combination of radar and optical sensors to find the target and make final guidance updates.... Finally, it uses a high explosive, or a radio frequency or cluster warhead that at a minimum can achieve a mission kill [against the target ship].”³⁴

Observers have expressed strong concern about the DF-21D, because such missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to the DF-21 as a “game-changing” weapon. Due to their ability to change course, the MaRVs on an ASBM would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicles.³⁵

According to press reports, the DF-21D has been tested over land but has not been tested in an end-to-end flight test against a target at sea. A January 23, 2013, press report about a test of the weapon in the Gobi desert in western China stated:

The People’s Liberation Army has successfully sunk a US aircraft carrier, according to a satellite photo provided by Google Earth, reports our sister paper Want Daily—though

the strike was a war game, the carrier a mock-up platform and the “sinking” occurred on dry land in a remote part of western China.³⁶

DOD has been reporting on the DF-21D in its annual reports to Congress since 2008.³⁷On September 3, 2015, at a Chinese military parade in Beijing that displayed numerous types of Chinese weapons, an announcer stated that a second type of Chinese ballistic missile, the DF-26, may have an anti-ship capability.³⁸The DF-26 has a reported range of 1,800 miles to 2,500 miles, or more than twice the reported range of the DF-21D.³⁹

China reportedly is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle that, if incorporated into Chinese ASBMs, could make Chinese ASBMs more difficult to intercept.⁴⁰

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)

Among the most capable of the new ASCMs that have been acquired by China’s navy are the Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn (carried by China’s four Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers) and the Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler (carried by 8 of China’s 12 Russian-made Kilo-class submarines). China’s large inventory of ASCMs also includes several indigenous designs, including some highly capable models. DOD states that

The PLA Navy is deploying a wide range of advanced ASCMs. The most capable include the domestically produced ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM and the Russian SS-N- 22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquired from Russia. China’s submarine force is also increasing its ASCM capability, with the long-range YJ-18 ASCM replacing the older YJ-82 on the SONG, YUAN, and SHANG classes. The YJ-18 is similar to the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER ASCM, which is capable of supersonic terminal sprint and is fielded on eight of China’s twelve Russian-built KILO SS. In addition, PLA Navy Aviation employs the 200 km range YJ-83K ASCM on its JH-7 and H-6G aircraft. China has also developed the YJ-12 ASCM for the Navy. The new missile provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to

Submarines and Mines

China’s submarine modernization effort has attracted substantial attention and concern. DOD states, “The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force.... ”⁴²ONI states that

China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence, particularly when conducting “counter-intervention” against modern adversary. The large, but poorly equipped [submarine] force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern submarine force, optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major sea lines of communication.⁴³

Types Acquired in Recent Years

China since the mid-1990s has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs) and put into service at least four new classes of indigenously built submarines, including the following:

a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design called the Jin class or Type 094 (Figure 1);

a new nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the Shang class or Type 093;  
a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 039A (Figure 2);⁴⁴and  
another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or Type 039/039G.  
The Kilos and the four new classes of indigenously built submarines are regarded as much more modern and capable than China’s aging older-generation submarines. At least some of the new indigenously built designs are believed to have benefitted from Russian submarine technology and design know-how.⁴⁵ DOD and other observers believe the Type 093 SSN design will be succeeded by a newer SSN design called the Type 095. The August 2009 ONI report includes a graph (see Figure 3) that shows the Type 095 SSN, along with the date 2015, suggesting that ONI projected in 2009 that the first Type 095 would enter service that year. DOD states, “Over the next decade, China may construct a new Type 095 nuclear powered, guided-missile attack submarine (SSBN), which not only would improve the PLA Navy’s anti-surface warfare capability, but might also provide it with a more clandestine, land-attack option.”⁴⁶ONI states that  The SHANG-class SSN’s initial production run stopped after only two hulls that were launched in 2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China is continuing production with four additional hulls of an improved variant, the first of which was launched in 2012.⁴⁷These six total submarines will replace the aging HAN class SSN on nearly a one-for-one basis in the next several years. Following the completion of the improved SHANG SSN, the PLA(N) will progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity.⁴⁸

Solvency

Need to expand the navy to deter China

Alan Lockie, November 10, 2016, Forbes, The man who will likely lead the Navy under Trump means business in the South China Sea, http://www.businessinsider.com/randy-forbes-navy-trump-south-china-sea-2016-11
When President-elect Donald Trump spoke about expanding the Navy to 350 ships in his September national security speech, he's most likely taking his cues from Randy Forbes, the Republican Congressman from Virginia poised to take over as Secretary of the Navy in a Trump administration. “The 350-ship navy, cruiser modernization – those naval planks [in Donald Trump’s policies] are lifted from Randy Forbes,” a source familiar with the matter told USNI News. The president appoints a Secretary of the Navy to "conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Navy," which includes the Marine Corps. Trump, during his speech, said he wants to greatly increase the size of both the Navy and the Marines, and to generally "rebuild our military." Additionally, Trump mentioned buying newer destroyers to bulk up the Navy's fleet of 272 ships, most likely with Zumwalt class destroyers, but the Navy has struggled so far to field those. Forbes, a military adviser to Trump during his campaign, serves as a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, and makes it plain on his website that he is "one of the nation’s most forceful advocates for a strong national defense." In September, Forbes asserted before Congress that "more than rhetoric is required to counterbalance China’s growing military power and assertiveness," referring to China's artificial island building and militarization in the South China Sea, as well as China ignoring an international court ruling that said its claims in the region were illegal. China has declared "no fly" and "no sail" zones in international waters in the Pacific that have gone unchallenged by the US in the last few years. Increasingly Beijing bullies ships from its neighbors, some of whom are US allies. In September 2015, Forbes wrote a letter urging Obama to increase the Navy's presence in the region, and has been bullish on the prospect of projecting power in the South China Sea for some time. Forbes has advocated an increased US presence in the region, as well as modernizing and increasing the size of the Navy's fleet as China makes spectacular progress in updating its own navy.

Navy should counter ASBMs

Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, June 17, 2016, CRS Report, China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy, Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s ASBMs Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s ability to counter China’s ASBMs. Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a “game changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered. There are several potential approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination. The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs. Breaking the ASBM’s Kill Chain Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., “hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., “soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship. Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”¹⁹¹In an interview published on January 14, 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated: In order for one to conduct any kind of attack, whether it is a ballistic missile or cruise missile, you have got to find somebody. Then, you have got to make sure it is somebody you want to shoot. Then, you’ve got to track it, you’ve got to hold that track. Then, you deliver the missile. We often talk about what I would call hard kill—knocking it down, a bullet on a bullet—or soft kill; there is jamming, spoofing, confusing; and we look at that whole spectrum of operations. And frankly, it is cheaper in the left-hand side of that spectrum.¹⁹²To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships.¹⁹³The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include developing and procuring improved versions of the SM-3 BMD interceptor missile (including the planned Block IIA version of the SM-3), accelerating the acquisition of the Sea- Based Terminal (SBT) interceptor (the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor),¹⁹⁴and accelerating development and deployment of the electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and solid state lasers (SSLs). Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.¹⁹⁵

Navy should expand its ability to counter China’s submarines

Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s Submarines

Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s ability to counter China’s submarines. Some observers raised questions about the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese submarines following an incident on October 26, 2006, when a Chinese Song-class submarine reportedly surfaced five miles away from the Japan-homeported U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63), which reportedly was operating at the time with its strike group in international waters in the East China Sea, near Okinawa.²⁰³In November 2015, it was reported that during the weekend of October 24, 2015, a Chinese attack submarine closely trailed the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) while it was steaming around the southern end of Japan toward the Sea of Japan; the event was reported to be the closest encounter between a Chinese submarine and a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier since 2006.²⁰⁴In December 2015, it was reported that during the encounter, the submarine conducted a simulated missile attack on the carrier.²⁰⁵

Improving the Navy’s ability to counter China’s submarines could involve further increasing ASW training exercises,²⁰⁶procuring platforms (i.e., ships and aircraft) with ASW capabilities, and/or developing technologies for achieving a new approach to ASW that is distributed and sensor-intensive (as opposed to platform-intensive).²⁰⁷Countering wake-homing torpedoes more effectively could require completing development work on the Navy’s new anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT) and putting the weapon into procurement.²⁰⁸

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