Trump’s Proposals

Many specific responses to China naval modernization now

The U.S. Navy has taken a number of steps in recent years that appear intended, at least in part, for improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities, including but not limited to those discussed below.

Force Posture and Basing Actions

Navy force posture and basing actions include the following, among others:

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  The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Navy “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.”¹⁶⁴ 

  
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  More generally, the Navy intends to increase the share of its ships that are homeported in the Pacific from the current figure of about 55% to 60% by 2020. 

  
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  The Navy states that, budgets permitting, the Navy will seek to increase the number of Navy ships that will be stationed in or forward-deployed to the Pacific on a day-to-day basis from 51 in 2014 to 58 in 2015 and 67 by 2020.¹⁶⁵ 

  
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  In terms of qualitative improvements, the Navy has stated that it will assign its newest and most capable ships and aircraft, and its most capable personnel, to the Pacific. 

  
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  The Navy will increase the number of attack submarines homeported at Guam to four, from a previous total of three.¹⁶⁶ 

  
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  The Navy has announced an intention to station up to four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) at Singapore by 2017,¹⁶⁷ and an additional seven LCSs in Japan by 2022.¹⁶⁸ 

  
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  In April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed an agreement that will provide U.S. forces with increased access to Philippine bases.¹⁶⁹ 

  
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  In September 2015, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander raised the idea of having the U.S. Third Fleet (the fleet for the Eastern Pacific—the part of the Pacific 

  
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  closer to the United States) operate some of its forces in the area of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (the fleet for the Western Pacific), which could increase the number of U.S. Navy ships operating in the Western Pacific.¹⁷⁰
  
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  In addition to the above actions, U.S. Marines have begun six-month rotational training deployments through Darwin, Australia, with the number of Marines in each deployment scheduled to increase to 2,500 in 2016.¹⁷¹
  
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  Acquisition Programs
  
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  As mentioned earlier (see “Limitations and Weaknesses” in “Background”), China’s navy exhibits limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Countering China’s naval modernization might thus involve, among other things, actions to exploit such limitations and weaknesses, such as developing and procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines, torpedoes, and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).
  
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  Many of the Navy’s programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapon systems can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities. Examples of highly capable ships now being acquired include Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers,¹⁷² Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines,¹⁷³ and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers.¹⁷⁴ Examples of highly capable aircraft now being acquired by the Navy include F-35C carrier-based Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs),¹⁷⁵ F/A- 18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft,¹⁷⁶ E-2D Hawkeye early warning and command and control aircraft, and the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).¹⁷⁷ Examples of new weapon technologies that might be of value in countering Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities include new and more capable versions of the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system,¹⁷⁸ as well as the electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), solid state lasers (SSLs), and a hypervelocity projectile (HPV) for the 5-inch guns on Navy cruisers and destroyers.¹⁷⁹
  
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  Training and Forward-Deployed Operations
  
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  The Navy in recent years has increased antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training for Pacific Fleet forces and conducted various forward-deployed operations in the Western Pacific, including exercises and engagement operations with Pacific allied and partner navies, as well as operations that appear to have been aimed at monitoring Chinese military operations.¹⁸⁰ A July 2, 2013, blog post states that
  
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  The U.S. Navy’s multi-national exercises in the Pacific theater are growing in size and taking on new dimensions due to the U.S. military’s overall strategic re-balance or “pivot” to the region, service officials explained.
  
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  Although many of the multi-national exercises currently underway have been growing in recent years, the U.S. military’s strategic focus on the area is having a profound impact upon training activities there, Navy officials acknowledge.¹⁸¹
  
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  Increased Naval Cooperation with Allies and Other Countries
  
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  U.S. Navy forces in recent years have taken steps to increase cooperation with naval forces from allies and other countries, such as Japan, Australia, and India. Some of these efforts appear to involve expanding existing bilateral forms of naval cooperation (e.g., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-India) into nascent trilateral forms (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Australia-India). A March 2, 2016, press report takes the idea further, stating:
  
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  The chief of the United States Pacific Command, Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., on Wednesday proposed reviving an informal strategic coalition made up of the navies of Japan, Australia, India and the United States, an experiment that collapsed a decade ago because of diplomatic protests from China.
  
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  The proposal was the latest in a series of United States overtures to India, a country wary of forming strategic alliances, to become part of a network of naval powers that would balance China’s maritime expansion.
  
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  The American ambassador to India, Richard R. Verma, expressed hope in a speech that “in the not-too-distant future,” joint patrols by navy vessels from India and the United States “will become a common and welcome sight throughout Indo-Pacific waters.”
  
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  And officials have said that the United States is close, after 10 years of demurral from the Indian side, to concluding a logistics agreement that would allow the two countries’ militaries to easily use each other’s resources for refueling and repairs....
  
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  Though he did not specifically mention China on Wednesday, Admiral Harris said powerful countries were seeking to “bully smaller nations through intimidation and coercion,” and made the case that a broad naval collaboration was the best way to avert it.
  
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  “Exercising together will lead to operating together,” he said, before meetings with his Indian counterpart. “By being ambitious, India, Japan, Australia and the United States and so many like-minded nations can aspire to operate anywhere in the high seas and the airspace above it.”¹⁸²
  

General China Deterrence Answers

Deterrence-by-punishment has collapsed --- fails to assure allies or prevent Chinese testing of US tripwires—deterrence by denial reverses the burden of escalation back to China—mutual denial is immediate

A. Wess Mitchell 15, president of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a foreign-policy institute dedicated to East-Central Europe, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial,” Aug 12, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for-deterrence-by-denial/

[this evidence has been modified for gendered language; Note- the study referenced about deterrence successes is this: What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Jul., 1984), pp. 496-526]

There are two basic ways to deter an enemy.1 One is to threaten to hurt him if he attacks you or your allies (deterrence by punishment). This form of deterrence depends on fear that the defender will inflict a level of pain that exceeds whatever gains the attacker hoped to achieve through aggression. For deterrence by punishment to work, the defender’s threat has to be credible. He [They have] has to possess sufficient lethal capabilities to carry through the threat. His weapons have to be known to be capable of reaching the attacker, evading or overcoming his defenses, and either defeating his forces, devastating his population or both. It also has to be clear that the defender is deeply attached to the object [they are] he is defending and what forms of behavior will prompt retaliation. The fuzzier the trigger mechanism, the more room there is for ambiguity, and the weaker the deterrent becomes.

¶ A second way to deter an enemy is to make it physically difficult for him to achieve his objective (deterrence by denial). This form of deterrence also depends on fear, but of costs that will be inflicted during the act of aggression, in the place that it occurs. It seeks to make aggression unprofitable by rendering the target harder to take, harder to keep, or both. To work, the defender has to have sufficient lethal capabilities in or near the likely site of aggression to demonstrate that victory will be either be impossible or difficult to attain. The defender’s capabilities have to be known to be able to inflict substantial pain, not in counter-attack but in defense. This differentiates deterrence by denial from the concept of “tripwires,” which are small forces placed in harm’s way to activate retaliation rather than to inflict pain. There is little room for misinterpretation about the trigger mechanisms in deterrence by denial, since by definition it is activated by physical contact with an invading enemy. Deterrence by denial has been favored by small states, but it can also be used in extended form by a Great Power to protect key pieces of terrain or weaker allies, either as a standalone strategy or in tandem with punishment.

For most of the modern era, America’s extended deterrence has been based on deterrence by punishment. This form of deterrence was well matched, both to the tools at America’s disposal and to the nature of the objects it needed to defend. Where Britain in its heyday possessed deterrence mechanisms (the Royal Navy and, later, strategic bombers) that were limited in their ability to reach rivals deep within the Eurasian heartland, the United States has faced no such geographic restrictions in threatening punishment. With the advent of nuclear weapons, it possessed the means to reach and devastate any state threatening its homeland or allies. Indeed, so vast was America’s military edge that it hardly needed to invoke nuclear force to achieve an effective extended deterrent; its “overmatch” in conventional arms was sufficiently wide to deter most challengers. This allowed the United States to secure far-flung alliances across the rimlands of Eurasia while retaining the flexibility to shift attention back and forth from crisis points without undermining its overall strategic position.

Why It’s Getting Harder to Punish

It was generally assumed that the underlying logic of security through fear of retaliation, which worked well enough during the Cold War, would be equally valid against whatever assortment of competitors eventually emerged after the Cold War to challenge U.S. primacy. But this is not proving to be the case. America’s international threat environment is evolving in unexpected ways that pose significant challenges to traditional extended deterrence based on punishment. Three changes in particular are likely to erode its effectiveness in the coming years. First, there is the sheer number of competitors that the United States must deter. Rather than managing a contest with one, large ideological opponent, the United States must cope with several powerful rivals simultaneously, two of which possess large nuclear arsenals, all of which have significant conventional militaries, and at least one of which is growing rapidly in relative economic and political power. This reduces America’s overall military edge and muddies the underlying power relationships upon which much of the superstructure of U.S. extended deterrence has rested. ¶

Second, America’s rivals are becoming better armed. In the words of one senior Pentagon official, Russia and China are “fielding very advanced capabilities at an extremely rapid pace.” They are investing in many of the types of technology—long-range missiles, stealth, next-generation fighter aircraft, and electronic jamming—in which the United States has long maintained a commanding lead. Both China’s build-up of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) weapons and Russia’s “escalate-to-deescalate” tactical nuclear doctrine are examples of efforts to deprive the United States of escalation dominance in future contests. While they have virtually no effect on U.S. nuclear deterrence, these changes erode the effectiveness of deterrence by punishment by reducing the certainty that America could manage escalation and successfully impose high costs for acts of aggression.2 They increase the presumed reliance of the United States on nuclear deterrence for managing even small confrontations—a recourse that America’s competitors rightly assume it will be loath to use in an era of public aversion to casualties (both inflicting and suffering them).

Third and most importantly, America’s rivals are developing tactics for evading retaliatory deterrence. Russia and China have introduced limited-war techniques designed to avoid trigger mechanisms of extended deterrence—for Russia, “jab and grab” land incursions; for China, the creeping militarization of maritime zones. Both techniques operate below the threshold of deterrence by punishment and seek to create territorial faits accomplis that lower the costs of revisionism. Such methods pose serious problems for deterrence by punishment, which is predicated on aggression being identifiable and therefore punishable. In a limited war setting, punishment quickly morphs into compellance—not just dissuading an enemy but dislodging him and forcing a withdrawal from his limited, stealthy conquest. As Thomas Schelling has argued, compellance (“a threat intended to make an adversary do something”) is inherently harder than deterrence (“a threat to keep him from starting something). Limited war shifts the psychological burden of conflict—fear of retaliation—away from the aggressor and places it on the shoulders of the defender—fear of escalation. It puts the defender in the position of perpetually under-responding to ambiguous provocations (and thereby losing control of strategically vital spaces by default) or over-responding (and risking war).

Diversifying Deterrence Options

So far, America’s response to erosions in its military position has been mainly technological: to bolster its competitive advantages against rivals and thereby shore up the credibility of existing deterrence methods. Attempts at reassuring frontline allies through the deployment of tripwires (most recently, in Eastern Europe); the push to refocus U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine on deterring major war; and some (though not all) of the components of the Pentagon’s third offset are all examples of how the United States is “doubling down” on punishment. These efforts are likely to yield positive results in bolstering key components of retaliation and ensuring that deterrence by punishment remains the backbone of America’s extended deterrent for the foreseeable future. However, as America’s lead in advanced weaponry narrows amid prolonged cuts in defense spending, the United States may face limits to how far it can go in using technology to deter its rivals. Unlike its past responses to the problem of competitor “catch-up” (for example, Eisenhower’s “New Look” and the Offset Strategy of the 1970s), the United States will need to look for other sources of comparative advantage with which to maintain its primacy.

One such advantage is geography. America’s possession of extensive security relationships with states along the rimlands of Eurasia offers natural strategic advantages that have not been systematically exploited in post-Cold War strategy. It was hard to employ such states effectively in past U.S. extended deterrence systems, since the very act of threatening punishment to rivals with America’s vast arsenal dis-incentivized self-help among its allies (the famous “free-rider” problem). More often than not, allies were viewed as liabilities, either because they required acts of assurance to maintain or because, if over-assured, they might themselves become sources of provocation (the “entrapment” problem). But as the global geopolitical environment turns predatory, frontline states now have a powerful incentive to do more for themselves in defense: self-preservation. Thus motivated, many are arming and aligning with similarly placed neighbors in an effort to contain large powers.

These dynamics create an opportunity for the United States. America’s extensive frontline alliances offer a natural means of pursuing a strategy of deterrence by denial, both as an end in itself for containing growing rivals, and as a compliment to deterrence by punishment. Historically, Great Powers have often employed alliances with states located near rivals in this way. Prior to the nuclear era, denial was a more common way to achieve extended deterrence, since the tools for projecting decisive military force were less reliable. When facing rivals that were numerous or far away, it was often more effective to make it physically harder for them to expand rather than by threatening to punish them. Such denial strategies were especially common among maritime or status quo powers attempting to raise the costs of revisionism in key strategic zones. Since they worked with the momentum of the small states’ desire to remain independent, deterrence by denial had the added benefit of being cost-effective, particularly at moments of power transition.

Three Ways to Deny

Generally speaking, there are three ways that a Great Power can achieve extended deterrence by denial. One is to make an ally or piece of territory harder to take. This usually involves placing defensive attributes of some kind in the place that is likely to be the object of the revisionist power’s desire—either using the forces of the patron or, far better, those of the targeted ally. The crucial difference between this approach and the “trip-wires” used for deterrence by punishment is that forces deployed for denial are intended not to die and trigger punishment but to live and inflict pain on the attacker. The most common way to ensure this is to help the frontline ally beef up its defensive properties. The classic example is 18th-century Britain’s policy of providing subsidies and arms to Europe’s smaller states to deter the expansion of continental rivals. Another, bolder method is to help the ally acquire offensive capabilities.3 This requires the ally to be large enough in size and capabilities to attempt a conventional deterrent of its own. France’s alliances de revers of the 17th and 18th centuries, for example, created an extended deterrence based on denial by building a bulwark of aggressive mid-sized frontier states (Sweden, Poland, and Turkey). Through subsidies, advisers, and shared technology, France encouraged these states to adopt eastward-facing offensive postures (Charles XII’s famous exploits were largely funded by France) to keep Russia on the defensive and impede its expansion into Europe proper.

A second form of deterrence by denial is to make the revisionist’s coveted object harder to keep. This is usually the best option when the ally in question is too weak to mount a credible defense but possesses sufficient willpower to make it indigestible for an attacker. Since the ultimate goal of revisionist powers is to achieve quick, easy grabs, this strategy seeks to make them prolonged and costly—what could be called the “bitter pill” strategy. Sixteenth-century Switzerland is one such example; another is 20th-century Finland. Both used scrappy defensive techniques and small but well-trained forces to advertise indigestibility to predators. In extended form, this approach can involve a Great Power providing weapons of a type or number that enable an otherwise indefensible state to be capable of waging guerilla war against an attacker and outlasting occupation. Britain used such an approach with the Netherlands in the early 18th century by funding mercenary armies and encouraging the flooding of Holland’s fields; in the early 19th-century, it supplied weapons and fortifications to Portugal to resist French encroachments. ¶

The third form of deterrence by denial is to make the ally or territory in question stronger industrially than the attacker. Unlike the methods above, which focus on militarily penalizing an attack, this form of deterrence is long-term and mainly economic. Since a major goal of revisionist aggression is to break alliances, denying them their objective can be aided by strengthening the ties between the target country and its patron. Abundant evidence shows that extended deterrence is most effective when the military relationship between two states is undergirded by economic ties, particularly in strategic industries. A study of 54 cases of deterrence between 1900 and 1980 found that defensive alliances characterized by close political ties and even small amounts of trade succeeded in deterring aggression seven times out of eight, compared to much lower success rates in alliances based purely on military relations. France famously sought to build up the resiliency of its CEE alliances not just by aiding and advising their militaries but by providing investment to build up strategic industries and railways, and to fuel economic growth.

Whether by short- or long-term methods, the goal of these strategies is to deter a revision of the overall system by deterring the conquest of specific places. Where deterrence by punishment leaves certain frontline terrain unguarded and thereby involves an assumed sacrifice—both of tripwire troops and the soil of the target state—deterrence by denial seeks to make the conquest of the target an altogether unattractive prospect. The two forms of deterrence are not mutually exclusive; indeed, combining them can strengthen the credibility of both. Having the ability to punish while cultivating the local means to resist creates a virtuous cycle, communicating to the ally that self-defense is not hopeless and to the revisionist that he may have to pay twofold for whatever gains his aggression may yield.

Alliances as Denial Tools

America has abundant opportunities to inter-weave denial methods into its wider punishment-based system. Rimland alliances offer natural tools for managing multiple, large Eurasian competitors. In both Europe and Asia, the United States possesses alliances with small states with the motivation to oppose local hegemons. A U.S. strategy to “activate” these alliances as instruments for discouraging attempts at control of important real estate could include all three of the forms of denial mentioned above. It would use the military geography of frontline allies to make them and nearby real estate harder to take. America’s archipelagic Asian allies can employ naval mines, submarines, and an increasingly advanced array of missiles to turn the region’s narrow waterways into clogging mechanisms for impeding Chinese naval expansion. Similarly, in Eastern Europe, allies in the Baltic-Black Sea corridor can be turned into “bitter pills” bristling with anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. Mid-sized states (like Poland, Finland and Romania) can be armed with offensive weapons like the AGM-158 JASSM and Tomahawk missiles to keep revisionists off balance and diverting budgets to defensive capabilities. Tiny but determined allies like the Baltic States can be made harder to hold in an invasion by, for example, offering pre-set U.S. packages of nasty weapons like landmines that are automatically released on the first sign of aggressive behavior. In both regions, a strategy to instigate and organize dense networks of intra- and inter-regional cooperation in strategic industries and R&D would thicken the “hide” of allied frontiers on a longer-term basis.

Incorporating denial into the U.S. extended deterrence system would offer important advantages for the United States. Strategically, it would focus scarce resources to the places where conflict is most likely to occur. Technologically, it would play to many of America’s emerging areas of competitive strength, including in defensive weapons like surface, air, and naval missiles favored in the third offset, while prompting greater clarity in Pentagon thinking on the as-yet underexamined role for alliances in the offset strategy. In defensive terms, it would provide tools that, should deterrence fail, are more easily employed to fight and win a conflict than those used for punishment. Geographically, denial would play to America’s latent, underdeveloped advantage: its wide range of frontline allies with the predisposition and location to disrupt rivals’ offensive moves. Organizing these states for stronger self-defense would raise the visible costs of revision without necessarily adding commensurate defense burdens for the United States. By systematically bolstering the denial capabilities of frontline allies, the United States could concentrate its own resources on higher-tier punishment weapons. Strengthening frontline resistance would also reinforce and clarify the trigger mechanisms for deterrence by punishment and help to make extended deterrence as a whole more solvent against hybrid-war threats.

Injecting greater emphasis on denial into U.S. strategy could also have a political benefit for America’s alliances. Traditionally, frontline states have had an aversion to patron relationships that are overly reliant on punishment, especially when the patron in question is a maritime power. Unlike retaliation, which can seem remote and beyond control to the state being defended, denial is immediate and in the obvious self-preservation interests of the ally, which therefore has strong incentives to deny the enemy the immediate and narrow objective of conquest. Whereas relying primarily on deterrence by punishment from the patron may weaken the alliance, leading to fears of abandonment and being merely a great-power bargaining chip, joint investment by the patron and ally in denial strengthens the political bonds of the alliance.

Most importantly, a greater focus on denial could help to shift the psychological burden of 21st-century conflict back where it belongs: on the shoulders of states that wish to rearrange the international order. Whereas limited-war techniques enable revisionists to believe they can avoid triggering retaliation and thereby get away with an easy victory, denial signals that they will pay a steep price for aggression at the place it occurs, ranging from a sharp rebuff to a war of attrition. From Eastern Europe to the Western Pacific, the goal should be the same: to limit options for easy revisions and to increase the immediate cost and difficulty of grabbing and holding territory. Building up such mechanisms will help the United States avoid the predicament of holding together through compellance what it could not through deterrence. The goal should be to restore a healthy sense of fear in would-be predators. Doing this now, while the century is still young and revisionists are still mulling over their options, will be a far cheaper policy in the long run than waiting for deterrence by punishment to fail and then trying to regain lost ground through coercion.

Taiwan Answers

Presence emboldens Taiwan to test redlines and causes China to miscalculate US commitments --- causes escalation

Eric Stephen Gons 11, former RAND-U.S. Air Force Academy Superintendent's Fellow, current consultant at the Boston Consulting Group, Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf

[edited for objectionable language]

Despite this impasse, it seems for now that both China and Taiwan realize that they have more to gain by cooperation than confrontation. However, bumps in this relationship will occur. Managing their differences requires open communication and a willingness to engage. Unfortunately, these attributes are largely absent in the relationship. China and Taiwan have limited formal communications channels, and thus no formal mechanism to resolve crises. This means that there is the very real and ongoing potential that a small problem could quickly become a big problem. In crises of the past, both governments have tended to use the United States as an intermediary, but this method is far from perfect. First, the United States is not up to the role of impartial mediator – it too has much at stake in any Taiwan-China crisis. Second, the United States has only limited sway with either side. Third, the PRC government tends to close itself off in the midst of crises. The communication problems are very worrisome, and hold the greatest potential that the PRC and Taiwan will be in conflict with each other.93 ¶ Bad decisions may result from bad information, miscalculation of costs and benefits, a mis-estimation of the likelihood of success, or just plain old irrationality. Unfortunately, there are many opportunities for misperceptions to complicate the decision chain in a Taiwan crisis. The inherent U.S. participation in any cross-strait dialog is both calming and concerning. It is calming because the United States can act as an unofficial communication channel between two parties who tend to communicate poorly, if at all. It is concerning because the existence of a crisis triangle compounds the opportunities for bad information – now each actor must not only understand his [their] own capabilities and likely reactions, he must know the capabilities and reactions of two other actors, and must know that they know the capabilities and reactions of the other two actors, and so forth.¶ Beyond the simple volume of information that each actor needs to process, we can identify some characteristics of the Taiwan situation that make perfect information hard to obtain. Some potential areas of misunderstanding include:¶ x Taiwan may overestimate the probability that the United States will intervene in a crisis, skewing their decision calculus towards crossing a Chinese “red line,”94 assuming China will be deterred by the prospect of U.S. intervention.¶ x China may not understand U.S. commitment or the conditions under which the United States will intervene. An estimate of Taiwan’s will to fight is also critical to China’s decision calculus.¶ x The United States may underestimate PLA capabilities or Taiwan’s will to fight.95¶ Decreased ambiguity would aid the decisionmaking of all parties. U.S. policy should encourage cross-strait dialog, including establishing permanent communications channels. Any intentional ambiguity in policy necessarily raises the risks involved in a crisis management chain. Most notably, the intentional American strategic ambiguity regarding its commitment to Taiwan carries with it serious risks should the Taiwan situation devolve into crisis. The U.S. position is intentionally ambiguous – intending to deter China from aggressive action while avoiding giving Taiwan free reign to declare independence.96 It thus serves a useful diplomatic purpose, carefully balancing competing commitments. However, the United States must be prepared to clarify its strategic ambiguity quickly should an emergency arise. Failure to do so would obfuscate the decisionmaking of China and Taiwan, and increase the risk of an unintentional war which the United States may be compelled to enter. Other measures may further increase information available to other actors – for example through increased military-military contacts, open communication channels, etc.¶ U.S. policymakers must be realistic about PLA capabilities, and the prospects for victory in a war over Taiwan. While it is evident that the United States possesses the most advanced military in the world, the PLA has advanced systems as well, many of which specifically exploit U.S. weaknesses. Given PLA strategic depth and the enormous access challenges the United States faces in the western Pacific, many typical U.S. advantages may be nullified. Further, pursuing a deterrent strategy like deploying large concentrations of aircraft to forward bases may actually have an effect the opposite of intended deterrence. A large concentration of USAF assets within easy range of PLA ballistic missiles may be too tempting a target to pass up. If Chinese decisionmakers feel the situation is deteriorating anyway, preemptive action may be their best option to achieving their goals. In this way, U.S. misunderstanding of PLA capabilities would be disastrous to crisis stability. This prospect should motivate U.S. policymakers to either take steps to address weaknesses, or change foreign policy to accomplish the feasible.

Demilitarizing the region by removing the carrier is the only way to avoid escalation --- presence undermines diplomatic solutions

Vasilis Trigkas 14, visiting research fellow at the institute for Sino-EU relations at Tsinghua University & a non-resident WSD Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, “Aircraft Carriers in the Taiwan Strait,” Dec 29, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/aircraft-carriers-in-the-taiwan-strait/

In the 1996 crisis, the U.S. “carrier monopoly” neutralized the Chinese tactical advantage over Taiwan by highlighting the U.S. strategic dominance. China’s leadership saw the potential destruction that an attack against U.S. carriers would unleash. However, in a renewed Taiwanese crisis today, China could pass the ball to the U.S. side. Its single carrier has delivered strategic risk parity in the straits. As the Chinese carrier would face-off against the U.S. carriers, a war of nerves would begin. The longer the confrontation and the maneuvering, the greater the possibility for a mistake that would lead to a strike on a carrier with perhaps irreversible consequences for the relationship between the two superpowers and for world stability. As China would enjoy the advantage of playing on its own doorstep with Chinese public opinion fiercely opposing any retreat, and is it would be willing to dance with the U.S. closer to the edge, the U.S. would have to deescalate and take the conflict to the UN or risk a nuclear confrontation. Thus the “predictable unpredictability” of escalation and Mutually Assured Destruction ensures, according to experts, that a U.S.-China aircraft carrier face-off would not be a prolonged confrontation and, most importantly, that it would end peacefully as both sides’ rational strategy would follow the norms of nuclear deterrence.¶ However, as Donald Kagan – one of Yale’s most distinguished professors – once put it, miscalculations and irrational decisions have been the norm in history, as old hatreds and wounded honor inspire dangerous and irrational actions. Even though experts and war simulation models confirm that a potential aircraft carrier face-off would end peacefully, Kagan’s observation stands as a clear reminder that preempting a clash by dialogue and demilitarizing a conflict zone is the safest and perhaps the sole path for sustained peace. After all, even a U.S. strategic retreat in case of a cross-strait crisis would leave an irreversible mark on the China-U.S. relationship, increase U.S. embitterment against China, encouraging militarization and an ever accelerating arms race.¶ In their post-1991 engagement, China and the United States have shown that their commitment to a peaceful resolution of disputes remains at the forefront of their strategic relationship. From the 1996 strait crisis to the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the 2001 U.S. spy plane collision, the U.S. and China have been optimistic about each other’s intentions and mutually de-escalated dangerous confrontations. A DPP government in Taiwan, with an assertive political agenda promoting a distinct Taiwanese identity and de jure independence, would unquestionably test Sino-U.S. relations. Beijing and Washington should preempt any possible cross-strait military buildup and engage in a sincere dialogue about Taiwan’s democratic future. A clash of carriers would be a risk that the world cannot afford to take.¶ As Stephen Hadley, a former U.S. national security advisor, once noted, in the most pivotal relationship for peace in our time – the US-China Relationship – seeing the glass half full instead of half empty is an important forma mentis in crisis management. The U.S. and China have shown in their communiqués that the glass over the question of Taiwan is half full and thus the solution should be political and not military. Managing renewed cross-strait tensions peacefully will be another significant brick in constructing a “new major powers” relationship and promoting long-term global prosperity.

China not deterred over Taiwan—thinks its resolve is higher

Joseph A. Bosco 15, member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Taiwan and Strategic Security, May 15, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwan-and-strategic-security/

That is why the U.S. declarative policy of “strategic ambiguity” needs to change sooner rather than later. Washington’s refusal to make an explicit public commitment to not only provide Taiwan with defensive weapons but to come actively to its defense sows doubts in the region. Worse, it encourages China to continue pursuing its anti-access, area denial strategy of deploying attack submarines and ballistic missiles to deter, delay, or defeat any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. After all, Washington has said ever since 1995 that it might or might not defend Taiwan depending on the circumstances. So Beijing has been creating the circumstances to affect that calculus. Would it have invested so much of its national wealth and effort to an anti-Taiwan strategy if the U.S. had made it clear back in 1995 that an attack on Taiwan would certainly mean military conflict, possibly all-out war with the United States? Whatever their faults, Chinese leaders are not suicidal. Yet, some experts argue that a clear declarative policy statement is unnecessary and “passé.” According to that thesis, China has been told in no uncertain terms in various private meetings of the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan so, they argue, it is already being deterred from taking action against Taiwan.¶ There are several flaws in that analysis. First, it is highly implausible that a U.S. commitment to go to war with China could be made behind closed doors without the American public being informed. Second, any commitment that is not made publicly lacks credibility precisely because American prestige is not on the line – a secret red line is especially evanescent. Third, China observed with interest what happened when, for one brief shining moment, strategic clarity broke through U.S. policy. After the EP-3 incident in April 2001, President George W. Bush was asked what the U.S. would do to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack; he replied “whatever it takes.” That unambiguous statement sent shock waves through the China specialist community. White House and State Department officials rushed to “clarify” that U.S. policy had not changed. Fourth, much as Chinese leaders complain about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, they understand that Washington has deferred to their sensibilities in both the quantity and quality of the weapons transferred. Taiwan is consistently denied the advanced systems it requests: F-16 CDs, F-35s, diesel submarines. Fifth, Beijing has reason to doubt Americans’ will and staying power in any serious military confrontation with China. After all, China has had first-hand experience facing America’s conduct of limited war in Korea and Vietnam. It has also observed U.S. strategic planners’ penchant for “off-ramps” on the escalatory ladder – even with non-kinetic means like sanctions, particularly against a major power, as in the case of Iran over its nuclear program or Russia over Ukraine. China’s leaders may well calculate that, even if here is an initial U.S. response to a Chinese move and Beijing demonstrates a willingness to escalate the crisis over its core interest, it will be Washington that will blink first.

Increasing Army Size Solvency Answers

Land bases are vulnerable

Robert Marnitage, 2014, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting Long Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability, , http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore [Robert Martinage recently returned to CSBA after ve years of public service in the Department of Defense (DoD). While performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Navy, he led development of the Department of the Navy’s FY 2014/2015 budgets and represented the Department during the Strategic Choices and Management Review, as well as within the Defense Management Action Group (DMAG). From 2010–2013, Mr. Martinage served as the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, providing senior-level advice on foreign and defense policy, naval capa- bility and readiness, security policy, intelligence oversight, and special programs. Appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Con ict, and Interdependent Capabilities in the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 2009, Mr. Martinage focused on special operations, irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, and security force assistance policy. He also led a two- year, DoD-wide effort to develop an investment path for a future long-range strike “family of systems.”]

From an adversaries perspective, planning strikes against major U.S. power projection “hubs” would be relatively straightforward in that their locations
are well known, they are relatively few in number, and their precise geo-loca- tions can be easily pre-determined in peacetime. Attack options run the gamut from unconventional delivery options (e.g., terrorist attacks, sabotage, and raids by special operations forces); to short-range attack by precision-guided rock- ets, artillery, mortars, and missiles (G-RAMM); to high-volume air strikes; and most worrisome, to long-range precision strikes with ballistic and cruise missiles.⁴⁷ Given trends in missile proliferation, not only will the number of states armed with missiles steadily increase, but so too will the size, lethality, and accuracy of their respective arsenals. While China represents the pacing threat in this regard, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Syria have, to varying base-denial capabilities.

Doctrine for China’s
 People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Second

Artillery Corps, which
is responsible for conventional and nuclear
missile operations,
calls for
strikes on American
and allied forward
bases and infrastructure. Fully consistent
with China’s overarching strategy of “active defense” and concepts for “counter-intervention” and “anti-air raid” campaigns, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns directs, for instance, that:

When the powerful enemy uses allied military bases in our periphery and aircraft carriers as aircraft launch platforms to implement various forms of military intervention; and when the powerful enemy’s allied military bases around our periphery are beyond our air arm’s ring range, and when the car- rier battle groups are far away from our shores...conventional missiles can be used to implement harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy’s allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups.⁴⁸

CONTINUES

The PLA is developing a conventional IRBM with a range of 3,000-5,000 km, “increasing its capability for near precision strike out to the second island chain,” running from Japan, through the Marianas and Guam, to Indonesia. As the U.S.-Economic and Security Review concluded in 2013: “The PLA is rapidly expanding and diversifying its ability to strike U.S. bases, ships, and aircraft throughout the Asia-Pacific region, including those that it previously could not reach, such as U.S. military facilities on Guam. According to some PLA experts, China is striving to extend its conventional precision-strike capability out to 8,000 km by 2020.

The denial of close-in bases by prospective adversaries around the world – whether by unconventional attacks, G-RAMM strikes, or waves of long range air missile attacks – would have profoundly detrimental implications for U.S. power projection. First, without access to secure ports, ti would be impracticle to insert and sustain large ground forces of any kind – but especially, heavy mechanized ground forces such as the Army’s Stryker and Armored “Heavy” Brigade Combat Team -- at least early on in a campaign. Logistically sustaining high tempo air operations would also be problematic. Second, without access to close-in air bases (i.e., within 500-1,000 miles of target areas), the majority of U.S. land-based airpower would either be sidelined, owing to insufficient combat radius, or required extensive (and potentially vulnerable) aerial refueling support.

Turn – Building-up combat power on bases encourages attacks

Robert Marnitage, 2014, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting Long Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability, , http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore [Robert Martinage recently returned to CSBA after ve years of public service in the Department of Defense (DoD). While performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Navy, he led development of the Department of the Navy’s FY 2014/2015 budgets and represented the Department during the Strategic Choices and Management Review, as well as within the Defense Management Action Group (DMAG). From 2010–2013, Mr. Martinage served as the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, providing senior-level advice on foreign and defense policy, naval capa- bility and readiness, security policy, intelligence oversight, and special programs. Appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Con ict, and Interdependent Capabilities in the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 2009, Mr. Martinage focused on special operations, irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, and security force assistance policy. He also led a two- year, DoD-wide effort to develop an investment path for a future long-range strike “family of systems.”]

Rather than signaling U.S. resolve and deterring future adversaries, the buildup of U.S. combat power on vulnerable forward bases (e.g., Okinawa) in a crisis may inadvertently precipitate conflict. Consistent with the emphasis given to maximizing surprise and seizing the initiative in the PLA doctrine, China would have a strong incentive to neutralize forces deployed to close-in regional bases preemptively before they could mount damaging strikes against Chinese forces or territory. The doctrine of the Second Artillery Corps recommends, for example, that: “It is necessary to strike the enemy at the first opportunity, before the enemy has discovered our campaign intentions and actions, surprise the enemy, act before the enemy, strike rapidly, catch the enemy by surprise.”⁶⁶ A similar, “use them or lose them” mindset would likely apply to Iranian and North Korean missile forces as well.

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