Trump’s Proposals



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Naval Power Pro

Naval Power Decreasing

Navy in a period of qualititative and quantitative decline


John F. Lehman served as Navy Secretary from 1981 to 1987. Rep. J. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) is Chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee., March 11, 2015, What the Navy’s New Maritime Strategy Should Say, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/what-navys-new-maritime-strategy-should-say/

After years of ill-considered budget cuts and a focus on large-scale land wars, the U.S. Navy had entered a period of qualitative and quantitative decline, diminished readiness, and a lack of confidence in its own mission and capabilities. Foreign adversaries seemed ascendant, including a radical theocracy in Iran and an expansionist Russia. Many American political leaders seemed resigned to a significantly reduced global role, and the Navy showed signs of abandoning its historic inclination toward an aggressive, offensive-minded spirit.


Status quo unsustainable


Adrey McAvoy, January 5, 2016, Washington Times, US Pacific fleet shrinks even as China grows more aggressive, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/5/us-pacific-fleet-shrinks-even-as-china-grows-more-/
One consequence of a smaller fleet has been more time at sea. Retired Adm. Zap Zlatoper, who commanded Pacific Fleet in the 1990s, said six-month deployments used to be “sacrosanct” as anything longer made it harder for the Navy to retain sailors. Ships now deploy for an average of seven to nine months, though the Navy plans to lower this to seven. Ship conditions have also suffered. The USS Essex left an exercise with Australia early in 2011 and skipped another with Thailand the following year because it developed mechanical problems after delaying maintenance to stay at sea. Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank, said these are signs the status quo is unsustainable. In a November report, Clark outlined alternatives: build more ships, though this would require money Congress may not give the Navy or deploy less, though the Pentagon has been reluctant to accept less of an overseas presence.

Should Increase the Number of Ships



We currently don’t have enough ships, causing overdeployments and reduced readiness of existing ships


Tryle Schlote, November 29, 2016, The Trumpet, Making the Military Great Again? https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/14357.2.0.0/world/military/making-the-military-great-again

Throughout the campaign, Trump established himself as the candidate who would expand the military and reestablish America’s prestige in the world. One of his most notable promises was to expand the U.S. Navy from 272 ships to 350. This incredible expansion would be favored by many military commentators. Right now the Navy is overworked, with deployment times getting longer and longer due to a lack of ships. More ships would greatly reduce the stress on the sailors and the equipment.

Need to increase the number of ships


Sydney Freeburg, April 19, 2016, HASC to Navy: We Want More Ships, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/hasc-to-navy-we-want-more-ships/

UPDATED from Hill staff briefing CAPITOL HILL: The House seapower subcommittee continued its crusade for more warships, adding vessels and relentlessly rejecting reductions in its draft portion of the annual defense policy bill. The full committee will mark up all draft language for the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act next week.

As we’d predicted, the bill rejects two major proposals from the Navy budget that the administration proposed in February. HASC says “no” to deactivating the tenth carrier air wing — a proposal it saw as prelude to a carrier fleet stuck at ten flattops forever. (Because one carrier is in long-term overhaul at any given time, there is traditionally one more carrier in the fleet than carrier air wings).

HASC also says “no” to taking 11 aging cruisers out of service for a slow-motion modernization — a proposal it sees as a disguised retirement. To prevent a de facto mothballing of the ships, the bill also requires the Navy to buy upgrades for them.

The bill also says “no” to cutting the Littoral Combat Ship, at least this year. The HASC would add a new LCS ship instead of just the two the administration requested. The third LCS would provide enough to keep both shipyards in business — Marinette in Wisconsin and Austal in Alabama — until the Navy holds a winner-take-all competition between them to produce the upgraded frigate version of LCS.

Overall, Defense Secretary Ash Carter has ordered the LCS program cut from 52 ships to 40: HASC can’t legislate on the long-term cuts in this year’s bill, but committee staff told reporters that it would include a statement endorsing the 52 figure.

The bill even says “no” to retiring the aging Avenger-class minesweepers until the Navy certifies the adequacy of their successors — which happen to be LCS variants equipped with a much-delayed Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) module.

More positively, the bill adds an additional amphibious ship to carry Marines, the long-awaited LPD-29. (The bill gives the Navy flexibility to buy first of the follow-on L(X)R class instead). And in non-binding language — various “sense of Congress” statements and reports — it urges the Navy



  • to buy new aircraft carrier fasters (every four years instead of every five) to restore the fleet to 11 flattops,

  • to double the production of T-AO(X) oilers from one a year to two, and

  • to buy two Virginia-class attack submarines every year, even in years when the Navy must also buy a much larger Ohio Replacement nuclear missile boat.

The bill also boosts the special National Sea-Based Deterrent Fund (NSBDF) created to pay for the staggeringly expensive Ohio Replacement Program. In particular, it adds a new authority for “continuous production” to allow the Navy to keep buying, and contractors to keep producing, key components of the submarine at a steady rate throughout the life of the program, rather than having production tied to individual submarines, which could cause inefficient surges and stalls. The continuous production authority will initially be used for the submarines missile tubes but could be applied to a range of other components, Hill staff said,

In an interesting “yes, but….,” the mark-up praises the Pentagon for finally moving ahead on the much-delayed program for a carrier-launched drone, formerly called UCLASS. But it urges the military to make the aircraft fully capable of strike missions, not just the refueling and reconnaissance roles emphasized in the current concept, CBARS.




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