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Then in February, the Corps did another study about navigational precision. If you're trying to hit a target, speed is your ally up to a certain point. What is the effect of degrading speed on your navigational precision?

And they found that every five knots in the range from 20 down to 10 costs you 20 percent in your navigational precision. So hitting that target, dropping speed from 20 to 10 knots, getting the ship through that door, you're going to have 40 percent more error in that evolution.

So here's the scenario. For six months of the year, we can go as fast as we need to, to maintain control of the vessels, we can pass vessels, and everything's fine. But for the other six months of the year, we're trying to meet vessels and pass them while we're going slower. And the effect is that we're working too close to the margins.

At ten knots, those crab angles just become debilitating. So that deviation clause -- that deviation clause, we apply it on every voyage, but it's applied after a long argument with the master.

For six months of the year, when a pilot climbs up onto the bridge of a ship, the master invariably says, my company told me don't go over ten knots no matter what. We'll have to send our logs in, we'll have to document everything, we=re not -- you know, I can't do it.

And we're telling them then we can't take your ship in because we can't move your ship safely at ten knots. So you end up on this compromise. The objectives of the master and the objectives of the pilot are bifurcated when normally you would want them focused on exactly the same thing, what's the safest way to navigate the vessel.

So when it goes wrong, it can go very wrong, of course. And we've had ships where the master was pulling back the throttles without telling the pilot.

We've been going along in the channel after we reached some compromised speed of 14 knots or whatever and the Coast Guard will get on the radio and say, you're in the right whale speed zone and you're exceeding ten knots and you need to slow down.

And now when you want everybody on the bridge focused on navigating the ship, now you're having that argument again when you're already in the channel.

So going back to that time where we tried to go ten knots in the channel and it didn't work was 2004. And it was the day after a tropical storm had gone through, and there were winds in the 20 to 30 range, which isn't all that unusual off of Charleston.

But the ship had mechanical issues, we shouldn't have taken it. Again, this was back in 2004 and, you know, we hadn't really studied this issue to the point we have now. But anyway, the more the currents were affecting the vessel, the pilot tried to put on more speed and more rudder.

He didn't have more speed to work with because the engines just weren't up to it. So the increased drag of the rudder slowed the ship down, and it became a downward spiral. And when I say that it stalled, it stalled like an airplane stalls when it's trying to climb too quickly.

It couldn't overcome the drag of its rudder that it needed to turn into the current, and they lost control and they went up against the bank of the channel. And the port was closed for the rest of the day.

Fortunately, it was a self-unloading vessel carrying granite pellets, and we were able to jettison 5,000 tons of cargo on the next high tide, and we pulled it off with five tugs and you never heard about it in the news.

When we bring that up to the NMFS folks that we have a case study on what can go wrong, they say well, that was a bad day. That was the day the margin of safety went negative.

Pilots are charged with keeping the margin of safety as positive as possible all day long. We don't ever want to be anywhere near a neutral margin of safety, and certainly not a negative margin of safety.

So this year, NOAA has accepted a petition from American Pilots Association to exempt only the dredged channels from the right whale speed rule. So why now? You know, we brought this up in 2006, but you've seen several graphics on the size of ships.

And ships are 30 to 50 percent larger now than they were when this rule was promulgated. It's a real problem now. Now this is -- I mentioned to some of you last night, the last time I put this slide up.

What this is is these are right whale sightings in northern New England from 2002 to 2011. So roughly half of this period before they promulgated the regulation, and half of this period after they promulgated the regulation.

These are locations where right whales were sighted. Every one of these little diamonds might be one whale, it might be 12 whales, it might be some -- you know, some number of whales, but a sighting happened at that place at a point in time.

Those are by aerial overflights or by vessel reports. In that period of time, there were 16,010 sightings over those ten years. These are just the 3,989 of them that are outside of the protected areas where these speed limits apply.

This is the boundary of the speed limits up in New England, and it's cut up into three sections. This one's in effect for four and a half months of the year, this one's in effect for two months of the year, this one's in effect for four months of the year.

So when you see sightings in here -- what's noted on here is this is a sighting that happened in a month when this speed zone isn't in effect. So this two month box here, this is the route that the ships take in and out of Boston. Here's the separation zone.

They moved the separation zone, as a matter of fact, to facilitate this program. This zone's in effect for two months of the year. Over a ten year period, 40 percent of the right whales that were spotted in this box were spotted in months other than those two months.

So when they designed this speed management area to protect right whales, they only targeted 60 percent of the risk. Out of this whole area, 3,989 sightings are not protected by current regulations. They're either outside of the geographic boundaries of the box or they are in a month or a year where those boxes aren't applicable.

So 25 percent of the sightings over a ten year period are not protected by the right whale speed rule. So the point is if NMFS is willing to accept that level of risk tolerance to the species in northern New England, why do we over regulate 6.7 square miles of channels throughout the eastern seaboard where there really is a good reason to maintain safe speed and navigate vessels safely?

So these are the nine channels where there is a speed management area, and you can see the boundaries of them. Some of them are a 20 mile line off the coast, and some of them are just a bubble around the port.

But that's the square miles of each of those channels. The two channels in New York, you add up the area between the dotted lines on the chart where it's dredged and it's 9/10 of a square mile.

So there's 6.7 square miles of regulated channels on the East Coast where it's dangerous to go 10 knots. The right whale speed rule covers 17,600 square miles of ocean. And it's only targeting 75 percent of the known risk in northern New England.

So it just doesn't make sense to so rigorously regulate those channel areas and introduce an environmental risk from a shipping accident when your targeted protection of the species is a completely different parameter elsewhere along the coast.

And we now -- the Army Corps, having studied that your navigational precision drops. The Army Corps has studied that your dimensional margin of safety drops significantly at ten knots.

NMFS has never studied whether those nine ports with those ten channels can handle slow speeds. They've also never studied why the Port of Boston and the Port of Canaveral, whose entrance channels are not in a speed management area, they haven't studied why those channels can't be regulated and run ships at ten knots.

There's been no navigational study by NMFS at all on the impact of this rule in confined channel.

The petition, we understand, is going to be denied by NOAA. Office of Management and Budget, or OIRA, has gotten involved because it=s a safety issue. If there's a shipping accident and there's oil on the beach and it's because the ships were following the rules, obviously that's a problem for the administration.

The Army Corps has backed us with the concern and done the studies, and NMFS is holding the line. So this is a significant problem that affects very few -- you know, very few ports, looking at it nationally. And I appreciate the opportunity to talk about this with you.

Unfortunately, this afternoon, I can't be here for the break out sessions because I'm getting on a plane to go to Baltimore to a NOAA focus group of our right whale reporting up at MITAG this afternoon. So for me, it's all NOAA all day, and that's fine to me.

So anyway, thank you. Thank you for listening.

CHAIR PERKINS: Thank you, Mr. Cameron. I want to ask a question. Have you done a presentation like this to the Coast Guard's NAVSAC FACA?

CAPT CAMERON: I have not. I would be delighted to be invited to NAVSAC. I would be delighted to be on NAVSAC, frankly. But I have not.

And the Coast Guard -- I was pleased when I was Captain of the port that my letter to my Admiral did make it to NOAA, and NOAA has told me that that's why the deviation clause is in the regulation. It's just not effective.

Since then, the Coast Guard has not wanted to have much involvement in that issue. They provide NOAA with AIS data from ships so that NOAA can electronically enforce the regulation. But that's been all we've gotten out of the Coast Guard last year.

CHAIR PERKINS: Yes. It sounds like a topic that would be perfectly suited for presentation to the NAVSAC FACA.

CAPT CAMERON: I'll be there if you can arrange that, sir.

CHAIR PERKINS: You know, I've only attended one of their meetings, the Admiral and I had the opportunity to attend together last year, but I will take that action item to try and determine when their next meeting is and try to facilitate that.

CAPT CAMERON: Thank you, sir.

CHAIR PERKINS: Great. Justin, the eHydro tool?

MR. WEST: Yes, sir.

CHAIR PERKINS: So is that intellectual property? Is that licensed software? Is that Army Corps developed software?

MR. WEST: It is Army Corps developed as far as the licensing. I don't have an answer for you, I would have to get in contact with the developers and see exactly how they are working that piece.

CHAIR PERKINS: I'm just curious, you know, whether other agencies or whether the public can utilize that tool.

MR. WEST: I could get back with you on that. Again, I would have to get with the developers and see exactly how their playing that piece. I know they're still working on some further development within the software itself, so that may be in the future plans.

CHAIR PERKINS: Okay. And the software development's taking place in Portland District, is that correct?

MR. WEST: The major development is taking place in Portland with the cooperation of some of the other districts. Charleston was one of the major testing facilities for the software.

CHAIR PERKINS: You mentioned that the CCRs, the Channel Condition Reports, that they're ---- you=re not distributing that data spatially?

MR. WEST: The Channel Condition Report itself does not contain spatial data. All it is is just a report indicating the depths --

CHAIR PERKINS: Why is that? I mean, you've got the spatial data in your hands, it's in your data set. I'm just wondering why isn't that a fully spatially enabled -- you know, data set that's being distributed?

MR. WEST: The CCRs are designed to be used in conjunction with the standardized chart that we would produce that would actually show the soundings. Unfortunately, because the CCR reports are standardized forms throughout the Corps --

CHAIR PERKINS: So that's a Corps of Engineers chart that you're referring to?

MR. WEST: Yes, sir.

CHAIR PERKINS: Can you export an XML so it can be used with Google Earth or, you know, with a public domain viewer?

MR. WEST: As far as the spatial data that's being output by eHydro?

CHAIR PERKINS: Yes. You know, that nice colored chart, the SAC. You had your depth code colored slide and it said SAC was the acronym. Is that available as an XML or for something that people can use without having to buy licensed software to view it?

MR. WEST: That is an option to be output with the eHydro software. It is not something that we have explored sufficiently yet. Charleston is prepared to start putting out the KMLs to be used with Google Earth.

CHAIR PERKINS: Okay, great, great. And I filibustered, so I apologize.

MR. WEST: That's all right, sir.

MR. WARD: Actually, I had a follow-on question to that. That eHydro is built on the Esri platform, is that right, in your developing that product, or am I misunderstanding?

MR. WEST: eHydro is actually developed using Python script.

MR. WARD: Okay.

MR. WEST: Which is integral the Esri GIS platform. It does require either a CAD input through like, Microstation or something like that, or also a geo-database that is created in the Esri GIS format.

MR. WARD: And also, the CCR is a product that is on the nautical chart, as well. So Channel Condition Report shows up.

CHAIR PERKINS: I don't want to -- I really do want to filibuster this, but we could schedule it -- I could come back to Charleston and meet with you guys separately, too. So are there other questions before I run the gauntlet? Yes, Frank?

MEMBER KUDRNA: Regarding the deepening of the channel by the Corps of Engineers, and I recognize based on yesterday's presentation any federal construction funding would require an award authorization for that. But what would the cost sharing be under the current rules of the Corps for federal participation?

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. So we've had some adjustments in the Water Resources Reform Development Act of 2014 with regards to how we cost share as depth changes. And so it would be premature for me to answer you with utmost certainty on that one until we get some implementation guidance from our higher headquarters.

It used to be that anything below 45 feet, there was a different cost share. And that mostly had to do with our operation and maintenance of the harbor in which the federal government paid for 100 percent of the operation and maintenance for a project 45 feet or less. And anything greater than that, the non-federal sponsor had to kick in some amount.

That's now changed to 50 feet with the latest WRRDA, but we don't have implementation guidance on down to our level on exactly how you slice that pie. So more to come. We'll get back to you as soon as we've got some --

CHAIR PERKINS: Joyce?

CAPT CAMERON: Byron, how much did the State set aside?

MR. MILLER: The State of South Carolina, in recognizing that as a nation we are somewhat constrained these days, did not wish to have a lot of doubt surrounding our portion of the share, whatever that share may indeed end up being.

So the State of South Carolina went ahead and set aside $300 million toward the project. It's not the State of South Carolina's intention to cover the federal share, but perhaps to cover in advance, seek reimbursement.

I know there's lots of details to be worked out surrounding all of those opportunities. But at least, the State share, we would hope, has been fully covered in advance, which you know, frankly is kind of unusual.

We had, as a State, about a $550 million budget surplus in 2011, and they set aside $300 million of that toward our next project. So I guess the question is answered about the local share. The question about what that share will be is, I think, not.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. We should ---- in the draft report that comes out, there should be, you know, clarifying language on how to share.

CAPT CAMERON: I think it's interesting to note, though, that 95 percent of the maritime commerce in and out of this country occurs through 15 ports in 12 states. So 12 states are paying 50 or 60 percent of the cost of deepening to serve all 48, and the other 48 share the other 50 percent.

CHAIR PERKINS: Okay. Joyce?

MEMBER MILLER: It's clear there's Governmental support. I come from a state, Hawaii, where there's a huge environmental lobby. And I know your public comment period is coming up.

What are the primary environmental concerns, and do you anticipate there will be strong pushback from any sector of the public, and that's to anyone who --

CHAIR PERKINS: Do you want to handle that one first?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. So we had a public scoping period that was part of our process, part of the National Environmental Protection Act process for coordination. And we solicited comment.

We received somewhere around the order of 100 comments from public and other interests. And a lot of those focused on salinity intrusion into the harbor, and whether or not that would have any effect on groundwater.

Lot of comments concerning erosional areas within the harbor, so shoreline erosion both for the, you know -- basically contiguous land bodies but also for the small islands within the harbor. We have Crab Bank, which was originally constructed by the Corps of Engineers using dredge disposal back in the '70s. That has experienced some erosion over the past two decades.

And so that was a concern along with Shutes Folly Island, which houses the historical fort, Castle Pinckney is currently located on, and then also Fort Sumner, which is, you know, historical resource within the harbor.

So I would say, you know, probably the main comments we received during that public scoping were centered on those types of concerns. And our draft report will address, you know, those concerns and the steps we took to investigate them.

As for any potential -- how did you say it, opposition, you know, that's really yet to be seen. It would be really kind of premature for me to make any guesses on that one. But you know, just following the kind of undercurrent within the press and kind of general feelings around Charleston, I don't get a strong feeling that there's strong opposition to this project.

MR. MILLER: And the only other thing I would add, which is more general than technical because I have no technical skills in my body, as it comes to environmental or others. You know, if you look historically and sort of within the context of other projects' order of magnitude, Charleston on one of the early slides that Brian referenced, because 11 percent of the waterway is the channel, that number is reversed in a lot of other port environments.

River ports that are very narrow, that number would probably be 60, 70, 80 percent would be within the channel. So generally, order of magnitude, deepening projects here in Charleston are -- I won't say it's an easy pull because that's discounting environmental impacts. These things have to be evaluated.

But in the general scope, it's not as significant as many other deepening projects. Our last deepening project was completed in 2004. Is that right? And I'm not aware of any significant environmental concerns that arose with that evaluation.

Conditions change. This project is different from that project. It has to be evaluated fully and fairly, but in the order of magnitude of other projects within both this region and nationally, I would say it's not simple, but it's a much narrower field of potential impacts.

It doesn't reflect on opposition, it reflects on real impacts.

CHAIR PERKINS: All right. We are perfectly on schedule, so I compliment our panelists for, you know, using their time well. If we can, to stay on schedule -- you know, we're right at 9:16. Oh, we have 15 more. Okay, I'm sorry. So Gary. Be advised, we have 15 minutes.

MEMBER JEFFRESS: I had the same question Joyce had.

CHAIR PERKINS: Okay. Susan?

MEMBER SHINGLEDECKER: I'll pass to Rick.

CHAIR PERKINS: Yes, Captain?

CAPT BRENNAN: So for Captain Cameron, I was curious. You mentioned salinity as being an issue for bringing ships in. I'm curious what would be a valuable way to the pilots, or any mariner coming in and out, to display salinity for you in some format so that that was useful to you.

I mean, if you had a direct salinity value, does that have any meaning to the general mariner, or is it a unitized value as far as your Plimsoll marks, or what would be helpful there?

CAPT CAMERON: Well, it would be very helpful in the upper harbor. We have a bridge up just below our North Charleston terminal, it's 155 feet. And that terminal is probably never going to handle ships larger than 8,000 TEU. There's a few of those ships going up there. But we're really literally squeezing them under that bridge and we're timing them with the tide.

The last time I rode a ship up through that bridge, we knew it was going to be very tight. The crew took a radar unit off of the mast to get them another nine inches to squeeze under.

And the ship had come from overseas, so they had estimated their fuel burn and they had estimated their draft. I calculated that we should have cleared that bridge by two feet, nine inches. And I was on the mast when we went under the bridge, and we were about two feet, two inches.

And I was pretty upset with myself that I had miscalculated by that much, because that's just too much of an error. So as we got to the dock, I went down on the dock and read the draft readings, and the ship was floating seven inches higher than they reported.

So I don't know whether that was due to salinity or due to inaccurate program that calculated their fuel burn on the way over, but a few inches matters. I don't know what the status of the technology is to measure and provide that, but that's one point where it would be very useful.

In the lower harbor, we're pretty much ocean salinity all the time. So it's just where you get into the farther reaches of the harbor where you're trying to wring out every bit of capability the waterway can give you.

VICE-CHAIR HANSON: Captain Cameron, we ask this question in every panel on every port. Who pays for ports in Charleston?

CAPT CAMERON: Byron paid for the bridge sensor, and ---- well, the not the marketing department, I suppose, but the Port Authority paid for the bridge sensor, and I think it was a $60,000 purchase.

And we really will need another one on the Ravenel Bridge, another bridge sensor. We understand the maintenance runs around 25 percent of the purchase cost per year.

For the Ports Authority it was, you know, either get the ships there or not and that's what it took. So you know, that's how it fell to them.

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