Unclassified our file Notre référence

ISSUE
In August 2016 the Crystal Serenity cruise ship will transit Canada’s Northwest Passage.

The scale of this transit is unprecedented and presents significant safety risks due to the difficult navigational environment in which the vessel will be operating. In the event of an emergency related to the Crystal Serenity, the Canadian Coast Guard may need to provide maritime search and rescue support to the vessel.

BACKGROUND
Crystal Serenity Transit of the Northwest Passage:

• 
  On August 16, 2016 the Crystal Serenity will depart from Anchorage, Alaska and begin a transit of Canada’s Northwest Passage. The vessel will enter the Northwest Passage via the Beaufort Sea, travel east to the Davis Strait, then south to its final destination of New-York City, New York where it is scheduled to arrive on September 17, 2016.¹ See Annex I for a graphical representation of the planned route.
  

• 
  Over the course of its planned voyage, the Crystal Serenity will be navigating within Canadian internal waters for approximately twelve days, between August 25 and September 6.²
  

• 
  The Crystal Serenity is registered in the Bahamas and owned and operated by U.S. based company Crystal Cruises.³⁴ It will be the largest cruise liner ever to navigate the Northwest Passage and will be carrying an estimated 1000 passengers and an additional 600 crew members.⁵ See Annex II for a summary of key information on the vessel.
  

• 
  The Crystal Serenity will be accompanied by an escort vessel that will provide support services, including ice-breaking services, during its transit through Canadian waters.⁶ The RRS Ernest Shackleton is an ice-breaker owned and operated by the British Antarctic Survey.⁷ A senior ice pilot with the CCG will be present onboard the Shackleton.⁸
  

The Canadian Coast Guard – Relevant Role and Responsibilities

• 
  The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has two primary responsibilities with regards to the safe transit of the Crystal Serenity: 1) the provision of maritime communication services and; 2) the deployment of maritime search and rescue operations.
  
• 
  With regards to communication, the CCG provides ‘Marine Communications and Traffic Services’ (MCTS) on a 24-7 basis to contribute to vessel safety and maintain efficient navigation in Canadian waterways.⁹ These services include: the provision of maritime distress and general radio communication; broadcasting of safety information; regulation of vessel traffic and; screening of vessels entering Canadian waters.¹⁰ MCTS services for vessels transiting Canadian Arctic waterways are provided by the CCG’s MCTS centre located in Iqaluit, Nunavut.
  
• 
  With regards to search and rescue (SAR) The CCG is responsible for the maritime component of the federal government’s national SAR system.¹¹ Under the ‘Search and Rescue Coordination and Response’ program, the CCG provides persons caught in dangerous on-water situations with assistance.¹² The CCG’s roles under the program include: distress monitoring and detection of maritime incidents; coordination, control, and conduct of active maritime SAR operations and; the deployment of maritime resources to assist with aeronautical SAR operations in coordination with the Department of Defence.¹³¹⁴ The Canadian Forces have the overall lead on the coordination and deployment of SAR activities in Canada, including in Canada’s Arctic waters, and will provide dedicated aircraft to support marine incidents in coordination with the CCG.¹⁵
  
• 
  Note that while the CCG shares SAR responsibilities with the Canadian Forces, the CCG is a civilian organization; its activities and services, including maritime SAR, are strictly non-military in nature.¹⁶
  
• 
  Canada’s maritime SAR system is highly effective. On average, 97% of live at risk due to maritime distress are saved each year, or approximately 2, 200 live annually.¹⁷
  

CURRENT SITUATION

• 
  In April 2016, the CCG participated in a table top exercise hosted in Alaska to simulate possible emergency scenarios, including a large-scale evacuation in Arctic waters, related to the Crystal Serenity transit. Other participants included Transports Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces, the U.S. CCG, Crystal Cruises, and the State of Alaska Division of Health Services and Emergency Management and Air Force Alaskan Command. Through this exercise, the Canadian CCG worked with participating agencies to identify risks, review existing capabilities and limitations to regarding Arctic emergency response, and develop response plans under multiple scenarios.¹⁸¹⁹ A full report on the results of the exercise can be made available upon request.
  
• 
  CCG officials continue to engage with Crystal Cruises regarding the logistics of the transit.
  
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  Additionally, the Crystal Serenity has shared its emergency response plan, which is being used to finalize CCG SAR preparations and response plans.²⁰
  

KEY CONSIDERATIONS
From the perspective of the CCG, provided below are key considerations with respect to the safe navigation of the Crystal Serenity through Canada’s Arctic waterways:
I. Heightened navigational risks in Arctic waters –
Large commercial vessels navigating Canada’s Artic waters, such as the Northwest Passage, face heightened risks compared to other maritime regions due to several factors, including²¹:

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  High potential for hull damage from floating sea ice or other underwater obstacles;
  
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  Shallow and narrow waterways;
  
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  Limited mapping of the sea-floor and maritime corridors;
  
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  Extreme and inclement weather;
  
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  Geographic remoteness.
  

While all vessels operating in Arctic waters face these risks among others, they are particularly acute in the case of the Crystal Serenity for several reasons:

• 
  The Crystal Serenity will be carrying a large number of passengers. This effectively multiplies the potential impact and scale of any emergency or other incident requiring SAR.
  

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  The Crystal Serenity is the largest passenger vessel ever to transit the Northwest Passage and has limited maneuverability, compared to smaller ships, to allow it to avoid ice and other obstacles that it may encounter over the course of its voyage.
  

• 
  While the Crystal Serenity’s hull has been ice-strengthened, it is a ‘1-D ice-classed’ vessel and is only capable of operating in very light ice conditions.²² During the time of the transit the extent of sea ice in the Passage is expected to be low, however, due to the unpredictable nature of ice flows there is still potential for Crystal Serenity to encounter ice that is beyond the capabilities of its hull.²³
  

• 
  The vessel will not be transiting continuously through the Northwest Passage. Based on the planned route, it is scheduled to make three stops where passengers and crew members will have the opportunity to disembark onto Canadian territory: Ulukhaktoc, Northwest Territories; Cambridge Bay, Nunavut and; Pond Inlet, Nunavut.²⁴ During these stops, the Crystal Serenity may face an increased probability of running aground as it may be required to anchor closer to shore or an uncharted zone. Furthermore, these planned stops may bring the Crystal Serenity within close proximity to local vessels, including small fishing boats, thereby raising the chance for maritime collisions.
  

II. Recent Arctic SAR experience –
Recent maritime emergencies in Arctic waters illustrate the risks that will be presented to the Crystal Serenity. In 2010 the CCG’s Arctic SAR capabilities were tested when, on August 27, an adventure cruise ship named the Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Coronation Gulf, Nunavut while on a 14 day voyage.²⁵ Two days later, on August 29, the CCG vessel the CCGS Amundsen arrived and evacuated 128 passengers to Kugluktuk, Nunavut.²⁶
While no passengers on-board the Clipper Adventurer reported injuries, the incident reveals the level of difficulty associated with reaching a vessel in distress in Arctic waters in a timely manner to conduct evacuations.²⁷ Moreover, the incident can be considered a best-case scenario; had the ship begun to sink (the hull had experienced extensive damage) the results of the SAR response may have been different.²⁸²⁹ Note that the Crystal Serenity will be carrying almost ten times the number of passengers.
III. Preventing a Maritime Emergency
To mitigate the above noted risks and prevent a potential incident or emergency, maintaining communication between the Crystal Serenity and CCG over the course of its voyage will be of the utmost importance.
Through the NORDREG vessel reporting and marine traffic system, the CCG will act as the initial point of contact with the Crystal Serenity once it enters into Canadian waters.³⁰ In line with Transport Canada Marine Security requirements, the Crystal Serenity is required to report to CCG MTCS centres 96 hours before entering Canadian waters.³¹ Any and all relevant information obtained by the CCG from the Crystal center regarding the entrance of the vessel into and through Canadian waters will be shared with other Canadian agencies and departments, including Transport Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency, and the Department of Defence.
Maintaining ongoing communication will be especially important due to the fact that the Crystal Serenity will be operating according to a flexible itinerary and may travel off its planned course on short notice. During its transit of the Northwest Passage, the vessel will partake in a number of ‘expedition days’ which will be determined and finalized 24 hours or less in advance.³² During these expedition days the vessel may navigate far from its planned route and into uncharted waters. The CCG is negotiating with Crystal Cruises to ensure that it is notified well in advance of any possible route changes.
In the case of the Clipper Adventurer, the Transportation Safety Board found in its investigation of the incident that the shoal upon which the vessel ran aground had been previously identified by the Coast Guard, but was not communicated through NORDREG.³³ As a result, the Clipper was unaware that the hazard was within its area of navigation. The CCG will take all necessary precautions to ensure that this is not repeated with the Crystal Serenity.
As a final note regarding communication, the CCG is aware of the possibility that communications between it and the Crystal Serenity may be disrupted to technical errors. While in Arctic waters, non-satellite radio communication can be disrupted by atmospheric and magnetic interference.³⁴ The Coast guard will ensure that it has a back-up means and maintaining communication in the event of a technical failure. Moreover, in the case that communication with the Crystal Serenity fails, the CCG may still be able to contact the Shackleton support vessel.
III. Responding to a Maritime Emergency
In the event that the Crystal Serenity experiences a maritime emergency while within Canadian waters, the CCG will need to provide maritime SAR support. There are multiple scenarios which may require an SAR response from the CCG, including but not limited to the following³⁵:

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  the vessel runs aground;
  
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  the vessel becomes stranded in or is damaged by ice;
  
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  a maritime collision occurs;
  
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  fire at sea;
  
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  onboard outbreak of an infectious disease.
  

Of particular note is the risk of a low-probability but high-impact event, such as multi-casualty incident or mass rescue operation. Given the large number of passengers and geographic isolation of the Crystal Serenity, such a large-scale emergency would place significant stress on the CCG’s SAR capabilities.

As part of its support responsibility, the RRS Ernest Shackleton will carry a helicopter on board which can be used for emergency medical evacuations, and will also have onboard additional response and damage control equipment to be used in the event of an emergency.³⁶ The Shackleton will be available for immediate response to any emergency related to the Crystal Serenity, however it will be unable to respond to any large-scale rescue or evacuation incidents. In such an event, additional support from CCG vessels may be required. While the CCG operates 116 multitasked vessels capable of responding to SAR situations, of those vessels only a small proportion are capable of operating in Arctic conditions.³⁷ Moreover, depending on the exact timing and location of a possible emergency, an even smaller proportion of the CCG’s arctic capable vessels may be available for deployment to assist the Crystal Serenity. Also, depending on the exact nature and scale of a possible emergency, the CCG may need to engage with Canadian Forces to obtain aeronautical SAR support.
International SAR Assistance –
In the event of a maritime emergency related to the Crystal Serenity within Canadian waters, the CCG may need to seek SAR assistance from foreign governments if it is unable to respond on its own. This may be necessary in the case that providing SAR support to the Crystal Serenity significantly weakens the ability of the CCG to respond to concurrent emergencies in other regions.
Canada is party to the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. Other parties are the governments of Norway, the United States, Denmark, Russia, Sweden, and Finland. Under the Agreement, the parties may request and provide SAR assistance and information to other parties in the event of a maritime emergency within their Arctic Waters.³⁸ See Annex III for an illustrative map of SAR obligations under the Agreement.
Importantly, based on the same obligations the CCG may be requested to assist the US or Danish Coast guards should an incident occur while the Crystal Serenity within waters off the coasts of Alaska or Greenland. In the case that Canada is requested to provide SAR support to either country, the CCG will engage with relevant foreign officials and departments either directly or in coordination with Global Affairs Canada.
Financial Liability -
As a final consideration regarding the response to a maritime emergency, Crystal Cruises will not incur any financial responsibility for SAR support provided by the CCG. Commercial ships operating in Canadian waters (excluding fishing vessels, government ships, and pleasure craft) are required to pay service fees to the Coast Guard only in relation to navigation and icebreaking services.³⁹
NEXT STEPS

• 
  Over the next several weeks, the CCG will continue to engage with Crystal Cruises to finalize preparations regarding maritime communication and SAR support.
  
• 
  Following the table-top exercise, the CCG will maintain communication with the US Coast Guard regarding emergency response plans and to anticipate possible joint SAR operations.
  
• 
  Additional planning is required to finalize the number and exact location of CCG Arctic-capable vessels, including ice-breakers, that will be stationed in the Northwest Passage and surrounding waters during the Crystal Serenity’s voyage. Plans will be finalized and shared regarding the possible deployment of these vessels to provide SAR support.
  
• 
  THE CCG will coordinate with Transport Canada to ensure that communication equipment onboard the Crystal Serenity will be functional and capable of maintaining radio and Satellite communication the CCG over the course of the voyage.
  

ANNEX I
Crystal Serenity Planned Route:

Source: Crystal Cruises, http://www.crystalcruises.com/alaska-cruises/northwest-passage--6319

ANNEX II:
Crystal Serenity Vessel Facts⁴⁰:

Guest Capacity	1070
Total Crew	655
Ship’s Registry	The Bahamas
Gross Registered Tons	68, 870
Length	249.9 m
Width	32.3 m
Draft	7.6 m
Cruising Speed	21 knots

1^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs. http://www.crystalcruises.com/alaska-cruises/northwest-passage--6319

2^ Ibid.

3^ International Maritime Organization (2016). Global Integrated Shipping Information System: Ship Particulars. https://gisis.imo.org/Public/SHIPS/Default.aspx

4^ Canadian Intellectual Property Office (2016). Canadian Trademark Data: Crystal Serenity. http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/vwTrdmrk.do?lang=eng&fileNumber=1124010

5^ Maritime Executive (2016). Rescue Exercise Conducted For Crystal Serenity Voyage.

http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/rescue-exercise-conducted-for-crystal-serenity-voyage

6^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs.

7^British Antarctic Survey (2015). RRS Ernest Shackleton https://www.bas.ac.uk/polar-operations/sites-and-facilities/facility/rrs-ernest-shackleton/

8^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs.

9^Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2016). 2012-13 Departmental Performance Report.

http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2012-13/SO3/so-rs-3.2-eng.html

10^ Ibid.

11^ Fishers and Oceans Canada (2016). Report on Plans and Priorities 2015-2016. http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/rpp/2015-16/so-rs-3.1-eng.html

12^ Ibid.

13^ Canadian Coast Guard (2014). Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in Canada. http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/CCG/SAR_Maritime_Sar

14^ Transport Canada (2005). “Guidelines for the Operation of Passenger Vessels in Canadian Arctic Waters.” Prairie and Norther Region: Marine. https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/tp-tp13670-menu-2315.htm

15^ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Force (2014). Search and Rescue Canada. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-current/sar-canada.page

16^ Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2009). http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/342738.pdf

17^ Canadian Coast Guard (2014). Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in Canada.

18^ Maritime Executive (2016). Rescue Exercise Conducted For Crystal Serenity Voyage.

19^ Maritime Executive (2016). Tabletop review of Crystal Serenity’s Arctic Voyage. http://www.maritime-executive.com/features/tabletop-review-of-crystal-serenitys-arctic-voyage

20^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs.

21^ Canadian Coast Guard (2010). Overview of Marine Disaster Scene Management. http://www.uscg.mil/pvs/docs/MDSM%20description%20May%2011%202010%20draft.pdf

22^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs.

23^ Ibid.

24^ Ibid.

25^ Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2010). Marine Investigation Report M10H0006. Retrieved from http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/2010/m10h0006/m10h0006.pdf

26^ Ibid.

27^ Ibid.

28^ Ibid.

29^ Conley, Heather A. et.al. (2012). “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective.” Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120117_Conley_ArcticSecurity_Web.pdf

30^ Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2010)

31^ Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2012). “Ice Navigation in Canadian Waters”. Icebreaking Program, Maritime Services. Retrieved from: http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/folios/00913/docs/ice-navigation-dans-les-galces-eng.pdf

32^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs.

33^ Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2010)

34^ Transport Canada (2005). “Guidelines for the Operation of Passenger Vessels in Canadian Arctic Waters.” Prairie and Northern Region: Marine. Retrieved from https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/tp-tp13670-menu-2315.htm

35^ Canadian Coast Guard (2010). Overview of Marine Disaster Scene Management. Retrieved from http://www.uscg.mil/pvs/docs/MDSM%20description%20May%2011%202010%20draft.pdf

36^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Northwest Passage FAQs.

37^ Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2009).

38^ Arctic Council (2011). Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531

39^ Canadian Coast Guard (2015). Marine Service Fees. http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/marine-services-fees

40^ Crystal Cruises (2016). Crystal Serenity Deck Plans & Details

http://www.crystalcruises.com/guidebook/crystal-serenity-deck-plans-and-details--31#link120