Yemeni Report Explores Al-Qa'ida's 'New Strategy' in Southern Yemen

GMP20101006155001 Sanaa Al-Masdar Online in Arabic 03 Oct 10

["Exclusive" report by Umar al-Umqi entitled: "Al-Masdar Online Looks

Into Al-Qa'ida's New Strategy in Southern Yemen; Taking Control Over

Kawr Al-Awaliq Operating Under the Popular Army"]

Al-Masdar Online -- During the past 10 days, I have been going back

Al-Qa'ida: Among the Followers of Bin Ladin, al-Qamash, and Obama

During the field visit, some raised profound questions about the

following points: All the leading members of the Al-Qa'ida

Members of the Al-Qa'ida Organization in Yemen have not killed any US citizens.

The US bases in the Gulf countries have never been targeted by

elements from the Al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula

[AQAP].

Since its assassination of former AQAP leader Abu-Ali al-Harithi, the

al-Wuhayshi after his release by the US authorities from Guantanamo

Bay prison.

After the release of Nasir al-Wuhayshi and the Saudi national Sa'id

al-Shahri from Guantanamo Bay prison, the two men managed to unify the

Al-Qa'ida Organization in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Al-Wuhayshi assumed

leadership of the organization, and Al-Shahri became his deputy.

What is the secret behind the Americans' silence over Al-Wuhayshi and

Al-Shahri and their excessive talk about cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi? And

why are the Americans promoting the idea that Al-Awlaqi is Al-Qa'ida's

leader?

On a different note, why did the Yemeni authorities release 175

Why have the Yemeni intelligence apparatuses been arresting persons

not directly involved with Al-Qa'ida, only to release them later or

put them on trial where they would be acquitted -- whereas it turns a

blind eye to the real members of the Al-Qa'ida Organization?

Why have judicial sentences been limited to imprisoning Al-Qa'ida

members for two to three years only?

Why has Abu-Bakr Ja'yul - who is accused of bombing the British

Embassy in Sanaa and is sentenced to 15 years in prison and a

20-million-riyal fine - been released? Which side has paid out the

court fine to the British Embassy?

What is the reason behind all the setbacks and security failures --

such as when statements attributed to a security source reveal that

the security forces had carried out a preemptive operation which has

killed a number of Al-Qa'ida symbols; their names would be braggingly

listed and Al-Qa'ida would deny the reports days later? Above all, we

want to know whose charred bodies are those, or does the matter not

concern our security apparatuses?

Why would the Yemeni intelligence apparatuses not reveal the Al-Qa'ida

spies insinuated into their intelligence entities?

In short, we are looking at three Al-Qa'ida organizations; the first

follows Bin Ladin, the second Al-Qamash, and the last is led by Obama

and the CIA; the US intelligence.

Al-Qa'ida's Strategy in the South

After the declaration of unification of Yemen's two parts, I went with

my father on a visit to what used to be known back then as the

economic and commercial capital, Aden. On our way there, we stopped

at Al-Hawtah, capital of Lahj Governorate, to pray. I still remember

that day very well, because my father whispered in my ear, urging me

to read out a Hadith to the congregation of worshippers.

Moments later, many worshippers came to shake my hand, and they

gathered around me to hear me retell the "Actions Are Judged by

Intentions" Hadith. I was only 10 years old at that time, but I could

sense the enthusiasm that overwhelmed them!

It is an enthusiasm that has led some to strap explosive belts around

their waists, while, in their eyes, others have become hypocrites and

persons of little faith for having refused to take the path of those

who dream of the Al-Hur al-Ayn [maidens of paradise.]

In front of a platform, a man in his seventies bows to his Creator

five times during the day and night. Although that group of young men

has itself brought about the anguish it appears to be going through,

he [the man in his seventies] still prays at the Abdallah Azzam mosque

in Al-Dakkah in Al-Ma'alla District in Aden Governorate.

Fathi's father considers those youngsters to be responsible for the

painful separation which he has been experiencing for 10 years -- ever

since his son left him to respond to the call for Jihad while his

peers stayed with their parents.

In the year 2001, Fathi headed for Afghanistan, where he received the

necessary training which enabled him to fight with the Mujahidin.

When the NATO coalition forces tightened the grip around the

Mujahidin, Fathi had to move to Indonesia. There, he married a girl

from the capital Jakarta. He had a baby boy whom he gave the name

Usamah.

He did not stay there for long. Soon, he quit selling "eggs" and

Ever since, Fathi's father has been waiting for any news about his

only son -- and his grandson, about whom he knows nothing except that

he is living among 18 million people of the Indonesian capital,

Yemen, in the eyes of a few analysts, is considered as one of the few

countries that were able to contain "the mujahidin" returning from

Afghanistan. Despite having used these elements [the mujahidin] as a

card for eliminating its domestic foes, Yemen managed to contain them

by two means: The first is by physical liquidation and defanging them

and the other by integrating them into political and social life.

Al-Mihdar's case is an example of the first means, whereas Al-Fadli

and Jamal al-Nahdi provide an example of the second.

Also, the intelligence apparatuses were able to attract many veteran

combatants such as Khalid Abd-al-Nabi -- preacher of the Friday prayer

at Hamzah mosque in the city of Ja'ar, who lives at his farm which

produces mango and papaya. It is said that the funds allocated to him

by Sanaa enabled him to own that farm and abandon the ideas of

Al-Qa'ida.

As to Abu-Hasan al-Mihdar, who was executed in 1999, his close friends

accepted condolences over his death from Al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin

Ladin.

Although the two men had not met before, Bin Ladin did not want to

miss that chance and sought to pay tribute to him and his jihadist

acts. In order for Al-Qa'ida to attract Al-Mihdar's followers - and

subsequently get a foothold in the governorates of Abyan and Shabwah -

elements from the Al-Qa'ida Organization carried out a strike against

the US destroyer USS Cole off the coast of Aden in October 2000, under

the pretext of avenging the death of Al-Mihdar.

The Yemeni intelligence could not absorb and deal as should be with

the success of the Al-Qa'ida elements' operation against the USS Cole.

The Yemeni intelligence quickly used the operation to reap huge

amounts of money under the pretext of fighting terrorism -- which is

the tune it has mastered playing up until today.

Instead of capturing the Al-Qa'ida elements involved, the security

services arrested the veteran "mujahidin" and a number of their

supporters. They also brought charges against them, only to find out

that they had been barking up the wrong tree during their months-long

investigations.

Every once in a while, the Yemeni authorities used to announce that

they had concluded their investigation with detainees suspected of

involvement, and accordingly, express their intention to put them on

trial. However, the US authorities used to reject that and request

that the submission of their files to court be postponed - especially

after the CIA was able to ascertain the presence of a connection

between the attack against the destroyer USS Cole in Aden and the bomb

attacks against the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam.

The young Alawi believes that executing his shaykh, Al-Mihdar, created

a fertile ground for him and his "mujahidin" peers in Yemen to fight -

which culminated in targeting the USS Cole in Aden and the French oil

tanker Limburg, which was attacked in October 2002.

I am not sure how the two operations are related with respect to their

timing, but both took place in October two full years apart. The

first operation came in retaliation for Al-Mihdar's execution, whereas

the other came to avenge the assassination of Abu-Ali al-Harithi, who

was bombed by a US drone in November 2002 while wandering around in

Ma'rib desert.

Toward the end of 2002, the sides to the conflict (the Yemeni

intelligence, US intelligence, and the Al-Qa'ida Organization) started

to master the game.

Yemen fell victim to those three sides. The Yemeni intelligence, US

intelligence, and Al-Qa'ida took advantage of what may be described as

the zealous, unemployed youth to implement its agenda and plans. This

we shall explain in another section of this field file.

Nonetheless, those young men did not hesitate to respond to the calls

for entering heaven through [the use of] explosive belts!

Tora Bora or a Spark From Hell

Kawr al-Awlaq... A Dream for 12,000 Combatants

At the beginning of last March, I had the chance to visit the city of

Zinjibar, capital of Abyan Governorate, for the first time. That was

one day after the separatist flags had been removed.

Calm prevailed across the city, and there was no cause for concern

since the authority had been able to strike a deal with Shaykh Tariq

al-Fadli. Soon after, I managed quite easily to enter to the office

of Abyan's security chief Abd-al-Razzaq al-Maruni, and to conduct an

interview with him without prior appointment.

I went back to Abyan last week. In the morning of 18 September 2010,

I decided to visit Al-Maruni, who enjoys a special relation with

journalists unlike his fellow security chiefs.

At the external gate of the building - which is surrounded by high

walls - you see cement bricks, behind which are sandbags that had been

carefully placed [on top of each other] to serve as a protective wall

- "precautionary barricades." Behind those, a number of security men

stand with their fingers pressed against the rifles' triggers.

Fear gripped me. Those rifles usually hung over the men's shoulders,

but the security chaos across the governorate has forced those

soldiers to remain on alert -- just as motorcycle owners were forced

to quit driving their motorcycles after the ban issued by the local

and security authorities. The ban was issued because motorcycles can

[be used to] facilitate assassination operations, which have claimed

the lives of a number of soldiers and officers, as stated in the paper

posters placed on the walls, fences, and gates of public and private

facilities in Zinjibar.

Due to transportation difficulties, I accompanied a manager of one of

the executive offices. However, we had to stand at the exterior gate

of the security administration building for over 10 minutes.

I realized that it was no longer easy to access this security

facility, for even the government official whom I was accompanying was

required to obtain an approval over the phone so the soldier would

allow him to cross a distance of up to 700 meters to reach the

security chief's office.

The security administration building is located in a bystreet, and the

Political Security Organization [PSO] department headquarters is

situated on the city's main street. However, the PSO has closed the

street and placed cement bricks over it to prevent transportation

vehicles from moving along its building's fences, as a precautionary

measure.

There, I met a young man, who had recently joined Al-Qa'ida.

Bakr is 22 years old. His educational failure is attributed to his

Islamic Education teacher, who used to treat him rudely when Bakr was

in first secondary grade.

The young man used to have memorization difficulties, and the teacher

was very good at punishing him. "He drove me away," said Bakr loudly.

Bakr justifies his joining the Al-Qa'ida fighters by citing the

Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace: "There will be 12,000

who set out from Aden-Abyan [in Yemen] to bring victory to [the

religion of] God and His messenger. They are the best of people from

my time until theirs."

Bakr told me good news about the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and I

listened along as a he quoted verses from the Holy Koran and Sunni

Hadiths about the virtues of Jihad and the rewards of martyrdom.

He recited those verses and Hadiths by heart. When I asked [how he

was able to do so], he answered: "Vim led me to memorize all these

texts... and my longing for paradise has made the task easier."

That prophecy has driven the Al-Qa'ida elements to station themselves

in Kawr al-Awaliq.

The Kawr al-Awaliq area is characterized by a chain of high and

connected mountains situated in the western and southern parts of

Shabwah Governorate and in the eastern and northern parts of Abyan

Governorate.

Al-Awaliq [tribe] -- to which cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi belongs, and

whose assassination by the US intelligence over suspected affiliation

to Al-Qa'ida has been reportedly approved by US President Barack Obama

-- is considered to be among the most rugged areas in Yemen.

The heroes of the 14 October revolution had previously taken refuge in

those mountains during their quest for liberating the occupied South

from Britain.

The British occupier may have recognized how important this area is to

us Muslims, since the Aden-Abyan army is going to come out of it.

This is why the British occupier - since the beginning of the

twentieth century - was keen to fragment and divide Kawr al-Awaliq

into the lower al-Awaliq, Abyan, and the upper Al-Awaliq, Shabwah.

The Al-Iklil [the Crown; an encyclopedia containing genealogical,

topographical, and historical information about South Arabia] states

that the Al-Awaliq tribes are historically related to the Yemeni

historic leader Sayf Bin-dhi-Yazan. Hence, many members of the

Al-Awaliq believe themselves to be the sole heirs of the Dhi-Yazan

Himyariyah tribe in the whole of Yemen.

The Al-Awaliq members also believe that the Aden-Abyan army will come

out from their descendents.

In praise of his tribe, Al-Awaliq's poet says:

[Start of a poem:]

The verses praise the gallantry of the Al-Awaliq tribe members in

their support of the mujahidin against their enemies. The verses

describe the Al-Awaliq tribe as a "spark from hell."

[End of the poem.]

The Al-Qa'ida Organization recognizes the significance of the area of

Kawr al-Awaliq. Some parts of Kawr al-Awaliq, such as "Al-Mahfad" in

Abyan and "Al-Sa'id- Mayfa'ah" in Shabwah, have witnessed fierce

clashes between Al-Qa'ida elements and security forces during the past

few months.

After a quick read through the writings of Al-Qa'ida's key preacher

Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri - in which he refers to "the Yemeni people's

responsibility toward the Muslims' sanctities and resources" and

mentions 10 reasons that assert Yemen's importance for Al-Qa'ida - we

conclude that Al-Qa'ida is currently seeking to take control over Kawr

al-Awaliq, which extends from the coasts of the Arabian Sea in the

South to the deserts of the Empty Quarter in the North. This is in

accordance with Al-Qa'ida's new strategy, which is based on

establishing direct contact with the dignitaries of the areas in which

its elements are stationed -- and the aim of which is to revive the

concept of popular Jihad. This would enable Al-Qa'ida to isolate the

security and military units, which would in turn be unwilling to get

involved in conflicts and confrontations with the tribes' members.

If Al-Qa'ida succeeds in accomplishing this, then the appropriate