THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF DETERRENCE THREATS DOES NOT EXONERATE THEM FROM THE WRONGFUL INTENTIONS PRINCIPLE Robert P. Churchill. Nuclear Arms as a Philosophical and Moral Issue Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 469, Nuclear Armament and Disarmament (Sep, 1983), pp. 46-57. p. 52. The objection that it is not immoral to intend massive retaliation may also be based on the claim that the US. intention is entirely conditional upon the behavior of the adversary. We are intending not to attack, but to launch a strike only if the opponent attacks. Such conditional intentions seem strange because they are by nature self-extinguishing: the purpose of forming the intention to retaliate is to prevent the very circumstances in which the intended act would be performed Nevertheless the wrong intentions principle applies to conditional just as to unconditional intentions. When a terrorist hijacks an airplane at gunpoint and threatens the lives of his hostages, the immorality of his threat is not canceled by its being conditional upon the behavior of the officials he seeks to coerce. The same is true of nuclear deterrence. In addition to the leaders who decide to launch a first strike, millions who have no part in the decision will die or suffer. Thus one does not significantly change the immorality of the threat to kill innocent persons by making it conditional upon the actions of national leaders