1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership
Scenario 2 is Missile Defense---
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- Ballistic missile prolif causes regional instability and asymmetric WMD use in important regions
- Causes fast escalation in the Middle East, South and East Asia Levinger 6
- Causes superpower nuclear war in Asia Stares and Wit ‘9
- And the Middle East
- Indo-Pak war causes nuclear Armageddon
- Even small threats pose great risk
- SMD deters threats because of its layered capabilities
Scenario 2 is Missile Defense---Rogue states are gaining Missiles in the status quo A. North Korea Bolton 7-14-11 – John R. Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, “North Korea edges toward next nuke test,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/14/north-korea-edges-toward-next-nuke-test/ You wouldn’t know it from the Obama administration, but North Korea’s global threat continues to metastasize. South Korea recently concluded that extensive cyber-attacks against civilian and military targets in the South emanated from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Following China’s lead in information warfare, the North is creating yet another asymmetric military capability it can deploy against its adversaries and also peddle for hard currency to other rogue states and terrorists. Although Pyongyang limited its targeting of this particular sortie to South Korea, the potential cyberwarfare battlefield is global and includes the United States, which already is the subject of extensive cyberprobing, exploitation and espionage by China. For a country perennially on the brink of starvation, North Korea’s military foray into cyberspace demonstrates its continuing malevolence. The DPRK’s nuclear-weapons program has not rested on its laurels, either, with widely observed surface-level preparations for a possible third underground test well under way. The North’s development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads is also advancing apace, as Russian missile designer Yuri Solomonov highlighted last month in a Kommersant interview. This is hardly surprisingly given Iran’s increasing long-range capabilities, the extensive Tehran-Pyongyang collaboration, and their programs’ common base in Soviet-era Scud missile technology. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan has released documents purportedly showing prior North Korean bribery of senior Islamabad officials to grease the transfer of nuclear or ballistic-missile technology. While their authenticity is disputed, the documents are part of Mr. Khan’s continuing campaign to prove he did not act solo in the world’s illicit nuclear-weapons bazaar. He long ago admitted supplying North Korea and Iran with critical nuclear technology. Pyongyang’s unveiling in November of impressive new uranium-enrichment facilities at Yongbyon and recent construction there show the continuing fruits of Mr. Khan’s entrepreneurship. His documents - and the many others he undoubtedly has in a shoebox somewhere - are worth verifying and actually might help Islamabad and Washington work together to repair their fractured relationship and prevent China from exploiting their current differences. Clearly, North Korea’s weapons programs are not decelerating even amid intensive preparations for a possible transition of power, following Kim Jong-il’s death, to a third member of the communist Kim dynasty. But faced with these challenges, the Obama administration has been not only publicly silent but essentially passive both diplomatically and intellectually. Only the Pentagon and the intelligence community, fortunately still implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative, have done much beyond noting pro forma that the troublemaking DPRK is still at it. B. Iran DAREINI 6-2-11 – Ali Akbar Dareini, Associate Press writer, “Iran: Missile progress shows sanctions futile,” http://news.yahoo.com/iran-missile-progress-shows-sanctions-futile-162422024.html Iran's defense minister claimed Saturday that the country's missile progress shows that U.N. sanctions are ineffective and won't stop Tehran's defense programs. The statement by Gen. Ahmad Vahidi comes during 10 days of war games in Iran's latest show of military might and displays what Tehran claims is growing self-sufficiency in military and other technologies. Vahidi said Iran's missile program is "indigenous" and has no reliance on foreign countries to meet its defense requirements. Iran is under four sets of U.N. sanctions over its refusal to halt uranium enrichment, a technology that can be used to produce nuclear fuel or atomic weapons. Last week, Iran unveiled underground missile silos for the first time, making Iran's arsenal less vulnerable to any possible attack. Iran's Revolutionary Guard, the country's most powerful military force, said the Islamic Republic has the ability to produce missiles with a greater range than those currently in its arsenal, but doesn't need to do so. The upgraded version of Iran's Shahab-3 and Sajjil-2 missiles already can travel up to 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers) — putting Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf region and parts Europe within reach. "The war games ... show Iran's great capability in designing, producing and using various kinds of missiles based on domestic knowledge. This showed that the sanctions imposed had no effect on Iran's missile program," Vahidi said in comments posted on sepahnews.com, the Guard's official website. Iran has periodically boasted of what it calls homegrown advances in technological sectors such as its satellite program and other scientific work. Ballistic missile prolif causes regional instability and asymmetric WMD use in important regions Roberto L. Delgado 5, Colonel - United States Army, “WHAT SHOULD BE THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA?”, U.S. Army War College, 3-18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA431775&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by rogue nations is an issue that jeopardizes the security of our nation, people, deployed military forces, friends, and allies. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the world has become more unpredictable and volatile rather than predictable and peaceful. The instability in some countries and regions of the world has increased the interest of insurgents and extremists in obtaining WMD and the means to deliver them, including ballistic missiles, in order to coerce or topple the governments within their countries. To many nations and countries, ballistic missiles are an inexpensive and effective means to overcome an adversary’s air defense system without having to use manned aircraft, lose trained personnel, and damage costly aircrafts. Missiles also require less maintenance, training, and logistics than manned aircraft. Ballistic and cruise missiles can also be armed with conventional or non-conventional warheads; even the limited use of these weapons could be devastating to any country or nation and their people. The United States, as the only global power, is a prime target for these players as they seek to destabilize the United States and its interests abroad through either the employment or threat of employment of WMD. Ballistic missiles, with the capability to deliver nuclear, biological, and chemical war heads cause significant anxiety in the United States and abroad. Causes fast escalation in the Middle East, South and East Asia Levinger 6 – Josh Levinger, Research Assistant with the Center for Future Civic Media at MIT, Fall 2006, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation Among the “Axis of Evil”: Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan,” http://www.levinger.net/josh/files/range/paper.pdf The real threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation is to regional stability. Intro- ducing long range missiles and nuclear warheads into inflamed regions such as the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and East Asia, opens the possibility for accidental launch and rapid escalation. While the United States and the Soviet Union stared each other down at the nuclear threshold for decades, other adversaries may not have as ad- vanced a military decision process, or the experience of living with the threat of total an- nihilation. The future of missile proliferation looks bleak, with the impending disintegra- tion of the NPT and the circumvention of the MTCR. On the other hand, the foreign market for budding missile designers appears to be booming. Perhaps there are job of- fers waiting for this graduating senior in Pyongyang, Tehran or Islamabad. Causes superpower nuclear war in Asia Stares and Wit ‘9, Sr. Fellow for Conflict Prevention at the C.F.R. & Adjunct Sr. Research Fellow @ Weatherhead East Asia Institute, Columbia University, 2009 (Paul and Joel, “Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea,” January, available for download athttp://www.cfr.org/ These various scenarios would present the United States and the neighboring states with challenges and dilemmas that, depending on how events were to unfold, could grow in size and complexity. Important and vital interests are at stake for all concerned. North Korea is hardly a normal country located in a strategic backwater of the world. As a nuclear weapons state and exporter of ballistic missile systems, it has long been a serious proliferation concern to Washington. With one of the world’s largest armies in possession of huge numbers of long-range artillery and missiles, it can also wreak havoc on America’s most impor- tant Asian allies––South Korea and Japan––both of which are home to large numbers of American citizens and host to major U.S. garrisons committed to their defense. Moreover, North Korea abuts two great powers—China and Russia––that have important interests at stake in the future of the peninsula. That they would become actively engaged in any future crisis involving North Korea is virtually guaranteed. Although all the interested powers share a basic interest in maintain- ing peace and stability in northeast Asia, a major crisis from within North Korea could lead to significant tensions and––as in the past–– even conflict between them. A contested or prolonged leadership strug- gle in Pyongyang would inevitably raise questions in Washington about whether the United States should try to sway the outcome.5 Some will almost certainly argue that only by promoting regime change will the threat now posed by North Korea as a global proliferator, as a regional menace to America’s allies, and as a massive human rights violator, finally disappear. Such views could gain some currency in Seoul and even Tokyo, though it seems unlikely. Beijing, however, would certainly look on any attempt to promote a pro-American regime in Pyongyang as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and a challenge to China’s national interests. This and other potential sources of friction could intensify should the situation in North Korea deteriorate. The impact of a severe power struggle in Pyongyang on the availability of food and other basic ser- vices could cause tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee North Korea. The pressure on neighboring countries to intervene with humanitarian assistance and use their military to stem the flow of refugees would likely grow in these circumstances. Suspicions that the situation could be exploited by others for political advantage would add to the pressure to act sooner rather than later in a crisis. China would be the most likely destination for refugees because of its relatively open and porous border; its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has reportedly developed contingency plans to intervene in North Korea for possible humanitarian, peacekeeping, and “environmental control” missions.6 Besides increasing the risk of dangerous military interactions and unin- tended escalation in sensitive borders areas, China’s actions would likely cause considerable consternation in South Korea about its ultimate intentions toward the peninsula. China no doubt harbors similar fears about potential South Korean and American intervention in the North. And the Middle East Alon Ben-Meir 7 professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, 2/6/07, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance, http://www.upi.com/Security_Industry/2007/02/06/Realpolitik-Ending-Irans-defiance/UPI-69491170778058/ Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program. Indo-Pak war causes nuclear Armageddon Praful Bidwai 8, International The News, 12-26-08, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=153861 Any India-Pakistan conflict is liable to escalate into nuclear war. In Nuclear Armageddon, there are no winners—only mega-deaths. Even a limited nuclear exchange will kill millions of civilians in both countries. The economic and environmental damage will set us back by decades. A single Hiroshima/Nagasaki-type bomb will kill 8 to 20 lakh people in a big city. India and Pakistan both have scores of such bombs, indeed even more powerful ones. In every conceivable war-gaming scenario—and many credible ones exist —, an India-Pakistan conflict has one inevitable outcome: full-scale war, in which Pakistan won’t hesitate to use nuclear weapons if it fears loss of territory. This will invite nuclear retaliation from India, with consequences too horrifying even to contemplate. Even small threats pose great risk Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 6 – Independent Working Group on Misile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 report, Washington D.C., August 28, 2006 Twenty-first century threats to the United States, its de- ployed forces, and its friends and allies differ fundamental- ly from those of the Cold War. An unprecedented number of international actors have now acquired – or are seeking to acquire – missiles. These include not only states, but also non-state groups interested in obtaining missiles with nucle- ar or other payloads. The spectrum encompasses the missile arsenals already in the hands of Russia and China, as well as the emerging arsenals of a number of hostile states. The character of this threat has also changed. Unlike the Soviet Union, these newer missile possessors do not attempt to match U.S. systems, either in quality or in quantity. In- stead, their missiles are designed to inflict major devasta- tion without necessarily possessing the accuracy associated with the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals of the Cold War.1
Under some plausible scenarios – including re-bas- ing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air- launch options, and shortened development pro- grams that might include testing in a third country – or some combination of these – the United States might well have little or no warning before opera- tional deployment.2 SMD deters threats because of its layered capabilities Pfaltzgraff 8 – Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff jr., President, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, December 15, 2008, “Space And U.S. Security A Net Assessment,” The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Space_and_U_S_Security_Net_Assessment_Final_Dec15_08.pdf The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their possession by grow- ing numbers of adversaries, ranging from traditional strategic competitors to terrorist organizations, pose a serious and growing threat to the United States, its civilian population and deployed military forces, and friends and allies. This threat encompasses: • • •
States such as North Korea and Iran which are working hard to acquire (or already possess) WMD and the means to deliver them; Strategic competitors, Russia and China, which are extending the sophistication of their strategic arsenals in terms of warhead accuracy, countermeasures, and delivery systems; Terrorist groups, which are making concerted efforts to obtain WMD that would enable them to conduct chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks; and
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