***AFRICOM***
Sealifting is key to AFRICOM stability
Martinez 08 (Miguel, LT USN, April 23, 2008, “LESSONS FROM SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS APPLIED TO AFRICOM”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA484403///TS)
The next lesson from the case studies is that a critical capability for U.S. forces in disaster relief operations is the ability to provide logistical support to relief agencies and the effected population. Recent disaster relief operations show the most effective elements of the Joint Task Force were not traditional combat forces. Instead, logistic units and assets were the most beneficial parts of the U.S. force. Examples include the importance of aviation units accessing remote terrain in Operations Lifeline and Support Hope.75 In Operation Unified Assistance, the forward deployed nature of the Military Sealift Command meant that large amounts of supplies could be provided quickly via shortened sea lines of communication.76 – Another lesson related to logistics is that effective coordination with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs is required to efficiently provide logistical support. Operation Support Hope showed how lack of coordination with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs can hinder logistical support. In Operation Lifeline, the JTF took advantage of preexisting relationships in the U.S. Embassy and with the host nation to better provide support. Even when an attempt is made at synchronization, friction can be introduced to disaster relief operations when a JTF attempts to synchronize with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs. Case studies in Rwanda and Indonesia showed how lack of synchronization can result from a number of different factors including different communication technology between military and civilian agencies. Joint doctrine does address the need to synchronize efforts with civilian organizations through the formation of civil military operations centers (CMOC) and humanitarian operations centers (HOC).77, 78 However, due to the advisory nature of the operation centers and the fact that IOs and NGOs are not bound by U.S. military doctrine, effective coordination is not always achieved. AFRICOM should establish a high threshold with objective criteria defining when U.S. military forces will be utilized for disaster relief operations. Less complex and common disaster relief situations should be left to the traditional providers of relief such as USAID as well as IOs and NGOs. The United Nations (U.N.) addresses this issue by pointing out the need to establish a clear distinction between civil and military humanitarian action.79 The U.N. goes further and suggests military forces should only be used as a last resort when a “humanitarian gap” exists because civilian relief agencies are unable to provide assistance.80 It has also been proposed by experts in humanitarian assistance that military assets should only be used when they hold a “comparative advantage” over other relief agencies.81 The threshold for U.S. military forces should include widespread destruction of infrastructure and evidence of an inability of OGAs, IOs, and NGOs to provide disaster relief due to lack of logistical capability. The U.S. civilian agency component of the command structure of AFRICOM should make it possible for OGAs to monitor and provide input to the geographic combatant commander if the threshold has been met to provide military support to disaster relief operations. Developing a high threshold for military participation in disaster relief operations should alleviate some of the concerns on the part of host nations and traditional providers of disaster relief. OGAs, IOs, and NGOs would not feel as if they were in competition with the U.S. military for humanitarian resources. The fear that the U.S. military uses humanitarian disaster to gather operational intelligence or gain a military advantage would also be alleviated. The next recommendation is AFRICOM should utilize the sea basing concept whenever possible in disaster relief scenarios. The case studies showed host nations can be wary of U.S. military disaster relief operations and sea-basing would reduce the size of the military footprint in the effected nation. Sea basing would also be more effective for force protection. Many of the regions USAID is providing relief for in Africa are accessible by the sea.82 If these regions degenerated into a complex crisis and experienced large scale destruction of infrastructure they would be ideal for sea basing.
Sealift is crucial to AFRICOM’s ability to meet threats
Ward 10 (General William, March 9, 2010, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: General Ward reports annual testimony to Congress”, http://www.usaraf.army.mil/NEWS/NEWS_100310_WARD_AFRICOM_REMARKS_CONGRESS.html///TS)
The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue the defense aspects of the President's stated priorities. The countries in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary missions-the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S. military air and sealift. Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them transform their security sectors. The greatest needs include the following:
Sealift key to African Stability
Sealift crucial to African stability
Sohn 09 (Kathi, is a civilian employee of the Department of Defense with a current assignment to the Pentagon in direct support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She graduated with highest distinction from the Naval War College in June 2008 and was awarded the McGinnis Family Award for Outstanding Performance in Distance Education. Sohn also has a master’s degree in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University 2009, “THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION
A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519324///TS)
In March 2008, the prepositioning ships of the Military Sealift Command’s West Africa Training Cruise joined the Africa Partnership Station for a sea-basing and humanitarian-assistance-distribution exercise off Monrovia, Liberia. The March 2008 edition of Rhumb Lines, a weekly Navy Office of Information e-mail circular for senior Navy leadership, reported the impact of such additional sea-base platforms as the Improved Navy Lighterage System, a redesigned floating-dock system originally used during WorldWar II, in its first operational deployment. Rhumb Lines reported, “The ability to create a mobile plat format sea enables future execution of the Maritime Strategy, complements APS initiatives and has the potential to enhance future support in the African region.” 18 One report on an early February 2008 visit by APS to Cameroon to assist with the relief of refugees escaping to the northern part of that country from civil conflict in Chad illustrates the multifaceted relationship-building nature of the APS mission: “In addition to providing relief assistance during the visit, Sailors from Swift will conduct a community relations project, meet with local officials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and support a diplomatic reception aboard the ship.”
AFRICOM stability is crucial for African stability- conflict reduction, security, terrorism, crisis response
Wood 08 (Colonel Patricia, United States Army, March 14, 2008, “FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION: THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING THE “TOTAL FORCE” IN U.S. AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada493835///TS)
The main focus for AFRICOM is to provide conflict reduction efforts, improve the security environment, defeat terrorist activity, and provide support in crisis response. The primary goal of AFRICOM is to develop a stable environment in Africa, promote civil society and improve the quality of life for those who live on the continent. The missions will include non-traditional military operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, training of African militaries and to conduct training, and medical missions. AFRICOM will be responsible for other presidential-directed military operations as required. 4 At the writing of this paper, AFRICOMs immediate focus is not necessarily on establishing a military presence or responding to a military operation in Africa, but rather refining the mission, formulating staffing requirements, and determining a headquarters location. A force health protection strategy in AFRICOM must be a critical priority prior to deployments in Africa because the nature of stability operations planned, such as multi-component jointly staffed, smaller contingencies, and/or in remote areas. Environmental health threats are the predominant threat to military personnel because of the many viruses, bacteria and parasites unique to Africa. Now is the optimum time to formulate a strategy for force health protection in Africa, identify critical force protection issues, and identify recommendations of strategic options to minimize the infectious disease threat to the operational force, and ensure a comprehensive and mobile medical care system to care for the sick and injured.
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