A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Alliierte Kontrollrat, p. 84; Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, p. 59.
247. Franco-American meetings, August 22-23, 1945, FRUS 1945, 4:711, 721. 248. Saint-Hardouin to Bidault, October 9, 1945, Y/283/FFMA. 249. See Caffery to Byrnes, June 11, June 22 and August 30, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:566-567, 567n, 596. For an open admission of the importance of domestic political considerations in France's German policy, see Byrnes-Bidault meeting, September 24, 1946, ibid., pp. 607-608. It was not as though Bidault, in taking a strong anti-Soviet line, was just telling them Americans what he thought they wanted to hear, in order, for example, to get economic or other concessions from them. His view, even in late 1946, was that the Americans were not tough enough with the Russians. See his comment to the British ambassador Duff Cooper of October 11, 1946, quoted in Soutou, "La sécurité de la France," p. 28. 250. Bidault-Marshall meeting, April 20, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:369-370. See also Bidault-Marshall meeting, March 11, 1947; Marshall to Acheson, March 24, 1947; Caffery to Marshall, March 25 and November 6, 1947; in FRUS 1947, 2:241, 396, 401, 702. 251. Bidault-Marshall meeting, November 28, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:739. 252. Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 66, 71, 78-80, 194. See also Elgey, République des illusions, pp. 386, 387; and Chauvel note of May 24, 1948, MP/67/FFMA, explaining Bidault's backpedaling on the German question in terms of French domestic politics. On Bidault's great concern with the political situation in France, see also Caffery to Marshall, May 24, May 25 and May 28, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:273-274, 281, 281n. On the backpedaling itself, see Bidault's memoranda of May 20, 1948, Z/Généralités/23/FFMA, and various documents in FRUS 1948, 2:266-281. For a wonderful example of the gap between the official rhetoric and Bidault's real beliefs, see Hüser, "De Gaulle, Bidault, Schuman et l'Allemagne," n. 55; note especially Bidault's private reference in September 1945 to the German threat as a "convenient myth." 253. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 119-123; JSSC report, April 29, 1947, FRUS 1947, 1:740; Pierre Guillen, "Les Chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED (1950-1954)," Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 129 (January 1983), pp. 3-33. 254. Interdepartmental meeting and Bohlen memorandum, August 30, 1947, FRUS 1947, 1:762-764. The views Bohlen expressed were fully shared by the other top officials at the meeting. 255. Summary of Bevin memorandum in Inverchapel to Marshall, January 13, 1948, FRUS 1948, 3:4-6, to be interpreted in the context of the general philosophy Bevin laid out in his December 17, 1947, meeting with Bidault, Y/297/FFMA and FO 371/67674. 256. Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 64-66, 141-142; Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman, homme d'état. 1886-1963 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986), p. 212; Poidevin, "Facteur Europe," p. 314; Humbert to the prime minister, July 29, 1947 (for the quotation), box 4Q2, SHAT, Vincennes. For various archival documents with similar themes, see Massigli note, November 22, 1947, MP/65; Massigli to Foreign Ministry, June 3, 1948, MP/67; Massigli to Chauvel, February 14, 1949, MP/68; all FFMA. On Anglo-American pressure on France--and in particular the threat to move ahead on the German question without France if the French did not come along--see, for example, Lovett-Douglas phone conversation, March 2, 1948; Douglas to Marshall, May 21 and May 24, 1948; Douglas-Saltzman phone conversation, May 31, 1948; Douglas to Lovett, June 4, 1948; Douglas to Marshall, June 16, 1948; and Marshall to Douglas, June 14, 1948; in FRUS 1948, 2:112, 269, 273, 301, 319, 335, 378. Note also the discussion of the issue in the British cabinet, May 3, 1948, CM 34(48), Cab 128/12, PRO. 257. Note especially a series of memoranda written in 1952 and 1953 by Jean Sauvagnargues, especially his memoranda of June 25, 1952, and April 22 and June 10, 1953, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/822 and 823/FFMA, and Europe 1949-55/Généralités/100/FFMA. The foreign ministers of the period--Bidault and, to my mind at least, Schuman as well--saw things in much the same way. See Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 179, and Georges-Henri Soutou, "La France et les notes soviétiques de 1952 sur l'Allemagne," Revue d'Allemagne 20 (1988): 270-272. 258. See, for example, Massigli to Bidault, July 8, 1947, MP/92/FFMA: "je crois en définitive que la coupure vaut mieux pour nous." J.C. Paris, the head of the direction d'Europe at the Quai d'Orsay, took the same kind of line in a note of July 18, 1948. "The cutting of Germany in two," he wrote, "has major advantages for us." Quoted in Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, p. 189. 259. Coulet to Massigli, October 31, 1947, MP/96/FFMA. See also a basic policy document drafted during the brief period in late 1946 and early 1947 when the veteran Socialist Léon Blum was prime minister: "In the economic area, but also in the political area, the integration of Germany into Europe has to be taken as the goal for both the allies and the Germans themselves. This of course means only western Germany and western Europe. But Europe is the only hope, aside from the Reich itself, which is open to the Germans, and for the victors of yesterday, it is the only way of giving life and substance to a Germany politically decentralized but economically prosperous, that they must take as their objective." Foreign Ministry to Koenig (draft), January 2, 1947, Y/298/FFMA. On the Blum interregnum in France's German policy, see Soutou, "La politique française à l'égard de la Rhénanie," p. 61. 260. John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 159; Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 79, 138-139, 230, 243; Pierre Gerbet, "Les Origines du Plan Schuman: le choix de la méthode communautaire par le gouvernement français," and Raymond Poidevin, "Le Facteur Europe dans la politique allemande de Robert Schuman," both in Poidevin, Histoire des débuts, pp. 209, 314-315. See also Massigli to Chauvel, February 14, 1949, MP/68/FFMA. 261. See Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 230-231; Seydoux note, April 7, 1950, Europe 1949-1955/Généralités/87/FFMA. 262. See Poidevin, "Facteur Europe," pp. 314-317; Poidevin, Schuman, pp. 220, 320-324; and Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, p. 138. Note also Saint-Hardouin to Schuman, September 5, 1948, Y/312/FFMA. 263. See Soutou, "La politique française à l'égard de la Rhénanie," pp. 64-65. 264. See, for example, Marshall to Douglas, February 20, 1948, and Douglas to Marshall March 2, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:72, 114. 265. Marshall to Caffery, February 19, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:71. 266. Douglas to Marshall, February 28, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:99. The argument about the "American origins of the Schuman Plan," and in particular about Douglas's role, is developed at some length in René Massigli, Une Comédie des erreurs: souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne (Paris: Plon, 1978), pp. 192-195. See also Poidevin, Schuman, p. 271; Pierre Mélandri, Les Etats-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe (Paris: A. Pedone, 1980), pp. 155, 245, 272ff; and Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, pp. 169-170. 267. On the key role that an American commitment to the defense of Europe played in French thinking at the time, see Soutou, "La sécurité de la France dans l'après-guerre," pp. 26, 29, 32. 268. For the main report of the London conference: FRUS 1948, 2:309-312. For the principal annexes, see ibid., pp. 240-241, 260-262, 290-294, 305-307. The fact that America and Britain were serious about moving ahead quickly in Germany is reflected also in what was actually going on in the bizone. In January 1948, something that looked very much like a German government was brought into being there. The bizonal Economic Council was a kind of parliament, and the Council's Executive Committee was made into a "proper executive body" ("really a cabinet but we are not calling it that"). Murphy to Marshall, January 7, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:5. The structural changes in Germany were made without consultation with the French, even though the French had been assured at London in December that the Anglo-Saxons would bring them into the basic political process in Germany. The French government was livid and protested vigorously; the American and British governments were embarrassed. This was one of a series of incidents that confirmed the French in their view that when it came to foreign policy, the Americans did not quite have their act together. On this whole affair, see Caffery to Marshall, January 10, 1948, and Wallner to Bonbright, January 16, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:20-21, 27-28; and, for the French reaction, Massigli to Foreign Ministry, January 9, 1948, MP/65/FFMA, and two Chauvel notes and Chauvel to Bonnet, all dated January 12, 1948, Bonnet Papers [BP], vol. 1, FFMA. On the establishment of the Federal Republic, see two works by Wolfgang Benz: Die Gründung der Bundesrepublik: Von der Bizone zum souveränen Staat (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1984), and Von der Besatzungsherrschaft zur Bundesrepublik, 1946-1949 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1984), esp. pp. 88-116, for the events described in the text. Note also two older but still useful English-language accounts: Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (New York: Oxford, 1963); and John Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 269. Bohlen memorandum, August 30, 1947 FRUS 1947, 1:765. 270. Oliver Harvey minute, October 20, 1947, MP/65/FFMA. 271. Caffery to State Department and Douglas to Marshall, both May 21, 1948; Douglas to State Department, May 30, 1948; and Caffery to Marshall, May 25 and June 2, 1948; in FRUS 1948, 2:266n., 267, 281, 301n., 317. For the general French sense of the seriousness of the situation at this time, see, for example, Dejean to Foreign Ministry, March 12, 1948, and Chauvel to Bonnet, March 18 and May 19, 1948, BP/1/FFMA; for a discussion, see Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, p. 89. See also Massigli to Foreign Ministry, May 3, 1948, MP/67/FFMA. Top American officials also felt that the West was skating on thin ice. See, for example, General Bradley's views, reported in Bonnet to Bidault, May 3, 1948, BP/1/FFMA; note also the cautious position taken by the JCS in April 1948, cited in JCS Historical Office, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 2 (1947-1949) (Wilmington: Glazier, 1979), p. 360. Truman himself later alluded to the possibility of a Soviet preventive war in his remarks to the NATO foreign ministers, April 3, 1949, published in the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 40 (1992): 416. 272. Kaplan, The Short March, p. 175. 273. Policy Planning Staff, Résumé of the World Situation, November 6, 1947, FRUS 1947, 1:773. Note also Bidault's remarks in "Conversations anglo-françaises," December 17, 1947, Y/297/FFMA. 274. Dejean to Foreign Ministry, March 12, 1948, BP/1/FFMA. Dejean's analysis was endorsed in Chauvel to Bonnet, March 18, 1948, ibid. See also the discussion in Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 87-91. 275. See especially Murphy to Marshall, FRUS 1948, 2:1268-70; and Seydoux to Foreign Ministry, November 14, 1947, Y/296/FFMA. See also Douglas to Marshall, March 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:120, and Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), pp. 87-88. 276. For the initial Soviet measures--what Murphy called the "series of strictures and annoyances" that USSR had "inaugurated affecting our continued presence in Berlin"--and the U.S. reaction, see Murphy to Marshall, April 1, 2 and 13, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:887-889, 892; and especially Clay teleconferences with Bradley and Royall, March 31 and April 10, 1948, and Clay to Bradley, April 1, 1948, in Clay Papers, 2:599-608, 621-623. Note especially Clay's comment (p. 623) that the "real crisis" would develop from the measures the western powers were about to take in western Germany, the currency reform followed by the establishment of a "partial Germany government." 277. Smith to Marshall, August 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:1003-1004. 278. JCS to Forrestal, July 22, 1948, JCS History, 2:144. See also "Notes on the Berlin Situation (Army View)," enclosed in Maddox to Army Chief of Staff, June 28, 1948, Army--Operations, Hot File, Box 11, RG 319, USNA. 279. JCS to Forrestal, October 13, 1948, in JCS History, 2:154. See also Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 218, 223-224, 259, 267. 280. Seydoux to Foreign Ministry, November 14, 1947, Y/296/FFMA. One well-informed observer noted the widespread feeling among American officials even after the crisis had begun that the West would sooner or later have to withdraw. Reston memorandum, December 28, 1948, KP/1/212-216/ML. 281. Bevin, in his important May 1946 paper on Germany, took it for granted that if a western strategy was adopted, the British would soon find themselves "forced out of Berlin." CP(46)186, May 3, 1946, Cab 129/9, PRO. And in late 1947, British representatives in Germany seemed to think that if the London foreign ministers' conference failed, a pullout from Berlin was inevitable. Seydoux to Foreign Ministry, November 14, 1947, Y/296/FFMA. During the crisis, Bevin sometimes took a firm line, but sometimes the British position struck the Americans as too soft. See Shlaim, United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 198, 212 (for the picture of Britain as very firm), and (for evidence pointing in the other direction) the report of a U.S. cabinet lunch, September 13, 1948, FD/12/FP/ML, and the evidence cited in n. 62 below. See also Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 313, 315. 282. Camille Paris, July 18, 1948, quoted in Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 189-190. Similarly, see Massigli to Chauvel, July 17, 1948, MP/45/FFMA, discussed in ibid., pp. 191-192. 283. PPS meeting, September 28, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:1194-96. 284. Marshall to Clay and Murphy, September 11, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:1148. At a meeting with the Brussels Treaty countries at the Hague on July 19-20, Bevin had urged that the western powers take a relatively soft line on Berlin. He did not want to give in on essentials, but he did not want a confrontation either. He had no doubt, he said, that the Americans would object and accuse him of weakness. If they did, he would respond by asking them how many divisions they would deploy in Europe and what exactly they would bring to the defense of the West. And in fact the Americans did complain about a "definite weakening" in Bevin following his return from the Hague. Marshall characterized a British draft of a note to the Soviets as "redolent with appeasement." Conférence de la Haye, 19-20 juillet 1948, p. 8, MP/67/FFMA; Marshall to Douglas, July 21, 1948, and Lovett-Douglas-Murphy teletype conference, July 22, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:975, 978. 285. JCS History, 2:135, 141, 151-152, 154-155; Royall to JCS, June 28, 1948, and Forrestal Diary entry for same date, FD/12/FP/ML. Truman's comment about this not being a "final decision" was deleted from the published Forrestal Diaries, p. 454. Note also that a series of "high level conferences" had resulted in a decision to stay in Berlin, and a top secret cable was sent out to Douglas informing him that in pursuit of that policy, the U.S. government was "prepared to use any means that may be necessary"--but the phrase "whatever the consequences" had been deleted before the document was sent out. See Marshall to Douglas, July 20, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:971, 971n.; see also the report of a July 22 NSC decision, ibid., p. 977n. 286. Douglas to Marshall, April 28, 1948, and Marshall and Lovett to Douglas, April 30, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:899-900, 900n. A mere three weeks later, Douglas was telling Massigli that the United States would if necessary be the first to cross this threshold. Massigli to Foreign Ministry, May 20, 1948, MP/67/FFMA. It is not clear whether Douglas had been authorized to make this very important declaration. 287. Samuel Williamson and Steven Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 87. 288. Quoted in Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 1, The Formative Years, 1947-1950 (Washington: OSD Historical Office, 1984), p. 347. 289. For the Bevin-Bidault and Bidault-Marshall talks, see Y/297/FFMA. For the Bevin-Marshall meeting, see FRUS 1947, 2:815-822; for Bevin's comment, see enclosure to Inverchapel to Marshall, January 13, 1948, FRUS 1948, 3:5. Cyril Buffet was the first scholar to bring out the full importance of these talks; see Mourir pour Berlin, p. 72. 290. "Conversations anglo-françaises," December 17, 1947, p. 10, Y/297/FFMA; Revers report, January 25, 1948, 4Q37/2/SHAT. On Billotte: Soutou, "La sécurité de la France," and Pierre Guillen, "Les militaires français et la création de l'OTAN," both in Vaïsse, La France et l'OTAN, pp. 25, 34, 77; note also General Humbert's analysis which Soutou cites on p. 32. See also Georges-Henri Soutou, "Georges Bidault et la construction europeénne, 1944-1954," in Serge Berstein et al, Le MRP et la construction européenne, (Brussels: Complexe, 1993), p. 209, for more information on Billotte and his December 1947 mission to Washington. Soutou notes here that in the spring of 1946 Bidault and Armies Minister Michelet had already wanted to send Billotte to America to negotiate an security arrangement, but that this was blocked at the time by the Socialist prime minister, Félix Gouin. 291. "Conversation Schuman-Marshall," October 4, 1948, p. 2, Z/Généralités/23/FFMA. 292. See Bevin's remarks in his talk with Bidault on December 17, "Conversations anglo-françaises," pp. 3-4. 293. Massigli to Foreign Ministry, May 3, 1948, MP/67/FFMA. See also Chauvel to Bonnet, March 18, 1948, Bidault to Marshall, April 14, 1948, Chauvel to Bonnet, April 15 and May 19, 1948, all BP/1/FFMA. In the last of these documents, Chauvel brought up the idea of an organized allied force with an American commander. For the idea that the Americans should not be let off cheaply, see Bidault's comments in "Conférence de la Haye, 19-20 juillet 1948, 2ème partie, les entretiens de Washington," MP/79/FFMA. 294. See Guillen, "Les militaires français," pp. 78, 87; Pierre Guillen, "La France et la question de la défense de l'Europe occidentale, du pacte de Bruxelles (mars 1948) au plan Pleven (octobre 1950)," Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains, no. 144 (1986), p. 78; and JCS History, 2:371. 295. A passage from a Chauvel letter catches the prevailing mood nicely: "Il est une autre sorte de garantie, bien que moins actuelle et même un peu perdue de vue depuis quelque temps, qui nous intéresse néanmoins: il s'agit de la garantie contre l'Allemagne." Chauvel to Bonnet, April 21, 1948, BP/1/FFMA. 296. See Appendix Two, "The German Threat as a Pretext for Defense against Russia," IS. 297. Marshall to Douglas, February 28, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:101. 298. Douglas to Marshall, March 2, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:110-111. 299. For the European reaction to new the U.S. commitment, see Douglas to Marshall, March 2, 1948, and Douglas to Lovett, March 6, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:110-111, 138-139. For Truman's declaration, see DOSB, March 28, 1948, p. 420. For the formal security commitment and the agreement to coordinate policy, see the London Conference report, June 1, 1948, agreed paper on security (Annex L of the report), and London Communiqué, June 7, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:292, 312, 316. For the point about France being able to cooperate on Germany because of what her partners had agreed to in the security area, see Chauvel to Bonnet, August 3, 1948, BP/1/FFMA. To understand how all these agreements added up to a system, see the London Report (with twelve annexes cited in the footnotes), ibid., pp. 309-312. 300. See Maurice Vaïsse, "L'Echec d'une Europe franco-britannique, ou comment le pacte de Bruxelles fut créé et délaissé," in Poidevin, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. 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