A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 628.
423. Declarations by the Federal Republic and the three western powers, October 3, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1352-54. 424. NSC meeting, February 6, 1958, Ann Whitman File [AWF], NSC series, box 9, Eisenhower Library [DDEL]. 425. Protocols to Brussels Treaty (including Adenauer declaration), October 22, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1446-56. 426. On the general issue of alternatives to EDC, see FRUS 1952-54, 5:693-694, 713, 799, 859-860 and FRUS 1952-54, 7:502. On the emergence of the NATO solution--that is, the strengthening of the NATO institutional structure--see Martin to Moore, January 18, 1954, 740.5/1-1854, RG 59, USNA. For the role that this concept played following the collapse of the EDC, see FRUS 1952-54, 5:1199-1201, 1219, 1228, 1282, 1293. 427. Gruenther to Dulles and Conant, September 16, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1201. 428. See his remarks in National Assembly, December 23, 1954, in his Oeuvres complètes, 3:613; see also p. 608. 429. See, for example, McCloy to Acheson, September 23, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1785-86, and also NSC 5524 of June 10, 1955, the draft of a basic policy document on the question of a deal with the USSR involving Germany. Adenauer, according to this latter document (p. 12), was strongly opposed to neutralization as the price for reunification, but the German people, the drafters felt, might well support a proposal along these lines. In the event of what appeared to be "a genuine Soviet offer of reunification after free elections," the chancellor might "lose control of the situation," and German opinion might "force him to accept neutralization as the price." In file for NSC 5524, NSC records, RG 273, USNA. 430. For the Truman administration's policy, see, for example, Acheson to Douglas, May 11, 1949, and Acheson to Jessup, May 18, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:872-873, 884. For the Eisenhower policy, see pp. xxx-yyy below. For the quotation and the point about how these things could not be said openly, see Dulles's remarks in a meeting with Pinay and Macmillan, October 31, 1955 FRUS 1955-57, 5:652. The assumption that a flexible Soviet line would put the western powers on the spot is reflected in a large number of documents. Note, for example, the French view in early 1951 that Soviet acceptance of the western proposal on free elections would be "the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us," or the British view in 1953 that "there was a great danger" in pursuing a policy that looked toward reunification based on free elections. For the sources and a sampling of additional documents showing British and French officials arguing along these lines, see Bruce to Acheson, February 27 and also October 11, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1763-64, 1796-97; Dulles-Bidault-Salisbury meeting, July 11, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1625, 1627; Gifford to State Department, May 6, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 7:227. For the French attitude, see especially Schuman to Bonnet, June 16, 1952, and Bonnet to Schuman, June 16, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/822. Note also Bidault's remarks in Dillon to State Department, April 26, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:390, and a Note de la Direction Politique, April 15, 1955, DDF 1955, 1:456-458. The Americans also felt that a "really attractive" Soviet offer would embarrass the western countries and were relieved when the Soviets turned out to be intransigent. See Eisenhower's remarks in the October 1, 1953, NSC meeting, FRUS 1952-54, 7:542. Dulles was also worried, before the Berlin foreign ministers' meeting at the beginning of 1954, that the Soviets might offer a "genuine settlement" providing for the "neutralization of a united Germany"; had they done so, he pointed out after the conference, the western powers would have had to make "certain very difficult decisions," but fortunately Soviet rigidity meant that the West had not been "obliged to face such tough problems." NSC meeting, February 26, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:1222. 431. See the report of an important Communist overture in François Poncet to Foreign Ministry, October 16, 1951, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/301/FFMA. 432. This episode has received a great deal of attention in the German historical literature. The more significant works are cited in Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, p. 241n. One of the most important studies, Rolf Steininger's Eine vertane Chance: Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 und die Weidervereinigung (Bonn: Dietz, 1985), was translated into English and published under the title The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York: Columbia, 1990). Rupieper's own discussion of the issue (pp. 240-300) is also quite useful, especially for the U.S. side of the story. For the French side, see Soutou, "La France et les notes soviétiques de 1952 sur l'Allemagne." 433. See Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 127, especially the passage citing Alexei Filitov, "The Soviet Policy and Early Years of Two Germans States, 1949-1961," CWIHP conference paper (1994), p. 6. See also Gerhard Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification: Archival Evidence on Soviet Foreign Policy in Spring 1952," Historical Journal 37 (1994): 411-419. 434. For the seriousness with which the Soviet overtures were taken, see Noblet to Foreign Ministry, March 14, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/819/FFMA, and Massigli to Foreign Ministry, March 18, 1952, MP/69/FFMA, giving both his and Eden's reaction to Noblet's dispatch. Both Massigli and Eden took these Soviet moves quite seriously. For the more skeptical reaction of the top permanent official at the Quai d'Orsay, see Parodi to Noblet, March 18, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/820/FFMA. For more evidence of the seriousness with which top British officials took the Soviet initiative, see Roberts to Strang, March 14 and March 15, 1952, with appended comments, FO 371/97878 and 97879/PRO. For the U.S. reaction, see for example Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, pp. 243-245. For the assumption that the proposal could not simply be rejected, that there were important political forces in Britain, France and Germany that had to be accommodated, and that the issue therefore had to be finessed, see, for example, Gifford to State Department, May 11, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 7:239. Note also the British document quoted in Steininger, German Question, p. 168 n. 27. This concern with domestic opinion came to play an even greater role for Britain and France in 1955. See FRUS 1955-57, 5:137, 161, 171, 304. 435. See Acheson to Gifford, April 18, May 9, May 12, June 10 and June 12, 1952, and Gifford to Acheson, May 6 and May 11, 1952; in FRUS 1952-54, 7:211, 229, 234-237, 239-242, 263, 268. Note also Bidault's remarks in western foreign ministers' meeting, July 11, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1614-15. The French foreign minister made it clear that although he disliked the pressure for talks with Russia, for domestic political reasons he had to accept the idea of negotiations. 436. On the tactic of making offers that one hoped would be or knew to be unacceptable, see, for example, the French views cited in Bruce to Acheson, October 11, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1797; Acheson to State Department, June 28, 1952, and Donnelly to State Department, October 14, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 7:277, 385. One typical point was that the western powers could make certain offers because the Soviets were not "likely to take them up." Dulles to Gifford, October 13, 1953, ibid., p. 655. Note also Bidault's comment that because the chances for a negotiation were so slight, the West would do well to offer the Soviets those guarantees "which they were not interested in anyway." Western foreign ministers' meeting, October 16, 1953, ibid., p. 695. British Foreign Office views were cut from the same cloth. See especially Eden marginal comments on Roberts to Strang, March 15, 1952, and Eden to Foreign Office, March 21, 1952, FO 371/97879, PRO. In a minute appended to the first of these documents, Strang had argued that if the Soviets were really willing to accept reunification on the basis of free elections, the West would have no choice but to go along, even though the elections would result in a Schumacher government which would probably reverse Adenauer's policy of integrating Germany into the West. But Eden was not so sure. "Is this really so?" he wrote on the margin. "Are there not other conditions we could add?" 437. Gifford to State Department, May 6, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 7:227; see also Schuman to Bonnet, June 16, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/822/FFMA. 438. For Adenauer's thinking and the gap between his views and the feelings of the German people as a whole, see, for example, Adenauer-Acheson meeting, November 13, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:309-310; Adenauer-Murphy meeting, July 8, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:581-582; Beam to State Department, April 28, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:153; Schwartz, America's Germany, pp 52, 78; Steininger, German Question, pp. 22, 118-119; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer, vol. 2, Der Staatsmann, 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991) pp. 145-147. For Adenauer's coolness even on bringing West Berlin into the Federal Republic--in part, in 1949 especially, because his plurality was so thin that he could not afford greater Socialist strength in the Bundestag--see Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, pp. 161-162; François Poncet to Schuman, October 19, 1949, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/8/FFMA; U.S. ambassadors' meeting, October 22, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:288; and above all Cyril Buffet, "Le Blocus de Berlin: Les Alliés, l'Allemagne et Berlin, 1945-1949" (doctoral thesis, University of Paris IV, 1987), p. 1004. 439. Blank-Alphand meeting, October 11, 1951, cited in David Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 133. 440. For Adenauer's thinking, and for the point that a certain degree of tension served his interests, see especially François-Poncet to Schuman, June 30, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/10/FFMA and François-Poncet to Foreign Ministry, June 14, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/821/FFMA. On the use of the Oder-Neisse issue for the purpose of preventing a successful negotiation see François Poncet to Foreign Ministry, March 17, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/820/FFMA. See also Steininger, German Question, pp. 48, 168. For a French official's appreciation of this strategy, see Bruce to Acheson, October 11, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1797. On the "policy of strength," see, for example, Klaus Erdmenger, "Adenauer, die Deutsche Frage und die sozial-demokratische Opposition" and Wilfried Loth, "Adenauers Ort in der deutschen Geschichte" in Josef Foschepoth, ed., Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage, second edition, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1990), pp. 173-174, 187-188, 282. Adenauer himself, in a talk with the Soviet ambassador, later dismissed the term "policy of strength" as a mere cliché. Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 3:453. 441. Steininger, The German Question, p. 45. 442. See especially François Poncet to Schuman, November 6, 1949, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/254/FFMA: "Le Cabinet ADENAUER est certainement, de tous ceux que nous avons connus et connaîtrons, le plus disposé à rechercher non seulement une amélioration des relations, mais une entente durable avec la France. Nous n'en aurons pas, de sitôt, de meilleur." 443. Eisenhower diary notes, October 8, 1953, p. 9, DDE Diary/4/DDEL. See also Dulles's remarks in western foreign ministers' meeting, July 11, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1617. 444. Meeting of western leaders, July 17, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:345. This had been the U.S. attitude virtually from the outset. See, for example, McCloy to Acheson, November 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:780. "Adenauer's outright championship" of the West had to be supported, the High Commissioner argued. He could see "no one else" who had taken a "similar stand." 445. For the western powers' view of Schumacher and for Adenauer's use of the specter of a Schumacher government as a way of exerting pressure on the allies, see Schwartz, America's Germany, pp. 53-56, 80, 243, and François-Poncet to Schuman, September 1, 1952, ff.182-189, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/10/FFMA. 446. This applied in particular to Germany's relations with America. Even in 1960, long after the honeymoon with the United States had ended, Adenauer still recognized this basic principle: "je enger die europäischen Staaten mit Amerika verbunden seien, desto stärker sei ihre innenpolitische Position." From account of Adenauer-Debré meeting, October 7, 1960, Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 4:75. 447. Conant to Dulles, November 30, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7:683. On Adenauer's ability to lay it on with a trowel, see the wonderful anecdote in Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:62-64. 448. For reports of three meetings with Adenauer during this period, see Stenger memorandum of conversation, September 18, 1945, Y/282/FFMA; French Consul-General in Düsseldorf to Saint-Hardouin, June 13, 1946, Y/286/FFMA; Arnal to Saint-Hardouin, March 25, 1947, Y/293/FFMA. In the first of these meetings, Adenauer said he favored the creation of three independent states in western Germany--the Rhineland, Bavaria, and northwest Germany--linked to each other more or less the same way the British dominions were. These would become part of a French-led "United States of western Europe." The French were also easily the best of the occupying powers. His comments in the two later meetings were a good deal less extreme. But in milder form Adenauer continued to emphasize his dislike for the east--including eastern Germany and even Berlin--in meetings with French officials (who, as a rule, shared those sentiments). See, especially, Buffet, "Blocus de Berlin," p. 1004; note also the sources cited in Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 332 n. 42. On Adenauer's flirtation in 1945 with the French occupation authorities, see also Schwarz, Adenauer, 1:449-462. 449. See Kidd memorandum, July 8, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:581-582. See also Adenauer to Dulles, August 9, 1955, p. 4, 762.00/8-955, RG 59, USNA; Loth, "Adenauers Ort," p. 271; Hallstein's and Adenauer's own comments in François-Poncet to Mendès France, August 16 and September 17, 1954, DDF 1954, pp. 155, 384-385; and Blankenhorn's remarks in a meeting with the French diplomat Jean-Marie Soutou, June 16, 1955, DDF 1955, 1:788. 450. Editorial note, FRUS 1952-54, 7:532-533; U.W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), p. 251 For Dulles's continuing concern with Adenauer's domestic political position and his realization that western policy had to be framed with an eye to this problem, see Dulles to Eisenhower, July 21, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:439. 451. Dulles-Krekeler meeting, June 23, 1954 (with attachments), and Merchant meeting with Senators, June 24, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:574-578. Adenauer himself was quite open in talking about his domestic political problems with western leaders. See, for example, the Dulles-Adenauer meeting, September 16, 1954, pp. 4-5, DSP/64/63069-63070/ML, or Adenauer's remarks in a meeting with the allied High Commission, November 16, 1950, AAPBD 1:267-268. 452. "Basic Position Paper on Germany for Four-Power Talks" (PTS D-1), September 8, 1953, enclosed in JCS 2124/94, September 12, 1953, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 17 SO File, JCS Chairman's Files, RG 218, USNA. The PTS papers--the series of papers on "Proposed Talks with the Soviets--are not included in FRUS 1952-54, vol. 7. 453. Cecil Lyon (German desk officer in the State Department) to Merchant, January 4, 1955, appendix on "German Unification," 762.00/1-455, RG 59, USNA. 454. Dulles in State Department meeting, September 26, 1953, and Dulles-Molotov meeting, February 6, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:636, 987; Dulles meeting with British, French and German leaders, June 17, 1955, and (for the quotation) Dulles in NSC meeting, July 7, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:238, 276-277. 455. Gifford to State Department, May 11, 1952; FRUS 1952-54, 7:239, and Beam to Dulles, April 26, 1955, 396.1/4-155, RG 59, USNA. See also Watson-Elbrick-Beam-Tyler meeting, April 1, 1955; Beam to State Department, April 30, 1955; Dulles to Acting Secretary, May 8, 1955; Jackson log, July 11, 1955; in FRUS 1955-57, 5:137, 161, 171, 304. 456. Western foreign ministers' meeting, July 10, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1614-15; western foreign ministers' meeting, October 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7:695. For Bidault's real views--his feeling that the status quo was by far the best solution--see especially Soutou, "La France et les notes soviétiques," p. 272. 457. Note especially the Mendès France U.N. speech of November 22, 1954, in his Oeuvres complètes, 3:494-495. 458. Steininger, German Question, pp. 103-109.See also Josef Foschepoth, "Churchill, Adenauer und die Neutralisierung Deutschlands," Deutschland Archiv 17 (1984): 1286-1301, and Rolf Steininger, "Ein vereintes, unabhängiges Deutschland? Winston Churchill, der Kalte Krieg und die deutsche Frage im Jahre 1953," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 36 (1984): 105-144. 459. Dulles memorandum, September 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 2:457-460. 460. For the best account, see Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:85-87 (for 1953), 186-187 (for 1955). See also Blankenhorn-Riddleberger meeting, July 10, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1606. There is also some information in the Thurston paper, Proposed Talks with the Soviets (PTS), September 24, 1953, 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 19 S.O. File, RG 218, USNA. For the German role in 1955, see Beam to State Department, April 28, April 29, and July 9, 1955; Merchant to Dulles, June 15, 1955; Dulles-Adenauer-Macmillan-Pinay meeting, June 17, 1955; in FRUS 1955-57, 5:155-158, 229, 235, 309-310. See also Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 3:151. Note finally the list of documents relating to the "Adenauer plan - 1955," DDRS 1989/3311. 461. See, for example, Bruce diary, July 9, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7:484; and Blankenhorn-Riddleberger meeting, July 10, 1955, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1607. 462. Note Blankenhorn's reference to putting forward proposals "for tactical and propaganda reasons" in U.S. Delegation to State Department, April 29, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:157. See also U.S. to State Department, July 9 and July 15, 1955, ibid., pp. 309, 322, and Soutou-Blankenhorn meeting, June 16, 1955, DDF 1955, 1:789. 463. Conant to Merchant, April 25, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:147-148. 464. Conant to Merchant, April 25, 1955; Adenauer-Dulles-Macmillan-Pinay meeting, June 17, 1955; Brentano in meetings with western foreign ministers, September 28 and October 24, 1955FRUS 1955-57, 5:148, 238, 600, 625. Brentano's declaration in September and October about NATO, as part of an agreement, offering not to move troops into eastern Germany, represented a softening of the German position, and is thus further evidence of increased flexibility. For the earlier German view, shared by the Americans and the French but not by the British, see U.S. Delegation to State Department, July 9 and July 15, 1955, ibid., pp. 310, 323. See also Adenauer's comments in the CDU executive committee, May 2, 1955, in Günter Buchstab, ed., Adenauer: "Wir haben wirklich etwas geschaffen": Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands, 1953-1957 [CDU-BV] (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1990), pp. 432-433. 465. For Dulles's optimism: NSC meeting, May 19, 1955, and Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, August 11, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:184, 546. For the argument supporting the optimistic view, see "Basic U.S. Policy on Four-Power Negotiations," June 10, 1955, in NSC 5524 file, RG 273, USNA; the line of argument developed here was watered down somewhat in the final version, NSC 5524/1, in FRUS 1955-57, 5:287-288. Note also Soviet ambassador to France Vinogradov's statement that the Soviets were "now prepared to accept free all German elections subject to strict international control, provided only that foreign troops were withdrawn from German soil prior to the vote." Dillon to Dulles, June 23, 1955, 611.61/6-2355, RG 59, USNA. The CIA, however, was not impressed by such indicators and took a more pessimistic view. See the Intelligence Comments on NSC 5524, July 1, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:251-252. Other governments, however, thought--or, in the case especially of some French officials, feared--that the Soviets were now really prepared to take a flexible line. See, for example, the Note de la Direction Politique, April 15, 1955, DDF 1955, 1:456-458. 466. Dulles's meeting with his top advisors, May 3, 1955, DSP/64107-109/ML; NSC meeting, October 20, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:616-617. See also the record of another meeting between Dulles and leading State Department officials, April 8, 1955, p. 5, DSP/66/64026/ML. For a further indication of the seriousness with which the issue was taken in May, see Wilson to Gruenther, May 6, 1955 and Gruenther to Wilson, May 25, 1955, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 30, RG 218, USNA. SACEUR was asked to give his views on the question, and the preparation of an answer caused him "considerable agony." His acceptance of the idea of the reunification of Germany outside of NATO and the withdrawal of western forces from German territory was subject to one basic condition: that "German potential can be related to the NATO system under all circumstances," and that a relationship with the Germans could be worked out "which would permit a satisfactory degree of joint defense planning." Dulles, in fact, had been toying with the troop disengagement idea even in 1953. See Dulles memorandum, September 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 2:459-460. 467. Dulles-Macmillan-Brentano-Pinay meeting, September 28, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:598. 468. NSC meeting, August 13, 1953, September 26, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7:505; Bonnet to Mendès France, August 16, 1954, DDF 1954, p. 158. Even as American policy was changing in 1955, the president and Dulles continued to tell the allies that a neutralization of Germany was practically "unthinkable." As Eisenhower himself put it: "there was no possibility of having 80 million hard-working people in the center of Europe as neutrals. It simply could not be done." See Eisenhower-Eden-Faure meeting, July 17, 1955, and Dulles-Pinay-Macmillan meeting, October 31, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:348, 652. Of the public statements, Eisenhower's remarks in his press conference of May 18, 1955, were the most important. See Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. 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