A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Eisenhower Papers, 16:1523.
541. Quoted in "Standing Group Report to the Military Committee on SACEUR's Capability Study, 1957," Annex to JP(54)76 (Final), September 2, 1954, Defe 6/26, PRO. Emphasis added. 542. Avis du Comité des Chefs d'Etat-Major au sujet des problèmes soulevés par le Plan des Possibilités du Commandant Suprême Allié en Europe," September 6, 1954, and "Examen du 'Plan des Possibilités' établi par le commandement suprême des forces alliées en Europe," Blanc Papers, fonds 1K145, box 2, SHAT. 543. See, for example, Eisenhower's diary entry for January 23, 1956, Eisenhower Papers, 16:1974, and his comments in NSC and other meetings in 1954, 1957 and 1960, in FRUS 1952-54, 2:641, FRUS 1955-57, 19:675, FRUS 1958-60, 3:413. 544. One should note that some of the arguments Eisenhower made when ruling out preemptive action were explicitly contradicted by comments made in other contexts. Thus in the January 1956 diary entry just cited he said that no attack could be ordered unless Congress first met and declared war, something he considered impossible. But when he met with Congressional leaders during the Berlin crisis in 1959, and said that if the Soviets cut off access to the city, he would come before Congress, one senator interrupted to tell him "not to come to Congress, but to go ahead." Eisenhower "assured him that in the event of a real emergency he would do just that." Eisenhower meeting with Congressional leaders, March 6, 1959, p. 7, DDRS 1996/3493. 545. North Atlantic Council meeting, December 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:479. 546. Eisenhower-JCS meeting, December 22, 1954, AWF/ACW Diary/3/December 1954 (2)/DDEL. Emphasis added. 547. The same kind of point applies to a sentence from one of the key French documents describing the new strategy: "Le Commandant Suprême des forces alliées en Europe (SACEUR) prend pour postulat de base de l'ensemble de ses conceptions, l'emploi immédiat des armes nouvelles dès la première manifestation d'hostilité." Avis du Comité des Chefs d'Etat-Major (see n. xxx above). The precise language is significant. The reference is not to launching the NATO attack at the start of hostilities (dès le début des hostilités); the attack, the actual language suggested, would instead begin as soon as the enemy's warlike intent became clear. Similarly, consider the following passage from a British document on the new strategy. Under the proposed arrangements, the general alert would authorize commanders whose forces were "attacked or menaced" to "conduct operations in accordance with the emergency plans." The use of the word "menaced" again suggests that the door was being kept open for preemptive action. "Standing Group Report to the Military Committee on SACEUR's Capability Study, 1957," Annex to JP(54)76 (Final), September 2, 1954, Defe 6/26, PRO. 548. See Vice Admiral Royer Dick to Lord Ismay, February 11, 1954, Ismay Papers, III/12/22/1, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives [LHCMA], King's College London, and cited in Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 615. See also Standing Group Report to the Military Committee on SACEUR's Capability Study, 1957, Annex to JP(54)76 (Final), September 2, 1954, para. ll, Defe 6/26, PRO, and Gruenther's Remarks to SHAPE Correspondents, January 11, 1954, Montgomery Papers, file "Philosophy of NATO Military Build-up," Imperial War Museum, London. 549. Eisenhower to Churchill, January 22, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, 16:1523. For another example of Eisenhower's interest in this question, see his comment in an NSC discussion of a study of "constitutional authority for use of U.S. forces in reacting promptly to aggression." The "great problem," he said, was "what the President could and should do in the event he had knowledge that Russia was on the point of attacking the United States." This again suggests that the option of preemptive action was not being ruled out a priori. NSC meeting, April 13, 1954, DDRS 1992/2735. 550. Beam memorandum, December 31, 1954, and n. 3 appended to this document, FRUS 1955-57, 19:1-2. Emphasis added. The sub-committee's report, dated March 21, 1955, was submitted to the NSC and discussed at its March 31, 1955, meeting. The report listed a whole series of Soviet actions which "should leave no doubt in the President's mind as to the need for taking immediate military action to save the United States from the consequences of enemy attack, or to postpone, lessen or prevent imminent enemy attack." Among other things, a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia and a Soviet occupation of Finland were considered in and of themselves "clear evidence that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is certain or imminent." The report did not call for preemptive action in the event of obvious Soviet preparations for a ground war in Europe, although the original version of the report did contain an annex which listed various indicators of this sort. NSC meeting, March 31, 1955, ibid., p. 69; "Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions," NSC 5515/1, April 1, 1955, ibid., pp. 71-75. The annex to the original draft can be found in DDRS 1986/2158. The annex was deleted because the JCS felt it was arbitrary and thus misleading, and in any case unnecessary. FRUS 1955-57, 19:70 n.11. 551. Eisenhower to Radford, December 8, 1954, CJCS Radford 092.2 NAT, RG 218, USNA. For Dulles, see his statement to the North Atlantic Council, April 23, 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, 5:512; Dulles to Wilson, Feb. 8, 1955, 740.5/2-855, RG 59, USNA; Dulles-Brentano meeting, November 23, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 4:191; Dulles to Adenauer, November 29, 1957, DDRS 1988/3308; and especially Dulles-Macmillan meeting, December 14, 1957, DDRS 1987/3307. Note also Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 650, 971. 552. See SACEUR's Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements for 1956, October 2, 1953, para. 26, COS(53)490, Defe 5/49, PRO, and cited in Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 501. 553. "Standing Group Report to the Military Committee on SACEUR's Capability Study, 1957," September 2, 1954, Annex to JP(54)76 (Final), and Joint Planning Staff report on "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years," October 21, 1954, JP(54)86 (Final), both in Defe 6/26, PRO. 554. JCS History, 5:305. 555. "Standing Group Report to the Military Committee on SACEUR's Capability Study, 1957," September 2, 1957, Annex to JP(54)76 (Final), Defe 6/26, PRO. Emphasis added. 556. Examen du Plan des Possibilités, 1K145/2/SHAT. 557. Foreign ministry note on atomic warfare, December 13, 1954, DDF 1954, pp. 906-909; Dulles-Mendès meeting, November 20, 1954, Dulles-Mendès-Eden meeting, December 16, 1954, SSMC, nos. 800 and 853. 558. Dulles-Makins meetings, December 4 and December 8, 1954, and Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, December 14, 1954, SSMC. nos. 827, 849. 559. Elbrick to Dulles, October 12, 1954, 740.5/10-1254, RG 59, USNA. These remarks were deleted from the version of the document published in FRUS, 1952-54, 5:527. 560. Top-level meeting, November 3, 1954, 740.5/11-354, RG 59, USNA. The passage quoted was deleted from the version of this document published in FRUS 1952-54, 5:532. Goodpaster to Eisenhower, November 16, 1954, SS/ITM/3/NATO File No.1 (4)/DDEL. 561. JCS History. 5:317. 562. See, for example, Foreign Ministry note on atomic warfare, December 13, 1954, DDF 1954, p. 907. 563. Memorandum for Radford, December 8, 1954, CJCS Radford 092.2 NAT, RG 218, USNA. 564. Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, December 14, 1954, SSMC, no. 849. 565. Thus, according to one U.S. document, by the end of the Eisenhower period a NATO system had taken shape full of ambiguities about "how war starts and who has the authority to start it." State Department memorandum on "The Problem of Berlin," p. 5, enclosed in McGhee to Bundy, March 24, 1961, NSF/81/JFKL. And in mid-1960 a British official characterized the system for the political control over nuclear use as "woolly and diffuse." Sir Solly Zuckerman, in a meeting with Macmillan and the defence minister, June 13, 1960, Prem 11/3713, PRO. That this kind of system had taken shape was no accident. The NATO commander, General Norstad, whose views carried a good deal of weight in this area, was very much against the idea of trying to work out a precise procedure to cover this fundamental issue. See, for example, Norstad-Adenauer meeting, December 16, 1957, DSP/231/107951/ML; Norstad-Adenauer-Spaak meeting, reported in Houghton to Herter, September 10, 1960, SS/ITM/5/NATO (4) [1959-1960]/DDEL; Norstad-Lloyd meeting, July 11, 1960, Prem 11/3713, PRO. Nor was it just the Americans who felt this sort of issue was best avoided. Adenauer, in his meetings with Norstad, basically saw eye-to-eye with SACEUR, and was irritated when Spaak brought up the issue in the September 1960 meeting. The British also, as a rule, were in favor of avoiding the issue. See, for example, Ismay meeting with U.S. State Department officials, March 13, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:361. In late 1957, a top British defense official also argued that NATO had to "stay away from effort at advance planning on how decision to use will be made." Martin to Timmons, November 29, 1957, State Department Freedom of Information Act release [DOS-FOIA] 90-1102-25. And according to a 1960 U.S. document, the members of NATO had as a whole informally agreed that it was "undesirable to set up formal procedures for a NATO Council approval of the institution of nuclear warfare." "NATO in the 1960's: U.S. Policy Considerations" (draft), September 9, 1960, p. 22, SS/ITM/5/NATO (5) [1959-1960]/DDEL. 566. JCS History, 5:317, and Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 1041. 567. Radford-Strauss meeting, December 10, 1956, Conference Files, CF 814, RG59, USNA, cited in Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 976. 568. See Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 629. 569. Quoted in Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 1005. It was a draft of the NATO document MC 57 that was being quoted here. Note also Dulles's reference in early 1955 to a NATO alerts paper, which provided for political consultation to be omitted "in case of sudden and extreme emergency." Dulles to Wilson, February 8, 1955, Records relating to Disarmament, 1953-62, box 83, NATO--Nuclear Weapons, 1954-56, RG 59, USNA. 570. The Americans--especially the military authorities--were very reluctant throughout this period to see their hands tied by agreements with even the friendliest foreign powers. Even arrangements governing the use of the American bases in Britain were left rather loose and informal, and could be interpreted differently by the two governments. U.S. officials had indicated that the British "obviously" had the right to be consulted before attacks were mounted from those bases. But according to the formal agreement reached in January 1952, the use of those bases "would be a matter for joint decision" by the two governments "in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time." The British could argue that this gave them the right to be consulted; the Americans could, however, proceed on the basis of the assumption that the proviso about "circumstances prevailing at the time" implied that they had to right to launch strikes from those bases on their own, if time did not permit consultation--and Dulles, in fact, endorsed this interpretation in a phone conversation with Senator Knowland in December 1957. See Timothy Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York: Greenwood, 1987), pp. 80-86 (for U.S. reluctance to make any commitment at all), pp. 84 and 93 (for earlier assurances about the use of bases in Britain); p. 101 (for the key passage in the agreement and the "implied consent" theory), and p. 206 (for Dulles's interpretation). 571. NSC 5602/1, March 15, 1956, para. 11, FRUS 1955-57, 19:246. Paragraph 39b of NSC 162/2 of October 30, 1953, said that "in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." The State and Defense departments differed on the interpretation of this provision; the JCS argued that it meant that in the event of armed conflict, authority to use nuclear weapons was automatic. At the end of 1953, the President decided that use would be "automatic" only in the case of an atomic attack on western Europe or the United States; in other circumstances, a political decision would have to be made. Cutler to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and AEC Chairman, March 14, 1955, summing up a memo from Lay to those three officials of January 4, 1954, on the interpretation of paragraph 39b, in OSANSA/NSC/S/1/Atomic Weapons (1953-60)(1)/DDEL. The BNSPs for the Eisenhower period, including NSC 162/2, were published in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., The Development of American Strategic Thought, 1945-1969, vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1988). 572. NSC meeting, February 27, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:204. 573. Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and Captain Schneider of the Chief of Naval Operations office, in notes of Eisenhower meeting with Twining, Quarles et al, March 12, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):436. The President, it is worth noting, did not disagree with this view. 574. Notes of Norstad-Lloyd meeting, July 11, 1960, Prem 11/3713, PRO. 575. Quoted in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 133-134. This accuracy of this account was confirmed in a letter Sprague sent me dated January 15, 1986. Note also Lemay's comments in Kohn and Harahan, "Strategic Air Warfare," pp. 92-95. 576. This was reflected in the attention given at this point Eisenhower period to the problem of developing a "response doctrine." See, for example, Eisenhower-Gray meeting, July 19, 1960, OSANSA/SA/P/5/DDEL, and Rubel briefing on continental defense, September 15, 1960, p. 13, SS/S/A/16/National Security Council [vol. II](6)/DDEL. See also the editorial note relating to this issue in FRUS 1958-60, 3:353. 577. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," pp. 48-49; Note on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons, JCS 2019/238, August 15, 1957, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 99R8, RG 218, USNA and DDRS 1980/272B; interview with Carl Kaysen, August 1988 [IS]. For the heavily sanitized predelegation letters, see DDRS 1997/1280-1282. Note also McGeorge Bundy's reference at the beginning of the Kennedy period to "a situation today in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach [the president] (by failure of communication at either end of the line)." Bundy to Kennedy, January 30, 1961, NSF/313/NSC No. 475/JFKL. 578. Note, for example, Eisenhower's account of a meeting he had with Churchill and Eden on December 5, 1953: "I told them that quite naturally in the event of war, we would always hold up enough to establish the fact before the world that the other was clearly the aggressor, but I also gave my conviction that anyone who held up too long in the use of his assets in atomic weapons might suddenly find himself subjected to such wide-spread and devastating attack that retaliation would be next to impossible." Eisenhower Papers, 15:733. 579. Eisenhower meeting with Congressional leadership, March 6, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 8:433. 580. See General Coiner to SHAPE Chief of Staff, September 2, 1960, DDRS 1990/1880; Eisenhower recollection in meeting with military leaders, March 12, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):435; and Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept." 581. Notes of Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960, SS/ITM/5/NATO(6)[1959-1960]/DDEL. This version of the document was declassified in 1979; in the version published fourteen years later (FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):638-642), the relevant passage was sanitized out. 582. White House meeting, January 31, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:454. 583. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 156-157. As Robert Wampler pointed out to me, some of the officers who had developed the Army point of view moved on to SHAPE, where they played a certain role in the process leading to MC 48, General Schuyler, for example, becoming Gruenther's Chief of Staff. 584. See the long footnote in the Eisenhower Papers, 13:1225-27. 585. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 129. 586. General Robert C. Richardson III, "NATO Nuclear Strategy: A Look Back," Strategic Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1981), esp. pp. 38-40; Robert Wampler, "The Die is Cast: The United States and NATO Nuclear Planning" (unpub. paper), pp. 13, 15, 19, 24, and esp. 27-28; and Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 500, 503-504. For the Ridgway strategy, see "SACEUR's Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements for 1956," COS(53)490, October 2, 1953, Defe 5/49, PRO. 587. Note, for example, JCS Chairman Bradley's views, in JCS History, 4:309-310. 588. Gruenther to Army Department, October 5, 1951, quoted in Eisenhower Papers, 13:1226. 589. Eisenhower diary, October 18, 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:651. 590. French general staff memorandum, November 25, 1953, Ismay Papers III/12/13a/LHCMA; Ismay's notes for December 6, 1953, meeting, Ismay Papers, III/12/17/LHCMA; summary of foreign ministers' meeting, December 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1789-90. 591. As the French military authorities were themselves aware: the Chiefs of Staff Committee appointed to report on the new strategy expressed "également son accord quant à l'intégration des moyens atomiques dans les dispositifs de défense occidentaux, et à l'étroite conjugaison des possibilités des forces stratégiques américaines avec ceux-ci, dispositions qui jusqu'à ce jour n'avaient cessé de faire l'objet des demandes françaises." Avis du Comité des Chefs d'Etat Major, September 6, 1954, 1K145/3/SHAT; emphasis added. And in other internal discussions, the French military authorities took a certain credit for the emergence of the new strategy. See, for example, the reference made at this time by General Blanc, the Army Chief of Staff, to "la réforme des systèmes militaires et des structures des forces, idée lancée par le Général ELY au standing group dès 1950, soutenue par le Général VALLUY avec une tenacité qui porte aujourd'hui ses fruits . . . " Notes of Blanc talk to Conseil Supérieur des Forces Armées, November 5, 1954, 1K145/4/SHAT. For the thinking of French military leaders during this period, very much in line with the MC 48 philosophy, see also Billotte, Passé au futur, pp. 41-42; Maréchal Juin, Mémoires, vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1960), pp. 255-258; Bernard Pujo, Juin, Maréchal de France (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), pp. 294-296. 592. See, for example, Secretary Humphreys' remarks in the December 21, 1954 NSC meeting, FRUS 1952-54, 5:562. 593. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 987-988, 1039. 594. NSC meeting, May 10, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 20:399. 595. NSC meeting, October 4, 1956, p. 8, AWF/NSC/8/DDEL. See also Dulles's remarks in the May 11, 1956, NSC meeting, FRUS 1955-57, 4:81, and Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 182-183. 596. Dulles meeting with Macmillan and Lloyd, October 22, 1957, DDRS 1987/3272. 597. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, October 22, 1957 (document dated October 31), AWF/DDE Diaries/27/October 1957 Staff Notes (1)/DDEL. The passage quoted, although declassified in 1982, was deleted from the version published in 1992 (FRUS 1955-57, 27:800). 598. Foreign ministers' meeting, December 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1790. 599. Dulles-Brentano meeting, November 21, 1957, 740.5/11-2157, RG 59, USNA. This sentence was sanitized out of the version of the document published in FRUS 1955-57, 4:202. See also Eisenhower's comments in a November 17, 1960, NSC meeting, FRUS 1958-060, 7(1):657. 600. Heads of government meeting, December 6, 1953, DDRS 1985/307. 601. Goodpaster to Dulles, Wilson and Radford, November 4, 1954; Goodpaster to Eisenhower, November 16, 1954; contingency paper on assurances which may be given on availability of aid programs, December 10, 1954; and Wilson and Dulles to Eisenhower, December 10, 1954; in Conference Files, CF 420, RG 59, USNA. the first two documents also appear (the second in sanitized form) in FRUS 1952-54, 5:533-535. 603. For the premium placed on operational readiness and its relation to the sharing policy, see, for example, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons, July 1945 through September 1977," February 1978, pp. 37, 43, DOD-FOIA; Gruenther to JCS, October 15, 1956, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 86 RB, RG 218, USNA; and Eisenhower in NSC meeting, November 17, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):655. 604. Couve to Massigli, February 2, 1956, MP/96/FFMA. 605. Eisenhower meeting with Gaither committee, November 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 19:623; Eisenhower remarks in meeting with Macmillan and de Gaulle, December 20, 1959, pp. 15-16, Prem 11/2991, PRO. Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, August 3, 1960, Eisenhower-Bowie meeting, August 16, 1960, and Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960; in FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):610, 612, 640. For Dulles's views, see foreign ministers' meeting, December 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1790, and Dulles-Pineau meeting, September 7, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:169. 606. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, October 22, 1957, AWF/DDE Diaries/27/October '57 Staff Notes (1)/DDEL. This passage was deleted from the version published in FRUS 1955-57, 27:800. 607. 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