A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

At the London Conference in December 1947, the three western powers had decided that no four-power arrangement for Germany could be worked out and that they themselves would therefore have to organize the western part of that country. It was Marshall who at London had put an end to the talks. The U.S. government had thus decided to press forward with the policy of building up western Germany, of establishing a west German state, and of tying that state closely to the West as a whole. Britain and France cooperated with that policy, but did they do so against their better judgment? Were they so dependent on the United States that they had little choice but to follow the American lead?

It was true, of course, that neither Britain nor France could do without American support. For both countries, American financial assistance was crucial. Both countries needed help getting their own economies back on their feet. The British also needed American assistance in financing imports into their zone in Germany. The British zone was the most heavily industrialized part of the country (it included the Ruhr basin, Germany's industrial heartland) and was thus for the time being the area least able to feed itself with its own resources. That in turn gave the United States a certain control over the Ruhr, and in particular over Ruhr coal, both matters of vital importance to France.²²⁴

And both Britain and France were dependent on American power to keep the Soviet Union at bay. During the war and in the late 1940s as well, there was a certain hope in Britain especially that a west European group--the term "bloc" was deliberately avoided--might in time be able to balance Soviet power on its own. As late as 1948, Bevin, for example, hoped that western Europe might eventually emerge as a "third force." A British-led grouping with a distinct social-democratic flavor would appeal to Europeans who both hated Soviet communism and "despised" American materialism, and would be able to steer a truly independent course in world affairs.²²⁵ Britain therefore sought to work closely with France, traditionally the other major power in western Europe. In late 1945, the French government had called for the internationalization of the Ruhr and the political separation of the Rhineland from the rest of Germany, and it seemed that Bevin in late 1945 might be willing to go along with those ideas. "Our view," he told the French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, on September 16, "was favorable to the creation of a Rhenanian Republic."²²⁶

But gradually the British gave up on the possibility of a free-standing European bloc, even as a long-term goal. As early as 1946, Prime Minister Attlee had come to think of Britain, and even western Europe in general, not as an independent pole of power, but simply as America's eastern march. The British Isles, he said, might have to be considered "an easterly extension of a strategic area the centre of which is the American continent rather than as a power looking eastwards through the Mediterranean to India and the East." His great fear was that the United States might not go along with such an arrangement, and that America might instead try "to make a safety zone round herself while leaving us and Europe in No Man's Land."²²⁷ Bevin was slower to abandon the idea of western Europe as an independent "third force" in world affairs. But even he, by 1949, had finally reached the conclusion that western Europe would never be strong enough to balance the Soviet Union by itself.²²⁸ And however the long-term possibilities were assessed, it was universally taken for granted in the late 1940s that Britain could not for the time being contemplate a "show-down" with Russia unless she were sure of American support.²²⁹ By 1947 many key French officials had also come to see that the security of the West, at least for the foreseeable future, had to rest primarily on American power.²³⁰

But these lopsided power relations did not mean that the U.S. government essentially imposed its will on America's allies, and that Britain and France only reluctantly followed the American lead. By December 1947, there was nothing grudging or forced about Bevin's or Bidault's cooperation with Marshall. At the London conference, they in fact took if anything a somewhat firmer line than their American colleague, fully accepting the break, and not even caring much about how exactly it was to be stage-managed.²³¹ This was not the product of a sudden change on their part. Britain and America had in fact long seen eye-to-eye on fundamental issues. And even between the English-speaking countries and France, substantive differences were not nearly as great as they appeared at the time.

With France, the story is more complex. On the most fundamental level, France was essentially a western country, and the broad forces shaping British and American policy were bound to push French policy in the same general direction. From the outset, many French leaders were concerned about Soviet power and sought close relations with the United States. General Charles de Gaulle, head of the French government until January 1946, sometimes argued along very different lines, but even he made it clear to the Americans in November 1945 that he considered the Russian threat more important than the German problem and that he understood that France had to cooperate with America if she "wished to survive."²⁴⁰

This fear of Soviet power was a key factor shaping French policy on the German question. In late 1945, the French openly opposed the central administrations, enraging Clay by vetoing their establishment by the Control Council. Their ostensible goal was to put pressure on their allies to go along with their plans for the Ruhr, the Saar and the Rhineland--that is, for the separation of these areas in varying degrees from the rest of Germany. The French said they would not support the central administrations until an acceptable arrangement for these areas was worked out.²⁴¹ Many French officials from de Gaulle on down took the Rhenish policy quite seriously, but for Bidault it was essentially a lever. From the start, he and certain other French policy makers made it clear that the real reason they opposed setting up the central administrations was that such a system would "inevitably lead to the eventual setting up of a Soviet dominated central government in Germany."²⁴²

The two other western governments shared these basic concerns. The British (as noted above) opposed "effective" central administrations and shared the view that centralization might lead to a Communist takeover of all of Germany. The advantage of the zonal approach, Bevin pointed out, was that Soviet influence could be kept out of the vital western part of the country.²⁴³ The British were not upset by the French vetoes, and disliked Clay's idea of organizing the great bulk of Germany on a tripartite basis--that is, with America and Russia, but without France.²⁴⁴

And the American government also did not really disagree with key French policy makers on these fundamental issues. Byrnes, practically from the start, was thinking in terms of a rump Germany limited to the western part of the country. This is clear not just from his Potsdam policy, but also from his reference at an August 1945 meeting with Bidault to a Germany of 45 million inhabitants, that figure being almost exactly the population of the three western zones at the time.²⁴⁵ But the French, as early as July 1945, had also begun to think in terms of a western Germany run by the three western powers.²⁴⁶ Bidault's goal was to keep Soviet influence out of western Germany, but this was a basic aim for Byrnes and Truman as well.²⁴⁷ As a result, Byrnes was not upset by the French vetoes in the Control Council and did not press energetically for a more accommodating French policy. Those vetoes demonstrated the unworkability of the Control Council system, and that system had to be seen as a failure before anything else could be tried.

The Americans, in fact, secretly encouraged the French in their obstructionism. It was Robert Murphy, the U.S. Political Advisor in Germany and thus the top State Department official in that country, who delivered the message. He met with his French counterpart, Saint-Hardouin, in October 1945. The American military authorities in Germany were of course angry about the recent vetoes in the Control Council, but the French, Murphy said, should not get too upset about that. These military officers, he pointed out, had their orders and were not in the habit of wondering whether there was any valid basis for the obstacles they found in their way. Murphy then discussed America's German policy in more general terms. The United States, he said, was stuck for the time being with the policy of trying to work with Russia. Murphy did not like that policy, and, like the French, he was worried that a unified Germany might fall under Soviet control. But until public opinion changed, his government could not repudiate the Berlin-based Control Council regime. France, however, did not have to go along with it. He therefore urged the French to avoid the drawbacks of the Control Council system and to "orient your zone toward the west, rather than toward Berlin."²⁴⁸

But if, at the most fundamental level, the three western governments shared some very basic goals, there were certain things which kept the French from cooperating too closely, and above all, too openly with their Anglo-Saxon friends in the immediate postwar period. First of all, there was a whole series of problems having to do with political conditions at home. Both Bidault and Jean Chauvel, the top permanent official at the Quai d'Orsay, repeatedly made it clear in mid- and late 1946 that they sided with the United States in the developing dispute with the Soviets over Germany, and that it was only for "internal political reasons" that France could not overtly stand with America.²⁴⁹ The power of the large French Communist Party was the key, but by no means the only, factor. The Communists were an important part of the governing coalition in France at the time. This problem of Communist strength within France continued to be a great concern in early 1947. When he with Marshall in April, Bidault made this explicit: "To the American question 'Can we rely on France?', he said, the answer was 'Yes.' But France needed time and must avoid a civil war."²⁵⁰ The internal crisis soon came to a head. In May, the Communists were forced out of the government, and later that year there was a wave of Communist-led political strikes. By November, however, Bidault was sure that the situation could be controlled and that the Communists' "great bid for power" would fail.²⁵¹ He now felt freer to come out openly on the side of the other western powers, although even at this point there were limits to how forthright Bidault could be. Indeed, his lack of candor was beginning to undermine his political position at home and would lead to his fall and replacement as foreign minister by Robert Schuman in July 1948.²⁵²

But domestic politics was not the whole story. There were also some real differences on foreign policy. The western strategy implied that Germany, or at least western Germany, was going to be built up--not just economically and politically, but ultimately in a military sense as well. It was obvious to military men in all three major western countries that German troops would be necessary if western Europe was ever to be defended effectively. The British Chiefs of Staff had been thinking along these lines even during the war; American military authorities were arguing for German troops in 1947 and their French counterparts by 1948 at the latest.²⁵³ The political leadership--or at least certain key policy makers--in America and Britain had come to the same conclusion by late 1947. The emerging American view in August of that year was that the non-Soviet world had to organize itself politically, economically "and, in the final analysis, militarily" to deal with the Soviet threat, and that western Germany had to be brought into this bloc.²⁵⁴ Bevin was beginning to think along similar lines; in January 1948, he thought the western countries had to come together to deal with the Soviet threat, and that Germany had to be brought into the western system "as soon as circumstances permit."²⁵⁵ But to build up German power too quickly was seen as risky, and the French, given their geographic position, were particularly sensitive to those risks. Who could predict how the Soviets would react? Who could tell how a strong and independent Germany would behave? If the Americans came in on a more or less permanent basis--if they committed their power in a major way to the defense of western Europe, and in particular if they maintained a large military force in western Germany--the risks might be minimal. The Soviets would be held at bay, and German freedom of action could be curtailed. But who could be sure that the Americans would really be willing to play this kind of role, not just for the next year or two, but more or less permanently? If the French could not be certain, perhaps it made sense for them to hedge their bets and avoid too sharp a break with Russia.

The debate within France on the "western strategy"--on moving ahead in Germany without Russia, on siding with America and Britain in the Cold War--would turn largely on how this set of problems was resolved. In the internal debates in 1947 and 1948, the supporters of the western strategy used a whole series of arguments. If France cooperated with the other western powers, it was said, her interests--in Ruhr coal, for example, and in Marshall Plan aid--would be viewed more sympathetically than if she held herself aloof. Her Anglo-Saxon friends in that case would also be more willing to let her have her say on German questions, and especially on matters relating to the Ruhr. To stand aside would not prevent France from being overrun if war broke out--France's "fate would be the same, whether she wanted to stay neutral or not"--and it would not prevent the Anglo-Saxons from moving ahead in Germany without her. The French would then have little choice but to accept a situation that had come into being without her input. But if she acted now she might be able to head off unfavorable developments and put her imprint on the system while it was still taking shape.²⁵⁶

Such arguments had a certain force, but they were not enough in themselves to bring about whole-hearted acceptance of the western strategy. What did bring it about was a fundamental shift in the way the German question was understood. Initially, the Cold War was seen as aggravating the problem: the conflict with Russia was pushing France to accept the distasteful and dangerous policy of building up Germany. But it gradually dawned on key French policy makers that the western strategy was a way of solving the German problem--that the system taking shape, a system based on the division of Germany and on a certain level of tension between east and west, was quite satisfactory from their point of view. With Soviet armies on the Elbe and with Germany weak and divided, western Germany would be dependent on the western powers for protection; even if most of the controls were ended, that west German state would be in no position to challenge the status quo; so the controls could be largely phased out, and western Germany could be brought into the western world as a kind of partner. The Soviet threat on the Elbe meant that American troops would remain in Germany, perhaps indefinitely, and American power would keep the Russians at bay. It was not a question, in other words, of one problem being piled on top of another; both problems--the German problem and the Russian problem--would be solved if such a system came into being. This sort of thinking became very sharp and explicit in the French foreign ministry around 1952.²⁵⁷ But the basic idea had begun to take hold much earlier. Already in 1947 and 1948, the more clairvoyant French officials were coming to the conclusion that a system based on the division of Germany was the best arrangement that France could hope for.²⁵⁸