A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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The Europeans reacted positively to the new American line. It seemed that French persistence was now paying off. The U.S. government was making a very important commitment. On March 17, Truman declared officially that American forces would remain in Germany until the peace was secure in Europe; this commitment was incorporated into the June 1 three-power agreement on Germany, thus giving it a certain contractual force. The French also received satisfaction on another point. The June 1 agreement called for a coordinated policy for dealing with the Soviet reaction to what the western powers now intended to do in Germany. The security arrangements were thus an integral part of the agreement reached on Germany, in a political as well as in a legal sense. This was particularly true in the French case: it was because France was receiving satisfaction in the security area that Bidault, as French officials pointed out at the time, was able to move openly toward a policy of "complete collaboration with the Anglo-Saxons" on the German question. The various commitments made during the negotiating process were adding up to a system; the central pillar of that system was a more or less permanent American military presence in Germany.299 Events now moved quickly. On March 17 the Brussels Treaty was signed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries.300 A common organization for the defense of western Europe was to be created. The U.S. government had originally insisted that the Europeans take the lead in this area, and the main purpose of Anglo-French cooperation was to pave the way for American involvement.301 But the Americans now wanted to move ahead rapidly, and even before the Brussels Treaty was signed, Marshall informed the British and French that the United States was ready to discuss "the establishment of an Atlantic security system."302 By May 11, the American government had agreed to take part in military talks with the Europeans.303 A basic security pact, the North Atlantic Treaty, was finally signed in April 1949. This very important agreement was to be the heart of the western security system for the entire Cold War period, and beyond.304 The next month the Berlin Blockade was lifted, and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was approved; elections were held that summer, and a West German government took office in September. Soon the Soviets created their own German state in the east, which for years would often be referred to in the West as the "so-called German Democratic Republic." Europe was now formally divided into blocs. This did not mean that a stable political system had finally taken shape: the ending of the blockade did not mean that the Soviets had accepted the new status quo, or that they were ready to give the western powers a free hand on their side of the line of demarcation. Western Germany remained a very fundamental Soviet concern. But the military situation was such that the USSR for the time being could not push things any further.
In 1948-49, neither side was willing to press the issue too close to the point of an armed confrontation. In the case of the Berlin Blockade, the most serious episode of the Cold War up to that point, Soviet policy was not nearly as confrontational as many western officials had feared. The airlift, for example, was successful because the Soviets chose not to interfere with it. Even non-violent measures, especially the jamming of radars, would have gone a long way toward compromising its effectiveness. But the Soviets continued to work with western officials at the Berlin Air Safety Center, managing the air routes into the city, and thus bizarrely "doing something to help the airlift which was undermining their blockade."305 And one is struck by the relatively friendly tone of U.S.-Soviet diplomatic interaction during the crisis: on July 31, for example, Molotov still referred to the four powers as "partners in Germany."306 The Americans, for their part, also ruled out extreme measures and sought to settle the crisis peacefully. In regional disputes more generally, the U.S. government felt at this point that it had to pursue a very cautious policy. The basic problem was that the American demobilization after World War II had been extremely rapid, and that by 1947 not much was left of the very impressive military machine that had been built up by 1945. It was not just that military manpower had dwindled from about 12,000,000 at the end of the war to a mere 1.5 million in mid-1947. "In terms of effective combat power," as the official JCS history points out, "the decline was even more striking." The United States had 97 ground divisions at the end of the war, "all at a high pitch of combat effectiveness." Two years later, there were only 12 divisions, all understrength, most of them committed to occupation duties, with only two weakened Army divisions remaining in the general reserve based in the United States. In terms of air power, the story was the same. Very few operationally effective units remained, and none of units that were supposed to carry out the nuclear attack "was fully manned or operational." Thus by 1947 the extraordinarily powerful force that had been built up during the war "had almost ceased to exist."307 The result was that American leaders felt they could not really pursue a firm policy of containment in this period. It might have been "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," as the president proclaimed in the Truman Doctrine speech in March 1947, but this policy was more honored in the breach than in the observance. The United States, for example, did not lift a finger to help the non-Communist side in Czechoslovakia as the political crisis in that country came to a head a few months later. On Korea, to take another example, the Chiefs argued strongly for a policy of disengagement, and their views ultimately prevailed. The key decision to withdraw "as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effect" was made in September 1947.308 In late 1947 and at the beginning of 1948, major decisions also had to be made about the use of American troops to prevent possible Communist takeovers in Italy and Greece. Certain State Department officials, especially Loy Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, wanted America to opt for a deterrent strategy, and felt that if America sent a small force into Greece as a demonstration of resolve, the Soviets would back off. No matter what the local military balance was, these officials argued, the USSR would not take action which might lead to general war.309 But the military authorities, who just a few years later were to embrace the deterrence philosophy with great zeal, now simply refused to see matters in those terms. They resented the idea that U.S. forces were mere pawns in an essentially political game, and insisted on tests of "military soundness" that ruled out the deployment of troops. One top Army general, for example, told a Senate committee that he was "much opposed" to sending combat forces to Greece, that such a deployment would be a "'mousetrap' operation from the strategic viewpoint," and that this reasoning "applied to the entire Mediterranean" as a "possible theater of operations." These views were "characteristic of the general line of thinking" within military circles in Washington on the Greek question.310 In these disputes, the political leadership generally took the middle road. Truman and Marshall did not want to abandon key areas to the Communists, but neither of them was willing to commit American power to a full-fledged policy of containment. In early 1948, for example, when there was a real fear that both Greece and Italy would be lost to the Communists, the U.S. government did not adopt a policy of doing whatever was necessary to prevent them from falling into Communist hands--and this was true even though both countries lay within what had long been regarded as a western sphere of influence. On Italy, it was decided that American forces would in no event be sent to the Italian mainland, even if the Communists seized power there illegally; at most, forces might be sent to Sicily and Sardinia in the event of an illegal seizure of power by the Communists on the peninsula, but only if they were invited in by the legal government.311 On Greece, the Henderson idea of being ready to send in troops as a demonstration of resolve was rejected. Marshall, of course, worried that if America took a weak line, she would "lose the game" and "our whole national position" would be compromised, but he was also deeply concerned about where a commitment of U.S. forces would lead. The problem was that if forces were deployed and then came under "heavy Soviet pressure," they would either have to be "backed up" or withdrawn "ignominiously." He felt that American military power had to be employed selectively: "it was necessary to conserve our limited strength and apply it only where it was likely to be most effective."312 Was this, however, just foolishness on their part? Shouldn't they have understood that the American nuclear monopoly was such a powerful trump card that they could have taken a much tougher line in any disputes that developed, and that the Soviets would be sure to back down rather than face a general war with America that they would certainly end up losing? The answer is that the policies they pursued made sense, given the strategic realities of the day. What in fact was the situation as it appeared to policy makers at the time? First of all, it was universally understood that if war broke out, Europe would be overrun. But then the United States would gear up and begin a sustained campaign of atomic bombardment. To be sure, the initial American atomic strike on Russia would have only a limited effect on Soviet war-making capabilities. The fission bombs then in the American arsenal were of relatively limited destructive power, with a yield of only 22 kilotons; there were not many of them during this period, only 13 in mid-1947 and only 50 a year later; intelligence was poor and target selection was a problem; and it was not clear whether the bombs could be delivered on target in any case. But as long as it was a question of a purely one-sided air-atomic war, these problems, no matter how serious, would not affect the outcome of the conflict. Russian industry and war-making power would gradually be destroyed with bombs and bombers produced after the war had started. The United States was sure to win in the end. The Soviets would not start a war because they knew that an American victory would be simply a matter of time.313 American leaders were aware of these fundamental military realities. Indeed, it was because they understood the enormous significance of the American nuclear monopoly that they felt able to adopt the sort of military policy they did. The nuclear monopoly--the fact that the United States was bound to prevail in the end, no matter what happened during the initial phase of the war--meant that the United States did not have to maintain a massive military establishment, or deploy forces in western Europe capable of defending that area on the ground. The West could settle for a tripwire strategy. Very powerful, and very expensive, forces-in-being--in particular, ground forces in Europe--were not absolutely essential. The economic recovery of western Europe was a more pressing need. If the continent was not to be lost, this, and not the military area proper, was where limited resources had to be invested.314 But U.S. leaders also understood that the acceptance of a tripwire strategy inevitably limited their freedom of action. If war did break out, western Europe would be overrun, and the Soviets would try to integrate the European economy into their war-making machine. America in turn would then have to bomb her own allies. This bombing, along with the ground war and the Soviet occupation, would devastate Europe. As Truman himself pointed out to the NATO foreign ministers in April 1949, "a Soviet attack today, while we could eventually defeat it, would involve an operation of incalculable magnitude in which, even if eventual victory is sure, the consequences to the US, and particularly to Western Europe itself, might well be disastrous." The American victory, in other words, would be Pyrrhic. The U.S. government, and even more the European governments, would scarcely relish the prospect of such a war, even if ultimate victory for the West was certain, and America herself could not take too tough a line for fear of alienating her main allies. And of course the Soviets understood all this. They understood that the western powers would be reluctant to push things too far--to take too unyielding or too belligerent a line in political disputes--and that this meant that they had a good deal of room for political maneuver.315 American leaders, in 1948 especially, were sensitive to all these problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular constantly hammered away at the point that American military resources were overextended. American commitments were not in line with the country's military capabilities: this was the central theme of the constant drumbeat of criticism coming from the military authorities.316 And the political leadership was also very uncomfortable with the situation. As Marshall put it at a key NSC meeting on February 12: "The trouble was that we are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out."317 Marshall felt that "without even a token military establishment in being" he was skating on thin ice and had to proceed very cautiously. But he also felt that nothing could be done about the problem. "The country," he said, "could not, and would not, support a budget based on preparation for war."318 In 1948, neither he nor Truman was willing to back a significant increase in the military budget.319 What this situation meant was that the defense of the West rested on a very narrow base. Even with the nuclear monopoly, American power only barely balanced Soviet power in central Europe. It followed that as soon as that monopoly was broken, the situation would be transformed radically, and practically overnight. The USSR would be much freer to press ahead on the German question. And this was exactly what happened: the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device in August 1949, and the world moved rapidly into a period of great crisis.
PART TWO
THE NATO SYSTEM CHAPTER FOUR THE MAKING OF THE NATO SYSTEM By 1949 Europe was divided between east and west. Each side had "organized" its part of Germany and had incorporated it into its bloc. But the division of Europe did not lead directly to a stable peace. It was not as though the two sides now had little choice but to accept things as they were--that American and Soviet power now balanced each other so completely that both sides were locked into the status quo, and that both sides now knew that coexistence was the only viable option. The Soviets still felt that the question of German power, meaning now West German power, was a matter of utmost importance--that given how much they had suffered at Germany's hands during the war, they had the right to do whatever was necessary to prevent Germany from again being able to threaten their most basic interests, and that how far they would go in giving point to these concerns was solely a question of expediency. If the military balance was unfavorable, then a tough policy, leading perhaps to an outright military confrontation, would obviously have to be avoided. But if that situation changed, they might well be able to take a much harder line. In late 1949 the balance did shift, suddenly and dramatically. The American nuclear monopoly was the one thing that had balanced Soviet superiority in ground forces in Europe; now, with the breaking of that monopoly, the Soviets were in a much better position to accept a showdown with the West. Indeed, by 1950, the USSR seemed to be getting ready for a real confrontation. Stalin told the Chinese in October of that year that the United States "was not prepared at the present time for a big war" and countries like Germany and Japan were currently unable to provide America with any real military support. The Communist side, on the other hand, was in a strong position, and need not fear an all-out war with the West. "If war is inevitable," he said, "let it happen now."320 The western powers were thus now faced with very serious problems. As western leaders saw the situation, their current difficulties were rooted in their military weakness, and the conclusion they drew was that they had to build up their military power, and build it up quickly. Western Europe had to be defended on the ground, and it was obvious that sooner or later German troops would be needed for that purpose. But German rearmament implied a transformation of the Federal Republic's political status: German rights would have to be restored, and the German state would become stronger and more independent. The problem was that movement in this direction might itself lead directly to war. The buildup of western power meant that the Soviets might feel that it was a question of now or never, and that they needed to act before the balance turned against them. A buildup of German power, involving as it did the restoration of German political rights, touched on a particularly sensitive Soviet nerve. The system of constraints on German power, the Russians were bound to feel, was disintegrating rapidly. There was no telling how far this process would go. It might therefore make sense for them to act quickly, and deal with the threat before things got completely out of hand. By the end of 1950, it seemed that the two sides were on a collision course and that a third world war might well be imminent. But in this atmosphere of crisis a system began to take shape which might have served as the basis of a stable peace in Europe. By October 1954, a whole series of interlocking agreements had been worked out. West Germany would be rearmed and would join NATO; Germany's political rights would in large measure be restored; but German sovereignty, German freedom of action, and German military power would be limited in major ways. The Germans, however, could accept the system, because it offered real protection against the threat from the east. And although the western system was directed against the USSR, it was in the final analysis something the Russians could also live with, since it solved their number one security problem, the threat of a resurgent and revisionist Germany. But a viable system depended also on strong American involvement, and this turned out to be the most problematic element in the equation. What role would the United States play in Europe? Would America remain the dominant force in the western alliance, or would the Europeans eventually have to provide for their own defense?
In the late 1940s, Soviet pressure on western Europe was balanced by the American nuclear monopoly. Even the great industrial strength of the United States, it was understood, might not be enough in itself to keep the USSR at bay. If the Soviets overran western Europe and harnessed the vast resources of that region to their own war machine, they could confront America as an equal in terms of military-industrial potential. If it were not for nuclear weapons, this great Soviet-dominated bloc might well be unconquerable, and indeed might in the long run be more than a match for the United States. The American nuclear monopoly, on the other hand, meant that a U.S. victory in a third world war would be just a matter of time. Since the ultimate outcome was so clear, one could in the final analysis rely on a tripwire strategy for the defense of western Europe. It had to be made clear, of course, that an attack on Europe would lead to a nuclear war of this sort.321 But if this were done, defense spending could be kept to a minimum and limited resources could be used elsewhere. The United State could concentrate on helping western Europe recover economically. Taxes at home could remain low, and a generation of Americans that had struggled through long years of depression and war could perhaps now begin to enjoy a somewhat more comfortable life. The tripwire strategy was by no means ideal. If general war broke out, Europe would be overrun and would have to be reconquered. The Europeans especially would scarcely relish the prospect of such a war, no matter who was sure to win in the end. In the late 1940s, the western powers had therefore been reluctant to take a tough line in their conflict with the USSR. In the various disputes that developed, western leaders felt themselves to be skating on thin ice. This was not a very comfortable situation, but on balance American and allied statesmen were willing to live with it--at least for the time being, at least until Europe had recovered economically and defense could be given a higher priority. It was, however, clear even then that sooner or later western Europe would have to be defended on the ground. The American nuclear monopoly would certainly not last forever, and when it was broken the whole basis of western defense strategy would have to be reconsidered. But in the late 1940s, as unsatisfactory as the situation was in some ultimate sense, the development of an effective defense in western Europe was not viewed as a matter of high urgency. With the breaking of the American nuclear monopoly in August 1949, everything changed practically overnight. A final American victory in a general war could no longer be taken for granted. Nuclear weapons would certainly be used by both sides in such a war; each side could absorb very large numbers of those early atomic bombs and still survive as a functioning society. And those air-atomic offensives would dominate the war. America and Russia, in such a war, would be racing against each other. In the period when only the United States could produce what was bound to be the decisive weapon, the Americans could go about destroying their enemy in a more or less leisurely fashion. Now suddenly time was of the essence. Each side's goal in a two-sided air-atomic war would be to gain a heavy advantage for itself in mobilizable war potential, which could then be used to develop a general military superiority in the sort of long war that was then anticipated. The aim of the bombing was therefore to destroy as much of the enemy's military-industrial power as quickly as one could while protecting and indeed if possible building up one's own. To achieve this kind of superiority, one had to move with great speed. The top priority for each side would be to destroy and keep on destroying the enemy's air-atomic capability--his bombs and bombers and air bases, his nuclear and aircraft production facilities--as quickly and as thoroughly as possible. The faster and more effective the attack, the less able the enemy would be to mount a counter-attack directed against similar targets in one's own homeland: thus the enormous premium placed on a rapid, massive, intensive bombing campaign--on forces-in-being as opposed to mobilizable war potential, on military readiness and effective command arrangements, and on adequate intelligence and secure overseas bases. The key to success in modern warfare was to destroy the enemy's air-atomic infrastructure more rapidly and more thoroughly than he was able to do the same thing to you; once success in this vital area had been achieved, the final outcome of the conflict would not be in doubt. But it was by no means clear which side would win this race. From the American point of view, all of the problems relating to the small size of the stockpile, the inadequacy of military intelligence, the unreliability of the basing system and so on, which had not mattered all that much during the period of the nuclear monopoly, were now suddenly seen as far more serious. And America herself was from the outset vulnerable to Soviet attack with TU-4 bombers on one-way missions. The Soviets knew where the American air bases and bomb stockpiles were, and a Soviet surprise attack might have a devastating impact on America's ability to recover and mount the kind of bombing campaign that would enable her to go on and win the war. The Soviets themselves, perhaps drawing on the great industrial and technological resources of western Europe, might ultimately be able to out-produce the United States in bombs and bombers, destroying American nuclear and aircraft facilities more quickly than the Americans were able to destroy theirs, thus permitting them to develop a general nuclear superiority which would guarantee ultimate victory in the war. Certainly an American victory in such a conflict could no longer be taken for granted. As General Omar Bradley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the NSC in November 1950, if a global war were to break out, "we might be in danger of losing."322 Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? Download 2.48 Mb. Share with your friends:
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