A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

And an active French policy could perhaps make such a system even more satisfactory. France should now, some leading officials were beginning to argue, take the lead in "building Europe"--that is, in supporting the creation of west European transnational economic and political structures. Some officials had been thinking along these lines even in early 1945, but it was only in 1947 that the basic idea that Germany had to be dealt with in a European framework--or, more precisely, that western Germany had to be integrated into western Europe--really began to get off the ground. The focus was on economic integration, but what was ultimately driving this policy was the great political goal of tying western Germany to the West. A purely repressive policy could not keep Germany in the western camp. Controls on German power, a special status for the Rhenish area, and so on--all that might be very well and good, one high official at the Quai d'Orsay noted in October 1947, "but it is not with such measures that we will discourage the Germans from flirting with the Russians." A more creative policy was essential. A "plan for economic cooperation between France and Germany," a customs union or something similar, needed to be developed.²⁵⁹

The view was thus taking hold that West Germany would have to be treated as more of an equal, and that a framework had to be established within which this new relationship would be possible.²⁶⁰ Only European institutions could in that new environment effectively limit Germany's freedom of action. If controls were to be maintained, they would have to be Europeanized and apply equally to everyone: a west European structure, and not a fully independent Germany, would emerge as the occupation regime was dismantled.²⁶¹ The "European" policy, moreover, might head off a resurgence of German nationalist feeling. The "building of Europe" might capture the German political imagination: it was this great project, and not reunification, that might serve as the focus of German political energies and thus help the Germans live with the division of their own country.²⁶²

This emphasis on "building Europe" was thus another element tying French and American policy together. Bidault himself was personally a strong supporter of the policy of integrating western Germany into the western world, and in his April 1947 meeting with Marshall he did not mince words on this point: "Germany is part of the West, Germany is in Europe."²⁶³ The Americans were of course delighted. The U.S. government had by 1947 come to believe in the great importance of "building Europe." By 1948, the point about the need for an integrated western Europe of which western Germany would be an essential part had become one of the central dogmas of American policy.²⁶⁴ Unless western Germany were tied to western Europe, "first through economic arrangements, and ultimately perhaps in some political way," Marshall wrote in February 1948, Germany as a whole might well be lost "with obvious dire consequences for all of us."²⁶⁵ As Lewis Douglas, the U.S. ambassador in London and a key policy maker in his own right, pointed out in a meeting with top French and British officials in February 1948, it was essential that the new arrangements being worked out for west Germany make the "German people feel part of Western Europe." Whatever controls were placed on the Ruhr should "be of such nature that Western Germany and Western Europe would be effectively integrated"; a more punitive approach might simply alienate the Germans and play into Soviet hands. The Americans, moreover, "attached very great importance" to the economic integration of western Europe as a whole. So "very tentatively and very informally" he suggested that the regime to be set up apply not only to the Ruhr but also to "similar industrial regions of Western Europe." This, of course, was the basic idea behind what two years later would be presented to the world as the Schuman Plan.²⁶⁶

But this emphasis on Europe did not mean that the French were thinking in terms of a purely European system. The European arrangements they had in mind were not meant as a substitute for a structure based on American military power. Indeed, the whole system based on the division of Germany presupposed a strong American presence in western Germany. The American troop presence there would not just protect western Europe from Soviet aggression, it would also automatically set limits to how far the Germans could go. It was the American presence, in fact, that made it possible to remove the controls, to treat Germany as a real partner, and thus to pursue the policy of "building Europe." In the French view, it was therefore vital that American power remain committed to the continent.²⁶⁷ But would the Americans agree to take part in such a system?

The answer to that, it was becoming clear, would depend to a certain degree on the choices the French themselves made. The Americans might be tempted to push ahead in western Germany without limit, to recreate a strong and fully sovereign west German state, and then withdraw militarily from the continent. Or the Americans might limit their assistance to air and naval support: Europe would not be defended on the ground; in the event of aggression, the Soviets would be attacked from forces deployed on the periphery. For obvious reasons, neither of these possibilities was particularly attractive to the French. But suppose the French made it clear that they would be willing to cooperate on German questions if the United States, for her part, was willing to pursue the other kind of policy--the policy of keeping U.S. troops in Germany, of maintaining limits on German power, and of providing an effective ground defense in western Europe. That might help tip the balance in Washington and lead to the kind of system the French really wanted.

And there was a good chance that French policy could make a major difference. From the U.S. point of view, French participation was important for a whole series of political and military reasons. It was not simply a question of adding another country to the anti-Soviet bloc. French participation would mean that western Germany would not just be the protectorate of the two great English-speaking powers, both based overseas. If France took part, the western system would have a broader basis, more of a continental flavor, greater legitimacy, greater viability, greater permanence. In military terms, it would provide more room for maneuver in the event of war, more secure lines of communication, and a major land force--all of which would help make it possible to defend Europe effectively on the ground, and an effective ground defense might be of fundamental importance in the long run if the western defense system was to be viable. In American eyes, it was therefore important that France be brought into the system. This meant that there was a good chance that the U.S. government would respond positively to a more forthcoming French policy and that quite satisfactory arrangements for Germany and for the defense of western Europe could be worked out.

So the idea was taking shape, especially in 1947, that France could support the western strategy for Germany, but that that support should not be unconditional. It would have to depend on America's willingness to help set up a security system for western Europe. This new French policy would have a major impact on the course of events in 1948.
Germany, Berlin and the Security Question

In early 1948, British, French and American representatives met at London to work out terms for the creation of a west German state. On June 1, after three months of talks, they reached agreement on what were called the London Recommendations. A constitutent assembly was to draft a democratic constitution "of federal type," but the new state was not to be fully sovereign. The occupation would continue, and the occupation authorities would continue to exercise certain controls--over the Ruhr, for example, and over West Germany's military status and foreign relations--and indeed would have the right to "resume the exercise of their full powers" in an emergency, or if the democratic system within the new republic were threatened. The London agreement also laid out a procedure for the establishment of the new system: a constituent assembly was to meet no later than September 1, 1948.²⁶⁸

The London Recommendations were of fundamental political importance. The western powers were going to set up a new state in their part of Germany, and there was no telling how the Soviets would react. Many western leaders felt they might be heading into a full-fledged confrontation with the USSR. It had been clear even in late 1947 that a real test of strength was in the making. In August, for example, Bohlen had predicted a "major political showdown crisis" with Russia. The indications, he said, were that the conflict would come to a head in a matter of months.²⁶⁹ High-ranking European officials also felt that the conflict over Germany was moving toward a climax. Bevin, Chauvel and René Massigli, the French ambassador in London and another key policy maker, had no doubt that the western powers were rapidly moving into dangerous waters. The "organization" of western Germany, they all recognized, would lead to an increased risk of war with Russia.²⁷⁰ There was a considerable fear that the Soviets might lash out and launch a preventive war, pushing the western powers out of Germany and perhaps overrunning the continent as a whole. They might feel that they had to take action before events in western Germany had moved too far and before America and her friends had a chance to build up their defenses.²⁷¹

And in fact in early 1948 the Russians did become more confrontational, more aggressive, as though they were getting ready for a major showdown with the West over Germany. In February the democratic order was brought down in Czechoslovakia. A Communist police state was imposed on that country. No Soviet troops were present as these events unfolded in Prague, but the shadow of Soviet power and the possibility of a Soviet military intervention played a key role in the calculations of both sides in the Czech capital. Soviet deputy foreign minister Zorin flew to Prague on February 19 and told the local Communists that Stalin wanted the matter to be brought to a head and that they should ask for Russian military help. Soviet troops, he said, were on the border with Hungary, ready to move in. But the local Communists calculated that overt military intervention would be unnecessary. The simple fact that the Soviets were ready to send in troops while a western intervention was out of the question made resistance pointless.²⁷²

In late 1947, western statesmen had expected the Communists to take full control of Czechoslovakia in the near future.²⁷³ The West was organizing itself into a bloc; the Soviets could therefore be expected to consolidate their own sphere was well; and Czechoslovakia lay on the Russian side of the line of demarcation. The events in Prague were nonetheless deeply disturbing. For many in the West, they underscored the brutality of Soviet policy. A servile ally was not good enough for the USSR. Whatever tactical flexibility the Russians might demonstrate in the short run, over the long run they would settle for nothing less than absolute control. It no longer mattered to the Soviets, one French diplomat argued, how world opinion reacted. Strategic considerations seemed to be the only thing they cared about, and Russia's "main preoccupation" now was to prepare for a conflict that might well be imminent.²⁷⁴

The situation in Berlin was an even greater source of concern. Czechoslovakia had long been recognized as part of the Soviet sphere, but western troops were in West Berlin. They were there by right of conquest, a right recognized by the Soviet government itself. Legal rights could not, however, alter geographical realities. The Soviets knew that the Berlin situation gave them an effective means of exerting pressure on the western powers, and indeed western leaders understood that the Soviets would be tempted to exploit the city's isolation and relative vulnerability. It was the obvious card for them to play.²⁷⁵

So it came as no great surprise when the Soviet authorities began in the early spring to interfere in a relatively minor way with western access to Berlin.²⁷⁶ This pressure soon subsided, but the signal was clear enough. When the London Recommendations were adopted in June, the Soviets responded by stopping ground traffic between Berlin and western Germany. In imposing the blockade, they made it abundantly clear that their real goal was to challenge the West's policy of establishing a west German state: the London Recommendations had to be suspended, the western allies had to come back to the conference table. Stalin himself told the western ambassadors in his usual blunt way that Berlin was just a lever, that even trizonal economic fusion was not a problem, and that "the only real issue" was the establishment of a west German government.²⁷⁷

This comment of Stalin's was both important and revealing. He was accepting trizonal fusion--that is, the inclusion of France in the bloc of powers that was to run western Germany--and this implied that he had more or less accepted the more general idea of a western bloc. He was also making it clear that he was not opposed to economic recovery in western Germany. What he disliked was the idea of a German state--of the Germans getting too much independence and too much power. He wanted the western governments, and not the Germans, to be the real power in western Germany. This was in keeping with the Potsdam policy of accepting the division of Germany between the USSR and the West. The implication was that the USSR was not fundamentally opposed to a western system that limited German power and prevented West Germany from ever threatening the status quo--that if the western powers could construct something of the sort, this was something the USSR would be willing to live with.

In 1948, Soviet and western leaders were not really able to discuss fundamental issues of this sort. For the Americans at the time, the real question had to do with the confrontation over Berlin and the policy they had adopted of establishing a west German state. They decided not to abandon their German policy, which meant that the conflict over Berlin would continue. But would they in the final analysis fight in order to defend their position in that city? The United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, but that was the only thing that balanced Soviet ground forces in Europe. The American military authorities thought that the United States was too weak to take a tough line and contemplated withdrawal from the city. In July 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the political leadership to consider "the possibility that some justification might be found for withdrawal of our occupation forces from Berlin without undue loss of prestige."²⁷⁸ In October, the Chiefs insisted that "in our present state of readiness," to go to war over Berlin "would be neither militarily prudent nor strategically sound."²⁷⁹

The view that the western position in Berlin was ultimately untenable, and that the western powers, in the final analysis, should be prepared to withdraw from the city, was in fact quite common at the time. One key State Department official argued in November 1947 that the Soviets had it within their power to make life in Berlin impossible for the western powers, that the West should hold on as long as it could, but should in the final analysis withdraw from the city rather than face war.²⁸⁰ The British at times argued along similar lines.²⁸¹ There was a certain sense, in Europe especially, that Berlin was a strategic liability that needed to be liquidated. As long as the western powers hung on, the Soviets would find it easy to exert pressure and limit what the West could do in western Germany. A withdrawal from Berlin was, from this point of view, a natural concomitant of the western strategy, both consequence and precondition of the policy of creating a west German state tied to the western world. As a French official laid out the argument in July 1948, the whole thrust of recent events--"the organization of western Europe," "the cutting of Germany in two"--had "major advantages for us." But by agreeing to take part in the occupation of Berlin, the western powers had sacrificed their "freedom of action"; so, as painful as this might be, the West had to find some way to pull out.²⁸² Bedell Smith's views were not that different. He thought the western powers could hold out in Berlin if they wanted to, but that it made no military sense to maintain a presence in this "exposed salient." He thought, in fact, that it would suit the Russians' purposes "to let us stay on indefinitely." The ambassador in Moscow, a strong supporter of the western strategy, now called explicitly for a withdrawal from the city.²⁸³

But Marshall and Truman saw things differently. In their view, America was in Berlin by right, and to withdrew ignominiously would have a profound effect on the whole political situation in Europe. They therefore very much wanted to stay on in Berlin. The question was whether this would be possible without a war--or more precisely, whether they should in the final analysis be willing to risk war in order to remain in the city. There were those, not just in the State Department but military officers like General Clay, who had embraced the deterrence philosophy and who felt that the best way to stay without war was to make it abundantly clear that the United States would under no circumstances abandon Berlin, and would in the final analysis go to war rather than capitulate on the issue. The counterargument, which the British and French tended to make, was that the best way to get through the crisis was to avoid confrontation and "leave the issues blurred."²⁸⁴

These were difficult issues, and Truman and Marshall were pulled in both directions. When the blockade was imposed, Truman's first reaction was simple and straightforward: "we are going to stay period." He was careful to note, however, that this was "not a final decision." The political leadership soon did decide in principle to take a firm line and to stay on in Berlin no matter what the Soviets did.²⁸⁵ But in reality the American position on the Berlin question was not quite as firm as it appeared. When Ambassador Douglas, for example, said in April that if Berlin were cut off, America would fight rather than abandon the city, Marshall was quick to correct him. The United States would not "initiate the application of force" over Berlin.²⁸⁶ As for Truman, he was unwilling even to shoot down a barrage balloon, since he was afraid of starting a war for which the "United States did not have enough soldiers."²⁸⁷

The basic American policy, the product of these conflicting feelings, was to put off the really vital decisions about the use of force until they absolutely had to be faced--that is, until the choice really was between war and capitulation. The best answer to the blockade was therefore an airlift, and West Berlin was supplied by air until the blockade was lifted in May 1949. But during that period the possibility of war had to be taken seriously. The Europeans were particularly alarmed. Marshall, returning to Washington in October 1948 after a brief trip to Paris, told President Truman that the Europeans were "completely out of their skin, and sitting on their nerves."²⁸⁸

It had in fact been clear from December 1947 on that the two sides were probably headed for a serious confrontation over Germany. This in turn, it was understood, implied that the defense of the West had to be organized, and the sooner the better. This was the theme of the very important talks Bevin, Bidault and Marshall had in London on December 17 and 18. Bevin began to call for a west European security organization. The British and French, he told Bidault on December 17, should begin military talks at once. As Bevin laid out his concept a few weeks later for the Americans, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg could then be brought in, followed by other western European countries, including Germany "as soon as circumstances permit." It was clear that the system ultimately had to be backed by American power.²⁸⁹ Bidault agreed that a western defense system needed to be constructed. General Revers, the French Army Chief of Staff, was sent over to London for talks with his British counterparts. General Billotte, another top French military officer and from 1945 on an advocate of a military alliance with the United States, was sent over to Washington to negotiate a "secret Franco-American military agreement"; Bidault himself had long sought to bring about an arrangement of this sort.²⁹⁰ In December 1947, moreover, Marshall and Bevin authorized the American and British commanders in Germany to work out a very secret plan for joint military operations in the event of a Soviet attack. No one else was told about it, not even Truman or Attlee. A retreat was of course seen as inevitable. The purpose of the planning was to make sure it did not turn into a rout.²⁹¹

In early 1948, the Europeans pressed hard for a formal American security commitment. They were fortunate that it had been Marshall who had lost patience and had decided on his own at the London conference to end to the talks with Molotov, since now they could say that the Americans had created the problem and could not leave them in the lurch.²⁹² In the months that followed, both governments, but the French in particular, insisted that the United States was primarily responsible for this very dangerous situation, that they were going along with America, but that they were entitled to something in exchange. Massigli, for example, said during the London talks that the American government was asking France to back an "extremely bold" German policy, one which might well lead the Soviets to take preventive action. If a new war broke out, France was in great danger of being overrun, and French diplomats argued repeatedly that the Americans had to do something about this problem. A formal guarantee of French security was not enough. The Americans had contracted a moral obligation and would not be let off cheaply with mere words. The simple fact that American troops were in Germany meant that if war broke out, America would be in it from the start. The real need now was for something more than a tripwire. Western Europe had to be defended on the ground. The European armies had to be built up with American aid; the U.S. military presence in Europe needed to be strengthened; the western armies should perhaps be welded into an integrated force, commanded by an American general.²⁹³ The French from the start--and this is an important point, given their later attitude--were thus strong supporters of a western defense system under American command. They wanted the American commitment to Europe to be as strong and as "organic" as possible.²⁹⁴

The other great argument for a western security system had to do with Germany. For Bidault and the French generally, the long term problem of German power, although now clearly overshadowed by the Russian problem, was still important both intrinsically and for domestic political reasons.²⁹⁵ The American presence in Germany would keep that country from becoming a problem. The two security problems were in effect merged. It had long been understood that the German threat could serve as cover for arrangements that were really designed to deal with the Russian problem.²⁹⁶ Now it was becoming clear that measures officially directed against Russia would also serve to keep the Germans in line.

The key to the security problem was an American military commitment, and the U.S. government quickly gave the Europeans the assurances they needed. "As long as European Communism threatens US vital interests and national security," Marshall wrote on February 28, "we could ill afford to abandon our military position in Germany." "The logical conclusion," he added, "is that three-power occupation may be of unforeseeable and indefinite duration, thus offering protracted security guarantees and establishing a firm community of interests." The maintenance of the occupation, he pointed out, meant in particular that the French would be secure against Germany.²⁹⁷ They could thus take a more relaxed view and cooperate more readily with a policy rooted in the idea that western Germany would eventually be treated as a partner.²⁹⁸