A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

According to the new thinking, there would have to be a strong American military presence in Europe, at least for the time being. The unified NATO army needed a supreme commander, and that commander would have to be an American.³⁵⁹ Only an American general would have the authority and prestige needed to make the integrated system work. And the NATO commander would have to be backed up by a respectable U.S. combat force. The goal was to shore up the morale of the Europeans and to lay the basis for an effective defense of the continent; the U.S. force would be the backbone of the integrated structure into which the Germans could be brought.

The Americans now moved ahead rapidly in this direction. In September, at the New York foreign ministers' conference, the Europeans were presented with a package. If they wanted an American general as NATO commander and a respectable American military presence on the continent, they would have to accept German rearmament along the lines worked out in Washington--that is, as part of an integrated NATO force, with the Germans having no "capacity for independent action."³⁶⁰ They were thus under enormous pressure to accept the American plan. The British suppressed their misgivings and went along with Acheson's proposal.³⁶¹ With the French, however, the problems ran deeper.

The French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, and other key officials personally agreed with the Americans on a whole range of basic issues: on the importance of drawing Germany into the West and transforming her into a partner; on the need for an effective ground defense in Europe and the impossibility of achieving this without a German contribution; and on the desirability of integrated structures that could provide a stable long-term basis for limiting German freedom of action. They understood that Germany could not be treated "as an economic and military ally" and at the same time as a political inferior.³⁶² But French leaders who thought along these lines had to deal with a whole series of problems. The first was bureaucratic in nature. The policy of integrating Germany into the western system as a real partner had to a certain extent been sabotaged by the French military administration in Germany. In 1949, Schuman and his associates had therefore taken the lead in bringing about a major liberalization of the occupation regime: the military governors were replaced by a civilian High Commission and the occupation controls were relaxed.³⁶³

Political problems at home, however, could not be dealt with so easily. At the New York conference, Schuman made it clear that he personally understood the need for German troops, and he fully agreed that it was illogical to think that Germany should be defended without a German contribution. He was ready to accept the principle of a German defense contribution if this could be done secretly, but the Americans were insisting on public acceptance now. The problem, he said, was that in France only a minority understood "the importance of Germany in western defense." It was politically impossible for him to do what the Americans wanted right now. The French public was simply not ready to go along with German rearmament at this point. It would be better first to let the NATO regime take shape, for a U.S. general to come over as NATO commander, for a U.S. combat force to take up positions in Germany. After those things were done, it would be much easier to get the French parliament to accept some form of German rearmament.³⁶⁴

Domestic politics aside, there were major substantive reasons for moving ahead cautiously. To press the Germans on rearmament would transform the relationship between the allies and the Federal Republic. It would put the Germans in the driver's seat and encourage them to pose political conditions, and the allies might end up having to give them too much political freedom too soon. Even more important than that, it would provoke the Russians, possibly into a preventive war, before the allies had built up their power and were able to defend themselves.

But the American government was now determined to move ahead rapidly. The argument that the West was skating on very thin ice, and that a decision to rearm Germany might tip the balance in Moscow and provoke a Soviet attack, Acheson now simply dismissed out of hand. The only thing the Russians were interested in, he told the allies, was the overall balance of power between east and west. The rearmament of Germany had "little bearing on the matter," since it did not "really matter to the Russians whether we are building up strength by the creation of a German force or by other means." Acheson was proud of his performance. His arguments, he boasted to Truman, had "destroyed any logical basis" to the European fear that German rearmament as such, as distinct from "the mere creation of allied strength," might provoke a Soviet attack. The French in particular, he said, had been in favor of putting off the rearmament of Germany until after the general power of the West had been built up, but he had simply blown their arguments "out of the water."³⁶⁵

The Europeans were not convinced by Acheson's reasoning, but they could not just turn their backs on the American offer. An integrated military system, an American NATO commander, a greatly increased U.S. troop presence on the continent--these were things the British and French very much wanted. Acheson had made it clear, however, that the Europeans would first have to accept the principle of a German defense contribution. This heavy-handed tactic was generally disliked in Europe, but all the allies except France were willing to accept America's terms. The French were therefore under great pressure to come up with a proposal of their own.

On October 24, Prime Minister René Pleven therefore announced a plan for a European army and a European defense ministry. The Pleven Plan was similar in structure to the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community proposed earlier in the year, and like the Schuman Plan had been worked out principally by Jean Monnet, the great French champion of a unified Europe. Under the Pleven proposals, German troops were to be recruited and armed not by the Bonn government but by a supra-national European authority. They would be welded into a highly integrated European army which would take its place alongside regular NATO national armies under the direct control of the NATO commander.³⁶⁶

The Pleven proposal had been worked out quickly. Neither the French military authorities nor the French foreign ministry had been consulted.³⁶⁷ The plan soon developed into a proposal for a European Defense Community, and the EDC project played a central role in alliance politics until its final collapse in August 1954.³⁶⁸ But the plan was never very popular. Military officers, especially in France, generally disliked the whole idea.³⁶⁹ Their misgivings were shared by many key political figures. To Marshall, now back in office as Secretary of Defense, it was a "miasmic cloud"; to Churchill, who returned as prime minister in late 1951, the EDC was a "sludgy amalgam."³⁷⁰ The prevailing view in late 1950 and early 1951 was that the Pleven Plan was unrealistic. The French had not come up with a practical solution to the problem of German rearmament; it seemed that the whole point of the proposal was to evade that basic problem. The American and British ambassadors in Paris both saw it as the "concoction of politicians designed to meet political difficulties," a view shared by a number of French officials.³⁷¹ The French wanted to take what the Americans were offering in terms of U.S. combat divisions, an American NATO commander and an integrated military system, while dragging their feet on German rearmament. It seemed that the Pleven plan had apparently been worked out with that goal in mind, and that the real French aim was to "play for time" on the German rearmament question.³⁷²

The basic goal at the end of 1950 was in fact to avoid provoking Russia by a decision to rearm Germany, without at the same time rejecting the American offer to begin building an effective system for the defense of Europe. The Europeans at this point believed that the risk of war was very real. By December, Bevin, for example, had concluded that the great crisis was no longer two or three years off but that things might come to a head very quickly. It made sense, he now felt, for the western powers to build up their strength first before they took the plunge and decided to rearm Germany, something which might well "tip the balance" and provoke a Soviet attack.³⁷³

The French felt the same way, and these fears were by no means a figment of the Europeans' fevered imaginations. As noted above, there was a whole series of indicators suggesting that the Soviets were getting ready for military action. That evidence had confirmed what many policy makers were inclined to believe on more theoretical grounds: that the nuclear monopoly was the one thing that had counterbalanced the USSR's enormous superiority in ground forces in Europe, so that the breaking of that monopoly would open up a window of opportunity for Russia, and would in all probability lead to a far more aggressive policy. Events--above all, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War--had now vindicated this whole way of looking at things. At the end of 1950, the level of risk was thus seen as very great. A general war, it was feared, might well break out in the very near future. The American military authorities were particularly sensitive to these problems. The JCS had taken a very cautious line in political disputes even in the late 1940s, and since then the strategic balance had worsened dramatically. In their view, the situation in late 1950 and early 1951 was quite dangerous: this was not the time to run major risks.³⁷⁴

The Soviets, it seemed, were poised on the brink. A decision to rearm Germany might well lead them to opt for war, especially since the West had embarked on a massive military buildup and action might no longer be possible in a year or two. McCloy, for example, thought in June that "the rearmament of Germany would undoubtedly speed up any Soviet schedule for any possible future action in Germany and would, no doubt, be regarded by them as sufficiently provocative to warrant extreme countermeasures." By December these fears had intensified. The CIA calculated in January 1951 that there was a better than fifty-fifty chance that German rearmament would lead to war with the Soviets, and Army intelligence was even more pessimistic. Soviet officials, from Stalin on down, made it clear, both publicly and in private talks with western diplomats, that the rearmament of Germany might well lead to preventive military action.³⁷⁵ But Acheson--an "uncompromising hawk," as General Bradley called him--insisted on pushing ahead.³⁷⁶ If the Europeans wanted a major American military presence, they would have to accept the principle of German rearmament, and accept it openly.

So although the Europeans sought to avoid provoking the Russians, they felt they could not simply reject the American proposal out of hand. By December a compromise was worked out. The Europeans would begin at once to work out plans for a European Army, but while these arrangements were being negotiated, German contingents would be formed and integrated into NATO directly under appropriate safeguards on an interim basis.³⁷⁷

The French accepted this arrangement, the so-called Spofford Compromise, and it was the German government that now played the key role in slowing things down; indeed, it was probably because they had learned that the Germans would not go along with the plan that the French in the final analysis had been willing to accept it.³⁷⁸ The German position had shifted dramatically since August. At that point, although Adenauer wanted a change in the Federal Republic's political status, he had felt that the long-term threat to German security was so great that the West Germans needed to do whatever the allies would let them do to help remedy the situation. But now the Adenauer government was laying down conditions: unless Germany's political status underwent a radical transformation, there would be no German defense contribution. Adenauer was concerned with the political situation within Germany, but, like the other Europeans, he also felt it was important not to provoke the Soviets at a time when the West was so weak. He therefore agreed with the French and the British that the main emphasis for the time being needed to be placed on building up NATO's strength, and that the specific issue of German rearmament should be placed on the back burner. And the way to slow things down was to stress his very real domestic political problems, and to insist that a defense contribution would be politically possible only if the Federal Republic were treated as more of an equal. So Adenauer now declared that unless the occupation regime were replaced by a system of contractual relations, there would be no German troops. The allies, on the other hand, were bound to insist that Germany's political rights would not be restored until they got what they wanted from Germany by way of a military contribution, with adequate safeguards. What all this meant was that parallel negotiations would be necessary: both the political and the military issues would have to be settled as part of one great package. These issues were both complex and politically sensitive. The negotiations would obviously last for months, if not longer.³⁷⁹

Acheson was frustrated, but he realized that the German rearmament issue needed to be put "on ice for a little while." The U.S. government had threatened not to send over a sizeable combat force or an American general as NATO commander unless the Europeans, including the Germans, made the kind of defense contribution the Americans expected of them. But this threat, Acheson now realized, could not be implemented. If America "tried to bargain," he said, and demanded more European army divisions, "everything would go to pieces."³⁸⁰ So the U.S. troops were sent, Eisenhower went over as the first NATO commander--the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, or SACEUR--and the NATO integrated command system was gradually set up.

In the meantime, western and German officials began to tackle the massive problem of regulating the Federal Republic's relations with the western powers--the whole cluster of issues relating to German sovereignty, a German defense contribution, the EDC, the structure of NATO and so on. These problems were not easy to resolve and progress was slow, but gradually a package of interlocking arrangements took shape. The western powers, after all, saw eye-to-eye on essentials. None of them wanted Germany to be too independent or too powerful. That meant above all that the Federal Republic could not have an army capable of independent action. On the other hand, they agreed that the Germans had to be won over to the West, and that meant that the Federal Republic would have to be treated "substantially" as an equal. "A large degree of sovereignty" would have to be restored to Germany. This very phrasing, however, reflected the allies' unwillingness to go all the way and grant full sovereignty to the Federal Republic.³⁸¹ How far they would go would depend largely on whether structural arrangements could be worked out that would automatically limit German freedom of action, and perhaps everyone else's as well.

It was not obvious, however, what kind of structure was to be built. The great question was whether it should have a distinctly "European" or a broader "Atlantic" focus. Would the Europeans ever be able to pull together and defend themselves without direct American involvement? Could the problem of German power ever be resolved in a purely European context? Or was continuing American involvement needed to solve the two great interlocking problems that lay at the heart of international politics, the German problem and the problem of defense against Soviet Russia?

The American government had long favored the "European" solution. To be sure, Byrnes at Stuttgart in 1946, and then Marshall and Truman in 1948, had given certain assurances about a long-term American commitment to the defense of Europe. But many American policy makers had come to think of the U.S. presence as a kind of crutch. It might be necessary for the time being, but eventually the Europeans needed to come together and take over primary responsibility for their own defense. America could then withdraw all or most of her forces. The goal was to get the Europeans ultimately to balance Soviet power on their own; at the same time there was to be no strong German force under national control, capable of independent action. The only way this could be accomplished was for the Europeans to delegate the war-making power to a central authority; this implied that foreign and military policy would be conducted on a unified basis, and thus that some sort of European federal state would have to be constructed. The Americans therefore attached enormous importance to the political unification of Europe, and generally supported whatever pointed in that general direction.

By the beginning of 1948, American policy makers were already talking about western Europe as an independent center of power, a "third force" strong enough "to say 'no' both to the Soviet Union and to the United States."³⁸² The feeling was that the Europeans had the resources to defend themselves. Faced with the great threat from the east, they should put their petty differences aside, pool their forces and ultimately unite politically. Unification would also solve the German problem, and was probably the only solution if the United States was not to remain in Europe forever. So the American attitude toward European integration was unambiguous. "We favor it," Acheson told Schuman, "I favor it." This was the way to build a Europe strong enough to defend itself "against the attacks of Communist nihilism and Soviet imperialism," and it was "the soundest basis on which this generation could reinsure the next against another dangerous German aberration."³⁸³

But was a "European" solution viable? A simple supra-national administrative structure would not be enough; for the system to work, there would have to be a genuine pooling of sovereignty. There would have to be a centralized European political authority to control whatever common force was built up. But were the European countries ready to turn over the war-making power, the very heart of sovereignty, to some supra-national European authority? "Building Europe" might be a very nice way in theory to keep Germany from being able to act independently. But the European system had to be constructed on a basis of equality. Whatever constraints applied to Germany would therefore also have to apply to France and the other countries. But would the French, for example, agree that they could no longer act on a national basis, and that they could no longer have armed forces of their own?

Then there were problems having to do with the British role. A purely continental grouping might not work. France perhaps would not feel strong enough to deal with Germany by herself, even if she had Italy and the Benelux countries at her side. It might be a different story if Britain came in. Perhaps Britain and France together, especially if they could disengage from their burdensome overseas commitments and concentrate their energies on Europe, would be an adequate counterweight to West Germany, and a grouping that included Britain might be strong enough to stand up to the USSR on its own. From the U.S. standpoint, what this meant was that Britain should be brought to think of herself as a primarily European power.³⁸⁴

But British leaders had little interest or faith in a solution of this sort, and indeed rejected the whole idea of Britain as primarily a regional European power, and even more as a key building block in a federal European system. Britain hoped to be treated as "the partner in world affairs of the United States." She refused to think of herself as just another European country, and British leaders resented American attempts to push their country "back into the European Queue." Britain was a world power with important overseas interests. This did not mean that the United Kingdom had any intention of disengaging from Europe. A "profound change" had in fact taken place in British defense policy in May 1950. The defense of continental western Europe was now considered "the first 'pillar' of British strategy," more important now than the defense of the Middle East. But the link with western Europe was, in Bevin's view, just one of "three pillars" on which British policy now rested. The ties with America and the Commonwealth were also of great importance. The Conservatives saw things in much the same way. Churchill especially had a clear vision of Britain's role in the world: Britain, as he saw it, lay at the center of three overlapping circles, western Europe, the British Commonwealth, and the United States of America.³⁸⁵

[Put Figure Four about here]

By 1950 Britain had thus become by far the most Atlanticist of the three major western powers. This was a fairly recent development. It was only in 1949 that Bevin had given up on the idea of a British-led "third force." Western Europe as a whole, he and most British officials were finally convinced, would never be strong enough to defend itself, whether Britain was included in a European system or not.³⁸⁶ America had to be kept in Europe, and one therefore had to emphasize the "Atlantic" concept and reject the narrow "European" idea. "We cannot afford," Bevin wrote, "to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within N.A.T.O. and thus weaken instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic. We must nip it in the bud."³⁸⁷ The NATO structure--that is, a broadly based integrated force with an American general as supreme commander--was to be emphasized; the NATO system was a way of keeping the United States involved.

So the British disliked the Pleven Plan and the whole EDC idea. The French concept of a European army, Bevin wrote, was "out of harmony with our general policy of building up the Atlantic Community as the major grouping for the future." It would be "a sort of cancer in the Atlantic body," and might give the Americans a most unwelcome excuse to disengage from Europe.³⁸⁸ Europe alone would never be able to defend itself, and the French plan would not provide an adequate framework for integrating Germany into the West. Indeed, a major goal of the French plan was to keep Germany out of NATO. Bevin, on the other hand, was "thinking in terms of a comprehensive Atlantic Confederation which would include all Atlantic countries and also Germany." "In this framework," he noted, "the Germans could do no harm."³⁸⁹

The British, however, were reluctant to oppose the Pleven proposal head on. They felt they had to go along with the idea, since this was now the only way to get the Americans to commit themselves to the defense of Europe--to send over the combat divisions and a NATO commander. But they themselves would not join the force, and they resented American efforts to push them into a European grouping. The United States had to understand, Bevin told a high American official, that Britain "was not part of Europe; she was not simply a Luxembourg."³⁹⁰ If the continental countries, however, sought to build a European federal force, the United Kingdom would not try to prevent them from doing so.³⁹¹

The British were thus firm Atlanticists. The French attitude was more complex. On the one hand, many French officials felt that some kind of a continental grouping might serve as a counterweight to what would otherwise be overwhelming American power within the alliance. It was in part for this reason that the idea of "building Europe" was popular in France, especially among the parties in the governing coalition. But at the same time there was a strong sense that it might be unwise to push the "European idea" too far. France did not want to be left alone on the continent with Russia and Germany. She wanted her Anglo-Saxon partners, and especially the United States, to remain by her side. From the start the French had pressed for a strong American military presence in Europe. They had pushed hard for an integrated defense system and for the appointment of an American as NATO commander, and in 1950 continued to champion the cause of a unified western defense authority under American leadership. "A common authority," Pleven said (in a phrase which would perhaps have appalled certain of his successors), would enable the United States to exercise the "preponderant role which it must play in the Atlantic defense effort."³⁹²