A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

All this--the strengthened NATO structure, the western military presence on German soil, the reserved rights, the limits on German military power--added up to a system. Germany was to be tied to the West, and in important ways made part of the West, but her freedom of action was to be curtailed and she was not to have the same sovereign rights as the other western powers. Would it be possible to maintain these constraints--that is, to discriminate against Germany--and still expect the Federal Republic to remain a loyal ally?

The problem would be serious in any event, but exactly how difficult it would be would depend on Soviet policy. The Soviets had it within their power to drive a wedge between Germany and the western countries. They could offer to accept reunification on the basis of genuinely free elections, demanding only that the reunified state not be part of the western bloc. It was commonly assumed that the Germans, if it were just up to them, would be strongly tempted to go along with such a plan.⁴²⁹

The western powers, however, were not prepared in the early 1950s to accept reunification on that basis. There were two basic variants of the neutralization idea: the reunified state might be weak, its military power limited by outside controls, or it might again become a strong and truly independent great power. But neither alternative was particularly attractive. A weak all-German state, unprotected by the West, would be vulnerable to pressure from the east, but a strong, reunified Germany maneuvering between east and west was bound (as Dulles put it) to be "the cause of future trouble." If the western countries, however, opposed the idea too directly and too openly, and especially if they said things that made it clear that the reason they opposed it was that they distrusted the Germans and did not want them to become too strong and independent, the Federal Republic might end up turning away from the western alliance and the NATO system would quickly unravel. The result was that any real flexibility on the Soviet side would put the western powers on the spot: from the western point of view, the more generous the Soviet offer, the more dangerous it would be.⁴³⁰

In the early 1950s, these problems were by no means purely hypothetical. It seemed, beginning in late 1951, that the USSR might actually be willing to accept reunification on the basis of genuinely free elections.⁴³¹ In March 1952 Stalin publicly proposed an arrangement designed to appeal to the Germans. Germany would be reunified on a democratic basis; foreign troops would be withdrawn and the new state would not be part of either bloc; the Germans themselves would be allowed to raise military forces "essential for the defense" of their country. This, along with other provisions in his proposal, suggested that what the USSR had in mind was the resurrection of Germany as a great power, able to stand on her own and play a truly independent role in international affairs.⁴³²

In public, the allies dismissed this offer as a mere ploy designed to sabotage the process leading to Germany's rearmament as part of the western bloc. And it turns out that this claim was correct: the Soviet move really was essentially a maneuver.⁴³³ But western officials had no way of knowing that at the time, and were in fact alarmed: the proposal was viewed as dangerous precisely because it was felt that the Soviets might well be in earnest this time. And the Europeans, and increasingly the Americans as well, thought they could not just reject the Soviet offer point blank, because of the effect this might have on Germany. The problem therefore had to be finessed: the goal was to be firm enough to prevent agreement with the Russians, but not so intransigent as to upset German opinion--or, in the case of Britain and France, domestic opinion either, since there were important political forces in both of those countries favoring détente and thus also the idea of a general settlement with the USSR, and that meant above all the settlement of the German question through some sort of reunification deal.⁴³⁴

Acheson, however, wanted to take a somewhat harder line. He took it for granted that the United States had to use "every means" in its power to head off talks with the USSR on the German question. But the very blunt tone he wanted to adopt would have hurt all three of the major European governments politically. In 1952 the allies therefore had to press hard to get him to take a less uncompromising line and to not close the door on talks with the USSR. The allied attitude upset him: he was "baffled" and "astonished" by the Europeans' willingness to meet with the Soviets. But these differences were more apparent than real: the allies might need to appear relatively flexible, but they, like the Americans, had no real interest in settling the German question along the lines the Soviets had proposed.⁴³⁵

How then could the western governments evade the pressure for a negotiated settlement without alienating the German people in the process, and without paying a major political price at home? The basic tactic was to pose conditions which would look good to German and domestic opinion, but which the Soviets were bound to reject. The tactic could be used to prevent a conference from convening, or for sabotaging negotiations after they had begun.⁴³⁶ The key thing here was to avoid focusing too narrowly on free elections. The French in particular were afraid that if this were left as the central issue, the Soviets might "well be ready to concede much or most of what we would demand." The allies had to retain some room for maneuver, and Schuman now said the West should call in addition for getting rid of four-power control. The slogan should be "not merely free elections, but free elections for a free Germany."⁴³⁷ This sort of slogan would appeal to the Germans, but it also represented a position which the Soviets would not accept: they would not agree to reunification on terms which would give the new state the freedom to remain in the western bloc. The allies would thus be able to finesse the problem. But the very fact that maneuvering of this sort was necessary pointed to a basic weakness in the western system: it depended on German cooperation and loyalty, but at the same time one of its fundamental goals was to limit German power and independence. Could this sort of system be maintained indefinitely?

For the time being, however, the system worked, and this was in large part due to the policy of the German government itself. That policy in turn was determined to a quite extraordinary extent by a single quite extraordinary individual, Konrad Adenauer, chancellor of the Federal Republic from its founding in 1949 until his fall from power in 1963. And the Adenauer factor plays a very important role in this whole story.

Adenauer was by his own account far more pro-western in those early years of the Federal Republic than the German people as a whole. His great goal was to make Germany a western country. By tying her to the West politically, economically, and eventually militarily, she would be absorbed into the western world, and would in turn absorb western values. This pro-western policy went hand in hand with a certain coolness toward reunification. Since the Soviets would not permit a reunified Germany to be integrated into the western system, reunification would have to be put on the back burner. But Adenauer was not too eager for reunification in any case. The Germans in the east, he said, were not like the Germans in the western part of the country. They were Prussians, nationalistic and militaristic. The West Germans, on the other hand, especially Rhinelanders like himself, were more closely tied to western Europe. It did not make sense, therefore, to bring the east Germans, or even the West Berliners, into the Federal Republic too soon, before the system really had a chance to take root--that is, before Germany had really consolidated her position as part of the West.⁴³⁸

Adenauer was thus the great champion of the pro-western policy within Germany and the western powers' great ally in dealing with the problems posed by the USSR's German policy in the early 1950s. His aim was to head off the possibility that four power talks on Germany might develop a certain momentum and lead to reunification along neutralist lines. He pursued that goal with considerable tactical skill. He would not openly reject the idea of negotiations with the east, but rather, in the words of one of his closest advisors, sought "to feign flexibility in order to be free to go with the West."⁴³⁹ One of his basic tactics was to outflank his nationalist opponents from the right--for example, by raising claims about the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which he knew the Soviets would find unacceptable, or by talking about how Germany could be reunified not through concessions but through a "policy of strength," a strategy which he probably never took all that seriously himself.⁴⁴⁰

The western governments could scarcely believe how lucky they were that someone like Adenauer was in charge of German policy. Even the British, whose relations with Adenauer were always relatively cool, thought in late 1950 that he was "probably the best chancellor" they could get.⁴⁴¹ The French, whatever their difficulties with Adenauer on day-to-day issues, were from the outset delighted that he was at the helm in Bonn.⁴⁴² The U.S. government quickly came to see him as indispensable. As Eisenhower put it in October 1953, "our whole political program in Europe" was based on "Adenauer's continuance in power."⁴⁴³ In 1955, the president referred to him as the West's "ace in the hole."⁴⁴⁴ The western countries had to do everything they could to keep him in office, especially since the alternative in the early 1950s, a Socialist government led by the highly nationalistic Kurt Schumacher, was seen as so appalling.⁴⁴⁵ If left to themselves, the Germans might well opt for what was viewed as the wrong sort of policy. They might be attracted to some kind of reunification-cum-neutralization deal. But Adenauer as chancellor could tip the balance in the other direction. Therefore Adenauer had to be supported.

Adenauer, of course, wanted the western powers to see him as an indispensable partner. He knew that their confidence in him was his single greatest domestic political asset and he did everything he could to cultivate it.⁴⁴⁶ So he told the western governments what he knew they wanted to hear. When dealing with the Americans, he emphasized the importance of U.S. leadership, of America as a "preceptor" who would exercise a "guiding hand" in Europe.⁴⁴⁷ When dealing with the French, as early as 1945, the "Rhenish," anti-Prussian and even anti-Berlin themes were given freer play--real views, but probably expressed in rather exaggerated terms, and which became milder from 1946 on.⁴⁴⁸ When dealing with the allies in general, he and his assistants often stressed how important it was that he stay in power. In July 1954, for example, Adenauer "dwelt upon the fact" that the "whole responsibility" for the pro-western policy rested "on his old shoulders." He "foresaw nothing but trouble if he should die." In his view, "it would be a long time before the Western powers found another German political figure" who would pursue such a pro-western policy. He had gone much further in this direction "than the German people were prepared to go of their own inclination." If his policies were discredited, there would be "an inevitable drift towards a more independent policy and Germany's traditional interest in the East."⁴⁴⁹

In the 1950s, the western governments agreed that Adenauer had to be kept in power, and the Americans in particular were determined to give him what he needed to remain at the helm in Germany. Dulles, for instance, actually intervened in the German national elections in 1953, warning of disastrous consequences if Adenauer was not returned to power; one German politician claimed that this intervention brought Adenauer a million votes.⁴⁵⁰ In mid-1954, the State Department was worried that with the impending collapse of the EDC, "Adenauer would be discredited and the Germans might adopt a more 'Germanic' attitude favoring independent action and playing off East against West." So when the German government at this point asked for a public statement that the return of Germany's political rights would not be further delayed--something, it pointed out, which Adenauer needed in connection with forthcoming elections in North Rhine-Westphalia--that statement was issued the very same day.⁴⁵¹ But it was not just that the western countries felt they had to make concessions in order to keep Adenauer in power. What was going on also had a more positive side: with Adenauer in charge of German policy, the western powers felt more comfortable about treating the Federal Republic as a full, or nearly full, partner.

And indeed the period from 1953 to 1955 saw a certain easing of the West's German policy. The Americans were coming to feel that the fundamental problem could not be finessed forever. As an important State Department paper pointed out in September 1953, the "demand for unification" was "the primary issue in Germany, which neither Adenauer nor the Western Powers could openly oppose without grave risk of alienating German public sentiment. In these circumstances, the tactics adopted by the West in the past may be no longer adequate."⁴⁵² By early 1955, there was an even stronger sense that the western countries needed to take the reunification issue seriously. Western policy on this question had so far been "like a promissory note on which, thanks to the Russians, we have never yet had to make payment." But one could not be sure that this situation would last forever, and in order to avoid losing the Germans, one had start thinking about what western policy should be if reunification became "a real possibility."⁴⁵³

To Dulles, it was obvious that the USSR was not simply going to hand over East Germany without getting anything in return. If the western countries were serious about reunification, they had to be prepared to offer the Russians offered something real. There would need to be some kind of "security agreement," the heart of which would be an arrangement to control the level and nature of German armament. The Soviets would have to be allowed to play a key role in such a system. As Dulles pointed out in 1955, reunification "would be impossible unless it was achieved under some sort of international control in which the Soviet Union would have a voice. The Soviets would never simply throw East Germany into the pot to be added to West Germany and the united Germany to be further rearmed against the Soviet Union itself." If the level of German armament was to be controlled by the western powers alone, he said, if the West was simply to reject as a matter of principle the very idea of European security arrangements, "we might just as well give up all hope of unifying Germany."⁴⁵⁴

British and French attitudes were moving in the same direction. The professional diplomats at the Quai d'Orsay and in the Foreign Office might have been perfectly happy with the status quo, but the top political leadership in Britain and France viewed the question somewhat differently. The public pressure to pursue détente was a major factor in both of those countries.⁴⁵⁵ For Bidault, back in office in 1953 as foreign minister, what this meant was that the western governments had to go through a kind of charade.⁴⁵⁶ But in 1954 Mendès was ready to take a fresh look at the whole complex of problems relating to Germany, Russia and European security. Perhaps the controls outlined in the WEU Treaty could somehow be extended into some kind of all-European security system; maybe a general settlement could be worked out on that basis.⁴⁵⁷ Churchill also thought the problem of a negotiated settlement had to be taken seriously, and in 1953 began to push actively for talks with the Russians.⁴⁵⁸ Churchill's interest in détente was rooted in what was going on in the nuclear area, especially the coming of thermonuclear weapons. Dulles was also worried about the implications of the thermonuclear revolution, and in late 1953 began talking about the need for a "spectacular effort to relax world tensions on a global basis."⁴⁵⁹

Adenauer's views were also beginning to soften. In 1953 and again in 1955 he urged the western powers to seize the initiative in pressing for negotiations. The plan was for the West to propose reunification in the framework of a European security system, with a special military status for eastern Germany and adjacent areas as well.⁴⁶⁰ Adenauer's closest advisor, Herbert Blankenhorn, explained that the plan was essentially a tactical move designed to improve Adenauer's position in the forthcoming elections.⁴⁶¹ Domestic political considerations continued to play an important role in Adenauer's thinking when the issue came up again in 1955.⁴⁶² Yet it seems that Adenauer, especially in 1955, was not just going through the motions for internal political purposes. The chancellor's domestic political situation had improved dramatically as a result of the 1953 elections and he was no longer so worried about nationalist opposition at home.⁴⁶³ But his position had become more flexible by 1955, and German tactics that year were very different from what they had been in the past. In 1951 and 1952, Adenauer had raised issues like the Oder-Neisse line with the goal of sabotaging negotiations. But now he and his government secretly made it clear to the Americans that they were prepared to make major concessions--to accept the Oder-Neisse line and the demilitarization of eastern Germany, and to include the WEU limits on German military strength in the settlement with the USSR--if negotiations were productive and a real agreement on reunification seemed within reach.⁴⁶⁴

The Americans now also hoped for an agreement and Dulles thought some arrangement might actually be negotiable.⁴⁶⁵ There would be a European security system--that is, German military power would be subject to outside control. The Americans were also beginning to be attracted to the idea of a disengagement agreement and the reunification of Germany outside of NATO. In Dulles's new view, a strong NATO was not "essential as a deterrent to war," and he was open to the idea of a "reunified Germany, friendly to the West," but not formally part of the western alliance. The best solution was still to keep a united Germany in western institutions like NATO and WEU, but if a reunified Germany remained outside as a pro-western "neutral," NATO strategy could be readjusted to deal with that situation.⁴⁶⁶ The Soviets would also be offered certain far-reaching juridical guarantees. The western powers would promise to come to the aid of the USSR if she were attacked by Germany. This "undertaking by the United States to engage itself on the side of the Soviet Union in the event of a war in Europe" was, to Dulles's mind, a very important concession, and he wanted to hold it in reserve until it was really needed. "We did not wish to cheapen such a momentous decision," he said, "by pressing it upon the Soviets even before they had asked for it."⁴⁶⁷ The United States was by this point taking the idea of a negotiated settlement very seriously indeed. In 1951 and 1952, the western governments had adopted an obstructionist strategy, but by 1955 U.S. tactics were designed to maximize the chance of a successful outcome.

All of this reflected a major shift in official American thinking. Dulles's inclination at this point to accept a formally neutralized, reunified Germany was the most remarkable aspect of the new policy. The Americans were now evidently willing to go a good deal further than they had been in 1953. And in 1953 policy was more flexible than it had been around 1951. By 1953 western policy makers had concluded that a reunified Germany should have the right to choose whether to ally with the West, the East, or remain neutral; the western powers were no longer insisting that the reunified state would have to remain in NATO, although they calculated that the Germans would probably maintain their alliance with the West if they were free to make that choice. But now in 1955 Dulles was inclined to go much further, and felt that the West could in the final analysis accept the Soviet condition that the reunified Germany would have to stay out of NATO, whether she wanted to be part of that alliance or not.

This, of course, marked a sharp break with prior American policy. Under Acheson, and in the early Eisenhower period as well, the very idea of a neutralization of Germany had been considered entirely out of the question. America could "hardly tolerate a neutralized Germany," Eisenhower's national security advisor said in 1953. In 1954, Bedell Smith, now Under Secretary of State, argued along similar lines. And in late 1954, Dulles had been livid when he had mistakenly thought that Mendès France favored the idea of a neutralized Germany, reunified on the basis of free elections. But now, just a few months later, he himself embraced this kind of approach, and public statements were beginning to reflect the new American thinking.⁴⁶⁸

Dulles's goal was to accommodate German national feeling, but his flirtation with the neutralization idea upset Adenauer and strained U.S.-German relations. After all Adenauer had done to bring Germany into the West, the Americans were now getting ready to cast Germany out of NATO, to put German security at risk, to side with his political opponents at home--and all this without any real consultation with his government. For years the Americans had taken the line that neutralization would be a disaster, and now, all of a sudden, they seemed to be taking the opposite position. How could you trust people like that? And yet in the current system Germany was supposed to remain absolutely dependent on the United States for her security.⁴⁶⁹

The new policy thus led to serious problems with one of America's most important allies, but it did not bring a real settlement with the Soviet Union any closer. Dulles had calculated that going the extra mile might well make a basic settlement possible, but he had been too optimistic. The USSR was simply not interested in the sort of arrangement Dulles had in mind. Even in 1952, the Soviets had not really favored a reunification-cum-neutralization deal. The huge American military buildup decided on at the end of 1950 had had a major impact on the strategic balance, and the Soviets in 1952 had been deeply concerned by what the Americans were now saying and doing--especially by all the talk about rollback and having it out with the Russians before it was too late.⁴⁷⁰ In such circumstances, the old Soviet policy of exploiting the divisions between Germany and the western powers--of developing the "contradictions" within the capitalist camp--still had a certain appeal. The Soviets felt they should try to get whatever mileage they could out of an appeal to German nationalism--as long as they were confident that they would never have to make good on that policy.

As it became clear, however, that the belligerent rhetoric about rollback and liberation was not really being translated into effective policy, Soviet concerns subsided, and the Russians lost whatever interest they had in playing the German card. Indeed, one is struck by how quickly, even in 1952, proposals designed to appeal to German nationalist feeling were superseded by references to the Potsdam agreement and to the principle of four-power control.⁴⁷¹ By 1954, Soviet appeals to German national feeling had become a mere propaganda exercise, and not a particularly effective one at that. Publicly, at the Berlin foreign ministers' conference in February of that year, Molotov, for example, condemned the Versailles system of 1919 as an "instrument of oppression," and said it had led to war. But when he met with Dulles privately, he laid out the real Soviet view. The problem with Versailles, he said, was that it had not been enforced, and he called for reunification under quadripartite control. His assumption was that the four victor powers had a common interest in keeping Germany down.⁴⁷² By 1955, it was obvious that the Soviets were simply not interested in the reestablishment of a strong, reunified and fully sovereign German state, free of foreign troops and able to chart its own course in international affairs. A divided Germany, with the Federal Republic locked into the western system, dependent on powers who were comfortable with the status quo and whose fundamental interest was the maintenance of peace--this was clearly a much better solution from the Soviet point of view than a reunified Germany free of great power control.