Afghanistan Aff



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EU Rel- I/L


EU Relations are vital- america’s most feasible partner
Grare 8 ( Frederick- Carnegie endowment for international peace staff, Centre for International Government Innovation, Feb , working paper 28) ET

The United States is the most important partner for the European Union. The EU, in turn, is the most important organization in the world to which the United States does not belong. In terms of values and interests, economic interactions and human bonds, the EU and the U.S. are closer to one another than either is to any other major international actor. The U.S.-EU relationship is among the most complex and multi-layered economic, diplomatic, societal and security relationship that either partner has, especially if it is seen to encompass the relationships the U.S maintains with the EU’s 27 member states as well as its Brussels-based institutions. The networks of interdependence across the Atlantic have become so dense,

in fact, that they transcend “foreign” relations and reach deeply into our societies.




EU Rel Good- Bioterrorism


And, a strong EU-US alliance is key to preventing bioterrorism – an attack equivalent to nuclear war
Hamilton 9 (Daniel- prof of law @ u of Illinois-Champagne, Feb 9, Atlantic Council of the US, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/bin/i/y/nato_report_final.pdf )ET

Biosecurity is perhaps the most dramatic example of the changing challenges we face. Bioterrorism is a first-order strategic threat to the transatlantic community, and yet neither our health nor our security systems are prepared for intentional attacks of infectious disease. Homeland security approaches that focus on guards, gates and guns have little relevance to this type of challenge. A bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and international responses. Unless we forge new health security alliances and take other measures, an attack of mass lethality is not a matter of whether, but when. A great challenge of our century is to prevent the deliberate use of disease as a weapon from killing millions, destabilizing economies and disrupting societies. The grand security opportunity of our century is to eliminate massively lethal epidemics of infectious disease by ensuring that biodefense – humankind’s ageless struggle to prevent and defeat disease – is far more potent than attempts to create and deploy bio agents of mass lethality.10 This example underscores the need for the United States, Canada and European partners to advance a multidimensional strategy of societal resilience that goes beyond “homeland” security and relies not just on traditional tools but also on new forms of diplomatic, intelligence, counterterrorism, financial, economic and law enforcement cooperation; customs, air and seaport security; equivalent standards for data protection and information exchange; biodefense and critical infrastructure protection. It needs to begin with the transatlantic community, not only because European societies are so inextricably intertwined, but because no two continents are as deeply connected as the two sides of the North Atlantic. Our ultimate goal should be a resilient Euro-Atlantic area of freedom, security and justice that balances mobility and civil liberties with societal security.11 Such efforts, in turn, can serve as the core of more effective global measures. Europeans and Americans share a keen interest in building the societal resilience of other nations, since strong homeland security efforts in one country may mean little if neighboring systems are weak. In fact, 20th century concepts of “forward defense” should be supplemented by the broader notion of “forward resilience.” Elements of this initiative will need to be conducted bilaterally, and much of it through invigorated channels between North America and the EU, but other mechanisms and organizations, including NATO, can offer support in specific areas, as we outline later.

EU Rel Good- NATO (1/2)


Lack of European orientation makes Balkan crisis and the collapse of NATO inevitable
Kober  8 (Stanley Kober, Ph.D., is a research fellow in foreign policy at the Cato Institute “Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s New Troubles,”http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/ pa-608.pdf) ET

But as NATO has expanded, Russia’s relations with China, in particular, have grown apace, leading initially to the formation of the Shanghai Five and then to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes— in addition to Russia and China—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as full members, and India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan as observer members. In other words, just as the Triple Entente gradually emerged in opposition to the Triple Alliance, so the SCO seems to be emerging in response to NATO expansion. And just as the Triple Entente insisted, at least in public, that it was not an alliance, so do the members of the SCO. But the membership of the SCO does not overlap with NATO, just as the membership of the Triple Alliance did not overlap with the Triple Entente, and SCO members conduct military exercises together just as NATO countries do.57 In short, the world is in danger of dividing just as Europe divided a century ago—a process that should have been foreseen by those who naively thought other countries would not respond to NATO expansion by taking their own corresponding measures.


If Turkey’s confidence in NATO’s guarantees were shaken, it could easily nuclearize

TERTRAIS 8 (Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), DECEMBER “The Middle East’s Next Nuclear State” Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, December 6/20 http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2008/Dec/tertraisDec08.pdf) TBC

Like most Arab countries, Turkey has announced its intention to restart its civilian nuclear program. It already has a very significant nuclear infrastructure. Its main research center (Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center) has two modern (1986) pilot installations for conversion and fuel fabrication.[51] The involvement of several Turkish firms in the AQ Khan network indicates that there is industrial know-how in the country which could be of use to a uranium enrichment program. However, Ankara claims to be uninterested by enrichment.[52] The country operates two research reactors: a light-water 5 MWth reactor;[53] and a small Triga Mark- II unit, which is being converted to operated on LEU.[54] It also has a small waste treatment facility (Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility). Scientists have made computer simulations of reprocessing with the Purex process.[55] Generally speaking, nuclear science and technology is very active in the country. Also, Turkey is one of the only States in the region to have started setting up the regulatory mechanisms needed for larger-scale nuclear programs, under the aegis of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK). Turkey is moderately worried about the Iranian nuclear program. It has generally good relations with its neighbor. It is covered by a formal nuclear guarantee, backed by a multilateral alliance, and has nuclear weapons on its territory (including for use by Turkish aircraft). However, Ankara may be losing its sense of confidence about NATO. At two occasions—1991 and 2003—its allies were perceived as hesitant to fulfill their security commitments. The new generation of Turkish officers do not trust NATO as much as the previous one.[56] In addition, political relations with the West have become more difficult because of Iraq, controversy about the 1915 events, and a European reluctance to give a clear perspective for entry into the European Union. Turkish public opinion has an extremely negative view of the United States.[57] (It is also opposed to the continued stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons.)[58] Ankara’s perception of the Western security guarantee will be a key for its future nuclear choices.[59] The military option would be an extreme one: a choice in that direction would require a deepening of the crisis in confidence with both the United States and Europe. Additionally, domestic power games may come into play: a nuclear program might be a way to consolidate the place of the military in the political decision-making process. Defiance vis-à-vis Iran is stronger in the so-called “kemalist” circles





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