Peirce 1 (Neal, “Can’t win war on terror fighting a war on drugs”, November 4, Houston Chronicle, http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1104-07.htm, date accessed: 6/23/2010) AK
If we expect to win the war on terrorism, we have to call off the war on drugs. There are three reasons: We can't afford both. The drug war feeds terrorist networks and diverts law enforcement from focusing on immense new perils. The drug war was failing anyway. If we want to reduce drug dependency and the crime associated with it, then intensive treatment programs will be far more effective. Sadly, official Washington isn't admitting any of these truths. House Speaker Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., has gone so far as to declare that "by going after the illegal drug trade, we reduce the ability of terrorists to launch attacks against the United States." First flaw in the argument: If our primary goal is Osama bin Laden and his Middle East-based network, choking off drug demand here (even if we could) wouldn't help much. Virtually all the heroin flowing out of Afghanistan goes to Europe, not the United States. But there's a larger flaw: What makes America's drug market so lucrative to suppliers in Latin America and elsewhere is our efforts to keep it illegal. Black markets always generate huge profits and networks of brutal, underground operators. Ties to terrorists are inevitable. "We have spent a half-trillion dollars on the drug war since 1990 and we are less safe and less healthy than ever," says Kevin Zeese, president of Common Sense for Drug Policy and long-term opponent of the prevailing national policy. Zeese, like most reformers, favors a legally controlled market that would focus on treatment and remove the hyperprofits of today's illegal trade. He charges the drug war actually "blinded our government to terrorism," citing reports in Boston news media that FBI agents in the '90s actually apprehended Raed Hijazi, an admitted al-Qaida member. Hijazi, according to the reports, provided the agents with information on the Boston area terrorist cell later involved with the Sept. 11 hijackings. But the FBI was reportedly interested only in information Hijazi had on heroin trafficking. Such incidents suggest that even if our federal, state and local governments found enough cash to fight a simultaneous war on drugs and war on terrorism, split agendas could mean that we end up losing both struggles. In a contorted way, one can argue America could "afford" to lose the war on drugs. Through the 1990s, times were good, government budgets sufficiently elastic, and the criminal justice system was kept busy. City neighborhoods may have been devastated, but there was little political outcry because the millions who got incarcerated tended to be politically less potent -- the poor and minorities. But terrorism is different. It's not some social choice (alcohol is OK, marijuana or crack get you prison, etc.). Rather, terrorism is a grim, undeniable force. Fed by global poverty and religious extremism, it could well be the most frightening, multifaceted threat to the lives, homes, cities and livelihoods of Americans since the Civil War. The harsh fact -- especially for state and local governments -- is that resources are finite. Every cop who isn't chasing a kid selling cocaine on a city street is a cop who could be guarding a subway station, a stadium or public plaza. Every detective not tied up in drug cases can be checking leads on potential assaults on city water reservoirs or local power stations. "Every dollar spent intercepting cocaine, heroin or marijuana," suggests Zeese, "is a dollar that could be spent intercepting bombs." Or take the federal Drug Enforcement Administration. Every DEA agent who isn't involved in a futile effort to stop an easily replaceable drug shipment from entering the United States can be investigating terrorist cells or working to prevent bioterrorism or nuclear terrorism. Yes, nuclear terrorism, which almost surely will be tried against us in the coming years. It is time to get serious, and deal with dire threats first. Instinctively, some federal agencies are shifting already. The FBI has changed its focus to terrorism. The Coast Guard has reportedly switched close to three-fourths of its personnel and boats from drug interdiction to antiterrorist patrols. Sharp moves in priority are also reported at the Customs Service, Public Health Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. But until weflip our drug policy, putting prevention and treatment first, and stop pursuing the millions of drug users in our own population, we'll have neither the resources nor the focus to pursue the very real terrorist threat that we face.
**SOLVENCY**
The DEA and US military are the backbone of the drug war- removing theme ends it Soldier of Fortune 10 (http://www.sofmag.com/wp/2010/06/marines-dea-afghan-police-nab-drug-kingpin-in-early-morning-raid/, date accessed: 6/23/2010) AK
Four other simultaneous hits in Marjah, the DEA, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment and the Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan netted other high-value targets and seized narcotics, weapons and explosives as evidence. The evidence was substantial against the primary target, and six other men arrested during the raids. Approximately 2,344 kilograms of opium, 16 kilograms of heroin, 27 kilograms of morphine, 5 kilograms of suspected methamphetamine, 3 kilograms of hash, 5 kilograms of poppy seeds, 65 kilograms of marijuana seeds, 502 pounds of homemade explosives, more than two tons of ammonium chloride, other HME making chemicals and weapons and cash were seized as evidence. For two months, DEA special agents from the Kabul Country Office Strike Force partnered with investigators from the Afghan Ministry of Interior’s Counter Narcotic Police Sensitive Investigative Unit to build solid cases against multiple terrorist and drug traffickers in Marjah. Confidential informants, made several buys under surveillance to secure evidence to arrest and indict the narco-terrorist suspects. The DEA and their confidential sources were gathering intelligence in Marjah prior to the Feb. 13, Operation Moshtarak push to clear the area of Taliban insurgency by Marines of Regimental Combat Team 7 in the fertile, opium-growing belt of the Helmand River Valley. Leading up to the February clearing mission, DEA informants identified 21 pages worth of IED emplacements, Taliban commanders and their headquarters, and pinpointed other threats that the DEA shared with the Marines and the intelligence community. The information was found to be very helpful in avoiding IEDs, according to a DEA special agent. “I think it’s good. The DEA is getting the intel to prosecute targets on opium producers and distributors. We all know they are linked to the Taliban or are Taliban,” said Staff Sgt. Stephen Vallejo, platoon sergeant, 2nd Plt., Alpha Company, 1/6. “That gives us the foot in the door to prosecute guys in our AO (area of operation) that we really wouldn’t know about,” added the 28-year-old from Kansas City, Kan. The Taliban and drug trafficking have long been connected. The Taliban uses the rich and illicit poppy growing fields in Helmand province to fund the insurgency through the profits from the byproduct of poppy opium. Local farmers have long grown the crop because they have been forced to, and because it has proven to be the best way to take care of their family, though be it illegal, explained a DEA agent. It was Vallejo’s company who led the foot patrol, from Patrol Base Littlefoot, under the cover of darkness, to the primary target’s compound where informants said they could find the Taliban high-value drug kingpin. Combined with the Marine patrol were two DEA Special Agents; one was the case leader on the entire case from the DEA’s Kabul Country Office Strike Force, and one special agent from the Foreign Advisory Support Team and a team of Afghan Counter Narcotic Police National Interdiction Unit. A Marine dog handler and his patrol drug-detection canine helped complete the search of the compound. The team of Afghan NIU agents armed with automatic weapons, search-and-arrest warrants led the forced entry in to the compound. The DEA and Marine dog handler and his canine followed directly behind them. The rest of the Marines from Alpha Company surrounded and secured the outside of the compound, and was ready to provide additional firepower if DEA and NIU required assistance inside. Soon after the NIU team entered the compound, a bearded man confronted them. He initially resisted the commands to surrender. While the NIU attempted to detain the man, the DEA agents and dog handler and his dog went building to building clearing each room and possible hiding spots for Taliban fighters. Still unaccounted for was the primary target. Credible sources reported he had spent the night in the compound. With one detainee secured, the NIU and DEA and the Marine canine team continued to search and clear into the main living area of the compound through a second entrance. Because women and children were present the Afghans took the lead in the main living area. They were quickly whisked into a separate room because of cultural sensitivities and the search continued. Moments later radio chatter from the 1/6 Marines from first squad, who were securing the perimeter, said they had detained a man who attempted to flee the compound. The quick action of the Marines had secured the DEA’s most wanted man in Marjah. With flexi cuffs on, the man was turned over to the NIU, who brought him back into the compound and continued to search for evidence and drugs. “They definitely see the value in the rule of law for the country,” said one of the DEA F.A.S.T. special agents, who wished to remain anonymous due to the nature of undercover work he does. “The reason I’m doing this, is you know the drug traffickers and the Taliban are both connected. The Taliban are getting their financing from the drugs,” said a special investigator with the SIU. “The case worked. We arrested the guys and got the seizure.” “This is all task and purpose,” said Sgt. Patrick Main, 1st Squad Leader, 2nd Platoon, 1/6. “If we’ve got to set a cordon [perimeter] for the DEA, or another squad, or ourselves, it’s pretty much the same.” Main underplayed the importance of their part of the mission because his Marines’ cordon nabbed the primary target as he attempted to escape. This was a joint operation with Marine forces, explained the Afghan special investigator through a translator.
