Afghanistan Aff



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DEA/US K2 WOD



The DEA & US military are key to the war effort

Braun 9 (Michael, http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/05/counter_narco-terrorism_succes.php, date accessed: 6/23/2010) AK

BC Nightly News reported yesterday evening (May 4, 2009) on a successful counter narco-terrorism operation involving U.S. Army Special Forces working shoulder-to-shoulder with a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Team (FAST), Afghan Army Commandos and Counter-Narcotics Police/Afghanistan (CNPA) officers. Notice that I used the term 'counter narco-terrorism operation' rather than 'counter-narcotics operation', because in Afghan virtually every aspect of the drug trade is unequivocally linked to the Taliban and the insurgency. I've reported before on a 2002 study by Professor James Fearon of Stanford University, which clearly paints an accurate picture of the important role the opium and heroin trade plays in the success, or failure, of the Taliban. Dr. Fearon studied 128 insurgencies and civil wars from 1945 to 2000 and found that they lasted on average about 8.5 years as I recall. He found that 17 of the 128 lasted about five times longer than the other 111, somewhere between 40 to 50 years. The common thread among the 17 was that anti-government forces all generated contraband revenue, most often through their involvement in one or more aspects of the global drug trade. The estimates of just how much contraband revenue the Taliban generates from their involvement in the Afghan based opium and heroin trade varies widely, but falls somewhere between $100 million to $500 million dollars annually. The reality of the situation is that figure could be even greater. The bottom line: we are not getting out of Afghanistan until we defeat the Taliban or bring them to a negotiated peace; and we will not defeat the Taliban or bring them to the peace table until we get the narcotics trade in check in Afghanistan. So how do we fight 21st century warfare in Afghanistan, the quintessential example of aymetric warfare, and win? It can be witnessed in the NBC Nightly New episode last evening. The raid started out as a bust, but quickly turned into a resounding success when the narcotics agents, both DEA and Afghan, persisted with thier search and found over three tons of morphine base buried behind one of the compounds that was identified by a DEA source of information. Our military are not the experts when it comes to counter-narcotics or counter narco-terrorism operations designed to identify and bring to justice those responsible for the opium and heroin trade in Afghanistan, or anywhere else for that matter. Nor should they be; they've got more than enough on their plate. However, U.S. Special Forces, the experts in fighting unconventional warfare, teamed with DEA Special Agents who our Special Forces have trained, make up a very formidable force that can, when coupled with our Afghan partners, significantly contribute to defeating the Taliban. These joint teams have reportedly been involved in a number of operations over the past few months similar to the one covered by last evening's NBC Nightly News episode. Large caches of drugs and clandestine laboratories have been destroyed as a result of the raids, and large caches of weapons, including suicide vests and IED bomb making materials, have also been located right along side the drugs. I've also read that over 60 Taliban have been killed while defending these locations. What is not being reported is that the DEA Special Agents and their partners are undoubtedly collecting tremendous evidence that will certainly lead to complex criminal drug conspiracy indictments in the United States and in Afghanistan. Those responsible for this activity will ultimtley pay a steep price, if they haven't already paid with their lives. I couldn't help but notice the determination etched on the faces of the DEA Special Agents in the video, something I witnessed many times over the 23 years I spent in the Agency. They were on the hunt, and hunting is what DEA Special Agents live for, whether they're searching for a drug cache ouside Kabul, Afghanistan, or taking down a methamphetamine laboratory outside Cabool, Missouri. This is what DEA brings to our warfighters in Afghanistan, subject matter experts who possess a unique tradecraft honed by many years of success at identifying and dismantleing the world's most notorious drug trafficking cartels from top to bottom. The DEA cannot operate in Afghanistan without the support of our U.S. Military, and our military will not succeed unless they take on the narcotics trade in a meaningful way. It looks to me like we're headed in the right direction.

A2: SQUO Solves


Squo is failing
Sullivan 9 ( Andrew, Van Hoffman Award Nominee, 27-Mar., The Atlantic, http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/03/the-drug-war-and-afghanistan.html ) ET

What to do about the opium flowing out of Afghanistan has always been a knotty element of US policy regarding Afghanistan. How much of a priority should it be? (Simply put, if you attack the the opium trade, warlords and locals get pissed off and join or support the other side.) Asked about the priority of drug fighting in the Afghanistan review, Holbrooke, as he was leaving the briefing, said "We're going to have to rethink the drug problem." That was interesting. He went on: "a complete rethink." He noted that the policymakers who had worked on the Afghanistan review "didn't come to a firm, final conclusion" on the opium question. "It's just so damn complicated," Holbrooke explained. Did that mean that the opium eradication efforts in Afghanistan should be canned? "You can't eliminate the whole eradication program," he exclaimed. But that remark did make it seem that he backed an easing up of some sort. "You have to put more emphasis on the agricultural sector," he added.


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