Afghanistan wave 4
AT: Nationalism means COIN will fail
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- Afghanis don’t dislike actual US military presence O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10
- . Yes, we have squandered much of that good will, but by virtue of doing our job badly, not by virtue of our very presence
AT: Nationalism means COIN will failCOIN can win hearts and minds – Afghanistan’s history of repelling invaders ignores the development efforts of US forces O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10- Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues, and Hassina Sherjan, president of Aid Afghanistan for education, (2010, “Toughening it out in Afghanistan,” p. 61-62) CRITICISM 1: Afghans Always Hate, and Defeat Invaders This allegation is based largely on Afghanistan's long history of being at the crossroads of human movement and conflict and, more specifically, on its ability to defeat British forces in the nineteenth century and Soviet forces in the 1980s. To be sure, Afghans are worthy warriors; many Americans who have dealt with Iraqis and Afghans in recent years consider the latter to be better natural fighters. But today's international presence in Afghanistan does not amount to an invasion. In contrast to the invaders of the past, today's international effort seeks only to help get Afghans on their feet well enough so that NATO can responsibly leave. The difference between U.S.-NATO goals, and the size and strength of our international coalition, and those of past invaders is stark. This is not meant as a naIve-sounding expression of the goodness of American motives. It is, rather, a fact, documented among other things by the reality that some forty countries are part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan today. Of course, not everyone believes what we say about our motives. Some think we intend to stay a long time; others believe we are not really trying hard to succeed. To the extent that we fail in the effort, our motives will surely continue to be doubted, and support for our presence will continue to weaken, as has been the case in recent times. But just as in Iraq, if we can successfully convey the sense that we are building up capability now so we can more rapidly and successfully build it down later, we have a chance to gain adequate Afghan support.2 Indeed, for all the reduction in our popularity this decade, the international community is still far more popular in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq when the surge began-and certainly more popular than the Soviets or other previous invaders ever were. Afghanis don’t dislike actual US military presence O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10- Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues, and Hassina Sherjan, president of Aid Afghanistan for education, (2010, “Toughening it out in Afghanistan,” P.62-63) This related charge, voiced in 2008 by none' other than the' British ambassador to Afghanistan himself, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles suggests that Afghans will do better if we leave them to their own devices-perhaps supplying some aid but otherwise strictly limiting our involvement. Cowper-Coles is highly regarded, and his observation must be taken seriously.4 The basis for his argument is that Afghans dislike foreigners enough that our very presence in Afghanistan weakens the Karzai government by association. Because NATO is fighting to help his government, so goes the reasoning, its unpopularity spills over onto him. NATO's reassuring presence may also discourage him from taking tough steps-firing corrupt officials, for example-needed to build a stable country. To be sure, popular anger at NATO has increased greatly over the years; eventually, we may reach a point of no return and no longer be able to win back the support of the Afghan people. But in fact, Afghans do not hate foreigners categorically. NATO was very popular in the war's early going, when it was seen as the agent that had driven the Taliban from power. Yes, we have squandered much of that good will, but by virtue of doing our job badly, not by virtue of our very presence. For all the unpopularity of the United States in Afghanistan, our popularity there is still better than it was in Iraq before the surge, as noted-and far better than it was among Iraqi Sunnis. Indeed, while only 32 percent of Afghans had a favorable opinion of NATO in early 2009, meaning that over 60 percent had a negative opinion, in Iraq only about 20 percent wanted coalition forces to remain in early 2007, and 61 percent of the population (and more than 90 percent of all Sunnis) thought it acceptable to attack NATO forces.' Yet Iraqi Sunnis-those most resistant to the coalition presence-nonetheless came to be our allies and partners in the past three years, as the Anbar Awakening aligned our interests, and more successful American tactics limited the degree of Sunni hatred the United States. This recent lesson suggests that it is often possible to rebuild even a severely strained relationship in a wartime setting-especially if the other party really needs the help. Moreover, July 2009 polls in Afghanistan indicated that U.S. and NATO popularity had returned, at least temporarily, to the 60 percent range, as had Afghans' optimism about the future and their favorability scores for their own president and army (actually the army scored even higher, in the 80 percent range). These numbers have probably sagged since then, because of the disputed presidential race among other problems, but they do suggest that Afghans are not fundamentally opposed to 'the international community's efforts to help them. Nor are they fundamentally pessimistic about the future; in fact, quirt, the contrary. When considering the idea that we simply must leave now, it is important to remember the real options. Afghan security forces are not up to the challenge of protecting their own country now; they are too small, too badly trained, and still too infested with incompetents as well as individuals playing both sides. Looking over the whole eight-year experience in Afghanistan to date, it would seem that the approach of minimizing the role of foreign forces has already been tried and found wanting. In the early years, foreign troops were based only in Kabul, then only in Kabul and the immediate vicinity-and the overall situation deteriorated. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.66 Mb. Share with your friends:
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