nc – at: terrorism – n/u – bomb dogs

The Federal Aviation Administration started its canine explosives detection program in 1972, about the time a police dog named Brandy sniffed out a bomb before it was set to explode on a TWA aircraft that was heading to L.A. from New York. (Alerted to the threat, the plane had returned to JFK, and passengers were removed before Brandy went to work.) The program, now overseen by the TSA, has about 300 teams at airports around the country, double the number deployed before Sept. 11. "The dogs are part of a whole layered deterrence system," says Dave Kontny, coordinator of the TSA bomb-sniffing dog program, "but they do their job really well." Speed, mobility and a high level of accuracy make them important contributors to airport security. They can sniff explosives in minuscule amounts, up to one part per trillion -- which is like being able to find the only black grain in the white sand on Long Beach, Kontny says.

oeBehavior detection is vital to TSAs layered approach to deter, detect, and disrupt individuals who pose a threat to aviation, the TSA said in statement responding to the report. oeLooking for suspicious behavior is a common sense approach used by law enforcement and security personnel across the country and the world.

VIPR searches are typically random and thus are not based on any actual specific threat or criminal activity. So it should come as no surprise that a 2011 Los Angeles Times article revealed (http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/nation/la-na-terror-checkpoints-20111220) that after VIPR teams had conducted thousands of operations, "TSA officials say they have no proof that roving VIPR teams have foiled any terrorist plots or thwarted any major threat to public safety." The TSA now refuses to comment on the effectiveness of VIPR teams to foil terrorist attacks, but it is willing to take credit for deterrence, which presumably is achieved by their mere presence.

Today's operation illustrates the growing cooperation among police departments in States, cities, and towns throughout the northeast with their partners in Amtrak, commuter rail and mass transit systems, and TSA. The deployed police officers will provide a visible security presence, on alert for and ready to investigate suspicious activities and items. Bolstering these efforts are TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams, or VIPR Teams, operating at and around multiple stations in random, unannounced deployments. These teams bring to bear specialized capabilities in monitoring for surveillance, detecting suspicious behaviors, and supporting random security inspections with mobile explosives detection equipment. The main focus of VIPR operations is to deploy TSA resources to augment local security and law enforcement capabilities and foster deterrence through coordinated actions with local transportation entities and law enforcement.

The recent disruption of the terror plot in the United Kingdom and of the developing plot targeting underwater tunnels connecting New York and New Jersey illustrate the necessity of this approach. The best defense is one that prevents the terrorists from ever entering the United States. TSA complements other efforts by creating visible, unpredictable deterrence environments to disrupt terrorists' planning capabilities and operational launching of their missions. For example, our aviation system security measures provide a significant barrier to entry for potential terrorists coming to our country. Our government's investments and improvements in terrorism watch lists, border security and intelligence networks significantly enhance surface transportation security.

Passenger screening at Bellingham International Airport was done by the contract employees before Sept. 11, 2001. The federal Transportation Security Administration was established in November 2001 and given a year to federalize passenger and baggage handling operations at all commercial airports nationwide. At Bellingham, TSA took over security operations this October and implemented new procedures and equipment aimed at making air travel safer. Ann Killian, special agent in charge of TSA operations at the Bellingham airport, said TSA's mission goes beyond making people feel safe. "A lot of security in a lot of areas is visual," Killian said, naming cameras and security guards as examples. "It's for deterrence." But TSA means business.

But even the enthusiastic Mr Ambinder offers a caveat: Will this get every bad guy? No. In Donald Rumsfeld's parlance, it will do a better job of getting the known unknowns, but the unknown unknowns will have to be caught by the rest of the security system, which is sophisticated in some areas and spotty in others, and relies heavily on deterrence. This seems like the right attitude. Even the best conceivable TSA procedures aren't going to catch every potential terrorist. Some of the most important counter-terrorism work happens well before a bomber shows up at the airport. And Jack Bauer-style fantasies aside, it is much better to stop an attack in the planning stages than it is to try to stop it once the plan is already in motion. What do you folks think of the (admittedly vague) new rules? Would you rather see blunt country-based profiling, even if it means a longer wait at security?

The recent shortcomings of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are not passing problems—there is a need for “fundamental” reform within the government agency, according to a panel of security specialists that convened at The Heritage Foundation on Tuesday. Chad Wolf, the former assistant administrator of the TSA, Ha Nguyen, a former adviser at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Brian Finch, an attorney specializing in cybersecurity and government affairs, expressed their concerns at a public forum entitled “Perspectives on the State of the TSA: Exploring Possible Reforms to the Transportation Security Administration.” The panelists spoke about problems with the TSA that have recently come to light, including the recent ABC News report that TSA workers failed to detect fake weapons and explosives at 67 of 70 checkpoints in a recent nationwide test. The TSA has also received criticism after it was discovered last week that 73 airport employees were hired despite their “potential links to terrorism.” During a wide-ranging and energetic discussion, the panel assessed the agency’s capability to respond to sudden threats and improve security for U.S. travelers. At the forefront of the conversation was the need for improved leadership at the administrative level, as well as technical innovation on the ground in our nation’s airports. Get our emails for free. We'll respect your inbox and keep you informed. Sign Up One idea that received notable attention from the panelists was an expansion of the PreCheck program, which streamlines the screening and customs process for low-risk passengers. By expanding trusted traveler programs like PreCheck, the TSA can devote more resources to “unknown” travelers and adopt a broader risk-based approach to security. Another market-based reform with great potential is the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). Following TSA directives, private airport screeners are able to check bags and screen passengers, which has been shown to increase efficiency without sacrificing security. A number of other countries currently use a private-public model, and several U.S. airports have already followed suit. During the presentation and Q&A session, the panelists highlighted a number of other areas where the TSA could pursue reform. A culture of regulation and compliance hampers overall security, due to the fast rate of technical obsolescence in the industry. Regular testing and probes, much like the ones that recently made headlines, are necessary to ensure that screeners can detect new and dynamic threats. The severe failures of the TSA are inexcusable. Reforms that increase efficiency, incentivize innovation over mere compliance, test security outcomes, and expand risk-based security are the immediate solutions for the agency’s troubles.

MANPADS, or man-portable air defense systems, have been described as a growing threat to commercial aviation following the outbreak of Libya’s civil war in early 2011 and subsequent news reports claiming that al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has obtained surface-to-air missiles.[6] Some reports suggest that missiles stolen from Libyan arsenals have spread as far as Niger, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to AQIM, al-Shabab has been known to possess advanced MANPADS, allegedly provided by Eritrea.[7] Given that AQAP maintains ties to al-Shabab and has reportedly taken over multiple military depots in Yemen following the outbreak of civil unrest there,[8] it is not implausible to assume that AQAP could acquire additional MANPADS. There are also reports that the Taliban acquired MANPADS from Iran,[9] making it conceivable that elements of the group sympathetic to al-Qa`ida’s aims could provide al-Qa`ida with MANPADS for a future attack. Although MANPADS are unable to target aircraft at cruising altitudes, commercial aircraft would become vulnerable for several miles while ascending and descending, particularly due to their lack of countermeasure systems. In addition to the MANPAD threat, a significant variety of ranged weapons could be used to target commercial aircraft, particularly when taxiing prior to takeoff or after landing. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), for example, are inaccurate at extended ranges; however, they have been used to shoot down rotary wing aircraft in combat zones, and have been used in at least one plot against El Al aircraft.[10] The Irish Republican Army (IRA) used homemade mortars to attack Heathrow Airport in the 1990s, while heavy anti-material sniper rifles such as the Barrett M82 fire .50 caliber rounds to a range of more than one mile and have been previously used by non-state actors, such as the IRA and the Los Zetas drug cartel.[11]

A potential problem arising from privatization is that the private operator may become overly concerned with the share price to the exclusion of other worthy goals. 153 This concern with share price occurs in all corporations, however, so expressing this doubt as a reason not to privatize calls into question much of the American economy. In a related problem, airport management may be seen as owing a duty to the public at large, although the only way for the public to express their displeasure is by voting with their wallets and finding alternative means of travel. 154 While privatization cannot help but encounter these problems, they are not nearly important enough to prevent the benefits of privatization from accruing. A potential solution to this problem is the continuation of government involvement. When the airports of the UK were privatized, they were still subject to regulations by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for safety and the airspace measures in the same way that an American airport would still be subject to FAA regulations. 155 In addition, the Monopolies and Merger Commission (MMC) were involved to prevent any monopolistic behavior. 156 Further, the CAA and MMC "review the private company's commercial policies as part of the five-year reviews and could require changes." 157 A private operator would also be subject to the reporting requirements of the SEC, IRS, and other financial watchdogs, so concern about the potential abuse of monopolistic ability and the misalignment of corporate profits and public good should fall short of erasing the benefits of privatization.

Now, I think we can all agree that we don’t want airport security run like a retail store or a restaurant. Nevertheless, you would think that nearly triple the compensation should result in way better job performance than a 95% failure rate. And you’d be right; it should. There’s simply no excuse for it. Clearly, the agency is not starved for funds. And that comparison sort of leads us to the obvious question many have asked: why don’t we just privatize TSA so it can operate more efficiently, like a private company? While I’m all for that – I think most government agencies should be privatized – there’s still one big problem: Washington. No matter who’s doing the work, TSA reports to HSA, HSA reports to the executive branch, and they’re all supposed to be overseen by Congress. And how well has that been working for us lately? That’s right, not very. There’s way too much bureaucracy, politics, political correctness, cronyism and corruption, and no real accountability.

Former Department of Transportation IG criticized hiring and pay practices of private contractors. In a September 19, 2001, Cincinnati Enquirer article, Mary Schiavo, the former inspector general for the U.S. Department of Transportation who oversaw two audits critical of FAA airport security standards, criticized the hiring and pay practices of private airport security providers. The Enquirer reported: At the local airport, like all domestic facilities, the tenant airlines are responsible for providing security checks for passengers, according to FAA regulations. The main local contract is through Delta, but Argenbright also supplies passenger screening services to United Airlines here. Critics say this system is at the root of many security problems. Most if not all airlines have turned to outside contractors for those services, and many of the jobs -- including screening positions -- pay wages at or just above minimum wage. "Isn't it awfully obvious now that airline and airport security is also national security?" said Mary Schiavo, former inspector general for the U.S. Department of Transportation who oversaw two audits critical of FAA airport security standards. "And we're entrusting that security to someone who makes $6 an hour watching the X-ray machine 'cause of a system that rewards the lowest bidder."

This seems to be a result of a fundamental misunderstanding of the economic incentives involved here, combined with magical thinking that a market solution solves all. In airport screening, the passenger isn't the customer. (Technically he is, but only indirectly.) The airline isn't even the customer. The customer is the U.S. government, which is in the grip of an irrational fear of terrorism. It doesn't matter if an airport screener receives a paycheck signed by the Department of the Treasury or Private Airport Screening Services, Inc. As long as a terrorized government -- one that needs to be seen by voters as "tough on terror" and wants to stop every terrorist attack, regardless of the cost, and is willing to sacrifice all for the illusion of security -- gets to set the security standards, we're going to get TSA-style security. We can put the airlines, either directly or via airport fees, in charge of security, but that has problems in the other direction. Airlines don't really care about terrorism; it's rare, the costs to the airline are relatively small (remember that the government bailed the industry out after 9/11), and the rest of the costs are externalities and are borne by other people. So if airlines are in charge, we're likely to get less security than makes sense.

Airport security was private, you may recall, before the 9/11 attacks. It was also a sieve, characterized by screeners' low pay, poor morale and astronomical turnover rates — all driven by the relentless airline industry cost cutting that fliers know so well. The TSA was formed after 9/11 to make airport security everything it wasn't: strict, uniform and professional. It's still not there, but it's far better than what it replaced. At Republican insistence, the law creating TSA allowed airports, after a waiting period, to contract with private firms for screeners. Sixteen airports now do so, under TSA oversight, and Orlando's second-busiest airport is headed in that direction. Mica is pressing more to take that route. But to what end? The alluring idea is that the private sector is more efficient; often it is, but not in this instance. Studies conducted by the TSA and, yes, a private contractor, found the costs for private screeners are as much as 17% higher. Scans and pat-downs are still required. Government screening and compensation rules still apply. Taxpayers pick up the tab. Travelers bear the risk of a return to pre-9/11 insecurity. It's about as sensible as having the FBI outsource law enforcement.