***SOLVENCY
1nc – uniformity
Regs maintain uniformity
Lipinski 4 – US House of Representatives from IL (William Lipinski, 4/22/4, “ HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen
I am not claiming that there aren't improvements to be made by the TSA when it comes to hiring, staffing, and the training of screeners. Understaffing at security checkpoints is noticed at many airports, including one in my own district at Midway. TSA has been urged to uphold a sufficient staffing level at all airports. Unfortunately, this goal so far has not been reached. From what I understand of the preliminary data of the GAO audit on the private screening contractors, it states, "The flexibility that TSA has given private screening contractors in implementing airport specific practices has enabled them to achieve some efficiencies." I understand that the TSA is looking to granting similar freedoms and flexibilities to federal security directors at federal airports. And, therefore, those airports could also have significant efficiency improvement. Again, I reiterate that the congressional intent behind the TSA was establishing a uniform level of security. Therefore, I do not believe that the PP5 airports should be granted more flexibility than federal airports.
More ev
Tauscher 4 – US House of Representatives from CA (Ellen Tauscher, 4/22/4, “ HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen
So, whether an airport opts out or in the system, it is imperative that the federal government continue to set uniform security standards for that system, provide strong federal oversight, provide a federal screening workforce where needed, and provide the investment dollars needed to make sure that they can accomplish these goals.
1nc – squo solves
Squo lack of oversight solves modeling
Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen
Private screening contractors at four of the six SPP airports we visited stated that they believed that unnecessary redundancies exist between supervisory TSA and contract screening personnel. For example, contractor officials at one airport said that TSA’s screening managers perform the same responsibilities as the contractor’s supervisors. No TSA personnel were assigned at the remaining two SPP airports that we visited.
1nc – no modeling
Elliott 10 – staff writer at Elliott.org citing TSA officer Ron Moore (Christopher Elliott, 12/4/10, “Ex-TSA officer: “Every new controversy breaks down morale further”,” http://elliott.org/first-person/ex-tsa-officer-every-new-controversy-breaks-down-morale-further/)//twemchen
Why hasn’t privatization caught on? Private companies balked in 2004 because Congress did not grant them a waiver from liability. I honestly don’t know where that issue stands today. It troubles me that companies like Lockheed Martin, who conduct the recertification testing of TSOs, are part of the consortium. Aviation screening policy was dictated by the FAA before 9/11. If screening is privatized it will only the staffing, the uniforms will remain the same, and the policies will be managed by TSA managers. Private companies will have no say in policy, period. So the agency could be downsized into simply an oversight agency but I still think it is an unpredictable landscape for firms and opting-out won’t happen. Kansas City was one of the five airports that remained private as part of a pilot program. Those screeners as private employees had collective bargaining rights. When they voted to unionize, the airport threatened to go federal.
No spillover – they can’t solve the TSA’s bureaucratic culture
Greenfield 12 – (Scott Greenfield, 4/16/12, “Kip Hawley Comes Clean,” http://blog.simplejustice.us/2012/04/16/kip-hawley-comes-clean/)//twemchen
Hawley goes on to explain how we arrived at such a sorry state of affairs, a crisis bred fear. Fear bred a knee-jerk demand for safety, but there was nothing in place to accomplish the security sought. So the government largely made it up, doing what seemed like a good idea at the moment. Today, we attribute the birth and growth of TSA screening methods to venal motives. According to Hawley, it was just plain, old stupidity. They had a problem and no real clue how to solve it. So they just made stuff up that seemed, to a bunch of people who had no real clue, like it ought to work. The procedures then became part of the bureaucratic myth, the internal inertia that once done cannot be undone. It became what they do, and they did it, and we suffered for it. Most fascinating is that the concern wasn’t to seek the input and methodology of security experts, but rather management consultants to speed up the lines. Rather than ask the question, why are we doing this, the primary focus was how can we make people hate us less.
1nc – say no – midway
Midway says no
AirGuide 7 – Pyramid Media Group (11/26/7, “ Airport News - North America,” Lexis)//twemchen
Southwest Airlines is the Midway Airport's largest tenant, had been a strong opponent in the past. Observers noted that its statement regarding the agreement was not a full endorsement of Daley's plan. The LCC said it "welcomes the opportunity to increase our collective knowledge about airport privatization in a manner that hopefully produces a mutually beneficial outcome. We applaud the City of Chicago for carefully exploring the possibility of a potential long-term lease of Midway Airport to a private airport operator." Hochtief AirPort, the airport investment and management unit of the global construction services firm, expects to put in a bid for Midway. Nov 19, 2007 Southwest Airlines, Midway Airport Southwest Airlines reached agreement last week with the City of Chicago that Mayor Richard Daley's office said is "a very big first step" toward its planned privatization of Midway Airport. US legislation enacted in 1996 created a pilot program for five airport privatizations, but under the law a city needs the approval of 65% of an airport's airline tenants in order to use proceeds from a privatization for nonaviation-related purposes, which has been a historical stumbling block. Daley wants to lease Midway to a private operator but his administration still must gain approval from four more airlines to reach the threshold. Nov 19, 2007
Say no
Fruchbom 7 – staff writer at Fortune Magazine (Paul Fruchbom, 2/17/7, “Investors circle Midway Airport,” http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/02/19/8400177/index.htm?postversion=2007021205)//twemchen
After the landmark privatization of the Chicago Skyway, which the city leased to a foreign consortium for $1.8 billion in 2005, similar deals followed. Last year Chicago sold a portfolio of municipal parking lots to Morgan Stanley (Charts) for $563 million. In January the State of Illinois put its lottery, which could fetch as much as $10 billion, on the block. However, Chicago's biggest potential payday may prove to be its most challenging. First there are the political hurdles. Since several potential buyers are foreign companies, the deal could run into the same jingoistic smackdown that killed the sale of five U.S. ports to a Middle Eastern company last year. Then there are the economic issues - 65 percent of the carriers at Midway have to approve the transaction, and they may require that landing fees (the charges they pay to the airport operator) be capped. The bidders, on the other hand, will push for a fee schedule that gives them a decent return on their equity. In the past, airlines have argued that privatization can exacerbate an airport's natural monopoly if landing fees and other economic concessions are not regulated. Airline deals could be grounded Macquarie's investment in Sydney Airport, for example, has been profitable for the bank, but it recently lost a court case to low-cost airline Virgin Blue over anticompetitive practices. Similar complaints have been heard at private-sector airports including Athens, Auckland and Rome. For passengers, the results have been much more positive. Though a new phenomenon in the U.S., airport privatization has been prevalent for decades in Europe and Australia, where the lack of a municipal bond market has forced governments to seek creative means to finance their infrastructure. In one of the first and most successful examples, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government raised $2.3 billion by privatizing the British Airport Authority, now known as BAA, in 1987. (Ferrovial acquired BAA last year for ten billion pounds.) To boost revenues post-privatization, operators typically focus on two primary profit streams often overlooked by government owners, both of which can have a positive impact on the airport experience. One avenue involves monetizing an airport's excess real estate by building parking lots for travelers or warehouses for companies such as FedEx that want to be on the runway. The other is adding restaurants or high-end clothing boutiques and getting passengers through security quickly so that they can spend more time (and money) in the terminal. Mark Florian, head of North American infrastructure investment banking at Goldman Sachs, points to Heathrow, a BAA property, as one of the best examples. "There are more opportunities to get into your pocketbook than one could imagine," he says. Yet as the Midway sale draws near, it remains unclear how much of an impact the transaction could have on the U.S. airport industry as a whole. Chicago is proceeding under the aegis of a ten-year old FAA pilot program that allows for five airport privatizations, only one of which can be a large hub airport. To date, only Stewart International in Newburgh, N.Y., has been privatized, but David Bennett, a director with the FAA's Office of Airport Safety and Standards, says that if Midway is deemed a success, Congress may extend the program and clear others for takeoff.
It’s politically unpopular
Byrne, Coen, and Dardick 13 – staff writers at the Chicago Tribune (John Byrne, Jeff Coen, Hal Dardick, 9/6/13, “Emanuel halts Midway privatization bidding,” http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-09-06/news/chi-emanuel-halts-midway-lease-talks-20130905_1_great-lakes-airport-alliance-midway-airport-midway-advisory-panel/2)//twemchen
Even if the deal had gone forward, Emanuel would have had to persuade a wary City Council to go along with it. Aldermen were stung by public criticism for approving Mayor Richard Daley's roundly reviled 75-year lease of the city's parking meters in 2008, and have pledged to be more than rubber stamps for Emanuel's plans to lease public assets. Emanuel has shown the ability to get other controversial revenue-raising packages past the City Council, however. Daley thought he had a deal to lease the Southwest Side airport for 99 years to a consortium led by a unit of Citigroup Inc., an agreement that would have brought in $2.5 billion. The plan died in 2009 when the financial markets froze. After taking office, Emanuel refused to commit to another deal to privatize Midway but petitioned the FAA to maintain the privatization slot for the airport to keep his options open.
Fails
BMIResearch 14 – BMI Infrastructure Report, South Africa Infrastructure Report (January 2014, “Global Infrastructure Overview - Q1 2014,” Lexis)//twemchen
In the US, a market offering more promising rewards than Western Europe, progress in introducing PPPs to the transport sector has seen only mixed success of late. Here, rather than financing or rewards, the obstacles are political and popular opposition to private operation of infrastructure. A prime example is the failure of the Midway Airport privatisation in September 2013. The project fell through due to unappealing terms as the Mayor tried to appease taxpayers, and failed to appeal to private companies ( see, 'Midway Grounded As Politicians Struggle To Find Middle Ground', September 17 2013). Despite this, our core view has been, and remains that we will see growing employment of the PPP model in the US, especially in highway projects. Investor interest is high, and financing, through various government funding programmes and a number of investment vehicles, is available. Indeed, in September 2013, Cintra and Meridiam Infrastructure closed financing on a concession to extend the North Tarrant Express in Texas.
Doesn’t solve liabilities
GAO 14 – (November 2014, “Airport Privatization: Limited Interest despite FAA’s Pilot Program,” GAO Report to Congress, http://gao.gov/assets/670/667076.pdf)//twemchen
Privatized airports (within and outside the APPP) also may not be entitled to local and state property tax exemptions, unless specifically authorized, and would likely not be exempt from tort liability claims. In the Midway airport example, City officials had to negotiate with state lawmakers to maintain Midway’s property tax-exempt status and the state enabling legislation required the city to dedicate 90% of lease proceeds to fund capital infrastructure and maintenance or to fund municipal employee pension funds. According to the recent ACRP report on airport privatizations, with reduced protections for tort liability claims, privatization (within and outside the APPP) may create greater tort liability risk for a private operator than a public operator in the event of, for example, an aircraft accident, since the private operator would not likely be entitled to same immunities as a public entity.58
Say no
GAO 14 – (November 2014, “Airport Privatization: Limited Interest despite FAA’s Pilot Program,” GAO Report to Congress, http://gao.gov/assets/670/667076.pdf)//twemchen
We spoke with key public sponsor representatives of two of the three APPP applicants that reached the final application phase. They discussed the planned as well as unanticipated consequences of lengthy and costly application procedures, support and learning resources required throughout, and risk factors that increased uncertainty. • Lengthy airline consent negotiations—Public-sector airport owners, consultants, and private investors that we spoke with all said that obtaining the 65 percent consent from airlines to use lease or sale proceeds from privatizing the airport for non-airport purposes was the pivotal and most time-consuming requirement of the application process. As depicted in figure 5 above, the privatization process for the Luis Munoz Marin and Midway airports took a total of 38 and 83 months, respectively. Within those time frames, it took 25 months for PRPA to obtain airlines’ consent for Luis Munoz Marin, and a combined 26 months for Midway’s airline agreement for both privatization efforts. Stewart was unable to obtain airline approvals to use airport revenue for non-airport purposes; the airport’s owner, New York, agreed to use the lease payments for airport purposes and to recoup past state investments in Stewart and other state-owned airports, in accordance with FAA’s airport revenue use policy. For Luis Munoz Marin and Midway, PRPA and City of Chicago officials said that it takes significant time to arrive at an agreement with the airlines, then submit the agreement to FAA for review, and then share the agreement with advance-stage private bidders for bid proposals and negotiation purposes. Additionally, the private sector airport stakeholders and PRPA representatives we interviewed said that airlines’ negotiations added an additional layer of complexity and that they believed the purchase transaction should be strictly between the public “seller” and the private “buyer.” Representatives from two airlines that occupied the position of having dominant air traffic at Midway and Luis Marin Munoz airports at the time of airports’ applications said that it could potentially be more efficient if a dominant airline assumed the responsibilities of coordinating the negotiation with other carriers. Overall, the airline representatives we spoke with said they were satisfied with their arrangements, while the public airport owners said there was extra work and time expended to get to an agreement with the airlines. • Evaluation and preparation of privatization deals by the public airport sponsors can be costly—Because APPP applicants must satisfy local, state, and federal requirements as well as potential investors, the process of drafting the final airport use and lease agreements becomes complex, requiring outside expertise. For example, the City of Chicago spent $13 million overall on privatization-related transaction costs in the first application, and $3.5 million in the second round, with both attempts failing to result in privatization. The Puerto Rico Public-Private Partnerships Authority spent $17.4 million in project costs from December 2009 to February 2013 that included but were not limited to costs associated with feasibility studies, legal counsel, financial consulting, engineering and technical consulting, and personnel and operating costs and service charges.59 Costs also included the estimated statutory fee payable to the IRS as a result of the elimination of tax-exempt bonds attributable to the airport. • Public opposition—Public opposition to privatization can undermine the public-sector airport owner’s interest in privatization unless the goals and benefits are clearly stated. The community association we spoke with in San Juan said that public concerns can potentially impact public-sector airport owners during the privatization process. In Chicago, two public interest groups we interviewed said that in their view, the first round of privatization of Chicago’s Midway Airport was not transparent and had limited public input. A representative of one of those public interest groups said that the State of Illinois tried to remedy this when it passed enabling legislation for the privatization of Midway.60 In San Juan, a community association we spoke with said that there were public concerns about the privatization, including over the foreign ownership of the bidder. The FAA public docket included written public comments and summarized responses from PRPA on how it and Aerostar intended to address those concerns.61 The Puerto Rico Public-Private Partnership Authority also provided public notice about the privatization of Luis Munoz Marin on its web site. • External factors can also undermine success—External factors can affect the outcome for public owners and influence decisionmaking by private investors. Given the lengthy timetable for consideration, application, and review, changes in economic or political climates can influence whether a deal is consummated. • Macro-economy—Changes in the economy, such as the onset of a recession, can alter the value and outcome of a privatization of a deal. In the first Midway privatization effort, a lease agreement with a bidder was reached but failed to close, in part, because broader financial problems in the economy left the private bidder unable to secure sufficient financing. Since then, the FAA has placed greater scrutiny on the potential private bidders’ proposed funding and financing and applied this lesson when reviewing the Aerostar bid for Luis Munoz Marin. • Shifting political agenda—In 1996, the city of San Diego entered into an agreement with a private sector developer, Brown Field Aviation Park LLC, to implement a comprehensive redevelopment of Brown Field, a general aviation reliever airport, into an air cargo hub and general aviation airport. After submitting a preliminary application to the APPP in 1999, the City withdrew from the pilot program in 2001 due, in part, to diminishing support from elected officials and over concerns and opposition among the community of the potential adverse affects of the airport’s being redeveloped into a cargo hub. Civic and public interest associations and airport experts we spoke with said that the decision to privatize municipal assets, such as airports, can involve a highly political decisionmaking process. One private-sector airport investor stated that political uncertainty reduces the private sector’s willingness to invest in an airport as well. • Performance risks—Even after privatization occurs there is a risk of poor performance by the private-sector airport operator if the lease is not properly executed. In the case of the Stewart, as previously discussed in this report, NEG shifted its business focus from airports soon after it assumed the lease. NEG managed the airport for immediate financial return and was not interested in investing in the airport. As noted above, the airport was acquired by the PANYNJ in 2007 after 7 years under private operation. The PANYNJ officials we spoke with said that the Port Authority made far greater investments compared to NEG to bring the airport up to Port Authority standards and to retain a key airport tenant.
Pls
McAllister 10 – Associate Editor at Airport Business (Brad McAllister, October 2010, “Carrier right-sizing and a challenging economy among top issues for airports,” Cygnus Business Media, Lexis)//twemchen
Apart from that, there are also many barriers to airport privatization in the U.S., from access to cheap tax-exempt debt to restrictions on revenue diversion to collective bargaining agreements and public sector unions, says Ernico. This makes the U.S. airport model unique. When considering airport privatization, Ernico says there are many resources airports should evaluate, including: Lessons learned from worldwide airport privatization; Lessons learned from privatization in non-airport transportation modes; Legal regulatory framework; Domestic policy context (AIP, PFC, tax-exempt bonds, municipal budget deficits, etc.); Stakeholder interests and concerns; Case studies; and Decision tree matrix and evaluation checklist. FAA compliance division's Kevin Willis explains that privatization is a local decision " ... and our role is to review that decision. We look at privatization as a management tool," adding that one size does not fit all when it comes to airport privatization. Explains Willis, "Privatization is not something that you create and then walk away from. What happens is a relationship change. You change from managing a workforce to managing a contract. "You have to map out how you plan to bring an airport through the initial implementation ... transparency and public outreach is important."
CBS 15 – CBS (1/7/15, “Sen. Schumer: Airline, Airport Workers Should Be Screened For Guns Daily,” http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2015/01/07/sen-schumer-airline-airport-workers-should-be-screened-for-guns-daily/)//twemchen
ALBANY, N.Y. (CBSNewYork/AP) – Sen. Charles Schumer called Wednesday for daily federal screening of airport and airline workers for weapons following last month’s arrests of five men accused of smuggling guns through the New York and Atlanta airports. The New York Democrat, joined in Washington by Brooklyn District Attorney Kenneth Thompson, said he’s asking the Transportation Security Administration to immediately require all U.S. airports to screen staff when they start work. “In this day and age of terrorism, rampant drug dealing and gun smuggling, we just can’t be too careful,” Schumer said. Currently, pilots and flight crews, as well as passengers, pass through the TSA metal detectors. But Schumer said many employees who work in the secure sections of airports are exempt. Schumer called the loophole “mind-boggling” and said criminals or terrorists could smuggle drugs, guns and explosives onto planes. While the TSA does a good job with background checks, he said they are “hardly foolproof” and not nearly as effective as metal detectors. The TSA has the authority to do the screening now and does not need a new law, Schumer said. He also said it would be an inexpensive fix that, at most, would add “pennies” to the cost of an airline ticket. Schumer said the gun-running scheme was “frighteningly bad news” that did not require a sophisticated smuggling scheme. Instead it was “a cakewalk for criminals to pull off,” he said. And the problem goes beyond Atlanta airport, Schumer and Thompson said. Very few, if any, airports require screening of these employees, Schumer said. Authorities have charged five people, including an airline baggage handler, with illegally shipping firearms between Atlanta and New York on passenger jets, including 153 guns seized during the seven-month investigation. Former Delta baggage handler, 31-year-old Eugene Harvey, is among those accused of helping smuggle guns aboard passenger jets bound for New York City. Investigators said the guns — some loaded — were hidden in carry-on baggage. Harvey was arrested Saturday in Atlanta. A FBI affidavit said there was enough evidence to charge him with trafficking firearms, violating airport security and aiding others in the scheme. An alleged accomplice, former Delta employee Mark Quentin Henry, was arrested in New York on Dec. 10 in a weapons trafficking investigation after an undercover agent bought a gun from one of his accomplices, according to the affidavit filed on Dec. 19. The investigation targeted firearms that were being sold in New York that had been purchased in the Atlanta area. “The ease by which airport employees are able to smuggle weapons and other contraband onto our commercial airliners is troubling and warrants immediate scrutiny and inspection,” Thompson said. That investigation, with the New York Police Department and federal authorities, identified “gaping holes in our nation’s airport security,” he said.
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