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- 1nc – circumvention The TSA will just end the SPP – a) Unions Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11
- “resume(d) federalization efforts.”
- TSA leadership could not have had sufficient information
- 2nc – circumvention – at: 2012 bill They’re circumventing that too Poole 13
- 2nc – circumvention – at: apps are good The TSA doesn’t care about application quality Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11
- No, really Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11
- 2nc – circumvention – xt: unions Unions cause circumvention Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11
- 24 months
Thompson 15 – Brooklyn District Attorney (Ken Thompson, 1/9/15, “Schumer, Thompson Demand TSA Require All Airports Develop Comprehensive Screening Process For All Employees,” http://brooklynda.org/2015/01/09/schumer-thompson-demand-tsa-require-all-airports-develop-comprehensive-screening-process-for-all-employees/)//twemchen In the wake of D.A. Ken Thompson’s exposure of a highly disturbing gun running scheme, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer today called on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to immediately implement a national requirement that all airports physically screen airline and airport employees each day before they enter secured areas of airports. Currently, pilots and flight crew pass through metal detectors, but amazingly, most employees that repair and clean planes, load luggage, and work in the terminal post-security checkpoints are exempt from this physically screening. Schumer and Thompson said this gaping and dangerous loophole in airport security plans allowed an expansive gun running scheme to smuggle 153 firearms into New York, when a former Delta Airlines employee carried backpacks and carry-on baggage full of guns and ammunition on nearly twenty commercial flights in 2014 from Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport to New York. Four men have been charged by Thompson for allegedly conspiring to sell these firearms, destined for the streets of Brooklyn. After Thompson notified federal authorities, a fifth man was charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia with a firearms trafficking offense and violating airport security requirements. Schumer said that like airplane passengers, flight crews and millions of private and government employees in courthouses and elsewhere, all commercial airport employees should be physically screened before entering secure areas, as a requirement of each airport’s unique Airport Security Plan (ASP). While Schumer made clear that while the vast majority of airline employees are honest, upstanding citizens, it takes one person to exploit the system and smuggle guns, or worse, explosives onto a plane and cause huge damage. 1nc – circumvention The TSA will just end the SPP – a) Unions Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen There is evidence that TSA officials erroneously claimed no communication with union representatives about the SPP. On February 1, 2011, Chairman Mica requested that Administrator Pistole provide all communications between DHS and TSA with labor union organizations and their representatives related to the SPP (see Appendix 6). Administrator Pistole responded on February 28, 2011, that “there are no such communications” (see Appendix 7).10 However, there is a public history of union meetings and communications with DHS and TSA officials regarding the program, including an in-person meeting between American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) representatives and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, where AFGE urged “the SPP program and policies be reviewed by senior leaders.”11 TSA officials also noted in an internal presentation that impact on the TSO workforce is a “justifiable reason” to end or limit the SPP program, stating that “TSOs at potential SPP airports face uncertainty about their job status.”12 b) Empirics Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen TSA officials recommended abolishing the SPP. Although the SPP is mandated statutorily through ATSA, documents obtained by the Committee confirm that TSA officials recommended awarding new contracts at existing SPP airports for one year while the agency “resume(d) federalization efforts.” 13 c) They’ll lie about the costs Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen The Administration has often used cost as justification for not promoting the SPP17; however an analysis by Committee staff found that if federal screeners at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) were to operate as efficiently as private screeners at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), American taxpayers would save more than $38.6 million a year (see Table 1). 18 Further, private screeners at SFO screened 65 percent more passengers per screener than federal screeners at LAX in 2010. Committee Staff also found that TSA officials did not examine the merit of pending SPP applications before denying them on January 28, 2011. The SPP application process was found to be flawed; airport authorities are not required to provide a clear explanation of challenges related to the federal screening model at their airport, or how SPP participation would fix those problems. Moreover, agency officials did not request additional information from airport authorities with pending requests, or contact them at any time during the decision-making process. TSA officials refused repeated requests by Committee staff to provide the metrics used by the agency to determine whether advantage existed.19 TSA leadership could not have had sufficient information to determine if a “clear or substantial advantage” would result from these airports joining the SPP and therefore did not have basis to deny airport authority applications. Furthermore, and as discussed later in the report, Committee staff discovered that such advantage did in fact exist to admit these airport authorities into the program. 20 2nc – circumvention – at: 2012 bill They’re circumventing that too Poole 13 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation (Robert Poole, 5/31/13, “Airport Policy and Security News #91” http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-and-security-news-91#a)//twemchen Despite Congress more than a year ago directing the TSA to speedily process airport applications to use TSA-certified screening contractors under its Screening Partnership Program (SPP), the agency appears to be stone-walling. Industry sources tell me that even though applications have been approved for six airports, not a single new SPP contract has been awarded by TSA since the 2012 legislation (part of FAA reauthorization last February) was enacted. In some cases, procurements that were under way have been pulled back, to be re-started at some unnamed future date. That's the case for a four-airport Montana solicitation begun last October, due to be completed by the end of February 2013. Not a word was heard during March, but finally, on April 17th, contenders received a letter from TSA cancelling the procurement and saying it would be re-started at a later date. Orlando-Sanford's approved application is still without a contract solicitation and Sarasota-Bradenton application awaits action. What appears to be happening is that TSA while TSA has adhered to the letter of the law contained in last year's legislation directing actions on applications, it has come up with a new hurdle for airports and contractors to surmount: a "cost-efficiency" factor. At the April 12th bidder's conference for re-bidding the SPP contract for San Francisco (SFO), bidders were told that no contract will be awarded unless it meets TSA's cost-efficiency target. The same provision was added at the last minute to the requirements for re-bidding the Kansas City contract earlier this year. What this means, exactly, is not yet clear. It appears that TSA has taken language from the SPP provisions of the 2012 FAA bill and used it to create a requirement that no SPP contract will be awarded if the cost to the government would be higher than what it currently costs TSA to provide screening at the airport in question. Taken at face value, that sounds uncontroversial. But as the GAO has pointed out in several reports, TSA still has not fully and accurately reported all its screening costs, and TSA still claims that its own screening costs less than contract screening under SPP. In its 2008 study (GAO-09-27R), the agency faulted TSA's cost comparisons for omitting the cost of overlapping TSA administrative staff at SPP airports, and failing to include TSA costs for workers' comp, general liability insurance, and some retirement costs. Not mentioned in this report, but relevant to accurate cost comparisons, TSA also does not include the cost of using its screener flying squad (the National Deployment Force) to fill in at TSA-screened airports. In March 2011, GAO reported that TSA had "made progress in addressing the limitations related to costs" (GAO-11-375R), but still had work left to do. GAO's most recent report in December 2012 (GAO-13-208) focused on screener performance at TSA and SPP airports, and did not address whether TSA was finally including all costs in its comparisons of screening. And as I noted at the time, GAO's 2012 report ignored a detailed study by the staff of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee: a case study of the cost of screening at two major hub airports, both in TSA's high-risk Category X—Los Angeles and San Francisco. The former has TSA screening and the latter is one of the original pilot program airports using a TSA-approved screening contractor. Even though federal law requires SPP contractors to pay screeners comparable wages and benefits as TSA, the study found that the cost per screener at SFO was 5.3% less than TSA's cost at LAX. While that may not sound like much, when combined with much higher productivity at SFO (16,113 passengers per screener at SFO vs. 9,765 at LAX, due mostly to a good mix of part-time and full-time screeners at SFO), the overall result would be 42.6% lower screening cost at LAX if the SFO contract model were applied there (see table). 2nc – circumvention – at: apps are good The TSA doesn’t care about application quality Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen The findings of this report reveal that Administration officials do not have clear criteria for denying SPP applications, have concealed significant cost factors unique to the federal screening model when conducting cost comparisons, and suggest that union pressure to retain federal jobs played a leading role in TSA officials’ decision to deny airport applications and stop expansion of the program. No, really Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen Six airports applied for participation in the SPP between 2007 and the date of this report, five of which were denied on January 28, 2011. Orlando-Sanford International Airport in Florida submitted an application after Administrator Pistole’s January 28 decision to halt the program that is still considered to be “pending.”53 Bert Mooney Airport in Montana first submitted an application in 2007 and then again in 2009. Glacier Park International and Yellowstone Airports in Montana submitted applications in 2008 and 2009, respectively, and Springfield Branson National Airport and Missoula International Airport submitted applications in 2010. TSA Administrator Pistole has maintained that he did not find a “clear or substantial advantage” to approve these applications.54 TSA officials have refused to provide the metrics used to determine “clear or substantial advantage” to airport authorities and Committee staff upon repeated request.55 Based on a thorough review of airport applications by Committee staff, and conversations with the Airport Director at each of the five denied airports, it is clear that officials did not have sufficient information to determine if such an advantage existed for each of these airport authorities to join the SPP (see Appendix 5). Through interviews with airport officials and a review of the application process, Committee staff determined that: 1. Sufficient merit existed at each of the five airports to determine clear and substantial “advantage” for participation in the SPP; 2. TSA did not require sufficient information in the SPP application or during the decisionmaking process to make an accurate determination of merit; and TSA officials did not communicate with airport officials after applications were submitted or share rationale for denial.56 Each of the denied airport authorities identified similar reasons for wanting to participate in the SPP (see Appendix 12): 1. Many of the airports had been encouraged by TSA to participate in the SPP; 2. Airport officials believe that the private sector drives innovation and efficiency at airports; 3. Airport authorities desire greater ownership of the screening experience (including efficiency and effectiveness) at passenger checkpoints; 4. TSA screeners provide poor customer service to passengers, resulting in a negative travel experience and perception of the airport; and 5. Many of the airports are either partially- or fully-staffed by the National Deployment Force, resulting in a high cost to taxpayers, a rotating staff with little experience at the airport, and low screener morale and customer service.57 Each of the five denied airports intends to continue pursuing participation in the SPP. 2nc – circumvention – xt: unions Unions cause circumvention Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen The Committee also uncovered evidence of multiple meetings between union representatives and Administration officials regarding the SPP, a finding that is in direct opposition to claims from TSA leadership denying any communication between union representatives and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or TSA officials about the program. 21 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen TSA officials cited the uncertainty TSOs face about their job status as a justifiable reason for limiting the scope of the SPP. Unions representing TSOs have placed significant pressure on TSA officials at headquarters and at local airports considering the SPP to abolish the program and preserve federal jobs. On February 1, 2011, Chairman Mica requested that Administrator Pistole provide to Committee staff all communications between DHS or TSA and labor union organizations and their representatives related to the SPP (see Appendix 6). Administrator Pistole responded on February 28, 2011, that “there are no such communications” (see Appendix 7).37 To the contrary, Committee staff discovered direct evidence that questions Administrator Pistole’s claim of no union involvement in his decision to stop the expansion of the SPP. A public history exists of union meetings and communications with DHS and TSA officials regarding the SPP, including an in-person meeting between AFGE representatives and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. Airport authorities that were denied participation in the program also reported that union representatives often met with TSA employees at the airport while their applications were pending.38 At Glacier Park International Airport (GPI), TSOs represented themselves as AFGE members and attended airport authority board meetings to lobby against the airport’s transition to the SPP, targeting board members supportive of the SPP.39 Airport officials at GPI believe these efforts resulted in the removal of Tim Grattan, a Flathead Municipal Airport Authority board member.40 In a January 29, 2011, newsletter following Administrator Pistole’s announcement to halt the SPP, AFGE reported that they first began communicating with TSA officials to “conduct a thorough review of SPP in 2009 after seven Montana airports’ applications were approved to privatize the screening function and three more airports in Montana publicly stated that they intended to apply to go private.” In a May 6, 2010 newsletter, AFGE reported that “TSA has told AFGE that the agency will revisit the SPP and will place any contracting out plans on hold until a decision has been reached.”42 AFGE also reported its participation in an in-person meeting with DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, “urging that the SPP program and policies be reviewed by senior leaders.”43 In the same newsletter, Eric Wood, a Lead TSO at GPI Airport, applauded the union’s efforts: “AFGE was able to get TSA management to stop moving forward on our airports application for SPP… now thanks to all the help from AFGE we were able to convince TSA that SPP was not a program that is good for the mission of TSA.”44 On December 19, 2010, Cynthia Jenson, President of the American Federal Government Employees Local 1120 in Montana, sent an e-mail stating, “I have some very good news. AFGE and TSA have agreed that the SPP program will be abolished. They just signed an agreement” (see Appendix 10).45 Jenson told Committee staff on May 19, 2011, that she “wholeheartedly believed” AFGE had a role in Administrator Pistole’s January 28 decision not to expand the SPP.46 Finally, on the same day Administrator Pistole denied five airport applications to the SPP and made his announcement that TSA would not expand the program, he sent an email to TSA employees informing them of his decision and guaranteeing that TSOs are safe (see Appendix 4). Pistole told employees: …I want to assure you that at this time, TSA does not have plans to replace federal employees with contractors at any airports that are not currently participating in the Screening Partnership Program… The entire leadership team and I remain committed to continuing our support for you in every possible way we can.47 In general, airport authorities reported multiple obstacles to participation in the SPP, including what airport officials interpret as a general desire from TSA to put an end to the program.48 As one example of TSA’s opposition to the program, Administrator Pistole arranged a meeting with Larry Dale, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Sanford Airport Authority (SAA), and attempted to dissuade the SAA from opting-out after a public meeting of the board unanimously voted to apply to the SPP in October of 2010 (see Appendix 11).49 Between January of 2009 and the summer of 2010, TSA officials informed airport authorities that a TSA Administrator must be named before SPP applications would be evaluated.50 Some airport management was left in the dark for 18-24 months after their SPP application was submitted before it was denied by the Administration.51 Private companies also reported that TSA was reluctant to extend contracts in a timely manner, resulting in multiple month-to-month contracts that often were not awarded until the day the previous contract expired, creating uncertainty and driving costs up.52 1nc – mica indict Mica’s paid off Frischling 14 – Boarding Area – Flying With Fish (Steven Frischling, 1/24/14, “Why Rep. John Mica Really Wants To Privatize The TSA … Corruption, Agendas & Personal Financial Gain,” http://flyingwithfish.boardingarea.com/2014/01/24/why-rep-john-mica-really-wants-to-privatize-the-tsa-corruption-agendas-personal-financial-gain/)//twemchen This of course leads to the question of what sparked a fury within Rep. Mica to privatize passenger screening at tiny Orlando Sanford International Airport? A question that has puzzled many for quite some time … and with some digging the answer becomes apparent. The answer? Lining his own pockets, lining the pockets of corporation, campaign donors and pushing the professional agenda of his daughter. So where does this all begin? In 2010, when Orlando Sanford International Airport decided it wanted to Opt Out of using the TSA and choose to use the Screening Partnership Program. The Screening Partnership Program is born out of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107-71, under § 44920, “Security screening opt-out program.” While many airports have explored the Screening Partnership Program, Rep. Mica had multiple personal reasons to take it up as his personal cause, despite the airport’s interest in Opting Out due to local corporate ties, rather than a genuine need. At the time Orlando Sanford International Airport became interested in the Screening Partnership Program, the person heading up the airport’s Strategic Communications was D’Anne Mica. D’Anne Mica is, as you may guess, the daughter of Rep. John Mica. As a communications contractor representing the airport, D’Anne Mica had a direct financial stake in not only the promotion of privatizing passenger screening at the airport, but in provoking the TSA and stoking the media about it. The more this story grew, the more hours she could bill the Sanford Airport Authority. A father using his position to help his daughter is nothing new, even though highly unethical for a U.S. Congressman, and a U.S. Congressman who is the Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, with oversight over aspects of the TSA. Although D’Anne Mica left her ties to Orlando Sanford International Airport behind in 2011, Rep. John Mica had other financial reasons to remain vocal about privatizing the TSA at the airport, ties to Covenant Aviation Security. Covenant Aviation Security has been the largest private aviation security company in the United States for more than a decade, earning more than an estimated US$700,000,000 from government contracts since 2002. Where is Covenant Aviation Security based? Casselberry, Florida, within Florida’s 7h Congressional District, the district Rep. Mica represents. Rep. Mica’s ties to Covenant Aviation Security don’t just end with the company being based in his district, the company’s current President, Michael Bolles, who joined the company as a Sr. Vice President of Aviation Security in August 2004, has been a consistent financial contributor to Rep. Mica’s campaigns and Rep Mica’s campaigns have received corporate donations from Covenant Aviation Security. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.61 Mb. Share with your friends:
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