Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency
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- Executive Agreement
- JDZ (S) Dispute
- Joint development solves disputes—overcomes the self-interest barriers
- Joint development solves the Beaufort Sea spat
Idle Leases FailSitting on leases is impossibleIER 9 Institute for Energy Research, 2/11, “Offshore Energy Exploration: Myth vs. Fact”, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2009/02/11/offshore-energy-exploration-myth-vs-fact-2/ Myth: Oil companies are sitting on 68 million acres of untapped leases and don’t need access to new areas. Fact: Lease agreements already contain federal requirements that require oil companies to use leased land in a timely manner. The 1992 Comprehensive Energy Policy Act requires energy companies to comply with lease provisions and explore expeditiously or risk forfeiture of the lease. Energy companies cannot “stockpile” leases (even those found to contain no oil or gas) to drive prices up. What’s more, historical data show only one discovery results from every 60 leases granted to energy companies. Companies are not “sitting” on the leases they now have. Technology has allowed companies to increase their production on leased acreage. Executive AgreementExecutive agreements overrules existing law to allow for drilling in the Beaufort Sea disputed zoneSteele ’85 – director of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, (Dr. John H., Oil and gas technologies for the Arctic and deepwater., 1985, Report to Congress) If an agreement locating the line cannot be reached, the United States and Canada may wish to consider other types of solutions to the problem. Joint exploration and development by Canada and the United States may be possible even though there are no specific provisions in the OCS Lands Act for joint activity. An executive agreement, which many scholars agree can overrule existing law, might be utilized to allow joint exploration and/or development to take place. In the absence of such an agreement, there still appears to be no legal reason why the United States, in concern with Canada, cannot hire a single firm or consortium to explore the area for both countries. Section 11 of the OCS Lands Act does not prohibit exploration without leasing. If exploitable resources are discovered, both conutrnies might consider offering the disputed area for lease to one lessee while agreeing to decide at a later date how revenues are to be divided. JDZ (S) DisputeJoint development zones are the likely way to resolve Beaufort Sea disputesBaker ’10 – associate professor and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment (Betsy B. Baker, “Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea”, Vermont Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-37, 3-26-2010) Integrated management lies at the heart of this section’s proposal to build in two ways on the basic idea of joint development zones (JDZ): (1) by adapting JDZ agreements for multiple uses beyond hydrocarbon development to include management of other resources; and (2) by introducing different stages of development gradually, justifying any new development phase with the scientific data gathered as part of an integrated ecosystem-based management plan. The Beaufort Sea is a good forum for testing this expanded notion of JDZs because both Canadian and U.S. national ocean’s infrastructures support the use of integrated ecosystem based oceans management, as does the Beaufort Sea LME endorsed by the Arctic Council ministers, and the related Arctic Council Beaufort LME Pilot Project now being planned jointly by Canada and the United States.286 If and when joint development of Beaufort Sea triangle hydrocarbon resources occurs, it is more likely to be under a negotiated JDZ agreement than a unitization agreement.287 Under JDZs states typically agree to share the resources found in the disputed area in agreed proportions,288 whereas with cross-border unitization agreements, states develop a specific transboundary field together.289 The idea of a JDZ for hydrocarbons in the Beaufort Sea is not new290 and was last discussed in any detail in the late 1970s by Special Negotiators Cadieux and Cutler.291 A JDZ agreement could be structured with or without resolving the maritime boundary, but neither solution has been pursued with any vigor for over a quarter century.292 Whether the issue will be resolved prior to, as part of, or following the continental shelf submission process remains to be seen.293 Joint development solves disputes—overcomes the self-interest barriersPetkunaite ’11 – master’s candidate at CUNY (Dovile, “Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic? UNCLOS and the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes”, The City College of New York, June 2011, http://digital-archives.ccny.cuny.edu/gallery/thesis/2011SpSs13.pdf) Based on this, the question arises, “why countries that maintain diplomatic relations still struggle to resolve the dispute in the Beaufort Sea?” This is a complicated issue, and one of the complicating factors is the constitutionally protected, 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement, which is based on Canada‟s perception of the maritime boundary. 256 Baker indicates that both parties perceive this dispute as well-managed and do not see competing claims in this area as extremely contentious. Moreover, neither Canada nor the United States expressed interest towards joint management of the area. In addition, both countries have agreed on a moratorium on hydrocarbon exploration in the Beaufort triangle. 257 This indicates willingness to cooperate. Despite overlapping claims in the Beaufort Sea, scientists from Canada and the United States initiated a joint geological survey that will include the disputed area. The purpose of the joint mission is data gathering for national submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 258 The bi-national study of the area and data gathering are necessary for both delineation of the continental shelf and eventual resolution of the maritime boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea. 259 Baker indicates that the method used by Canada and the United States is joint seabed mapping, and scientific cooperation, in accordance with international law and international institutions, can be applied to the dispute in the Beaufort Sea. He further claims that cooperation in gathering and expanding the data about the region is valuable. 260 Both countries have shared an interest; however they cannot reach a consensus on the maritime boundaries. Joint efforts to explore the region can strengthen Canadian and U.S. national security, economic potential, and environmental protection. Both countries should be interested in better exploration of the resources in the sea, thus, dividing responsibilities and benefits that the exploration and protection can bring. Moreover, it would provide an excellent example of how national legal systems can improve the governance and regulation of the Arctic by relying on the interplay between law, policy, science, and technology. 261 Intelligent political decisions should be based on a scientific foundation in order to define the standards, implement, and enforce them. Joint development solves the Beaufort Sea spatBaker and Byers ’12 – professors of political science at the University of British Columbia (James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, “Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute”, Ocean Development & International Law, 43:1, 70-95) As McDorman explains, the “Beaufort Sea boundary dispute area has long been seen as a candidate for the development of some type of hydrocarbon joint development regime.” 139 Canada and the United States considered a type of joint development area for the Beaufort Sea when they conducted maritime boundary negotiations in the 1970s. 140 Joint management regimes of larger regional scope already apply in the disputed zone with respect to beluga whales and polar bears—though they involve the indigenous peoples on both sides of the boundary as well as the Alaskan rather than the Canadian and U.S. governments. 141 Joint development arrangements with respect to hydrocarbon resources have been a relatively popular solution to intractable overlapping maritime claims in some parts of the world. They can be adopted either alongside a final delimitation or in its absence. Three general types have been identified by Hazel Fox et al. 142 : • Model 1: A system of compulsory joint ventures between the States or their nationals; • Model 2: A joint authority with licensing and regulatory powers manages development of the joint development zone on behalf of the States; Downloaded by [University of Technology Sydney] at 18:50 31 August 2012 88 J. S. Baker and M. Byers • Model 3: One state manages development of the joint zone on behalf of both with the other State’s participation confined to revenue sharing and monitoring. In reality, these models are pure types and there may be substantial overlap between them. Each also involves varying levels of delegation to joint bodies and harmonization of legislation as it applies to the joint development area. These issues are likely to be important to states that opt to negotiate some form of joint development arrangement, but regardless of the model, the difficulties of reaching agreement on arrangements are sometimes as significant as those involved in delimiting a final boundary. This situation is exemplified by the difficulties in setting up a “model 2” joint development zone between Thailand and Malaysia, which led to an 11-year hiatus between the signing of the memorandum of understanding that expressed a desire for cooperation and its actual implementation in a considerably watered-down form. 143 Joint development remains a possibility in the event that the parties simply cannot agree on the location of a final boundary, and perhaps even if they do. For instance, the 2010 Norway-Russia Barents Sea Treaty creates a system for joint management in instances where oil and gas deposits straddle the new boundary. 144 Although this type of arrangement is common where a boundary exists, this option might [also] be considered if the parties are, through negotiation, only able to reduce the size of any contested area generated by overlapping claims. 145 Finally, “model 3” might be a creative way in which Canada could uphold its commitments in the Inuvialuit Final Agreement. In short, Canada could gain rights to manage the southern portion of the disputed zone and simply pay the United States a proportion of the profits from exploitation activities there. 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