Joint development solves border limitation in the Beaufort Sea
Byers ’10 – professor of political science at the University of British Columbia
(Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic?, 2010, pg. 103)
A third option is a joint development regime for energy resources in the disputed zone—a relatively unusual approach that has worked before, including in the Arctic. In 1981, Norway and Iceland concluded a treaty giving Norway the right to 25 per cent participation on a portion of Iceland’s continental shelf between that country and the Norwegian Island of Jan Mayen. In 2008, the two countries adopted a follow-up treaty setting out the framework for cooperative oil and gas exploration in the zone. According to the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, the treaty provides the predictability that oil companies need. Other joint development regimes exist between Australia and East Timor and between Thailand and Malaysia. As Ted McDorman explains, Canada and the United States “could either agree to set aside the boundary issue and share the exploration costs and development benefits of any hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area; or proceed with a maritime boundary but have a joint zone for hydrocarbon activity, the benefits of which would be shared by both States.” During negotiations over both the Beaufort Sea and the Gulf of Maine in 1977, both countries agreed in principle to use the latter approach. But they lost interest in the matter after deciding to send the Gulf of Maine dispute to the International Court of Justice.
Joint development would buy time for a resolution to the maritime border dispute in the Beaufort Sea
Bakers and Byers ’10 – professors of political science at the University of British Columbia
(James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, THE BEAUFORT SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE: ¶ IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING OPTIONS, 2-25-2010, http://byers.typepad.com/files/baker-byers-discussion-paper-25-feb-2010.pdf)
Drawing a maritime boundary is a final and irreversible act. It brings into play issues of ¶ national pride and ownership, which can complicate negotiations. A joint development ¶ arrangement, on the other hand, does not have to present the solution to a maritime boundary ¶ dispute in zero-sum terms and certainly avoids the territorial mindset that can beset ¶ negotiations over boundary delimitation. ¶ Having said that, while a cooperative arrangement may enable decision-makers to avoid some ¶ thorny issues, it can, in some circumstances, introduce problems surrounding a whole set of ¶ other sensitivities and practicalities. These problems are not, however, insurmountable: nation-states can be creative in the institutional configurations they adopt within a zone of ¶ joint development and tailor arrangements to fit with their own national economic and ¶ political priorities. To be sure, the models presented by Fox et. al. are ideal-types and, as the ¶ examples illustrate, compromises can be struck and a variety of principles --- from ¶ harmonized laws to the operator or nationality principle -- may operate in the same area ¶ depending on the preferences of the parties and the practicalities of the situation. ¶ Governments should be forward-thinking and sensitive to potential issues before they arise so ¶ that institutional design can accommodate them from the outset. ¶ Finally, there is nothing to prevent continued efforts to delimit a final maritime boundary if ¶ the regime has been put in place in its absence. Indeed, joint development may be a temporary ¶ solution or it can be permanent. A temporary agreement will have to include a provision for ¶ the length of time it will be in force, which must be cognizant of the need to provide oil ¶ companies with stability, but it does enable both parties to an agreement to more rapidly ¶ develop resources in the event that negotiations over boundary delimitation become ¶ protracted.
Joint development is a step towards cooperation—the rest would be implementation
Petkunaite ’11 – master’s candidate at CUNY
(Dovile, “Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic? UNCLOS and the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes”, The City College of New York, June 2011,http://digital-archives.ccny.cuny.edu/gallery/thesis/2011SpSs13.pdf)
The “joint development” concept may also be an option. Claimant countries would jointly explore, exploit, and have shared jurisdiction over adjacent borders. 267 This solution would allow both countries to share benefits equally and explore the region more systematically. Later this may lead to the final delimitation boundary as the resources deposits are explored, and mined. This option is mostly considered in the disputes involving natural resources, because in such cases parties to the dispute tend to be less flexible in defining the border line. 268 Canada and the United States have a similar culture and legal system; therefore, the option of joint exploration and exploitation might work for them. As was indicated before, Canada and the United States have already started a joint mission aiming at exploration. If both parties find this option acceptable, there would be several issues that will need to be resolved. 269 The parties will need to negotiate the boundary of the joint-development zone, define how the mining will be undertaken, and how it will be administered? Moreover, the issues of funding and profits or minerals division will need to be addressed. There might be some disagreements and tensions, but a step forward on cooperation would already have been taken.