Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency



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Transition Wars DA

Transition from neolib causes massive violence – counter-revolutionary interventions


Anderson ‘84

professor of sociology – UCLA,

(Perry, In the tracks of historical materialism, p. 102-103)

That background also indicates, however, what is essentially missing from his work. How are we to get from where we are today to where he point us to tomorrow? There is no answer to this question in Nove. His halting discussion of “transition” tails away into apprehensive admonitions to moderation to the British Labor Party, and pleas for proper compensation to capitalist owners of major industries, if these are to be nationalized. Nowhere is there any sense of what a titanic political change would have to occur, with what fierceness of social struggle, for the economic model of socialism he advocates ever to materialize. Between the radicalism of the future end-state he envisages, and the conservatism of the present measures he is prepared to countenance, there is an unbridgeable abyss. How could private ownership of the means of production ever be abolished by policies less disrespectful of capital than those of Allende or a Benn, which he reproves? What has disappeared from the pages of The Economics of Feasible Socialism is virtually all attention to the historical dynamics of any serious conflict over the control of the means of production, as the record of the 20th century demonstrates them. If capital could visit such destruction on even so poor and small an outlying province of its empire in Vietnam, to prevent its loss, is it likely that it would suffer its extinction meekly in its own homeland? The lessons of the past sixty-five years or so are in this respect without ambiguity or exception, there is no case, from Russia to China, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Chile to Nicaragua, where the existence of capitalism has been challenged, and the furies of intervention, blockade and civil strife have not descended in response. Any viable transition to socialism in the West must seek to curtail that pattern: but to shrink from or to ignore it is to depart from the world of the possible altogether. In the same way, to construct an economic model of socialism in one advanced country is a legitimate exercise: but to extract it from any computable relationship with a surrounding, and necessarily opposing, capitalist environment—as this work does—is to locate it in thin air.


Reversal of neoliberal globalization causes transition wars and extinction – terrorism, diseases, and regional tensions


Sachs ’95,

(Jeffrey, Prof of International Trade @ Harvard, Consolidating Capitalism, Foreign Policy No. 98, questia)



For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?

Neolib Good- Democracy

Tremendous security benefits from neoliberal globalization


Weede ‘04 Weede, Erich. "The diffusion of prosperity and peace by globalization." INDEPENDENT REVIEW-OAKLAND- 9.2 (2004): 165-186.

Although neither “realist” theorizing about interstate politics (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) nor critical treatments of globalization (Gray 1998; Kapstein 1999) recognize it, a strong and beneficial link exists between globalization and the avoidance of war. In my view, the economic benefits of globalization and free trade are much less important than the international security benefits. The quantitative literature (Summarized by Weede 1996, chap. 8, and 2000, chap. 11) comes fairly close to general agreement n the following four propositions from economics, political sociology, and international relations. First, democracies rarely fight each other (Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). This finding does not necessarily imply that democracies fight fewer wars than do other regimes. It is even compatible with the view widely shared until recently that the risk of war between democracies and autocracies might be even higher than the risk of war between autocracies. I agree with critics of the democratic peace that we do not yet understand fully why democracies rarely fight each other and whether normative or institutional characteristics of democracies matter most. Explaining the democratic peace between Western democracies as “an imperial peace based on American power” (Rosatto 2003, 599) is not justified, however. Admittedly, I held this view thirty years ago (Weede 1975). Then I explained peace among U.S. allies by their common ties or even by their subordination to the United States. Later, however, I discovered that autocratic U.S. allies, in contrast to democratic U.S. allies, fought each other or against democratic U.S. allies, as the football war in Central America and the Falklands War illustrate. Thus, I became a convert to the democratic peace proposition. John Oneal, in an unpublished analyses carried out in Bonn in 2003, found that although the democratic-peace proposition consistently calls the imperial peace proposition into question, controlling for an imperial peace does not subvert the democratic-peace proposition. Second, prosperity, or high income per capita, promotes democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Lipset 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003; Rajapatirana 2004). Third, export orientation in poor countries and open markets in rich countries (that is, trade between rich and poor countries) promote growth and prosperity where they are needed most, in poor countries (Greenway and Nam 1988; Dollar 1992; Edwards 1998; Lindert and Williamson 2001, 37; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Rajapatirana 2004). Fourth, bilateral trade reduces the risk of war between dyads of nations (Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). As to why trade contributes to the prevention of war, two ideas come to mind. First, war is likely to disrupt trade. The higher the level of trade in a pair (dyad) of nations is, the greater the costs of trade disruption are likely to be. Second, commerce might contribute to the establishment or maintenance of moral capital (Ratnapala 2003), which has a civilizing and pacifying effect on citizens and statesmen. In the context of this article, however, answering the question of why trade affects conflict-proneness or providing the answer with some micro-foundation is less important than establishing the effect itself in empirical research.


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