Alliance Advantage Answers

Non-unique and no impact – China is pulling back from Senkaku to preserve relations – also no retal

The Japanese Coast Guard has been dispatching patrol vessels on regular rounds in response to the presence of Chinese ships in waters around the islands. While the Japanese Coast Guard keeps an eye on the activities of Chinese vessels, it is a law enforcement body and can only take action in civil incidents. Under the Japan Coast Guard Act, the role of the Coast Guard is to “ensure maritime safety”; its mission does not extend to defending territorial waters. It is not authorized to use force against foreign government vessels engaged in illegal activities and can only issue warnings or request ships to leave the area. Coast Guard patrol vessels ensure maritime safety and security in the vicinity of the Senkakus and minimally assert Japanese control of the islands by inhibiting incursions and limiting the duration Chinese ships stay in surrounding waters. Japan and China’s dispute over the Senkaku Islands emerged suddenly in the latter half of the 1960s. After that, tensions increased slowly until 2008, when the situation rapidly deteriorated. Japan’s move to nationalize the islands further strained relations and brought the dispute over the islands to a peak. But since around the middle of 2013 the situation has been holding more or less steady at the level of mutual eyeballing between the patrol vessels dispatched by the two nations to the waters around the Senkakus. This may be seen as a sign that the Japanese and Chinese governments have been taking steps to prevent the situation from deteriorating further and thereby keep things quiet between them as a precondition for the improvement of bilateral relations. Mutual efforts have been made to cool off public opinion, and China in particular has taken actions to quell extreme nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment. As evidence of this posture, the Maritime SDF and the Chinese navy have not deployed vessels in the vicinity of the islands but have limited themselves to providing of support for maritime surveillance and the like and stationing ships on remote standby in readiness for unexpected situations. The measured nature of this response may be seen as indicating that the Chinese have adopted a sensible, pragmatic mind-set: They are also concerned about the current state of Sino-Japanese relations and, in line with hopes of seeking improvement in the bilateral relationship, do not wish to see the situation regarding the Senkakus get any worse. This is a welcome sign, but Japan still needs to keep its guard up and be ready for developments involving the use of both hard and soft power.2

Alt cause – can’t resolve structural problems in Japan-China dispute

Yōji 6-10-14 Kōda Yōji, retired vice admiral of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, “Maritime Concerns and the Future of Sino-Japanese Relations”, Nippon.com, 6/10/14 http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a03102/ JDI14 LabBKG

The front-line issues of the Senkakus and of the Ryūkyūs and the western Pacific involve fundamental concerns of sovereignty and security for both China and Japan. This means it will be difficult to resolve them over the short term. Building mutual trust is a key element in the process of finding solutions. But official exchanges between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the Chinese military have been halted, and the only channels still open are the few exchanges between retired officers from the two countries. I know from my own experience with such exchanges that they help make up for the absence of official interactions, but they are quite roundabout. One impression I have formed from my contacts is that the Chinese, while keeping up their hard line on the Senkakus, are starting to look for a way out of the confrontation, having come to sense that the current course leads to a dead end, that staying on this course will hurt China’s national interests and could give rise to unexpected situations. As realistic steps to address these concerns, Japan and China urgently need to take trust-building measures and establish a crisis management system. Japan and China should look to the 1972 US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, a pioneering pact that built trust between the main adversaries in the Cold War. The establishment by Japan and Russia of the 1993 Agreement Concerning the Prevention of Incidents at Sea also served to improve bilateral relations and led to the development of a crisis management system.(*4) Japan and China need to forge a similar agreement. In order to achieve this, the two countries’ leaders will need show the same resolve as the US and Soviet leaders did during the Cold War. The key to success in this endeavor will be to keep the trust-building process distinct from the emotionally charged issues between the two countries. Both the leaders and the people of Japan and China must display the courage and magnanimity to view the issue of the Senkakus Islands separately from other matters; only in this way can we hope for a success story in the bilateral relationship.

Turn – US japan alliance strong now and causes conflict – china won’t initiate

CRI 6/1/14 CRI English, “Chinese Military Officer Lashes out at US-Japan Military Alliance” June 6, 2014 http://english.cri.cn/6909/2014/06/01/2821s829523.htm

A top Chinese military official has lashed out at the US and Japan, saying China opposes an assertive military alliance emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. Wang Guanzhong, Deputy Chief of General Staff for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, made the comments at an international security conference in Singapore. "We oppose the practice of military alliances flexing muscles against third parties, resorting to threat or the use of force or seeking so-called absolute security of one's own at the cost of the security of others." Wang's comments came a day after a much-watched speech delivered by U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Hagel criticized China as being the one taking unilateral actions on the South China Sea and said that the United States will maintain its leadership in the Asia Pacific and defend the interests of its allies. He also expressed support for Japan in releasing its so-called collective self-defense right, and reclaimed the U.S. position that the disputed Diaoyu Islands are under the mutual defense treaty with Japan. Wang said he did not expect the language of "hegemonism" and words of intimidation in Hagel's speech. The Chinese military officer underlines that no disputes or incidents have been initiated by China on sovereign and maritime issues.

AT: Russia-China War

Their authors are wrong, misleading and fear-mongering – Russia doesn’t truly fear China

Judah 13 Ben Judah, author of Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In And Out of Love With Vladimir Putin published by Yale University press, Open Democracy Russia, “Russia-China relations: fantasies and reality” January 21^st 2013 http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ben-judah/russia-china-relations-fantasies-and-reality

Russia-China relations are the stuff of fantasies and paranoia, which reflect the deepest held views about world affairs of those that expound them. They are what the West chooses to conjure up when they want to frighten Russia. Here is an example: ‘Not all of them yet realize that, whatever quarrels they have with Warsaw or Washington, these will soon pale beside the existential challenge they face along Russia's eastern and southern borders.’ These are not the threats of an armchair general but the Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, the great white hope of the EU, writing in The Economist. Chinese nightmares are also what the Russian foreign policy establishment stirs up to try and frighten the Kremlin into modernizing and investing diplomatic capital into East Asian visits and embassies. Listen to this terrified appeal from Sergey Karaganov, who has advised Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev about the wider world: ‘But, if current trends persist, Russia east of the Urals, and later the entire country, will become an appendage of China – a warehouse of resources, and then an economic and political vassal. No “aggressive” or unfriendly effort by China will be needed; Russia will be subdued by default.’ This kind of fear-mongering is not restricted to politicians or the politically minded. A recent New York Times special report announced that the borders of the Russian state are sooner or later, likely to be redrawn by a demographic tidal wave: ‘Russia’s greatest geopolitical fear is fed by a very plausible scenario — China, populous and resource-hungry, taking over large chunks of Siberia, part of Russia’s failing and emptying East. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese have already crossed the border at the Amur River and set up trading settlements, intermarrying with Russians and Siberia’s native nomadic minorities.’ Russia’s Chinese facts You could almost joke – ‘Tell me what you think about the future of the Sino-Russian relationship and I will tell you what you think about the future of Russia.’ Is Moscow a successful, sovereign raw-material exporter to the world? Is it in control of its dialogue with Beijing and has it secured its borders against corruption and migration? Is Russia a dystopian blend of Asiatic settlement in the Far East, with neo-Tsarist propaganda and little better than Central Asian bureaucracy at the centre? Then Moscow rules an illusion of empire, which has ended up completely dependent on Beijing. This is why we have decided to begin 2013 with this special series on Russia-China Relations: Fantasies and Realities. Our first theme is the fantasies and facts behind Russian foreign policy towards Beijing. Alexander Gabuyev, Moscow’s leading young writer on China, examines how Russian sinology has been in collapse and decay since the fall of the USSR, leading to a rise in ignorance, fear-mongering and bad policy choices by the Kremlin. Our second theme is the reality of the Russian Far East. In the summer of 2012 I spent several weeks travelling through the remote regions most settled by Chinese migrants, such as Birobidzhan, Khabarovsk and Primorye, for my forthcoming book ‘Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In And Out Of Love With Vladimir Putin’. I draw on this experience to argue Russia is not losing Siberia. To look at what the politics of Putin’s Far East really are, Russia’s leading reportage writer Olesya Gerasimenko shows how surprisingly un-Asian, but shockingly hostile to Moscow the region has become. Opening up each power’s world-view, we present the foreign policy dreams of leading Russian and Chinese specialists. Pavel Salin, a frequent commentator in Russia’s leading journal Russia In Global Affairs, argues that Moscow has taken fright at an impending Chinese world order and need to recalibrate its position in world affairs, especially towards the United States. The view from China is presented by Liu Jun from the country’s hub of Russia studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai. He lays out what China’s new leadership wants from Russia and why the USA’s return to Asia means that Moscow and Beijing might have to draw closer.

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