Arkansas Tech University The Culture Wars & Political Polarization in Perspective
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G.W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Speech War in Iraq Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ Speech Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Speech Bush’s ‘New World Order’ Speech Berlin Wall Comes Down Clinton Administration 
Defense Spending / Foreign Policy Bimodality – A Rational Public Reacts to the Real World As I pointed out in assessing the linear models of trends in the issue self placements reported in Table 7.4, the OLS regression model of defense spending overtime is a poor fit for the data. The linear model of defense doesn’t work because the defense spending trend is distinctly non-linear, as is apparent in Figure 7.6. The conflict over defense policy, as captured in the playtkurtic distribution on defense policy, increased from the outset of Ronald Reagan’s presidency and only began to improve as George H. W. Bush succeeded Reagan in 1988. Shortly thereafter the Berlin wall came down and the slow-motion collapse of the Soviet Union is coincident with a marked decrease in the bimodality for the distribution of opinion on defense spending. This was followed by a period of relative peace (dubbed by George H.W. Bush as the “New World Order”) and no commitments of significant forces of U.S. ground troops in active military conflict during the Clinton administration (the Serbian-Kosovo war was mostly conducted through the air). This would all change with the dual terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11th, 2001. Those attacks spurred a new buildup in defense spending with two separate land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The measure of bimodality in Figure 7.6 tracks with these broad foreign policy and defense policy-related events: trending increasingly bimodal during the Cold War, then strongly unimodal during the New World Order, and finally trending once again towards bimodality during the Bush administration in the first decade of the 21st century. While there appears to be a strong relationship between the exogenous foreign policy events that defined distinct defense policy periods over the past thirty-plus years, this is not the final word on opinion polarization on defense spending. As I noted earlier, there are multiple potential causal factors operating independently and in concert to influence and structure public opinion on defense spending and, by implication, foreign policy. In order to take a more sophisticated look at defense spending opinion, we need to incorporate the other factors which theory and experience suggest are potentially significant factors. One such is the defense spending levels themselves. While the raw levels of defense spending would be one and perhaps appropriate measure of defense spending, I look at defense spending as a percentage of GDP. This controls for confounding factors such as inflation and budget-creep, and it permits a more valid measure of defense spending—assessing how much of the economic pie defense-related spending consumes in a given year. I report the actual level of defense spending from 1980 to 2003 as a percentage of GDP in Figure 7.7. Note that spending on defense peaked in the mid-1980’s, at the height of the Cold War, and steadily declined in the post-Soviet Union period of George H.W. Bush’s “New World Order” and on through the span of the Clinton administration. It begins to tick back up post-911 as the prosecution of two wars—Afghanistan and Iraq—required significant increases in defense appropriations. In March 1983, Ronald Reagan gave two famous speeches that set the agenda for his presidency on foreign policy: a more aggressive, judgmental and confrontational stance towards the Soviet Union matched with a substantial defense spending build-up. On March 8, 1983, President Reagan delivered Figure 7.7: Defense Spending as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1980-200351 September 11th Attacks Clinton Administration Berlin Wall Comes Down 
“Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today…a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from the rain" – Ronald Reagan, 1983 an address to a meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. In it, he referred to communism as "the focus of evil in the modern world," and it quickly became known as his "Evil Empire Speech." Reagan had similar language in a speech to the British Parliament in 1982, but aides struck the language before Reagan delivered it. The Evil Empire speech was delivered at a time when Congress was debating a resolution in support of a "nuclear freeze," a doctrine supported by the Soviet Union that would have prevented the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II Missiles in Europe. On March 7, President Reagan had met with a conservative leaders and Hawkish officials in regards to the nuclear freeze legislation moving through Congress. The President reiterated his opposition to the nuclear freeze, and meeting participants urged him to go public on the topic and make an appeal directly to the people. According to a contemporaneous report by the President's National Security Advisor Judge William Clark, the president added the famous paragraphs to the speech he delivered the next day to the National Association of Evangelicals. As the National Center for Public Policy Research put it, “Those additional paragraphs turned it from a routine, if worthy, speech to one that electrified dissidents behind the Iron Curtain and appalled Reagan's domestic opposition, including much of the press” (Reagan 1983). While the speech itself is not a cause of defense spending, this speech (and the subsequent presidential speeches mentioned here) are a marker for major changes in foreign policy as a consequence of presidential vision and/or historical circumstance. In the same month, Regan delivered a speech to the nation on national security and the defense budget. On March 23rd, 1983, Reagan delivered his speech, which focused on the debate in Congress over defense spending cuts and the ‘nuclear freeze,’ the threat of the continued buildup of nuclear arms by the Soviet Union, the necessity of addressing the defense spending crisis due to neglect of the defense budget during the Carter administration, and his administration’s commitment to guaranteeing “peace through strength.” Towards the end of the speech Reagan advocated the Strategic Defense Initiative (though SDI wasn’t mentioned specifically), a defense spending program aimed at developing a technological solution to the threat of intercontinental ballistic missile attacks through, in part, the deployment of satellites into space (Reagan 1983). Dr. Carol Rosin is credited with first referring to the program as “Star Wars,” a derisive term intended to suggest the whole concept of missile defense was fantastical. Hailed by supporters as a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union, SDI was a very controversial program. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke out strongly against SDI. And Reagan’s domestic opponents attacked SDI, the deployment of missiles in Europe, and the “cowboy” diplomacy of the Reagan administration. All of this played into an atmosphere of intense partisan and political conflict over defense policy, diplomacy, Reagan’s foreign policy, and the Cold War. This is evident in the playtkurtic trend in the kurtosis of defense spending opinion (Figure 7.6). Whatever the ultimate cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union during George H.W. Bush’s administration in the early part of the 1990’s52, the consequence was a significant shift in actual defense spending and the perception of defense spending in the American electorate. As is apparent from Figure 7.7, the reduction in defense spending, at least as a percentage of GDP, began in the first year of the GHW Bush administration and declined steadily through 2000 with the sole exception of 1992. In the wake of the successful and low-casualty war in the Gulf in 1990-91, George H. Bush, as many erstwhile prognosticators before him, asserted an end to war as a function of traditional balance of power international politics or the adventurism of opportunistic nation. The “New World Order” that George H. Bush declared in his March 6th, 1991 speech involved the use of a coalition, backed by international organizations such as NATO and the United Nations, to enforce an international ‘law’ against aggressor states and an idealistic vision of a world in which war (rather than coalition-backed police actions) is an anachronism. War would—if not disappear—certainly change in a fundamental way. And efforts by ambitious nations to act outside of the framework of international law would be met by a united world and a coalition of nations ready to punish the transgressor. Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order… A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. - George H. W. Bush, 1991
"I know…that the United States cannot--indeed, we should not--be the world's policeman, and I know this is a time, with the Cold War over, that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our shores." -William J. Clinton, 1994 Clinton promised dramatic defense cutbacks and, while initially subscribing to ‘holding budgets’ rather than initiating a rollback of Cold War defense spending, his administration witnessed a marked decline in defense spending. As Figure 7.7 illustrates, defense spending declines from 5% of GDP in 1992 to 3% of GDP in 2000. This represents a 40% reduction in defense spending over the eight years of the Clinton administration. The decline in defense spending was marked by a philosophical move away from intervention. Under Clinton, the only significant commitment of ground troops was in Haiti, a quintessential police action in the mold of “New World Order” foreign policy. The Serbian conflict was almost exclusively prosecuted by air power, and Clinton withdrew forces from Bosnia after a high-profile botched operation resulted in several U.S. marine casualties. The defense spending cutbacks, base closures, and an apparent reluctance on the part of Clinton (either due to non-interventionist foreign policy philosophy or a concern that Clinton’s own war-protesting and draft avoidance would make the serious commitment of ground troops by him a political problem beyond the efficacy of the military decision) to commit troops on the ground resulted in a minimalist interventionist strategy during the Clinton years. Indeed, even in such minor altercations as the Haiti police action, where the U.S. met no significant military opposition, Clinton couched the actions in terms of a reluctance to intervene in international affairs (Blumenthal 1994). States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. -George W. Bush, 2002
On March 20th, 2003, Operation Iraqi freedom was initiated and the Iraq war was underway. Though initially an unvarnished military success, the toppling of Saddam Hussein would give way to an insurgency and an intense sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunni’s that would seriously undercut support for the mission in Iraq in the public. While the Bush doctrine was the philosophical basis for the war, in the public campaign to win support for the war the administration emphasized the threat posed by Iraq given its believed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. The failure to find significant stockpiles by the Iraq Survey Group would prove a significantly polarizing event, as it lead the opposition to the war and the Bush administration to charge that Bush had “lied” us into war. The September 11th attacks were the impetus for the largest “Rally around the Flag” effect since we began measuring public opinion (Figure 7.8). George W. Bush was the recipient of the highest job approval rating for a president in the history of public opinion polling, topping out at 89% approval in October 2001, the month after the attacks. These numbers were unsustainable given a return to some sense of normalcy in politics. Clearly the prosecution of the War on Terror, particularly in Iraq, served to seriously erode public support for the Bush administration (Figure 7.8). Though Bush narrowly won reelection over John Kerry in 2004, that year would mark the last in which his approval rating would exceed his disapproval rating. With the security difficulties in Iraq, the difficulties in establishing a stable, democratic Iraqi government with the participation of Iraqi Sunni and Shiite leaders, and the growing number of casualties brought on by the Iraqi Insurgency, Bush lost the confidence of the public on the war. By 2007, the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) had declared a civil war underway in Iraq, and the anti-war movement was putting on large demonstrations across the country. Though the appointment of General Petraeus and Figure 7.8: George W. Bush Job Approval Rating (Gallup / USA Today Poll), February, 2001 – December, 200853 Invasion of Iraq Interim Report Iraq Survey Group: No WMD Found NIE: Civil War in Iraq Iraqi Insurgency September 11th Attacks 
the 2006 “surge” of forces reestablished security and reduced casualty counts, the die was cast on the Bush administration and the Iraq war in the eyes of the public. While pop stars writing colorful song lyrics accusing Bush of ‘lying’ the country into war and large anti-war demonstrations on the Mall in Washington, D.C. suggest polarization and political conflict over foreign policy, they are not sufficient markers in and of themselves. A March 2003 poll showed that only 5% of the public reported having participated in an anti-war protest or having made a public demonstration against the war (Bowman 2008). Furthermore, there is nothing to say that either pop stars or large protest demonstrations are representative of the public at large, or even of a substantial portion of the public. Large protests against the war were organized in 2003, when approval for the war was at 65% and approval of President Bush was in the sixties. Intensity of opposition does not connote the frequency of opposition. The bimodality trend in public opinion on defense spending in Figure 7.6, however, provides a measure of conflict independent of these unreliable polarization markers. It shows that conflict within society was significant in the 1980’s, declined in the 1990’s, and has spiked in the first decade of the 21st century. But what is causing these shifts of American public towards and away from “two camps” status? The linear model of defense spending bimodality (Table 7.4) doesn’t fit well because, as is apparent in Figure 7.6, the trend in bimodality on the defense spending issue scale is decidedly nonlinear. While there is an overall positive trend for the time-series due (at least in part) to the substantial move towards consensus coincident with the collapse of the Soviet Union up until the events of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent war in Iraq, this trend masks the significant bimodality during the height of the Cold War in the 1980’s as well as precipitous decline in consensus on defense and foreign policy in the post-9/11 world. But why have the trends in the division of the American public over defense spending been so volatile? In order to answer this question, as with government spending, I can assess trends in actual defense spending with the trends derivative of public attitudes on defense spending from the ANES using Z-Scores: Equation 7.2: Z-Score for Defense Spending ZDS = Where:
As I noted with government spending, this allows for a direct comparison of the variables despite the fact that they are scaled using different scales and units. As such, the values for defense spending (%GDP), average opinion on defense spending, and the bimodality of defense spending are translated into differences from their respective means and standardized relative to the Z-distribution (Z-scores) centered on a mean of zero and a standard deviation equal to 1. The z-scores for defense spending bimodality and for actual defense spending are reported in Figure 7.9. In order to match increases onthe defense spending scale with increases in bimodality (conflict), I flip the z-scores for defense spending kurtosis and report the negative z-score for defense spending (Figure 7.10). As Figure 7.10 shows, the variance in the bimodality of defense spending and actual defense spending as a percentage of GDP track very closely together. Indeed, it is easier to point out incongruities than it is congruities. In the early part of the 1990’s, defense spending bimodality is well below the actual defense spending levels in terms of deviation from the mean. In 1992, we see more polarization, above that of the declining defense spending levels. Finally, in the later part of the 2000’s polarization is again on the rise, outstripping even the significant increase in defense spending levels. In Figure 7.11 I include the trend in the Z-scores for defense spending means. There is an apparent inverse
relationship between the mean public opinion on increasing or decreasing spending relative to actual defense spending levels. As actual defense spending levels become more extreme relative to the mean defense spending levels for the period, public opinion on what the level of defense spending should be moves in the opposite direction. There are three readily apparent explanations for the trend in bimodality we observe from 1980 to 2008. Briefly, they are public responsiveness to the status quo on defense spending, partisanship, and defense-related exogenous shocks and foreign policy. The first and perhaps simplest explanation for the shifts in bimodality of defense spending is the mass public reacting to changes in the status quo on defense spending. Indeed Figures 7.10 and 7.11 seem to show this is pretty much the entire story. But to conclude that is premature. There are apparent relationships, in both means and kurtosis, between the presidential administration and exogenous foreign policy events as well. While we only have two switches in the party of the presidential administration (GHW Bush Clinton; Clinton GW Bush), bimodality in defense spending as well as the mean preferred defense spending level are distinctly different between Republican and Democratic administrations. There was more conflict/polarization, as measured by kurtosis, in Republican administrations as opposed to the Democratic administration in the time series. Why might this be? It is possible that the Left and its anti- war faction are more active in relation to defense spending when Republicans control the White House (and hence foreign policy and the military), given their presumably Hawkish disposition, as opposed to Democrats. Or, at least in the case of Bill Clinton, who was not only a Democrat but who had protested the Vietnam War, had avoided the draft, and instituted the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy on gays in the military. Figure 7.11: Bimodality Trend (-Z-Score) Actual Defense Spending % GDP (Z-Score), Public Opinion on Defense Spending (Z-Score), 1980-2008 Download 4.38 Mb. Share with your friends:
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