2.3.1 Principles
The Review Committee considers that the following principles should guide the direction of programs by which the Australian community seeks to achieve its quarantine goal. These principles are that:
· programs should be national in their approach;
· objectives, formulation of policy and delivery within and between programs should be consistent;
· programs should be effectively coordinated to ensure objectives are met;
· programs should be transparent;
· effective consultation and communication are necessary to ensure community awareness and ownership of programs;
· programs should aim to maintain or improve the protection of Australia's human, animal and plant health status and its natural environment;
· programs should reflect Australia's national and international obligations.
2.3.2 The Continuum of Quarantine
The Review Committee believes that there is a need for a fundamental shift in the culture of quarantine. The goal of quarantine can be most effectively achieved by:
· implementing measures offshore to reduce the threat of entry;
· using well-targeted border controls;
· ensuring early detection of incursions; and
· having emergency responses to contain, control or eradicate incursions.
The Review Committee views effective quarantine as a continuum reflecting a nationally coordinated system of surveillance, inspection and control using pre-border, border and post-border measures to prevent the establishment and spread of unwanted pests or diseases that may have a deleterious effect on humans, animals, plants or the natural environment. At present, activities under the three elements of the continuum of quarantine — pre-border, border and post-border — are addressed by each segment of the Australian community in different ways. Although responsibility across the continuum should be coordinated at a national level, this does not necessarily imply that a single authority should have sole responsibility for the development, implementation and funding of all quarantine-related programs.
Quarantine is a community responsibility. Hence the responsibility for the development, implementation and funding of the specific elements of quarantine policies and programs should be shared between governments, industry and the general public. However, it is important that one agency assumes responsibility for the coordination of the respective quarantine elements of the continuum to ensure that the goal of quarantine is met. The Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) delivers an efficient and effective quarantine operation — pre-border, border and post-border — for northern Australia. In essence, NAQS is a program that is based on the notion of a continuum of quarantine, an approach that the Review Committee believes needs to be adopted nationally. Such an approach is supported by a number of peak organisations within the Australian community, including the National Farmers' Federation, which refers to it as a 'holistic' approach.
Individual elements of the continuum were addressed in a number of written and oral submissions to the Review. For instance, submissions such as that of the Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry argued that 'the culture of prevention is the first line of defence and the level of recognition of this culture should be regarded as a priority'. The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) does this in part through the development of import protocols aimed at reducing the risk of infected or infested product departing from its source. However, collaborative work can also be undertaken to reduce the prevalence of pests and diseases offshore, particularly with Australia's northern neighbours and those countries with which Australia has significant contact through trade or tourism. This is discussed further in Chapter 6 on Offshore Activities.
Similarly, other submissions to the Review made the point that responsibility for protecting human, animal and plant health does not diminish once goods are quarantine cleared at the border. For example, the submission from The Botanical Ark argued that 'quarantine does not end once a seed germinates or a plant is released from the quarantine house — we must constantly observe the health and vigour of the plants and monitor their potential as weeds'. In the past, this element of the quarantine continuum has been performed primarily by States and industry. Unfortunately, budget cuts have seen a number of States severely reduce their agricultural field and laboratory services. This is discussed further in Chapter 9 on Monitoring and Surveillance and in Chapter 10 on Preparedness and Response.
Formal emergency response plans to incursions into Australia are currently limited to about 20 pests and diseases of animals, and to even fewer pests and diseases of plants. This deficiency is now being addressed by a task force under the umbrella of the Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand and the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management. Similarly, the Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services is working on emergency responses for incursions affecting human health. This element of quarantine is discussed further in Chapter 10 on Preparedness and Response.
The continuum of quarantine requires a partnership between each member of the Australian community. Its effective and efficient implementation requires each member of the community to take ownership and responsibility for delivery of its share of various programs (see Section 2.4).
To be fully effective, quarantine programs must be coordinated on a national basis and developed with a national perspective. AQIS currently has overall responsibility for national quarantine policy and service delivery, although the States and the Commonwealth, through well-established consultative arrangements, work together on specific policy issues. In some States (the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia), service delivery is also undertaken by State staff under operational guidelines developed and disseminated by AQIS.
Uniformity and consistency in the application of procedures, cost-effectiveness of administration and planning, and flexibility of staff use are key factors in a national approach to the coordination and development of quarantine programs. Anything less can lead to a reduction in confidence in the program by Australian and international communities. During the conduct of the Review, the Review Committee saw evidence of a number of instances of inconsistency in approach to quarantine between regional operations, particularly with respect to inspection procedures. A number of written submissions to the Review also raised the issue of inconsistency of implementation of quarantine policy (see Chapter 8 on Border Activities). The Review Committee is also aware that in delivering quarantine policy on behalf of the Commonwealth, States have tended to overlay their own imperatives or interpretation on some national quarantine policies, resulting in inconsistency of implementation and confusion for industry, domestically and internationally. This lack of uniformity and consistency is to the detriment of effective and efficient quarantine for Australia.
Recommendation 3: The Review Committee recommends that the goal of quarantine be achieved through a nationally coordinated, consistent and transparent quarantine system using pre-border, border and post-border measures.
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