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Link – Mexican violence

Fear of Mexican violence is based on an inaccurate headline-driven spectalization---this causes militarized responses and structural violence


Correa-Cabrera 14 - Associate Professor and Chair of the Government Department of the Uni- versity of Texas at Brownsville. Her areas of expertise are Mexico-U.S. relations, border security, immigration, and organized crime. Her teaching fields include comparative politics, Latin American politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, U.S.-Mexico border policy, comparative public policy and public administration, and American Hispanic politics. Guadalupe’s most recent book is entitled Democracy in ‘Two Mexicos’: Political Institutions in Oa- xaca and Nuevo León

(Guadalupe, w/ Terence Garrett, and Michelle Keck, “Administrative Surveillance and Fear: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Border Relations and Governance,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 96)//BB



Similar to immigration, the illegal drug trade has been defined by the U.S. government as a potential terrorist threat due to the recent increase in drug violence in Mexico. The rise in violence has raised fears among U.S. policymakers regarding the Mexican government’s ability to control the drug cartels. For example, U.S. House Representative Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, has introduced legislation that would designate top Mexican TCOs, including the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, the Arellano Félix Organization, Los Zetas, La Fa- milia Michoacana, the Beltrán Leyva brothers, and the Juárez Cartel as for- eign terrorist organizations (Aguilar 2011b). Such a designation would give U.S. law enforcement personnel additional tools to fight Mexican originat- ed TCOs, including the ability to freeze assets and increase penalties for certain offenses. Several lawmakers have backed McCaul’s legislation – including former U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes whose spokesman noted in 2011 that cartels, ‘Frequently engage in brutal acts of narco- terrorism to undermine democratic institutions and the rule of law, and to incite fear among the people and law enforcement’ (Aguilar 2011b, para. 9).¶ U.S. media and the politics of fear¶ Given the wide exposure the issue has received in the media, it is evident that fear plays a key role in the discourse on border issues, U.S. immigra- tion policy, and national security policy.3 Most often this fear is associated with terrorism, undocumented immigration, and with the potential spread of Mexican drug-related violence into the U.S. These purported threats to U.S. national security are almost universally said to be literally climbing over the U.S. southern border from Mexico.¶ This growing sense of fear has evolved and gotten more complex since the turn of the century. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and former President Felipe Calderón’s ‘war on drugs’, which began as Calde- rón began his first year in power at the end of 2006, are key events that have changed the image of Mexico in the eyes of the U.S. public. As a re- sult, fear has become an essential component of U.S. policy towards its southern neighbour. Mass media are essential to spreading this growing sense of fear. ‘The corporate media has been exploiting fear for decades in their excessive presentation of murder and violence and dramatization of a¶ wide range of threats from foreign enemies and within everyday life’ (Kellner 2003, 91). It is worth mentioning that some journalists who work for the mainstream media seem to have their own or imposed agendas, given the marketing prospects of bloody sounding headlines.¶ Nowadays, in the U.S., the idea of a terrorist threat, and the fear that it can come through the southern border has combined with the unprecedent- ed levels of drug violence in Mexico, and the possibility that this violence could also spill across the U.S.-Mexico border. The perception of a deadly threat made up of drug violence and terrorism creeping over the border and the need to combat its entrance into the U.S., has created a media spectacle (Debord 1967/1995; Edelman 1964/1985; Kellner 2003, 2007, 2008), detrimental to societies and partially responsible for the continuation of the phenomenon of what we could define as ‘the politics of fear’.¶ This media spectacle weds concepts such as ‘narco-insurgency’ and ‘narco-terrorism’, and has even brought in the possibility of an alliance of the U.S. deadliest enemy – Al Qaeda – and the brutal Zetas organized crime group. The attention such a spectacle generates has intensified fear in the U.S., especially among U.S. border residents. In turn, this growing fear is used to justify extreme border security measures, including harsh legislation against undocumented immigrants (Correa-Cabrera 2012).

Representation of cartel violence as an existential risk obscures root causes and ensures violent US imperialism---deconstruction of this narrative promotes counterhegemonic alternatives


Carlos 14 – PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine

(Alfredo, “Mexico “Under Siege” Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?,” Latin American Perspectives March 2014 vol. 41 no. 2, 10.1177/0094582X13509069)//BB



According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (quoted in Dibble, 2010) described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. The Los Angeles Times (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces. More important, it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination.¶ The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story. In that regard discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful.¶ Previous Section¶ Next Section¶ Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses¶ Michel Foucault (1972–1977: 120) argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth.” Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power. This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” In essence, power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it. Similarly, Edward Said (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. He says that literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” (Said, 1994: xiii). They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.¶ Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance (36). Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action. For Said, there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge.” They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth.¶ Dominant discourses, meta-narratives (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites. Western1 powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies (Dunn, 2003). Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” Consequently, dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions, particularly economic ones.¶ Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism.¶ Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations.¶ This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North (the United States) and scholars from the South (Latin America, Africa, et al.) and even between white and nonwhite (American Latino) scholars. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003).¶ It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal, as Lynch (1999) points out, is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives.

Link – failed state discourse

Representation of Mexico as a failed states gives military cart blanche for imperial intervention


Carlos 14 – PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine

(Alfredo, “Mexico “Under Siege” Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?,” Latin American Perspectives March 2014 vol. 41 no. 2, 10.1177/0094582X13509069)//BB



A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35):¶ The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.¶ Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999).¶ Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s.

This narrative is a product of western imperialism---used to scapegoat foreign countries to justify widespread violence at home


Carlos 14 – PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine

(Alfredo, “Mexico “Under Siege” Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?,” Latin American Perspectives March 2014 vol. 41 no. 2, 10.1177/0094582X13509069)//BB



Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others” (Said, 1994). This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it.In 2010 there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico.¶ In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state.”¶ View this table:¶ In this window In a new window¶ Download to PowerPoint Slide¶ Table 1¶ Homicide Rates by Country¶ Furthermore, while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period.¶ The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs.¶ There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence.¶ Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination.

This discursive construction justifies intervention


Dear 13 – PhD, professor in the College of Environmental Design at UC Berkeley

(Michael, “Why walls won’t work,” p. 134-136)//BB



Complaints about a Mexican narco-state often seamlessly shift into accusa-tions that Mexico is a "failed state," that is, a state incapable of carrying out its basic functions. Reporting to the US Council on Foreign Relations in 2,008, Pamela Starr warned that Mexico was on its way to becoming a failed state, linking this condition to the rise of a lawless society ruled by drug cartels:∂ The violence [in Mexico] threatens the government's ability to govern effectively. It threatens oil supply. It makes Mexico a potential transit point for terrorists. The worst thing in the world that could happen to the United States is to have an unstable country on its southern border.17∂ Notice how the stakes get raised in this assessment, moving from a concern with a single problem (drug-related violence), through potential failure of the state as a whole, to an invocation of national security. Starr was not alone in ber prognostication. Former federal drug czar Barry McCaffrey warned: "Mexico is on the edge of an abyss."58 A year later, Michael Hayden, former head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, put Mexico on top of his list of international worries with this heart-stopping sentence: "Mexico is one of the gravest dangers to American security, on a par with a nuclear-armed Iran.""∂ The notion of a "failed state" is poorly defined and controversial. The cavalier manner with which the term is bandied about only adds confusion. It has been applied, for instance, to a small African nation governed by a brutal dictator engaged in bloody civil war while its citizens face starvation, but also to state governments in the US that arc beset by partisan gridlock, bloated budget deficits, and disenchanted electorates (the roster includes New York and California).∂ A state may be said to have "failed" when it is unable to satisfactorily exe-cute its most basic functions, including maintaining public order, resisting external threat, and ensuring the well-being of its population. If the breakdown is severe, in a democratic society the compromised government loses the consent of the governed and may be replaced by a successor in the normal course of electoral politics. In nondemocratic societies, the transition beyond a failed state may involve overt conflict to the point of revolution.∂ Even if it occurs, state failure is unlikely to apply equally across all sectors and levels of government operations, still less over an entire territory. After Hurricane Katrina, for instance, US federal emergency response proved to be inadequate; however, the remainder of Washington DCs government apparatus continued to function, and FEMA's failure was confined to the geographical region most severely affected by natural disaster. In other words, the nation-state's dysfunctionality was sector-specific and geographically localized; it did not warrant labeling the US a failed state. Another difficulty in understanding what state failure entails is revealed by contemplating what it means to talk about a "successful" state. For example, can a state be regarded as successful if its performance is based on the repression and suffering of its citizenry, or on the rapacious subordination of other nation-states?∂ The term failed state is deeply flawed, perhaps to the point of incoherence. The desire to label a country as a failed state has less to do with existing conditions in the country under examination and more to do with the moti-vations of the nation doing the name-calling. Identifying Mexico as a failed∂ state allowed the US to fold that country into its national security rhetoric and protocols, thereby calling forth financial aid and justifying other kinds of intervention (such as cooperative law enforcement).6' Even if inappropriately applied, the label may yet cause harm if other nations regard it as an accept-able pretext for intervention. Before awarding or condoning the failed state appellation, it is prudent to check who is doing the name-calling and why.

Link – economic impact

Fear of economic losses is grounded in the Border-Industrial-Complex---relies on the racist construction of Mexican-as-criminal and promotes militarized responses to limited crime


Weissman 14 - Distinguished Professor of Law University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law

(Deborah, “The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality,” SSRN)//BB



It is not only the invocation of the threat of a foreign invasion of dangerous criminals that serves as justification for the heightened U.S. military response to Mexico’s drug cartels. Drug cartel violence increased as the United States and Mexico were establishing a more integrated economy through NAFTA.52 Demands for a military response were advanced for the purpose of protecting emerging transnational trade and commercial networks. In fact, plans for new cross- border military initiatives appeared when drug violence began to affect important industrial corridors.53 As political analyst Laura Carlsen explains, the United States “sought a means to extend its national security doctrine to its regional trade partners.”54 Counter-terrorisminitiatives, she notes, were in fact designed to protect “strategic resources and investments.”55 Assistant Secretary of State Tom Shannon called these strategies the “armoring [of] NAFTA.”56¶ Congressional representatives justify support for transnational intervention against drug cartel violence in defense of U.S. economic well-being.57 Multinational corporate executives have expressed concern about the loss of profits in areas of construction and tourism due to the violence and appealed to the U.S. government to curtail the chaos.58 Others with interests in supply-chain maquiladoras and manufacturing interests located in Mexico have expressed concerns about the volatile circumstances in Mexico and the effects on business profitability.59 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce called for action to address the imminent threat to business interests while invoking the specter of “border-related security challenges and the threat of terrorism.”60 At the same time, U.S. defense contractors have benefitted from the sale of military equipment and business interests promote the privatization of security to protect their investments.61¶ That the Congressional Quarterly data demonstrates that border cities such as El Paso and San Diego, in close proximity with Mexican cities once considered the most dangerous in Mexico, have the lowest crime rates in the United States, somehow has not fit into the narrative calculus.62 A study that analyzed over a decade of crime data of the four U.S.-Mexico border states that included information from 1,600 local law enforcement agencies as well as federal crime statistics found that “U.S. border cities were statistically safer on average than other cities in their states. Those border cities, big and small, have maintained lower crime rates than the national average...”63 Moreover, as one researcher has observed, Mexicans attempting to cross the border are all “lumped in with drug and human traffickers,” without discernment between those who seek to migrate to the United States “because of the disastrous economic and employment situation created by policies like NAFTA” and cartel members who may desire to traffic drugs.64 Whether the threat is expressed as one of gruesome death or the demise of profits, the dominant narrative fosters the misperception of increasing rates of crime and violence along the southwestern border and puts the U.S. on war-footing with Mexico and the ubiquitous Mexican-as-criminal.65

Impact – war


***this card should maybe be 1nc impact card

The narrative of Mexican escalation facilitates global policing and unrestrained militarism


---militarization incites Mexican escalation

Weissman 14 - Distinguished Professor of Law University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law

(Deborah, “The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality,” SSRN)//BB



The narrative of Mexican drug war violence fits within the description of a “noisy construction [ ] manifest[ed] in moral panic accompanied by high levels of public, political, and media attention.”67 It performs as the specter of transnational crime and serves as the “new moral imperative” for extraterritorial intervention and transnational policing.68 The rhetoric of war has shaped the principles around which relations with Mexico are organized.69 As one expert observed, “[t]o frame the problem as an insurgency almost necessarily invites a military response”—and in this case, it is a response consummated through transnational legal processes.70 This section reviews the transnational legal agreements that have legitimized the militarization strategies and authorized U.S. intervention in the national security and constitutional legal affairs of Mexico.¶ (a). Bilateral Legal Transactions: Legalizing Military Initiatives¶ A series of militarization strategies have been countenanced through binational legal¶ transactions enacted between the United States and Mexico.71 These arrangements are best characterized by agreements that have authorized U.S. intervention in Mexico in the form of an armed offensive against drug trafficking organizations—a war fought on Mexican territory.¶ These agreements have legalized joint law enforcement operations within Mexico and on the U.S.-Mexico border.72 New accords have authorized U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to carry out “in depth investigations” with Mexican law enforcement agents.73 U.S.-Mexico pacts have expanded the jurisdiction of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) whose agents have been permitted to engage in surveillance, arrests, and seizures in Mexico.74 They have empowered the U.S. military’s Joint Task Force-Six to conduct covert troop operations, eighty percent of these in Mexico.75 Some of these agreements require Mexican governmental institutions to accommodate the presence of U.S. agencies within their offices.76 Recently, U.S.-proposed legislation seeks to militarize Mexico’s southern border through a ‘‘Foreign Military Financing Program’’ in response to the crisis of Central American children fleeing violence.77 These legal transactions function as a “politics of authority” and reinforce fear and nationalistic rhetoric.78¶ The most important transnational legal response to the narrative of drug violence has been the Mérida Initiative, a congressionally funded mandate to intervene in the Mexican drug cartel phenomenon.79 Enacted in October 2007, this “regional security partnership” was¶ designed to develop a heightened military response to Mexico’s drug wars.80 A joint U.S.- Mexico statement set forth its primary purpose: “to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to fight criminal organizations.”81 The plan, when first initiated, involved four goals: 1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) assist in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems; and 4) curtail gang activity and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.82¶ The Mérida Initiative was enacted to “enhance the ability of the Government of Mexico, in cooperation with the United States, to control illicit narcotics production, trafficking, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and organized crime” as well as to “strengthen respect for internationally-recognized human rights and the rule of law.” 83 Congress, at the inception, however, promoted the pact as one that needed to focus first and foremost on “assistance to the armed forces of Mexico.”84 Mérida Initiative funding has exceeded $1.2 billion in foreign aid, most of which has been allocated for the Mexican purchase of U.S. military equipment, new surveillance technologies, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and for the training of Mexican police.85 U.S. military officials have deemed the Mérida Initiative a directive to prepare Mexico’s military “for a war much like the ones Washington is waging in Afghanistan and¶ Iraq.86 Since 2008, funding for the Initiative has doubled and is presently the largest U.S. foreign aid program. 87¶ Critics have questioned the very premises of the Mérida Initiative.88 Mexico experts have observed that the plan’s purpose was wrong-headed from the start:¶ “The official intention to ‘fight criminal organizations . . . [and] disrupt drug- trafficking . . . weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities and currency smuggling, and human trafficking’... cannot be reconciled with the Mexican military’s record of human rights abuses or with the fact that money laundering and weapons trafficking have never been tightly regulated by the United States.”89¶ As a result of these transnational agreements, human rights advocates have documented discernible and destructive consequences.90 According to 145 civil society organizations in the region, they have enabled war strategies that have resulted in a “dramatic surge in violent crime, often reportedly perpetrated by security forces themselves.”91 Efforts to suppress the cartels through military means demonstrably increased the violence and resulted in untold numbers of human rights abuses, including rapes, murder, harassment of labor and land activists, and torture of innocent citizens at the hands of security forces.92 Drug cartel operations became more sophisticated in response to Mérida’s military initiatives. Some Mexican soldiers trained by U.S. military personnel subsequently left the Mexican army and joined the violent cartels where they¶ have carried out acts of gruesome brutality.93 As one Mexican writer put it, “[y]ou didn’t have to be a genius to see that a military challenge to the narcos would lead to the militarisation of the narcos.”94 The U.S. State Department’s annual report on human rights in Mexico, notwithstanding its support for the Mérida Initiative, also found that “accusations of [Mexican] army abuses had risen sixfold” since the offensive against drug cartels began and documented evidence of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and torture.95 One human rights group observed that the Mérida Initiative has turned Ciudad Juárez into “Mexico’s Baghdad.”96

Impact – structural violence

Focus on Cartel violence masks structural factors that devastate Mexican people---causes inequality, poverty and violence


Carlos 14 – PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine

(Alfredo, “Mexico “Under Siege” Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?,” Latin American Perspectives March 2014 vol. 41 no. 2, 10.1177/0094582X13509069)//BB



The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones (O’Reilly, 2013), and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people. Even at its most basic level, we can only call this imperialism.¶ While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico.¶ The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism.¶ For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary.¶ The irony of it all is that NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest. In the end, the way Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people. This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.

Alt solvency / AT perm

The 1ac’s narrative of escalating violence precludes effective responses that remedy structural inequalities---disruptive reframing solves


Weissman 14 - Distinguished Professor of Law University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law

(Deborah, “The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality,” SSRN)//BB



Narratives about Mexico function in the realms of social circumstances and policy from¶ which they emerge and to whose purpose they are given. They serve to obscure other—larger— questions bearing on the determinants of drug-cartel violence, particularly on political-economic factors, including neoliberal trade agreements, U.S. drug demand, and U.S.- to-Mexico gun trafficking. They serve the economic interests of military contractors and avail themselves of the conventional wisdom about Mexico to influence political decisions and policies that militarize the drug war. They thus inhibit the consideration of policies designed to mitigate structural and systemic issues that underlie drug-related violence.354 The use of the narrative as political fodder contributes to an environment in which a dispassionate discussion of important legal values and principles becomes difficult if not impossible.¶ When used for humanitarian purposes, the narrative often fails to identify the relationship between politico-economic conditions, on the one hand, and drug-cartel violence, on the other, and in its own way further contributes to a distorted understanding of circumstances in Mexico.¶ It is difficult to ascertain if the rhetorical turn by which Mexico has been recast as a global economic partner and Mexican immigrants have come to be appreciated as economically productive and work-skill savvy immigrants will counter-act the narrative of the Mexican-as- criminal.¶ Perhaps the most promising developments originate with Mexican and immigrant activists on both sides of the border, who seek to create a movement to reframe the discourse and the current policies that result from a militarized response to drug violence. Across the Hemisphere, activists seek to replace the narrative of criminality with the narrative of human rights. They call attention to social inequalities, poverty, and health care as opposed to the war on crime/drugs motif.355 Latin American and global commissions have been established to study ways to reform drug laws; they have emphasized decriminalization and regulation as the most propitious strategies.356 In 2011, Javier Sicilia, the leader of Mexico’s Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity, urged reforms to address drug-related violence that would, of necessity, challenge the paradigmatic neoliberal economic developments that he describes as constituting “the legal form of criminality.”357 The movement has created an alliance on both sides of the¶ border as groups affected by the war on drugs in Mexico and the United States seek to find common cause.358¶ In the United States, immigrant advocacy groups, such as 1996 Blog Committee, organize for justice in all matters relating to crimmigration.359 Together with Families for Freedom, a center for families affected by criminalization and deportation,360 and other coalition members, advocates seek to promote a new discourse that honors the strength and creativity of immigrants to “heal, analyze, strategize, force change in unjust laws, and inspire community empowerment.”361 They call for an end to any form of discourse that promotes the good immigrant/bad immigrant narrative:¶ [W]e contest social exclusion and develop the leadership of directly affected people in their own liberation. Resisting the labels of ‘Illegal Immigrant’ and ‘Criminal Alien’ that posit us as an exception to U.S. Civil Rights, FFF assert our common humanity by situating our work in a human rights framework.362¶ This binational effort to shift the narrative addresses the larger context for drug cartel violence and the root causes of migration. Rather than maligning Mexicans as a threat to the social order and cultural fabric of the United States, a new discourse may help restructure public perceptions about Mexican immigrants so that they are no longer the target of laws and policies of exclusion.

AT discourse engrained

Discourse of Mexican criminality is not inevitable


Weissman 14 - Distinguished Professor of Law University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law

(Deborah, “The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality,” SSRN)//BB

In addition to alternative uses of the discourse of criminality, a new narrative hasemerged that takes a rhetorical turn from the threats posed by Mexico to promote its transformation to a regional and global economic power. Since 2013, U.S. officials have begun to emphasize the role of Mexico as one of its most important economic partners. The “new” Mexico has been described as a nation “on the rise;” it is predicted to enjoy even greater¶ economic growth and stability.304 In fact, in recent years, Mexico’s rate of economic growth has surpassed that of other regions in the world, including the United States.305¶ The shift in the discourse has been notable.306 Media attention has focused on positive economic improvements in Mexico.307 Journalists report that Mexican manufacturing is gaining on, or has surpassed other regions in the world and has become especially attractive to international investors.308 Experts have praised Mexico’s reforms and have suggested that the country is moving toward greater parity with the United States.309 At a recent summit on Latin America’s economies, Mexico was described as “vital” to the global economic interests of the United States.310 As the two economies develop deeper dependencies, commentators now refer to a U.S.-Mexico global economic partnership.311

AT fear key to asylum

Asylum claimants don’t rely on cartel narratives


Weissman 14 - Distinguished Professor of Law University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law

(Deborah, “The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality,” SSRN)//BB

A more constructive critique would give greater attention to the distortions produced more from what is omitted in the asylum narrative than what is included. The structure of an asylum claim provides little opportunity to set forth the relationship between the complex historical determinants of violence and the violence itself. That is, due to the constraints of the legal structures within which these claims are developed, advocates are likely to omit from asylum narratives the historical and structural determinants of Mexico's drug war, particularly U.S. policies that contribute to drug violence.297 The discourse on crime and drugs moving North de-contextualizes the issue of drug violence from conditions associated with the aftermath of the Washington Consensus dictates and the United States as Mexico’s drug-demand side gun supply-side neighbor.298 That NAFTA has produced tens of thousands of displaced workers who have moved into drug-trade related activities appears to have no apparent relevance in these cases.299 The U.S. trade in guns and demand for drugs as factors that contribute to drug violence are not likely considered relevant to asylum proceedings.300 Similarly, that the circumstances of globalization and financial deregulation have allowed drug traffickers to move their goods and launder their profits with greater ease does not easily fit within the client’s asylum petition.301 Indeed, it is difficult to construct a proper means for introducing these facts in the context of individual asylum claims.

AT util

Util is bad in the context of immigration debates---economic rationality dictates racist oppression


Kretsedemas 11 - PhD. Associate Professor of Sociology, College of Liberal Arts Director, Undergraduate Studies in Sociology @ U Mass Boston

(Philip, “Immigration Crucible: Transforming Race, Nation, and the Limits of the Law,” Ebrary)

Liberal thinkers, ranging from Robert Park to John Locke, have denounced racism as something that is inimical to their enlightened ideals. What is rarely admitted, however, is that racial resentments can be guided by the same kind of utilitarian reasoning that has been promoted by liberal thought. For example, some of the most popular arguments against affirmative action have made the case that these policies work against the practical interests of the white middle class. So even though it can be acknowledged that racism is wrong, policies that attempt to intervene on this history of discrimination are also viewed as being impractical. It follows that the only workable solution is one that eliminates racism without adversely effecting the privileges of the white majority—which leads, once more, to the conundrum of laissez-faire racism. In a similar vein, economic complaints are among the most popular arguments against immigration, whether the arguments focus on immigrants who steal jobs, illegally access public services, or take more from the welfare state than they pay back in taxes.

It is possible to counter these arguments by appealing to the same kind of cost-benefit reasoning. For example, it can be argued that restrictions on legal migration and the mass deportation of unauthorized migrants would not significantly improve the economic situation of the American middle and working class. To whatever extent job stealing actually occurs, it does not account for the steady decline in real wages for the average worker over the past quarter century, the rising costs of health care and education, or the general lack of economic security produced by the casualization of U.S. labor markets. So, the argument goes, it makes more sense to focus on solving these bigger problems rather than scapegoating minorities and immigrants. The economic payoff for solving these problems is much greater than the economic benefits that accrue to the white majority for tolerating existing patterns in racial inequality. The argument can also be made that the long-term costs of racial inequality will actually be more expensive for taxpayers than the short-term inconveniences produced by policies that attempt to protect



immigrant rights or promote racial equality. So a rational cost-benefit calculation actually works in favor of the argument for racial equality and progressive social change. But this cost-benefit rationality also tends to cultivate a narrowness of vision. The nature of cost-benefit calculations is that they are based on assessments of known quantities. As a consequence, they lead the rational individual to recoil from disruptions that alter the value of these known quantities—making it more difficult to produce reliable calculations about the likely costs or benefits of a given path of action.

The irony of this line of reasoning is that it cultivates a resistance to change that is the antithesis of the continually evolving, modern individual who has been idealized by other branches of liberal thought The failings of this shortsighted pragmatism shed some additional light on the rarely acknowledged collusions between liberal reasoning and the racist ideologies disdained by liberal intellectuals. Racism has been guided by its own kind of economic rationality, which has been legitimized by institutional practices that treat racial inequality as the normal state of affairs. And even though most liberal intellectuals have not been racial ideologues, liberal reasoning has nurtured this kind of pragmatic racism by promoting a cost-benefit rationality that becomes invested in perpetuating the inequalities that are taken as given by its calculations.

AT cartels do bad things

Ending cartels devastates the poor


Gray, PhD candidate at MIT, in 10 (Colin, “The Hidden Cost of the War on Drugs,” Stanford Progressive, published 5-2010, accessed 6-27-15; http://web.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=521; JRom)

By far, the people most hurt by a blow to the drug cartels would be the rural poor in certain areas of Mexico. According to Ms. Rios: “drug traffic cash flows are in fact helping some Mexican communities to somehow alleviate a grinding stage of poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, for almost all drug-producing communities, the drug traffic industry seems to be the only source of income.” This is partly due to the nature of drug cultivation, which, in many ways, is similar to farming. As of the late 1990′s, roughly 300,000 peasants were employed in drug production. The National Farm Workers’ Union (UNTA) estimates a number around 600,000. The importance of drugs in the area is nothing new. The earliest documented poppy production in the state of Sinaloa, called “the heart of Mexican drug country” by Newsweek, was in 1886. The extent of this dependence was illustrated in 1976, when a joint operation by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Mexican government was organized. Called “Operacion Condor”, it involved helicopters that would spray (and ruin) poppy and marijuana fields. The operation caused such immediate economic destabilization in the region that the Mexican government indefinitely halted the project. This dependence on drug cultivation, especially on the labor-intensive process of processing poppy gum, still exists today. Given the close ties between drug revenues and the economy, it is not entirely surprising to see some support for cartels in certain areas. Drug organizations have begun to provide psuedo-governments in certain towns, and sometimes win the support of locals by positive means. Of course, terror tactics, including a rising trend of beheadings, death threats, and atrocities, balance these. Still, a dependence on drug money establishes what some call an “artificial economy” that may simply disappear as the drug war goes on.



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