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- Violation: The affirmative curtails surveillance of non-US persons abroad
- 2nc ev
- Fourth Amendment rights are the key delineating factor
- Empirically, legislation only governs domestic surveillance as surveillance done within borders
- People on the border/crossing are not given Fourth Amendment rights—they violate
T – DOMESTIC1ncDomestic is defined individuals within the United States or US persons elsewhere—non-citizens are excludedJackson, RAND Safety and Justice program director, 2009 (Brian A., “The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society,” RAND, Homeland Security Program and the Intelligence Policy Center, 2009, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG804.pdf, p. 4-5, IC) To guide the work reported in this volume, we define domestic intelligence as efforts by government organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere3 BEGIN FOOTNOTE 3 Federal law and executive order define a U.S. person as “a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association with a substantial number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the U.S.” (NSA, undated). Although this definition would therefore allow information to be gathered on U.S. persons located abroad, our objective was to examine the creation of a domestic intelligence organization that would focus on—and whose activities would center around—individuals and organizations located inside the United States. Though such an agency might receive information about U.S. persons that was collected abroad by other intelligence agencies, it would not collect that information itself. END FOOTNOTE 3 that are not related to the investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity.4 Violation: The affirmative curtails surveillance of non-US persons abroadVoting issue for two reasons:---LIMITS –loosening the ‘domestic’ restriction opens the floodgates to country-specific affirmatives---PREDICTABLE GROUND – immigration is a completely distinct topic. Core topic links related to NSA and domestic law enforcement don’t apply2nc evDomestic implies US persons as protected under the Fourth Amendment, which excludes non-permanent immigrants—this means the aff is foreign, not domestic, surveillanceFreiwald, University of San Francisco School of Law professor, 2009 (Susan, “ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AT THE VIRTUAL BORDER,” Mississippi Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1/14/09, http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/ljournal09Freiwald.pdf, p. 331-332, IC) The Fourth Amendment does not protect everyone, however. It mandates the greatest judicial oversight when government agents monitor, for law enforcement purposes, the communications of “U.S. Persons”13 BEGIN FOOTNOTE 13 Under Fourth Amendment doctrine, U.S. citizens and aliens with “sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of th[is] community” have the same rights. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). Federal statutory law refers to American citizens and permanent resident aliens as “U.S. Person[s].” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(i), 1821(1) (2005). Throughout this essay, the term “U.S. Persons” will be used to represent the group of citizens and aliens who have Fourth Amendment rights. END FOOTNOTE 13 in America.14 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Fourth Amendment has nothing to say about government surveillance of the communications of foreign persons in foreign places to gather foreign intelligence.15 When they want to monitor entirely “foreign” communications, executive branch agents enjoy considerable discretion. That is in part because such surveillance falls within the executive’s constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs,16 and in part because foreigners surveilled abroad generally lack standing to bring cases in United States courts.17 As the Fourth Circuit has noted, “[j]ust as the separation of powers . . . forced the executive to recognize a judicial role when the President conducts domestic security surveillance, so the separation of powers requires us to acknowledge the principal responsibility of the President for foreign affairs and concomitantly for foreign intelligence surveillance.”18 Fourth Amendment rights are the key delineating factorFreiwald, University of San Francisco School of Law professor, 2009 (Susan, “ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AT THE VIRTUAL BORDER,” Mississippi Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1/14/09, http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/ljournal09Freiwald.pdf, p. 334-335, IC) While the FISA scheme is a creature of Congress, it must conform to constitutional constraints.26 As Part II discusses, Fourth Amendment precedents require the judiciary to oversee executive branch surveillance of purely “domestic” surveillance.27 But the Fourth Amendment has much less, if anything, to say about executive branch conduct of purely “foreign” surveillance.28 One could defensibly arrange the scenarios along a spectrum from most “domestic,” and therefore protected by the Fourth Amendment, to most “foreign,” and therefore least protected. Rather than viewing the Fourth Amendment as providing decreasing judicial oversight as the character of the electronic surveillance becomes increasingly foreign, however, one could instead view Fourth Amendment protection as being all or nothing. In other words, one could view the Fourth Amendment as providing strict regulation for purely domestic investigations and no regulation for purely foreign investigations because the latter are governed by executive branch discretion. Then one would view the rules for cases that fall in the middle as designed to determine whether to treat the investigation as domestic or foreign. Under this view, in cases that are neither clearly domestic nor clearly foreign, the judge’s role would be to review the executive’s decision to deprive the target of judicial oversight of the surveillance that the Fourth Amendment mandates. The executive makes such a determination when a target effectively acts in the interest of a foreign power; in such a case, the executive may be said to “exile” that target if she is a U.S. Person.29
As part of this procedural framework, FISA established a special court known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the "FISC")." This court hears most government requests to conduct "electronic surveillance" within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.97 The Act also mandated the adoption of minimization procedures to limit the effects of FISA-authorized surveillance on U.S. persons." FISA does not, however, extend protection to non-U.S. persons outside the United States.99 Collecting signals information outside U.S. borders is not considered "electronic surveillance" under the Act's definition, even if a U.S. person is specifically targeted.100 BEING FOOTNOTE 100 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). Section 1801(f) of FISA defines four types of conduct that arc considered "electronic surveillance" under F1SA. Signals collection operations that target U.S. persons outside the United States do not fit within any of these four definitions. The first three definitions require the targeted individual to be located inside of the United States to be considered "electronic surveillance." The fourth definition applies only to the use of surveillance devices within the United States. Therefore, the NSA's signals monitoring stations in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are not regulated by FISA. U.S. personnel located at these foreign stations presumably may monitor U.S. persons who are outside the United States, and that conduct technically would not be considered electronic surveillance under FISA's definitions. This highlights the fact that FISA was meant to govern only domestic surveillance taking place within U.S. borders. Although such efforts would not fall under FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance," USSID 18's minimization procedures still would apply and offer some protection to the rights of U.S. persons abroad. See generally USSID 18, supra note 13. END FOOTNOTE 100 Independently, the Fourth Amendment applies based on persons, not location—the question of the border is irrelevant, but they violate because the surveillance is not done on ‘US persons’Jordan, New York University School of Law LLM, 2006 (David Alan, “DECRYPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WARRANTLESS NSA SURVEILLANCE AND THE ENHANCED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY PROVIDED BY ENCRYPTED VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL,” Boston College Law Review, Vol. 47, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2330&context=bclr, p. 542, IC) Professor Kerr states that "the Fourth Amendment is not a roving privacy machine," but in many ways, it is. 2" The Supreme Court has long held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 221 This protection travels with a person wherever he or she goes, and it covers all situations where a legitimate expectation of privacy can be held.222 The Supreme Court has made it clear that it is the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy, not the geographic location of the conversation in question, that determines whether or not a conversation is protected. 2" American citizens do not lose their Fourth Amendment rights simply because they set foot outside the United States; likewise, their conversations do not become fair game once the electrons transmitting them pass beyond U.S. borders.224 People on the border/crossing are not given Fourth Amendment rights—they violateJordan, New York University School of Law LLM, 2006 (David Alan, “DECRYPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WARRANTLESS NSA SURVEILLANCE AND THE ENHANCED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY PROVIDED BY ENCRYPTED VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL,” Boston College Law Review, Vol. 47, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2330&context=bclr, p. 514, IC) BEGIN FOOTNOTE 55 Courts have held that the government may use evidence collected by foreign governments against U.S. persons at trial in the United States even though such evidence was collected in a manner that would have violated their constitutional rights if conducted by U.S. agents. See Stefan Epstein, Annotation, Application of Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Evidence Obtained Through Search Conducted by Official of Foreign Government, 33 A.L.R. FED. 342, § 3(a) (1977) (explaining the general rule that the exclusionary rule does not apply to searches conducted by foreign governments). This is true even if U.S. agents are involved with the foreign government's efforts, provided that their participation is not substantial. See id.; see also Gov't of Canal Zone v. Sierra, 594 F.2d 60, 72 (1979) ("Fourth Amendment rights are generally inapplicable to an action by a foreign sovereign in its own territory in enforcing its own laws, even though American officials are present and cooperate in some degree."). Also, traffic stops and questioning conducted by U.S. border officials on U.S. citizens entering and leaving the country have been upheld as constitutional despite the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (holding that the use of fixed border checkpoints and the questioning of travelers at U.S. borders do not require warrants or probable cause). The Supreme Court has also held that the government may hand over an American soldier for trial by a foreign government although U.S. constitutional guarantees will not be provided. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957). END FOOTNOTE 55 Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.1 Mb. Share with your friends:
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