Case Neg Masterfile Non-inherent



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Space Mil Inevitable

Russia/China

US, China, and Russia all already have weapons in space


Axe 15 (David Axe, 8/10/15, Reuters, “When it comes to war in space, U.S. has the edge”, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/)

Quietly and without most people noticing, the world’s leading space powers — the United States, China and Russia — have been deploying new and more sophisticated weaponry in space. Earth’s orbit is looking more and more like the planet’s surface — heavily armed and primed for war. A growing number of “inspection” satellites lurk in orbit, possibly awaiting commands to sneak up on and disable or destroy other satellites. Down on the surface, more and more warships and ground installations pack powerful rockets that, with accurate guidance, could reach into orbit to destroy enemy spacecraft. A war in orbit could wreck the delicate satellite constellations that the world relies on for navigation, communication, scientific research and military surveillance. Widespread orbital destruction could send humanity through a technological time warp. “You go back to World War Two,” Air Force General John Hyten, in charge of U.S. Space Command, told 60 Minutes. “You go back to the Industrial Age.” It’s hard to say exactly how many weapons are in orbit. That’s because many spacecraft are “dual use.” They have peaceful functions and potential military applications. With the proverbial flip of a switch, an inspection satellite, ostensibly configured for orbital repair work, could become a robotic assassin capable of taking out other satellites with lasers, explosives or mechanical claws. Until the moment it attacks, however, the assassin spacecraft might appear to be harmless. And its dual use gives its operators political cover. The United States possesses more space weaponry than any other country, yet denies that any of its satellites warrant the term. When 60 Minutes asked the Air Force secretary whether the United States has weapons in space, Secretary Deborah Lee James answered simply: “No, we do not.” Still, it’s possible to count at least some of the systems that could disable or destroy other satellites. Some of the surface-based weaponry is far less ambiguous and so easier to tally. Even taking into account the difficulty of accurately counting space weaponry, one thing is clear: The United States is, by far, the world’s most heavily armed space power. But not for a lack of trying on the part of other countries. Earth’s orbit wasn’t always such a dangerous place. The Soviet Union destroyed a satellite for the last time in an experiment in 1982. The United States tested its last Cold War anti-satellite missile, launched by a vertically flying F-15 fighter, in 1985. An anti-satellite missile launched from a highly modified F-15A over Edwards Air Force Base, California, September 18,1985. U.S. Air Force photo illustration For the next three decades, both countries refrained from deploying weapons in space. The “unofficial moratorium,” as Laura Grego, a space expert with the Union of Concerned Scientists, described it, put the brakes on the militarization of space. Then in 2002, President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from a treaty with Russia prohibiting the development of antiballistic-missile weapons. The move cleared the way for Bush to deploy interceptor missiles that administration officials claimed would protect the United States from nuclear attack by “rogue” states such as North Korea. But withdrawing from the treaty also undermined the consensus on the strictly peaceful use of space. Five years later, in January 2007, China struck one of its own old satellites with a ground-launched rocket as part of a test of a rudimentary anti-satellite system. This scattered thousands of potentially dangerous pieces of debris across low orbit. Beijing’s anti-satellite test accelerated the militarization of space. The United States, in particular, seized the opportunity to greatly expand its orbital arsenal. U.S. companies and government agencies have at least 500 satellites — roughly as many as the rest of the world combined. At least 100 of them are primarily military in nature. Most are for communication or surveillance. In other words, they’re oriented downward, toward Earth. But a few patrol space itself. The U.S. military’s Advanced Technology Risk Reduction spacecraft, launched into an 800-mile-high orbit in 2009, is basically a sensitive infrared camera that can detect the heat plumes from rocket launches and, presumably, maneuvering spacecraft. It then can beam detailed tracking data to human operators on the ground. The risk-reduction satellite works in conjunction with other spacecraft and Earth-based sensors to keep track of Earth’s approximately 1,000 active satellites. The telescope-like Space-Based Space Surveillance satellite, launched in 2010, “has a clear and unobstructed view,” according to an Air Force fact sheet, “of resident space objects orbiting Earth from its 390-mile-altitude orbit.” “Resident space object” is military speak for satellites. A network of around 30 ground radars and telescopes complements the orbital sensors. Together, these systems make “380,000 to 420,000 observations each day,” Space Command explains on its Website. Observing and tracking other countries’ satellites is a passive and essentially peaceful affair. But the U.S. military also possesses at least six spacecraft that can maneuver close to enemy satellites and inspect or even damage them. Personnel run initial checks on the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, December 3, 2010, U.S. Air Force/Michael Stonecypher In 2010, the Air Force launched its first X-37B space plane. A quarter-size, robotic version of the old Space Shuttle, the X-37B boosts into low orbit — around 250 miles high — atop a rocket but lands back on Earth like an airplane. The two X-37Bs take turns spending a year or more in orbit. Officially, the Air Force describes the maneuverable mini-shuttles as being part of “an experimental test program to demonstrate technologies for a reliable, reusable, unmanned space test platform.” But they could also attack other spacecraft. The X-37Bs “could be used to rendezvous and inspect satellites, either friendly or adversarial, and potentially grab and de-orbit satellites,” the Secure World Foundation, a space advocacy group, pointed out. The group stressed that the feasibility of the X-37Bs as weapons is low because the mini-shuttles are limited to low orbits and because the United States operates at least four other maneuverable satellites that are probably far better at stalking and tearing up enemy spacecraft. These include two Microsatellite Technology Experiment satellites that the military boosted into low orbit in 2006. The MiTEx satellites are small, weighing just 500 pounds each. This makes them harder for enemy sensors to detect — giving them the advantage of surprise in wartime. The two Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program satellites are much bigger and higher up. From their stationary positions 22,000 miles above Earth, these spacecraft — in orbit since July 2014 — monitor other satellites and can, according to the Air Force, “maneuver near a resident space object of interest, enabling characterization for anomaly resolution and enhanced surveillance.” Maneuverable space planes and satellites are one way of attacking enemy spacecraft. But there’s an older, less subtle method — blasting them out of space with a rocket. In late 2006, an U.S. spy satellite malfunctioned shortly after reaching low orbit. In early February 2008, the Pentagon announced it would shoot down the dead spacecraft. Officially, Washington insisted that the anti-satellite operation was a safety measure, to prevent the defunct craft’s toxic fuel from harming someone when the satellite’s orbit decayed and it tumbled to Earth. But it appeared to more than one observer that China’s 2007 anti-satellite test motivated Washington’s own satellite shoot-down. A new Cold War was underway, this time in space. On Feb. 20, 2008, the Navy cruiser Lake Erie, equipped with a high-tech Aegis radar, launched a specially modified SM-3 antiballistic-missile interceptor. The rocket struck the malfunctioning satellite at an estimated speed of 22,000 miles an hour, destroying it. Today, the United States has dozens of Aegis-equipped warships carrying hundreds of SM-3 missiles, more than enough to quickly wipe out the approximately 50 satellites apiece that Russia and China keep in low orbit. “Aegis ships could be positioned optimally,” Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists wrote in a 2011 paper, “ to stage a ‘sweep’ attack on a set of satellites nearly at once,” As an anti-satellite backup, the U.S. Army and the Missile Defense Agency also operate two types of ground-launched missile interceptors that have the power to reach low orbit — and the accuracy to strike spacecraft. Against this huge arsenal, Russia and China possess few counterweights. China’s 2007 anti-satellite test, and a similar trial in early 2013, proved that Beijing can hit a low satellite with a rocket. In 2010, the Chinese space agency launched a cluster of small space vehicles, including two named SJ-6F and SJ-12, that slammed into each other in orbit, seemingly on purpose. In July 2013, China deployed a small inspection spacecraft, designated SY-7, in low orbit. Like the U.S. fleet of maneuverable inspection spacecraft, the tiny SY-7 with its remote-controlled claw could be orbital repair or inspection vehicle — or it could be a weapon. “One could dream up,” Brian Weeden, a technical and space adviser at the Secure World Foundation, told the War Is Boring Website in 2013, “a whole bunch of dastardly things that could be done with a robotic arm in close proximity.” But China lacks the space- and ground-based sensors to accurately steer these weapons toward their targets. Compared to the U.S. space-awareness system, with its scores of radars and telescopes, China possesses a relatively paltry system — one consequence of Beijing’s diplomatic isolation. Where the United States can count on allies to host parts of a global sensor network, China has few formal allies and can only deploy space-awareness systems inside its own borders, on ships at sea or in space. The Chinese military can watch the skies over East Asia, but is mostly blind elsewhere. By contrast, Russia inherited an impressive space-awareness network from the Soviet Union. Russia’s allies in Europe — in particular, the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc states — extend the network’s field of view. As a result, Moscow possesses “a relatively complete catalog of space objects,” the Secure World Foundation concluded. But Russia is still far behind the United States and China as far as space weaponry is concerned. There was a 31-year gap between the Soviet Union’s last anti-satellite test and Russia’s first post-Soviet orbital-weapon experiment. On Christmas Day in 2013, Russia quietly launched a small, maneuverable inspection spacecraft into low orbit, hiding the tiny spacecraft among a cluster of communications satellites. Two more space inspectors followed, one in May 2014 and another in March 2015. Moscow hasn’t said much about them, but amateur satellite spotters have tracked the vehicles performing the kinds of maneuvers consistent with orbital attack craft. “You can probably equip them with lasers,” Anatoly Zak, the author of Russia in Space: Past Explained, Future Explored, said of the Russian craft. “Maybe put some explosives on them.” They join a growing number of space weapons guided by expanding networks of Earth-based and orbital sensors on a new, distant battlefront of a so far bloodless neo-Cold War.

Russia

Russia has already militarized space - independent of US-China actions


Kislyakov 13 (Andrei Kislyakov, 12/6/13, Russia Beyond The Headlines, “Russia’s military looks to outer space”,https://rbth.com/science_and_tech/2013/12/06/russias_military_looks_to_outer_space_32341.html)

Along with the general reform of the space industry, Russia plans to qualitatively increase the space military forces to improve the strategic nuclear missiles and capacity building of precision-guided conventional means. President Vladimir Putin said in a late November defense meeting that orbital space grouping has grown considerably with five spacecraft joining this year and five more scheduled to launch before the end of this year. Next year six new spacecraft will be put into orbit as well as a trial launch of modern rocket Angara. In March 2014 Russia is expecting its first launches of military spacecraft, which were delayed for several years for technical reasons. In addition, construction will begin of terrestrial infrastructures. According to preliminary estimates, this is expected to cost several trillion rubles up to 2020. The current situation and trends of new military conflicts suggest that known presentations of combat operations are obsolete. The aim of the war of the future is not conquering of enemy territory, but applying verified attacks on its weak spots. The massive use of ground troops based on armored vehicles are ideas of the past, and the role of strategic aviation has been reduced. The emphasis in the concept of "strategic weapons" has shifted from the classical "nuclear triad" to non-nuclear facilities based on high-precision weapon systems of various modes. This in turn implies the existence of a large number of orbiters providing satellite reconnaissance, warning, forecasting and targeting systems, which are themselves in need of protection and defense. According to General Vladimir Slipchenko, a military analyst, we should expect that in the current decade the number of precision-guided weapons in the leading countries of the world will reach 30,000 to 50,000, and in 2020 it will reach 70,000 to 90,000. One can only imagine the number of satellite systems needed to provide them. And without them, every missile and "smart bomb" that can strike a mosquito becomes a useless iron. Thus, hundreds of seemingly harmless "passive" spacecraft, which are themselves not attack systems, are in fact an integral part of the main weapons of the 21st Century – precision-guided weapons. But the long-standing armed nuclear missile systems now cannot be effective without enough space information support, based on communication satellites and the satellites of missile warning systems. One of the main developers of the Russian strategic missile systems, the director of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering Yuri Solomonov, believes that "the creation of advanced strategic complexes is unthinkable without their adaptability to the conditions of the full deployment of missile defense systems, including space-based elements." This implies at least three conclusions. First, rocket and nuclear power should have a powerful satellite data ware constellation. Second, it needs to deploy its own missile defense system active agents. Third, it needs to function as a single organism, with the aim to protect the country from the strategic offensive weapons. Does it follow from this that the militarization of space, which is due to the need to protect the satellite constellations and groups, is only a matter of time? If we keep in mind the deployment of near-Earth space strike weapons capable of hitting targets in space on their own, in the atmosphere and on Earth, then the answer is yes. In this case, the space becomes a "turret" holding at gunpoint the entire planet. However, it is not necessary to place in orbit battle stations or arm, for example, intelligence or meteorological satellites. Tasks of satellite protection could successfully be tackled by means of ground-based systems created in the Russian aerospace defense.

Russia wants to militarize space – sees it key to supremacy against other super powers


Majumdmar 16 (David Majumdar, 2/22/16, The National Interest, “The Real Star Wars: Russia to Develop Space Weapons?”, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-star-wars-russia-develop-space-weapons-15282)

Russia hopes to build a space-based missile defense warning system to complement its ground-based air and missile defenses. The Russian military has rebuilt its terrestrial air defense system since its decline in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, but Russia hopes to gain an upper hand in the control of space as well. “We’re actively moving along the way of creating a completely new generation of armaments and military hardware for air and space defense, which will help make our facilities fully secure from a potential enemy’s sudden missile attack,” deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin told the Moscow-based news agency TASS this week. According to TASS, Rogozin said that the world is entering an “epoch” of space-based armaments—and Russia has to win supremacy in that sphere. The first step to achieving that supremacy is to build a new space-based missile attack warning system, he said, according to the Russian news report. Such a system, if successful, could aid in tracking and destroying incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles. In previous years, the United States too had explored developing a constellation of space-based radars for intelligence-gathering purposes. One such program, launched in 2001, was called the “Space Based Radar.” The idea behind the SBR was to provide global radar surveillance with Surface Moving Target Indication (SMTI), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging and High Resolution Terrain Information (HRTI) radar modes. The Pentagon even explored upgrading the system to include a missile defense capability as well. In 2005, the ambitious program was renamed Space Radar—consolidating the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) requirements in the hopes of brings costs under control. This cost-saving approach of combining the IC and DOD objectives for SR turned out to be, as Maschenka Braganca at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) explains, “. . . one of the major stumbling blocks, as military and intelligence communities were unable to agree upon system requirements and control. The dispute between the IC and DOD circled largely around the strength of aperture imagery and high revisit rates, as DOD requires more rigorous activity in tracking motion of moving objects than the Intel Community.” Ultimately, cost and myriad technical challenges doomed the U.S. program. The projected price tag for the system approached $38 billion. The program was eventually cancelled in 2008. Only time will tell if Russia will be more successful.

Europe



The ESA, and France, have ambitions for the militarization of space – Galileo system would have militaristic capabilities


Khan 08 (Urmee Khan, 11/21/2008, UK Telegraph, “EU developing 'militarised' space policy which could trigger 'arms race'”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/3493260/EU-developing-militarised-space-policy-which-could-trigger-arms-race.html)

The European Space Agency is accused of developing technology to dominate the "high ground" of space, including a multimillion pound EU Satellite Centre in Spain. The Transnational Institute, a Dutch think-tank, said: "EU-financed communication and spy satellites are slowly becoming reality and in the long term the inclusion of space-based missile defence and other more offensive uses of space are real options for an increasingly ambitious EU military space policy." The report said French ambitions for the "militarisation of space" have led to arguments with Britain - particularly over Galileo, the much-delayed European global positioning system. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who currently holds the Presidency, said in June that space agenda was one of his priorities. Next week, ministers from all ESA member states will meet in The Hague to implement a new European space policy which identifies military "security" as a priority. Galileo would be vital in any European deployment of the sort of GPS-guided artillery now being used by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2002, the EU approved the £2 billion satellite network to break strategic dependence on America and seize the lead in space technology. Galileo was designed to end dependence on America's Global Positioning System, a network of 24 satellites controlled by the American defence department which can be cut off in war or even used as a tool of pressure. At the time, it was said that Galileo would create 150,000 jobs, generating £7 billion in annual revenue for European companies from 2008. British demanded a statement in 2002 to describe Galileo as a "civilian" project that would not threaten the cohesion of Nato. However, author of the new report Frank Slijper, an economist and arms trade specialist, said: "While Galileo is generally presented as a genuinely civilian programme, it now appears highly militarised. "The public denial of these important capabilities shows how much Brussels and many European capitals are afraid to tell the public that Galileo is to become an extremely important tool in future warfare by European military forces," he said.

History Proves



Space exploration was founded in militarism pretending to be peace, the US can change this regime of peace through militarization and cement its status as the largest global hegemon


Everett C.Dolman 2005 School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL “ASTROPOLITIK Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age”

The rhetoric of harmony and cooperation that attends most popular accounts of humanity’s entry into outer space simply belies the historical record, Despite an ongoing effort to make the cosmos an international commons (the so-called ‘province of mankind’), expansion into near-Earth space came not as the accommodating effort of many nations joined as one, but rather as an integral component of an overall strategy applied by wary superstates attempting to ensure their political survival. The technique these combatants chose was classically Mackinderian. They established an international regime that ensured none of them could obtain an unanticipated advantage in space domination—for if any one nation did, the face of international politics might be changed forever. Regimes are an important and evolving component of the post-World War II international environment, yet outside of academic political science they appear poorly understood. Stephen Krasner, who has done more to develop the notion and explain the relevance of regimes to the academic community, describes them as: ‘Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area’. 2 The four characteristics are arrayed in a strict top-down hierarchy: ‘Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.’ 3 Straight to the point, regimes are perceived to structure extant political arrangements so as to enhance or facilitate negotiation, bargaining, and—ideally—cooperation. In this definition, regimes can be implicit or explicit, and the issue areas can be specified or limited. Krasner further notes the difference between regimes, which are intended to be lasting structures, and international agreements or treaties, which are ad hoc, often ‘oneshot’ deals. Over time, successful regimes can shape normative behavior through habituation. Expectations of future actions can be made predictable, and over time behavior changes. Regimes are thus intended to be more than a substitute or expediency for short-term self-interest. They imply a continuing area of agreement and cooperation. Too commonly we mistake regimes for the functioning bodies and bureaucracies associated with them, and lose sight of the true regime as a process of cooperation. The World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, is not a regime. It is part of a regime, embodying the rules and decision-making procedures for structuring the international system along principles and norms associated with free-trade theory. For those who believe (in principle) that all states can gain from free trade, behavior should be guided by the norm, among several others, that tariffs and other trade barriers should be gradually reduced and ultimately eliminated. Within that mandate, the WTO is established. Moreover, since regimes by definition must encompass principles and norms, the utility function that is being maximized must embody some principle of obligation. The WTO is thus a set of rules and decision-making procedures established by a voluntary association of states working to make real the principles and norms of a liberal world free-trade system. Likewise, the United Nations is not a regime in and of itself. It is the manifestation of a belief (principle) that national or individual state sovereignty can best be achieved through collective means (a permanent coalition opposed to aggression), structured within the norms of open negotiation and constant vigilance. Rules and decision-making procedures (international agreements and the physical presence of the United Nations as a negotiating, public forum) can be formulated in a variety of ways that comply with the extant principles and norms of a regime, and so changes or modifications in the agreements/institutions do not overturn—though they can seriously weaken—the regime itself. Changes in principles or norms, however, do require the acceptance or establishment of a new regime. Should the principle that all states are sovereign be revoked over time or by circumstances, the United Nations as an organization would crumble. The regime for outer space as typified by international agreement and committee action has ostensibly been created on the overarching principle that space is the common heritage of all humankind, and on the norms that no nation should dominate there nor should large-scale military weaponry and activities take place there. These stated maxims have had the unfortunate effect of limiting post-Cold War space expansion, a theme to be taken up in detail in the next chapters. For now, the intent is simply to show how the apparently cooperative regime was constructed for the purpose of furthering competitive state policies.


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