Case Neg Masterfile Non-inherent

Space Mil Good

Key to Deterrence

Space weapons are the best form of deterrence – they can effectively police the world but cannot be used to challenge a state’s sovereignty

Everett Carl Dolman: professor of comparative military studies at the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. “New frontier, old realities” spring 2012. Webpage. Accessed 6-27-16

Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is further eroded. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. But they offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less intimidating to the international environment than any combination of conventional weapons employed in their stead. Which would be more threatening to a state that opposes American hegemony: a dozen lasers in space with pinpoint accuracy or (perhaps for about the same price) a dozen infantry divisions massed on its border? A state employing offensive deterrence through space weapons can punish a transgressor state, but it is in a poor position to challenge that state’s sovereignty. A transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives that its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons would inhibit their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states may recognize that the United States could not and would not use space weapons to threaten another country’s internal self-determination. The United States still would challenge any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and it would have severely restricted its own capacity to do the latter. Judicious and nonarbitrary use of a weaponized space eventually could be seen as a net positive—an effective global police force that punishes criminal acts but does not threaten to engage in an imperial manner.

US Space weapons serve as a deterrent against offensive ASAT technology that threatens the peace of space

http://www.iar-gwu.org/content/deter-us-needs-offensive-space-weapons

US space weapons are necessary – deter attacks against orbital assets.

Lamrani in 2016, Omar, Omar Lamrani focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology, logistics and military doctrine for a number of regions, including the Middle East and Asia. He studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine and the balance of power in the Western Pacific, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248

. Reinforcing Deterrence: If the United States wants to preserve its primacy in the face of increasing threats to its strength in space, Washington will need to invest in strategies to deter attacks on its orbital assets. The first step in strengthening space deterrence is to ensure proper attribution: The United States cannot hold its enemies accountable for attacks if it does not know who initiated them. But the vastness of space, along with the difficulty of obtaining physical evidence from attacked satellites, can make responsibility hard to prove. To that end, the United States is investing in a second-generation surveillance system, known as Space Fence, to track satellites and orbital debris. Slated to begin operating in 2018, Space Fence uses ground-based radars that give it 10 times the detection capability of its predecessor, the Air Force Space Surveillance System. In addition, the United States has been working with a classified satellite defense technology called the Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness system, which reportedly will be able to pinpoint the source of a laser fired at a satellite. Redundancy and shielding can also deter limited attacks against satellites. The innate redundancy of large satellite constellations could make attacking them too risky; such an assault would fail to significantly impair U.S. space control while still inviting retaliation. Meanwhile, more widespread use of resistant antenna designs, filters, surge arresters and fiber-optic components, which are less vulnerable to attack, is already being explored to further shield satellites from jamming, dazzling and blinding. Finally, the United States can work alongside its global partners and allies to convey the idea that a full-blown battle that would destroy orbiting satellites would be bad for all of humanity. Reinforcing this message and openly tying it to a powerful U.S. response could further bolster deterrence. Preventing a War in Space: While the United States works to discourage hostilities in space, in no small part to ensure its enduring advantage there, Washington is also taking more steps to plan for the contingency of a war in space. The Department of Defense has nominated the secretary of the U.S. Air Force as the initiative's principal adviser, tasked with coordinating space-related efforts across the military. Late last year, the United States also established the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center at Colorado's Schriever Air Force Base. The center facilitates information sharing across the national security space enterprise and has already run a number of wargame scenarios to simulate conflict in orbit. Furthermore, the Pentagon has added $5 billion to its space programs budget in 2016, pushing the total to about $27 billion. The budget provides for spending on technologies and tactics that can help the United States mitigate and recover from a space attack. One effort, spearheaded by the Operationally Responsive Space Office, aims to develop small satellites and associated launch systems that can be built and deployed quickly and cheaply. (For the most part, the current U.S. fleet consists of large, sophisticated and expensive satellites, some of which cost billions of dollars and take years to construct.) As part of this endeavor, the office has directed the development of a standardized but modular satellite chassis that allows for multiple payload variations. The result is increased flexibility, as well as lower costs and quicker turnaround in production. Developing a less expensive and more efficient way to launch replacements for destroyed or disabled systems is the next step. With that in mind, the Operationally Responsive Space Office is funding the development of the Spaceborne Payload Assist Rocket-Kauai (SPARK) launch system, designed to send miniaturized satellites into low-Earth and sun-synchronous orbits. In its efforts to rapidly launch swarms of miniaturized satellites on the cheap, the U.S. military is also looking to leverage the private sector. Companies such as Virgin Galactic (with the LauncherOne) and the Rocket Lab (with the Electron Vehicle) have expressed keen interest in the initiative. The small satellite revolution promises the speedy replacement of disabled satellites in the event of attack — theoretically securing the U.S. military's use of space constellations in support of operations during a conflict. Small satellites are not a magic bullet, however; key satellite functions will still depend on bulkier and more complex systems, such as the large but critically important nuclear-hardened command-and-control mission satellites. Many of these systems involve hefty antennas and considerable power sources. Given that access to orbit may not be guaranteed during a war in space, the United States has also been exploring alternative ways to perform some of the core functions that satellites now provide. At this stage, high-flying unmanned aerial vehicles with satellite-like payloads offer the most advanced alternative. But considering the vehicles' vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, their lower altitude and endurance relative to orbital satellites, and their limited global reach, this remains a tentative solution at best. Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a contingency is being put in place. In the race between shield and sword, however, there is no guarantee that offensive ASAT capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially denying critical access to space during a catastrophic celestial war.

Space militarization provides the last form of deterrence -should the US fail in militarizing peace is unachievable

Zubrin 2015 (Robert Zubrin is president of Pioneer Energy, a senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy, and the author of “Energy Victory.”; “U.S. Space Supremacy Now Critical “ Published: January 22, 2015; http://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-space-supremacy-now-critical/#sthash.mWWwrsYt.dpuf)

The United States needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a large-scale conventional war, and we are woefully unprepared. Eastern and Central Europe is now so weakly defended as to virtually invite invasion. The United States is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So deterrence is dead, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop tankless remnant, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. It’s not enough. Meanwhile, in Asia, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region. How can we restore the balance, creating a sufficiently powerful conventional force to deter aggression? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the United States must seek to totally outgun them by obtaining a radical technological advantage. This can be done by achieving space supremacy. To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the 21st century, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls space. The critical military importance of space has been obscured by the fact that in the period since the United States has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against minor powers that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless. But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war. But modern space power involves far more than just reconnaissance satellites. The use of space-based GPS can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based communications provide an unmatched capability of command and control of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will prove decisive. Not only Europe, but the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to wipe them out with the push of a button. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States possess space capabilities that are so robust as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to comprehensively deny it to others. Space superiority means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a complete monopoly of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made so formidable as to render any conventional attack unthinkable. On the other hand, should we fail to do so, we will remain so vulnerable as to increasingly invite aggression by ever-more-emboldened revanchist powers. This battle for space supremacy is one we can win. Neither Russia nor China, nor any other potential adversary, can match us in this area if we put our minds to it. We can and must develop ever-more-advanced satellite systems, anti-satellite systems and truly robust space launch and logistics capabilities. Then the next time an aggressor commits an act of war against the United States or a country we are pledged to defend, instead of impotently threatening to limit his tourist visas, we can respond by taking out his satellites, effectively informing him in advance the certainty of defeat should he persist. If we desire peace on Earth, we need to prepare for war in space.

Key to Hegemony

Space dominance is key to US hegemony – without access to space, its military would be reduced back to WWII

Colby 2016

Elbridge Colby: Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously he served for over five years in the U.S. government, primarily in positions focusing on nuclear weapons, arms control, and intelligence reform. “FROM SANCTUARY TO BATTLEFIELD: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space” cnas.org. January 2016. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Space%20Report_16107.pdf

The United States is profoundly reliant on the ability to use space for its security. Though little appreciated outside of professional and expert circles, space – or, more precisely, U.S. assets in and using space – are vital to U.S. defense and intelligence communications with and among national leaders, military forces, and others; command and control; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and a host of other functions. While these may seem rather like “back office” functions to a lay reader, they are actually the stuff of which American global military primacy is made. The U.S. military is not currently superior to its potential adversaries because it has stronger soldiers, bigger guns, or more tanks. Rather, it has the upper hand because it can understand better what is taking place in the midst of conflict, what its own forces are doing, and what those of an enemy are doing amidst the “fog of war.”2 The United States can therefore employ force around the globe more rapidly, more precisely, and more intelligently – and thus more effectively.3 Together, this “smarter” and more agile U.S. military is therefore uniquely capable of applying decisive power against an adversary.4 Exploitation of space is particularly critical to effective U.S. power projection, as it provides the U.S. military with the ability to operate effectively over global distances, beyond the reach of what U.S. ground-based and aerial assets, limited by range and endurance, can provide. As General John Hyten, Commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command, recently said on CBS’ 60 Minutes, because of space “we can attack any target on the planet, anytime, anywhere, in any weather.”5 Thus Washington’s ability to project credible and effective military power to key regions such as the Western Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East – which is elemental to the U.S. national security strategy of forward engagement – relies on space. And this reliance is increasing. Furthermore, while space is crucial for U.S. power projection and an effective military posture in key regions, it is also vital for crucial homeland defense and deterrence functions. Space-based assets provide early warning of missile attacks against the United States (and others) and serve as a crucial component in the command and control system for U.S. nuclear forces in the event of war – including a nuclear war.6 As the 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy, a document bearing the signatures of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, summarized, “[s]pace capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages … create a decision advantage … [and are] vital to monitoring strategic and military developments … Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our national security.”7 Space, then, is vital for America’s military preeminence and the national strategy it underwrites. But this reliance is becoming increasingly problematic. This is because potential U.S. adversaries have noticed the degree of U.S. reliance on its space architecture and the advantages that the United States has accrued from it and have been assiduously working to find ways to threaten U.S. space and space-related systems. Indeed, many observers have noted that these potential opponents judge the U.S. space architecture to be the “Achilles’ heel” of U.S. military power, in light of the depth of American reliance on these systems and the vulnerability of the U.S. satellite architecture.8 As General Hyten put it, without access to space the U.S. military would be a greatly reduced force. As he put it, in such a circumstance the U.S. military would return to a model of “World War II” or “industrial age” warfare.9

Space weapons boosts US hegemony, military readiness, and effectiveness

Everett C. Dolman Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For e-parliament conference on Space Security, Washington DC 14 September 2005 http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf

The United States has embarked on a revolutionary military transformation designed to extend its dominance in military engagements. Space capabilities are the lynchpin of this transformation, enabling a level of precision, stealth, command and control, intelligence gathering, speed, maneuverability, flexibility, and lethality heretofore unknown. This twenty-first century way of war promises to give the United States a capacity to use force to influence events around the world in a timely, effective, and sustainable manner. And this is a good thing, a true transformation from conflicts past. That the process of transformation was well underway became evident in 1991, when the world’s fourth largest military was defeated in just ten days of ground combat. Unfathomably complicated battle equipment, sleek new aircraft, and promising new missile interceptors publicly debuted. Arthur C. Clarke went so far as to dub Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) the world’s first space war, as none of the accomplishments of America’s new look military would have been possible without support from space. Twelve years later, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), assertions as to the central role of space power could no longer be denied. America’s military had transitioned from space supported to a fully space enabled force, with astonishingly positive results. Indeed, most of the nation’s current space power functions were successfully exercised in OIF, including space lift, command and control, intelligence including rapid battle damage assessment, timing and navigation, and meteorological support. The tremendous growth in space reliance from OSD to OIF is evident in the raw numbers. Despite engaging with a 60 percent smaller force (fewer than 200,000 personnel v. over 500,000), satellite communications usage increased four-fold, from 200 to 800 Mbps (Megabits per second) capacity. Newly possible operational concepts such as reach back (intelligence analysts in the United States sending information directly to frontline units) and reach forward (rear-deployed commanders able to direct battlefield operations in real time) reconfigured the tactical concept of war. The value of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), completely reliant on satellite communications and navigation for their operation, was confirmed. Special Forces units, paradoxically tethered to satellite support and yet practically unfettered in their silent movements because of them, ranged throughout Iraq in independent operations that were extremely disruptive. But the paramount effect of space-enabled warfare was in the area of combat efficiency. Space assets allowed all weather, day-night precision munitions to provide the bulk of America’s striking power. Strikes from standoff platforms, including Vietnam-Era B-52s, allowed maximum target devastation with extraordinarily low death and collateral devastation. In ODS, 90 percent of munitions used were unguided. Of the ten percent that were guided, none was GPS capable. By OIF, 70 percent were precision guided, more than half of those from GPS satellites. In ODS, fewer than five percent of aircraft were GPS-equipped. By OIF, all were. During ODS, GPS proved so valuable to the army that it procured and rushed into theater over 4,500 commercial receivers to augment the meager 800 military-band ones it could deploy from stockpiles, an average of one per company (about 200 personnel). By OIF, each army squad (6-10 soldiers) had at least one military GPS receiver. With such demonstrated utility and reliance, there is no question the US must guarantee space access if it is to be successful in future conflicts. Its military has stepped well over the threshold of a new way of war. It is simply not possible to go back to the violently spasmodic mode of combat typical of pre-space intervention. The United States is now highly discriminating in the projection of violence, parsimonious in the intended breadth of its destruction. For the positive process of transformation to continue, however, space weapons must enter the combat inventory of the United States.

Key to Peace

The United States must weaponized space as soon as possible to ensure peace

Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLaughlin 2014 Professors at the ANU College of Law Australian National University

http://www.hsafavi.ir/magazines/New_Technologies_and_the_Law_of_Armed_Conflict_2014.pdf#page=109

Finally, there are those who point out that space offers the opportunity for a technologically advanced state to militarily dominate the ultimate high ground against any adversary.26 Adherents to this school of thought believe that such a state could strike terrestrial targets from space with ubiquity and without fearing counter-strikes. They go on to argue that, for so long as it remains possible for competing states to dominate the ultimate high ground, international relations will remain inherently unstable. It is therefore incumbent on one, pro-active state, acting with a mix of self-interest and a desire to bring a benign peace to the world through its own invincibility, to dominate the high ground as quickly as possible, and as soon as possible. This school of thought places a very much greater emphasis on space itself and on activities conducted from and in space.

Ensuring US space heg is key to unencumbered access to space for all

Dowd 2009

Alan W. Down: senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research. “Surrendering Outer Space” hoover.org. 8-3-09. Webpage. Accessed 7-2-16

In 1996, the Clinton administration concluded that “assuring reliable and affordable access to space through U.S. space transportation capabilities is fundamental to achieving national space policy goals.” It directed the Pentagon to “develop, operate and maintain space-control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, to deny such freedom of action to adversaries.” A decade later, the Bush administration declared that America’s “national security is critically dependent upon space capabilities, and this dependence will grow.” This statement had already been underscored by the early phases of the “Global War on Terror,” which Bush called “the first war of the 21st century.” The nation’s initial counterstrikes against al Qaeda were thrown by satellite-guided cruise missiles. Since then, U.S. pilots have been using Joint-Direct Attack Munitions (jdam) to pound terrorists and their sponsors. The jdam continually receives data from gps satellites to lock on and destroy targets in any weather and at any time of day. In May 2008, gps-guided Tomahawk missiles, launched by Navy vessels, hit al Qaeda bases in Somalia. Raytheon, the smart missile’s manufacturer, proudly notes that more than 1,900 Tomahawks have been fired in combat, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, the Predator drone, which transmits images and information via satellite to faraway command centers, has enabled U.S. forces to attack targets within minutes rather than days. Retrofitted with Hellfire missiles, the Predator has struck targets in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Its next-generation cousin, the Reaper, has weaponry grafted into its systems. Instead of just two Hellfires, the Reaper has 14 and flies higher and faster than the Predator. Thanks to satellite links, the Reaper can be piloted by a technician 7,000 miles away. In addition, an updated version of the Reaper, due to be deployed in 2010, will be equipped with the ominously named “Gorgon Stare,” which will give controllers and commanders the ability to eye a target from 12 different angles across a four-kilometer radius. As Air Force News explains, if 12 different terrorists scatter from a building in 12 different directions, “Gorgon Stare could dedicate one angle to each.” Predators and Reapers are using satellites to transmit 16,000 hours of video every month to troops on the ground and commanders around the world. In other words, these are anything but glorified remote-control toys. In fact, the Predator and Reaper are so central to the battle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militants in Pakistan’s laughably misnamed “federally administered tribal areas” that observers have dubbed this front “the drone war.” The blame for our current position rests with Congress and the White House, with Democrats and Republicans. In the second war of the 21st century, which looms somewhere beyond the Global War on Terror, space itself could become the battlefield. “We know from history that every medium — air, land and sea — has seen conflict,” the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization concluded in 2001. “Reality indicates that space will be no different.” The commission’s chairman, Donald Rumsfeld, argued, “More than any other country, the United States relies on space for its security and well-being.” Underscoring this assertion, the United States has more satellites than the combined total of the rest of the world, as AP has reported. However, America’s command of the ultimate high ground is increasingly precarious. The Washington Post reports that in the past decade Russia has put more satellites into space than has the U.S. In fact, 53 U.S.-built satellites were launched in 2007, down from 121 in 1998. Moreover, many other nations are planting their banners in space; China is the most active newcomer. The Europeans are pooling their resources to deploy ever more sophisticated space assets. According to the Washington Post, Japan is committed to using space assets to buttress its national defense; India recently launched ten satellites on just one rocket; and Brazil, Israel, Singapore, and a growing list of other nations are deploying a range of space assets. That list includes Iran, which has plans to put five satellites into orbit by 2010. To be sure, much of this activity is civilian, but even civilian satellites can be diverted for military uses. In 1991, for instance, the U.S. military “procured commercial remote sensing imagery from a non-U.S. company during Desert Storm.” Likewise, the Pentagon paid firms for exclusive control over satellite imagery during the war in Afghanistan, thereby depriving the enemy of information. According to General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Intentional interference with space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and communication satellites, while not routine, now occurs with some regularity.” He warned the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2007 that America’s “increasing appetite for space-based technical solutions . . . could become our Sword of Damocles.” Indeed, the ability to attack U.S. space assets is no longer limited to a select club of military powers. Anti-satellite weapons, satellite-jamming equipment, and microsatellites are inexpensive and increasingly accessible on the global market. “To minimize the threat to our space capabilities now and in the future,” Cartwright has argued, “we need continued support of programs that enhance our space situational awareness, space protection capabilities, and satellite operations in order to preserve unfettered, reliable, and secure access to space.” Civilian programs must be viewed as part of this mix. It pays to recall that many shuttle missions have been strictly military missions, some of them highly classified. Indeed, the link between manned spaceflight, national security, and satellites should not be brushed aside. The space shuttle, after all, is a manned satellite, performing functions, gathering information and conducting operations (such as rescue, repair, and experimentation) that unmanned satellites cannot. It’s hard to imagine that, during the 5-year gap without a shuttle, the U.S. will be better served by unmanned satellites and Russian-piloted rockets than by Americans deploying into space on American vessels. Just as the United States relies on space, much of the world relies on the United States to ensure the unencumbered use of space. Protecting what Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called “the 21st century’s global commons — in particular, space and cyberspace” is America’s duty, just as protecting the sea lanes fell to America after World War II. But can America defend the heavens without the capacity to deliver its own into space? We will soon find out, because other countries will not stand still while the United States regroups.

Key to Environment/Energy

Space militarization provides the means to clean up the orbit and provide clean renewable energy

Dolman 2012

Everett Carl Dolman: professor of comparative military studies at the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. “New frontier, old realities” spring 2012. Webpage. Accessed 6-27-16

Where will we get the money for this space weapons capacity? It will not come from school budgets or foreign aid programs. It will not come at the expense of health care reform or corporate bailouts. It will come at the expense of conventional military capabilities on the land and sea and in the air. There will be fewer aircraft carriers and high-dollar fighter aircraft and bombers. If the United States deploys space weapons capable of targeting the earth, relatively slow-moving ships and aircraft will become conceptually obsolete, instantly vulnerable to space weapons. As we scrounge money for space lasers and exotic kinetic-kill satellites, the systems these space weapons make defenseless will be scrapped. More funding will come from current ballistic and antiballistic missile development and deployment, as global ballistic missile defense from space is more cost-effective and practically effective than comprehensive ground or sea-based systems. And most importantly, it will come from personnel reductions—from ground troops currently occupying foreign territory. In this way, the United States will retain its ability to use force to influence states around the world, but it will atrophy the capacity to occupy their territory and threaten their sovereignty directly. The era of US hegemony will be extended, but the possibility of US global empire will be reduced. Maybe. The future is not determined or even determinable. I have argued elsewhere the practicality of controlling space. I will not add to that argument here. I have also pointed out that the theory animating these conclusions is precise and well-developed, but the real world is too complex to mirror theory. The political will necessary to weaponize space and follow up with a regime capable of ensuring commercial and cooperative development of space is not yet evident, and such a pure, realist astropolitik vision is thus not currently viable. But support for the common or collective good that could come from a properly weaponized space force may change that. Space weapons have some potential missions that could help generate the will to pay for and use them. These missions do not detract from the primary purpose of the weapons but complement the goal of space control. For example, nuclear-powered space-based lasers could, in theory, clean up debris from high-traffic orbits—good target practice for their operators. Assured access to space provided by a robust space control force could pave the way for clean, permanent nuclear and toxic waste disposal, as such items currently stored on Earth could be sent into the sun. Space-based solar power generation could provide the world with cheap, abundant energy that would deemphasize the value and authority of current oil-producing states and fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape of the Earth. These scenarios are far more likely with the monitoring and protection provided by a space-based military or police power. These scenarios are an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the Army, Navy, and Marines— pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory—are profound. With the downsizing of traditional weapons programs to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the ability to do all three would wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight deployments of US peacekeeping forces around the world, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to pacify and police.

Now is key

Now is key -- waiting means the rules of the game are created by other nations in opposition to the United States

Kamocsai 2015 (Peter Kamocsai is a graduate student at the George Washington University specializing in space policy “Why the U.S. Should Be a Leader in Space Weaponization” Published: January 10, 2015; http://spacenews.com/commentary-why-the-u-s-should-be-a-leader-in-space weaponization/#sthash.4Te65nRc.dpuf)

A space arms race is impending. The treaties that govern outer space specifically allow its weaponization. Nations have already started deploying space weapons. And although the costs may not seem justifiable, being a leader in space now will require fewer resources than trying to surpass other nations later. Therefore, the United States risks losing its current advantage and will have to pay the cost of catching up if it does not lead the charge in space weaponization. What will space weaponization look like? What is a space weapon? While experts have long discussed the issue, no accepted definition exists. After comparing several of these definitions, we seem to come to the same conclusion as the Union of Concerned Scientists. Accordingly, a space weapon is any land-, sea- or air-based weapon able to damage space systems, such as satellites, their ground stations and communication receivers. It can also be any space-based weapon intended to attack space or ground targets. A space weapon, therefore, is more than most of us would assume a space weapon is. It does not have to be deployed in space, but can be Earth-based. It does not have to attack targets in space; the targets can be here on Earth. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which is a framework for space activities, specifically allows for space weaponization. It prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but it allows for any other type of weapon anywhere except for the surface of planets, moons and asteroids. Even one of the reasons the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, as one senator highlighted, was that it sanctioned the militarization of space. The United States wanted to be able to weaponize space in the future, if it chose so. It now has to use this possibility and beat other nations to be first, because they will not hesitate to beat the United States. Others are also keeping their options open. Nothing proves this better than the number of countries that signed and ratified the 1979 Moon Agreement, which calls for greater control of weapons in space: As of 2014, that number is seven. Contrast this with the more than 100 countries that signed and ratified the Outer Space Treaty, which allows weapons in space. Nations are already using the opportunity that the Outer Space Treaty presents to weaponize space. As some scholars observed, although we are yet to deploy space-based weapons, we have already made the first steps. The Soviet Union was building a secret military space station under the Almaz (Diamond) program and was also designing an anti-satellite spacecraft called Polyus. Currently, the Chinese are testing advanced anti-satellite weaponry and the Russians are building a system to neutralize space weapons. These countries are preparing for a space arms race. They will surpass the United States if it allows them to do so. The cost of space weaponization might not seem justifiable in the short term, but in the long term the cost of inaction is higher. The public is not yet involved in the space weaponization debate, and therefore explaining the reasons for deploying space weapons to taxpayers is moot. Moreover, the costs of developing, deploying and maintaining space weapons can seem prohibitive. According to some estimates, the Brilliant Pebbles space-based anti-missile weapon proposed in the 1980s would have cost around $20 million apiece in today’s dollars. However, if the United States does not act now, it will eventually have to pay the cost of neutralizing the threat of others’ space weapons. As history proves, this cost of catching up will be higher: Before the First World War, it was economically impossible for Germany to close the naval arms gap with the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union collapsed while trying to equal the United States in the Cold War arms race. Not being able to determine the rules of the game is also a cost of not being a leader — if the United States does not, someone else will determine what is and what isn’t allowed in the space arms race. Additionally, other nations will become technologically superior, and foreign space weapons will threaten the United States. If the United States does not deploy space weapons now, it risks falling behind in the space arms race. Others will become dominant in outer space. Others will set the rules governing space activities to their benefit and to the detriment of the United States. Others will confine the United States to Earth and will deny its use of space and the vast opportunities it presents. If the United States is not the first in space weaponization, it will lose the race for the future.

At: Space Mil Collapses Deterrence

Space weapons don’t break down status quo deterrence

Shixiu in 2007 (Bao Shixiu is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China. He formerly served as director of the Institute. He recently was a visiting scholar at the Virginia Military Institute in the United States. His research focuses on China-U.S. relations in the field of comparative security strategies and the application of deterrence theory. “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space” Published: Winter 2007, pp.2 – 11; China Security)

It is a well-known phenomenon that the use of nuclear weapons is considered taboo. Along with the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the use of nuclear weapons in war is almost unimaginable. The utilitization of nuclear weapons is therefore almost entirely limited to a role of deterrence. What about the taboo of space weapons? More and more specialists are looking at the impact of space debris that results from the use of space weapons.10 Large amounts of space debris caused by space weapons will invariably Bao Shixiu China Security Winter 2007 threaten space assets of all space-faring countries, not just intended target countries. Any attack by one country against another using space weapons will result in many losers. With so much of commercial, scientific and military activity increasingly reliant on space, there exists a considerable and growing taboo against using space weapons in a situation of conflict. Thus, under the conditions of American strategic dominance in space, reliable deterrents in space will decrease the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese space assets. At a fundamental level, space weapons – like nuclear weapons – will not alter the essential nature of war. Throughout history, there has been much ink spilled over new weapons that have the unique power and ability to change the underlying quality of war. For example, military theorists once exaggerated the tank’s role in deciding the war’s outcome during World War I.11 The atom bomb itself is probably the most salient example, as many analysts and politicians described the weapon as the unique ultimate weapon.12 But this was a fundamental misunderstanding of war and its implements. Nuclear weapons crossed a threshold in terms of their immense capacity for destruction. But deterrence, mutual assured destruction and the nuclear taboo evolved to consign the use of nuclear weapons to a near impossibility, negating its utility as a tool of war-fighting. Weapons to change the nature of war have not emerged in the past and will not emerge in the future. As such, space weapons will not be the ultimate weapon nor will they be able to decide the outcome of war, even if they are used as a first strike. Space weapons and their use are unique from other types of weapons, whether nuclear or terrestrial conventional weapons. Although there will be a taboo on the use of space weapons, the threshold of their use will be lower than that of nuclear weapons because of their conventional characteristics. Space debris may threaten the space assets of other “third party” countries, but the level of destruction, especially in terms of human life, could be far less than nuclear weapons or potentially even conventional weapons. Therefore, the threshold of force capability required to launch an effective deterrent will inevitably be higher than for that of nuclear weapons. This unique nature of space weapons will affect the determination of the quantity and technical level of a “deterrent capability” in space.

AT: Space Debris

Space debris removal tech is already being created

Daniel Gregory February 16, 2013 Engineer for Raytheon BBN Technologies ”Space Debris Elimination (SpaDE)” http://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/niac/gregory_space_debris_elimination.html

The amount of debris in low Earth orbit (LEO) has increased rapidly over the last twenty years. This prevalence of debris increases the likelihood of cascading collisions that cause the debris generation rate to outstrip the rate at which debris deorbits, falling into the atmosphere and burning up. This accumulation creates debris belts that render many orbits unusable. Current strategies emphasize debris mitigation, as there is no practical method for debris removal. Raytheon BBN Technologies (BBN) and the University of Michigan will study the Space Debris Elimination (SpaDE) system to remove debris from orbit by firing focused pulses of atmospheric gases into the path of targeted debris. These pulses will increase drag sufficiently to cause the deorbit rate to exceed the debris generation rate. The pulses themselves will fall back into the atmosphere, leaving no residual trace in orbit to interfere with LEO satellites. In contrast to other proposed methods, SpaDE is failsafe, in that it places no solid material in orbit where a malfunction could create new debris.

We are developing lasers to destroy space debris

BY AVANEESH PANDEY ON 04/18/15 AT 8:06 AM Staff writer for International Business Times “Space Lasers To Remove Space Debris? Japanese Researchers Present Ambitious Plan” http://www.ibtimes.com/space-lasers-remove-space-debris-japanese-researchers-present-ambitious-plan-1887510

Removal of space debris -- a collection of defunct parts of old satellites, rockets and spacecraft -- has been a major headache for space agencies. According to current estimates, there are up to 500,000 pieces of debris the size of a marble, or larger, orbiting Earth. This orbital junk can travel at speeds of up to 17,500 miles per hour -- fast enough to cause serious damage to satellites and even the International Space Station (ISS). Now, a team of scientists from Japan’s Riken research institute have come up with an ambitious plan to eliminate the debris. In a paper published in the latest issue of the journal Acta Astronautica, the researchers proposed a method that basically involves blasting an estimated 3,000 tons of debris through a fiber optic laser mounted on the ISS. This, the researchers claimed, would be a two-step process. Firstly, the researchers plan to use the existing infrared telescope of the European Space Agency’s Extreme Universe Space Observatory (EUSO) -- originally built to detect high-energy cosmic rays bombarding Earth -- to track the space junk. The second part of their proposed plan involves using a fiber-based laser system to shoot the objects until they are knocked out of their orbit and destroyed during re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere. According to current estimates, there are up to 500,000 pieces of debris the size of a marble, or larger, orbiting Earth. “The new method combining these two instruments will be capable of tracking down and deorbiting the most dangerous space debris, around the size of one centimeter. The intense laser beam focused on the debris will produce high-velocity plasma ablation, and the reaction force will reduce its orbital velocity, leading to its reentry into the earth's atmosphere,” the researchers said in a statement on Friday.

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