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No Space War

Space war/attacks won’t happen in the Squo – mutually assured destruction is the deterring factor

Gunasekara 12 (Surya Gablin Gunasekara; Juris Doctor cum laude from the University of Mississippi School of Law with a certificate in Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law., 1/6/12, “Mutually Assured Destruction: Space Weapons, Orbital Debris and the Deterrence Theory for Environmental Sustainability”, Air & Space Law, Vol. 37, p. 2, accessed 6/27/16, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980710)

While the current international legal regime provides some measures discouraging the propagation of orbital debris from space weapons, the fundamental principles of deterrence theory provide the final piece for environmental sustainability in space. Space deterrence can be best described by the old maxim: “We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly attack.”182 To launch an effective counterattack requires military capability. Over the last three years the United States and China have both demonstrated that they have the space weapon capabilities to launch a successful counterattack, eerily similar to nuclear weapon tests of the Cold War.183 “Credibility is important both to enhance deterrence and to provide options should space deterrence fail.”184 Now that the superpowers have established credible counterspace abilities a clear space deterrence theory can evolve. In the context of nuclear weapons, the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction made the use of nuclear weapons in warfare unimaginable.185 While nuclear weapons could completely destroy both actors, space weapons can be even more indiscriminate. The space debris that would be caused from actual space warfare could result in the cascade effect. “Orbital debris would collide with other space objects, which in turn would create new debris that would cause even more collisions” making space totally unusable for all actors.186 Although space debris threatens the entire space environment, the destruction level, especially in terms of human life, is far less than nuclear weapons.187 Therefore, the threshold for their use will be lower than that of nuclear weapons resulting in the deterrent effect be lowered as well.188 Nevertheless, the fact that space weapons have the capacity to destroy a common resource of the entire planet (mutually assured destruction) provides a significant deterrent against their use.

Current practices are a sufficient deterrent against the United States

Wortzel 7 (Larry M. Wortzel, 10/17/2007, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare”, American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/publication/the-chinese-peoples-liberation-army-and-space-warfare/)

One question that begs an answer is whether the PLA is considering the implications of exercising the capabilities it is developing–that is, when researchers consider a form of space warfare, or develop capabilities to be applied in space weapons, are there also PLA officers in the policy or planning spheres thinking through the implications of employing that capability? If not, an incident could quickly escalate and get out of control, leading to an exchange of fire or a deeper crisis. For example, four officers from the PLA’s Second Artillery Command College have published an analysis of how to jam or destroy the space-based ballistic missile advanced warning systems of the United States.[82] In their article, the officers note, “a space-borne missile early warning system will play a pivotal role in future space wars.”[83] They set out the capabilities and parameters of the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) early-warning satellites, including the geosynchronous orbits of the satellite sets, their axis of look, the infrared bands they cover, and their shortcomings. The authors discuss how to destroy the DSP satellites with other satellites, ground-based lasers, or direct ascent weapons.[84] They also discuss how to jam the satellites and their satellite-to-ground transmissions and how to camouflage the infrared radiation emitted by a missile to make it more difficult for the warning satellite to detect an attack.[85] In their conclusion, the authors find that maintaining a strategic ballistic missile capability is a powerful deterrent to prevent the United States from launching a large-scale military attack or intervention aimed at China’s own military operations on its southeast coast (say, to intervene in potential Chinese military operations against Taiwan).[86] Their view is that “destroying and jamming space-borne missile early warning systems not only can paralyze such anti-missile systems, but also will help [the PRC] win the war in space.”[87] The problem in this reasoning is that there is no consideration of a likely American reaction to the disruption of its missile early warning systems. One possible reaction by the United States is that it might well think it is coming under immediate attack and launch its own strike against China’s strategic missile forces. Another reasonable–and perhaps equally escalatory–reaction by U.S. forces might be to strike the source of the Chinese attack, particularly if it came from a ground-based laser or direct ascent launch. Thus, even if such a reaction by the United States would use conventional weapons, the PLA may find it had created a deeper crisis leading to an American strike on Chinese soil. These four PLA authors do not seem to have considered the ramifications of their own research.

Solvency

Cooperation Unlikely/Won’t happen – US

ITAR causes US cooperation both private and public to be excluded

Mastalir 2009 (Anthony J. Mastalir Lieutenant Colonel; “The US Response to China’s ASAT Test An International Security Space Alliance for the Future”, USAF Drew Paper No. 8 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962 Contributors: Air University Allen G. Peck, Lt Gen, Commander Air Force Research Institute John A. Shaud, Gen, PhD, USAF, Retired, Director School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Gerald S. Gorman, Col, PhD, Commandant John B. Sheldon, PhD, Thesis Advisor August 2009 PG: 65-67)

One anonymous philosopher once quipped that “the path to hell is paved with good intentions.” Jurisdiction under ITAR, a change implemented with the best of intentions, has become a living hell for America’s space industry. The bureaucratically intense restrictions, regulations, and licensing requirements that typify the current process have hamstrung the US space industry to the point that foreign entities no longer care to do business with US manufacturers. Nearly every metric used to determine the overall health of the space industry has trended downward since Congress enacted the more restrictive legislation. Prior to the change in export controls in 1999, the United States dominated the commercial satellite-manufacturing field with an average market share of 83 percent. Since that time, market share has declined to 50 percent.14 Likewise, the US share of satellite manufacturing revenues and satellite exports has declined over the past decade, while the US share of the overall foreign space market has fallen over 10 percent.15 Much of the decline can be attributed to the increasing difficulty foreign entities face when dealing with US export laws. Numerous foreign companies and governments are no longer interested in purchasing US products that come with severe legal ramifications. European aerospace executives claim that export customers are demanding with increasing frequency “ITAR free” systems.16 Canadian Telesat has stated, “We will not buy from [the] US due to export controls.”17 Moreover, ITARfree components such as apogee motors, thruster control valves, star trackers, microwave components, and satellite busses have replaced US components on the world market. The US export control laws have, in effect, created an entire new market for ITAR-free components—a market in which US industries are excluded. According to Joseph Rouge, director at the National Security Space Office, export controls have not only failed to prevent the rise of foreign space industries, they actually encouraged foreign industry growth. At the 2008 National Space Forum, he noted, “Two nations have actually declared openly that their space industry is due to ITAR. Well that wasn’t exactly the plan for ITAR. The plan for ITAR was to keep them from having their own space industry, but we essentially did it for them because we gave them an incentive to do it.”18 Defense experts contend that Europe’s decision to enter the space launch industry with the French Ariane booster was primarily in reaction to US efforts to control what the Europeans could launch on US boosters. The Ariane has since become the largest competitor to the US launch industry.19 Daniel Sacotte, the head of the European Space Agency’s Human Spaceflight program, believes export controls have made cooperation with the United States “too complicated to be feasible.” He states that “we are now obliged to develop our autonomy in various areas, which is no bad thing. . . . We may also find partners besides NASA.”20 The Indian prime minister, in an address before members of the Indian Space Research Organization, commented that “it is a matter of particular pride that international technology denial regimes have not impeded your efforts—in fact, they have spurred you to greater heights.”21 One contentious issue regarding the ITAR regime is its slow and unpredictable licensing process. Space systems and information providers generally have to submit a technical assis- tance agreement (TAA) and wait for approval before discussing technical solutions with potential international clients. According to a recent Air Force Research Laboratory analysis of over 200 space companies, the process has become increasingly unpredictable and unnecessarily lengthy over the past five years, jumping from an average of 52 days in 2003 to an incredible 106 days in 2006.22 This becomes especially problematic when one considers the competitive environment wherein a 60-day response requirement for new proposal requests is the norm. Some industry leaders claim the real travesty is the unpredictability of the process. There is very little transparency in the process, making it difficult for companies to establish timelines and meet customer’s expectations. Marion Blakey, president and chief executive officer of the Aerospace Industries Association, notes that “export controls are like death and taxes . . . but I certainly would not underestimate the challenges and impediments that the current [ITAR] regime poses for us. Predictability—knowing what you can promise a customer and how you move forward—affects everything.”23

Cooperation Unlikely/Won’t happen - China

Chinese cooperation unlikely – military control of space programs, and ambition of political advancement make it untimely at best

Cheng 14 (Dean Cheng, bringing detailed knowledge of China's military and space capabilities to bear as The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. “Prospects for US-China Cooperation, 04/09/2014; accessed 06/26/16. http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation)

My name is Dean Cheng. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. My comments today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in outer space. While the United States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at the same time, it is vital that cooperation occur with full understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that such cooperation serve American interests. In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed, and an asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two countries in this vital arena. To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics of China’s space program. First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with the United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA. Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any other foreign actor. These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront serious obstacles, and entail significant risks. A Brief Overview of China’s Space Program The PRC is a major space power, by which we mean that the PRC has the range of space-related capabilities to be able to access and exploit space for its own purposes, at times and places of its own choosing. Indeed, the PRC has a range of space capabilities that arguably equal or exceed those of Europe, and places it ahead of every other Asian country. China possesses three space launch facilities (Jiuquan, Taiyuan, and Xichang), and is building a fourth on Hainan Island, in the southernmost province of China. From their current launch facilities, they can place satellites into low, middle, and geosynchronous orbit, relying entirely on the Chinese-manufactured Long March family of launch vehicles. It is expected that China will be launching the new Long March 5 heavy lift vehicle from the new Hainan facility. Satellites. China fields a significant array of satellites. •It has a communications satellite array that includes both domestically produced and foreign satellites, including at least two military communications satellite constellations: the Shentong and Fenghuo systems. •It is only the third country to field a satellite navigation and positioning system, the Beidou/Compass system. The Beidou system was first orbited in 2000, with several satellites in geostationary orbit. This was an active system which required the user to transmit a signal to help determine the user’s location. This active signal also provided a communications channel, which could handle messages of up to 140 characters. The Compass portion (sometimes referred to as Beidou-2) is comprised of 35 mid-earth orbit satellites. The Compass portion is currently being deployed and is in regional service. •It has a weather satellite constellation that includes both sun-synchronous and geosynchronous meteorological satellites (the Fengyun series). There has been discussion in the United States of relying on China for weather satellite data, due to repeated delays in replacing American meteorological satellites. The Chinese 2007 ASAT test involved a defunct FY-1C weather satellite in low earth orbit. •It fields a number of earth observation and reconnaissance satellites. The Ziyuan series was the first Chinese observation satellite to be able to beam their data to earth. It is the product of a joint development effort between the PRC and Brazil (in the form of the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite, or CBERS). •China has also fielded a large array of small satellites, including the “Practice,” “Experiment,” “Gaofen,” and “Innovation” series. These have carried a variety of payloads, including synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electro-optical imaging equipment, and monitoring equipment believed to support military intelligence requirements. A Chinese small satellite, believed to be from the “Experiment” series, was recently launched with a robotic arm. Previously in 2010, two “Practice” satellites deliberately “bumped” each other in orbit. Manned Space Program. China has an active manned mission program that involves the Shenzhou manned spacecraft, which has now had ten successful flights (five manned, five unmanned), and the Tiangong space lab. With the completion of the 2013 Shenzhou-X mission, China has also successfully demonstrated docking capabilities between the Shenzhou and Tiangong spacecraft, as well as relatively extended duration missions. (Shenzhou-X lasted 15 days.) To support the manned program, China established its first overseas bases with mission support facilities in Swakopmund, Namibia, and Kiribati in the South Pacific. Chinese documents have indicated that a space station, perhaps in the 60–80 ton range (smaller than the U.S. Skylab) is expected to be deployed by 2020. Lunar Exploration Program. The Chinese lunar exploration program has launched two lunar orbiters (Chang’e-1 and -2), as well as a lunar rover (the Jade Rabbit on Chang’e-3) since 2007. The lunar rover has exhibited erratic performance, but is still considered fairly successful. The final part of the Chang’e program is expected to be a lunar sample retrieval mission in the 2017–2018 time frame. At this point in time, there is no official indication of plans for a manned mission to the moon. In the 2011 Chinese white paper on space, it was indicated that initial studies were now underway to explore the requirements for such a mission. Supporting these various space efforts is a major space industrial complex mainly comprising two state-owned enterprises (SOEs): the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). Each of these SOEs is believed to employ over 100,000 people and is dedicated to producing aerospace and missile-related systems. Thus, unlike their American counterparts (e.g., Boeing and Lockheed-Martin), these companies do not manufacture aircraft or helicopters. On the other hand, not only do they produce rockets and satellites, but also ground test equipment and specialized vehicles associated with space launch, etc. In this regard, they somewhat resemble large, vertically integrated corporations. The two SOEs are also responsible for manufacturing missiles for China’s Second Artillery, the equivalent of the Soviet Union’s Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as tactical missile systems for the PLA as a whole. Thus, subordinate research academies within the CASC manufacture not only the Long March space launch vehicle, but also the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which comes in an anti-carrier variant (the DF-21D) and serves as the launch vehicle for the Chinese anti-satellite system (the SC-19).[1] The PLA and China’s Space Program The close links between the Chinese military and space are not restricted to the Chinese military and space industrial complexes. The PLA has consistently played a key role in the Chinese space effort, and China’s space program is closely identified with the military.

Limited opportunities and china’s lack of interest make space collaboration challenging

Cheng April 9^th 2014, Dean; “Dean Cheng brings detailed knowledge of China's military and space capabilities to bear as The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. He specializes in China's military and foreign policy, in particular its relationship with the rest of Asia and with the United States. Cheng has written extensively on China's military doctrine, technological implications of its space program and "dual use" issues associated with the communist nation's industrial and scientific infrastructure. He previously worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute. Before entering the private sector, Cheng studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program.” Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation, Heritage, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation

Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them. It is possible that the Chinese could be induced to be more transparent when it comes to space, although the unwillingness of Beijing to engage in substantive discussions on space during the last several Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) would cast doubt on this. But this would argue for a “go-slow” approach, at best. There is room for greater interaction, especially in the sharing of already collected data, such as geodesy information. As both sides set their sights on the moon, exchanges of data about lunar conditions and the lunar surface and composition all might help create a pattern of interaction that might lower some of the barriers to information exchange. Even there, however, concerns on both sides about information security and electronic espionage, etc., is likely to raise serious doubts about how freely one should incorporate data provided by the other side.

China Says No- Wants Space Mil

The PLA has already started militarization with the PRC’s space programs – US doesn’t want that association

Cheng 14 (Daniel Cheng, head research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs with the Heritage organization; Written April 25, 2014, accessed 06/26/16 http://dailysignal.com/2014/04/25/growing-chinese-military-space-capabilities/)

Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited the headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) earlier this month and issued remarks calling for the PLAAF to strengthen integrated air-space operations. Coupled with reports of a new Chinese anti-satellite weapon test—this time of a system that can apparently reach satellites in geostationary orbit—there is growing concern that China is intent on a new round of military space weapons development. In reality, the situation is both more and less serious than the reports would indicate. In 2004, the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military authority, finally incorporated a PLA air component into the national military strategic guidelines. That is, the PLAAF was granted its own “strategic mission,” finally placing it on a par with the naval and ground forces. That strategic mission—implying that PLAAF senior commanders could be in charge of war-zone-level joint operations like their ground and naval counterparts—is to conduct “integrated air and space operations, prepare for simultaneous offensive and defensive operations.” In essence, Xi was not giving the PLAAF new instructions but emphasizing the PLAAF’s current missions. This should not be reassuring, however. It reflects the long-term focus the Chinese military has given toward establishing “space dominance” (zhi tian quan). Based on close observations of foreign wars, especially those fought by the United States since the early 1990s, the PLA has concluded that the ability to establish “information dominance” (and especially “space dominance”) is essential for fighting and winning future wars. This interest in the ability to secure space is not simply theoretical, as the PLA has conducted space weapons tests in 2007, 2010, and 2013. Within this context, Xi Jinping’s comments appear to be a criticism of the pace of PLAAF development and progress. Given yet another double-digit increase in the PLA’s budget for 2014, this suggests that the pace of PLA space capability improvement will further accelerate this year.

China won’t cooperate- they prefer unilateral expansion of space military power

China Says No- Politics

Chinese space program is politically important to CCP legitimacy- they won’t agree to play by US rules

Dean Cheng 2014 “prospects for US-China space cooperation” Dean Chang previously worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute. http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms.

Turn- Espionage

Cooperation is unlikely at best, and would allow China to access US military secrets- sacrifices our technological advantage

Cheng 09 (Dean Cheng, bringing detailed knowledge of China's military and space capabilities to bear as The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. “Prospects for US-China Cooperation, 10/30/09; accessed 06/26/16. http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation)

With the delivery of the full report from the U.S. Human Space Flight Review Committee (commonly referred to as the Augustine Report), the potential for a substantial, multi-year gap in U.S. manned spaceflight capability has drawn increased attention. In light of this problem, the idea has been raised in some quarters, including in the report, that the United States should expand its cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and leverage Chinese space capabilities. Such cooperation has far more potential cost than benefit. Very Real Problems The idea of relying on Chinese cooperation glosses over very real problems. At a minimum, it is an open question whether the PRC is capable of providing substantial support to the International Space Station (ISS) in the timeframes discussed by the report. It is important to recall that the PRC has had only three manned missions and has never undertaken a manned docking maneuver. Would the U.S. and its partners be comfortable inviting a neophyte Chinese crew to dock with the ISS? Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China, therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages. Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas. What's the Point? So what would be the purpose of cooperation from the Chinese perspective? To sustain the ISS? China is hardly likely to be interested in joining the ISS just in time to turn out the lights. There is also the question of whether the other partners in the international station, such as Russia and Japan, are necessarily interested in including China, especially now that the most expensive work has already been completed. There is also the issue of transparency. While it seems logical that the principal partners for cooperation would be the Chinese and American civil space agencies, the reality is that the China National Space Agency is, in fact, nested within the Chinese military-industrial complex rather than being a stand-alone agency. Indeed, China's space program is overwhelmingly military in nature. And nowhere more so than in the manned space program, the "commanders" or "directors" of which include the head of the General Armaments Department, one of the four general departments responsible for day-to-day management of the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA). The challenges presented by the Chinese space program's strong ties to the PLA are exacerbated by the generally opaque nature of China's space program on issues ranging from who the top decision-makers are to the size of their budget. Any effort at cooperation is likely to be stymied so long as the PRC views transparency as a one-way affair. Reciprocity Lacking According to the discussions between Presidents Bush and Hu Jintao, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin's groundbreaking visit to China in 2006 (the first by a NASA administrator to the PRC) was supposed to be matched by a visit to the U.S. by the head of China's Second Artillery. Yet the PRC has never agreed to that visit, despite Hu's commitment and repeated invitations from the U.S. If reciprocity in terms of basic leadership visits cannot be obtained, it is even more problematic how either side would achieve reciprocity in other areas. There is a general disparity in technology between the U.S. and the PRC. Under such circumstances, reciprocity would likely benefit the Chinese side far more than the U.S. side. And if the U.S. holds back, it only undermines the case for cooperation. Yet well-founded reticence on the part of the U.S. to share information could also jeopardize the missions and safety of the crews. These are the high costs of cooperation with the Chinese on manned space flight. Covering funding shortfalls seems to be the only tangible motivation for the U.S., and even that prospect is not promising. If U.S. decision-makers conclude that a manned-space capacity is important to American interests, they should find a way to properly fund it -- and not rely on the one country in the world likely to emerge as a peer competitor for global influence. By contrast, reaching out to the Chinese from a position of strength and independence in the cause of a broader diplomacy and development of space is appropriate. But even then, such engagement must be strongly conditioned to demand transparency, limit expectations, and involve America's allies and partners. The potential costs of extensive cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese space programs far outweigh the likely benefits. Steps that can safely be taken to build toward future collaboration must be cautious and contingent.

Space cooperation leads to espionage- Chinese military will get access to US technology that accelerates Chinese military modernization

Indeed, it is useful to recall that the U.S. prohibitions currently limiting the ability of the PRC to launch any satellites containing American parts, under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR), were put in place due to the transfer of aerospace-related information to Chinese companies in the 1990s. As the Cox Commission report noted, information that was given to China regarding items such as the fairing on the Long March-2E space launch vehicle led to improvements for Chinese ballistic missile programs. In particular, it led to changes in both rocket design and Chinese operations that improved the reliability of all Chinese rocket launches.[4] Meanwhile, China’s satellite programs are often linked to military, as well as civilian, users. Like the United States, for example, China’s satellite navigation system (Beidou) is linked to the military—specifically, the General Staff Department Satellite Navigation Station.[5] There is even a website celebrating this organization’s achievements.[6] Military officers from key GSD departments apparently were part of the design effort for the Chinese weather satellite system. Military participation in space efforts is hardly unique to the PRC, but should serve as a reminder that any interaction with the Chinese space program will almost certainly mean a PLA role and presence. More to the point, there is no obvious civilian counterpart to the PLA in terms of China’s space efforts. The most regularly mentioned equivalent to NASA is the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA). But the head of CNSA is typically described in Chinese writings and press coverage first as a vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), then as a deputy director of the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), before being mentioned as the head of the CNSA. This suggests that the position of the CNSA is a third-tier bureaucracy, standing below the key super-ministry for advanced technologies, and the managing authority for China’s military industries (SASTIND). By contrast, the PLA is a key part of the Chinese power structure. One of the key positions for the top Chinese leader (Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin) is the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. That role, along with being General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is what vests Xi, Hu, and Jiang with their power—head of the Party and head of the military. In short, bureaucratically the CNSA is dwarfed by the Chinese military (which may explain the CNSA’s absence from the top echelon of Chinese manned space management).

Coop with China in space leads to the leaking of sensitive information

A current controversy in Washington, D.C., surrounds the possible leakage of U.S. missile technology to the People's Republic of China through the commercial use of Chinese satellite launchers. American companies are using Chinese space launch services to launch U.S. satellites with increasing frequency because they are less expensive than their counterparts in the United States. Yet, in at least one instance, U.S. technology that China's military could use to advance its military missile program may have been transferred through the commercial launch process. Acquiring such dual-use technology could allow China to build missiles capable of targeting the United States and its allies. The controversy surrounding this incident strongly suggests that the Clinton Administration's desire to promote commercial space cooperation with China has inappropriately outweighed its desire to resolve strategic security concerns with China. This imbalance in priorities may have caused Clinton Administration officials to minimize the likelihood that U.S. missile technology and know-how was transferred through commercial space cooperation. The Clinton Administration tried to entice China to join a missile technology control convention by offering this increased civilian commercial space cooperation, but so far this effort has failed. Yet China's role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia, which helped to accelerate the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, may mean that even China now will begin to feel the need to improve its missile forces. This possibility increases the security threat to the United States and its allies significantly. Clearly, when President Bill Clinton meets President Jiang Zemin in China in the next few days, national security must receive greater emphasis than commercial space cooperation.

China has gotten US military info in the past – Long March rocket proves

Fisher 98 (Richard D. Fisher, 6/26/98, The Heritage Foundation, “Commercial Space Cooperation Should Not Harm National Security”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1998/06/commercial-space-cooperation)

The prospect of increased space launch and satellite commerce with China and the controversy over satellite export control may have caused the Clinton Administration to ignore simmering concerns over security. More satellite launches from China, however, will increase the number of opportunities that important technology could be transferred to China's missile program. The overwhelming vote in the House of Representatives to halt commercial satellite cooperation reflects bipartisan frustration with the Administration over key security issues, such as: (1) the possible leakage of U.S. missile technology or know-how to China; (2) perceived lax policies toward export controls of products to China; (3) possible influence over satellite export decisions by campaign donors; and (4) allegations that Chinese aerospace executives--perhaps in collusion with China's highest leaders--sought to purchase political influence.13 In the near future, Congress will investigate these deeply intertwined issues. Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) will direct a select committee in the House; in the Senate, investigations will take place in the Intelligence Committee chaired by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) and in the Government Affairs Committee under Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN). The Senate Foreign Relations and House National Security and International Relations Committees will hold hearings as well.The most important security issue for Congress to consider is whether U.S. missile technology or know-how has been transferred to China's military program through commercial space cooperation. Evidence that this may have occurred, for example, is an exchange of information between a committee led by Space Systems/Loral and Hughes Electronics officials and the Chinese involved with the launch of a commercial satellite in 1996. The committee issued a report assessing the Chinese analysis of the failure of its Long March rocket in February 1996, which discussed "[r]ocket guidance and control systems."14 Loral officials immediately admitted this information had gone to the Chinese. The Department of State later charged that this transfer of information violated U.S. arms control laws. In May 1997, the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) of the Department of Defense is reported to have approved an Air Force intelligence finding that the Loral crash review indeed had passed technology that could have helped China to improve its guidance systems for its ballistic missiles.15 The conclusion of the DTSA report, that "United States national security has been harmed,"16 provoked an ongoing investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice. Space Systems/Loral officials have said that "No `secret' or `classified' information was ever discussed with the Chinese or included in any reports provided to the Chinese."17 And U.S. defense officials explained that, when a U.S. satellite goes to China for launch, every aspect of its delivery and launch is monitored by officials at the Department of Defense and other agencies to ensure that Chinese technicians do not tamper with it.18 There is not sufficient public information available to judge, however, whether the United States has been successful in this endeavor.

Military tech still gets transferred even if it was a commercial launch

Fisher 98 (Richard D. Fisher, 6/26/98, The Heritage Foundation, “Commercial Space Cooperation Should Not Harm National Security”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1998/06/commercial-space-cooperation)

Although National Security Adviser Berger has written that "The satellites exported to China for launch are not used for military purposes, nor do they result in the transfer of missile technology,"23 the recent DTSA report indicates that some U.S. know-how more than likely was transferred during the commercial space launches. This know-how could help China to improve its existing strategic missile force. Conventional defense policy accepts that, for nearly two decades, China probably has had a small nuclear missile force designed for retaliation or deterrence.24 A recently leaked U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report notes that China already has 18 8,000-mile-range DF-5 ICBMs that can reach the United States today, and about 25 2,850-mile-range DF-4 medium-range ballistic missiles.25 Some Chinese military analysts note that even some transference of U.S. know-how from commercial endeavors may not increase the gravity of the threat already facing the United States from these existing missiles.26

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